基于风险分担的垃圾焚烧BOT项目特许期政府决策
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摘要
随着生活垃圾生产量的增加以及受到土地资源的制约,生活垃圾焚烧处理的比例会大幅度增加,这就需要大量的资金建设焚烧处理厂,受到财力限制,政府是难以解决的,引进社会资本参与垃圾处理行业是一种有效解决政府资金困难的途径。BOT是一种很好吸引社会资本参与公共基础设施建设的融资模式。目前,BOT模式在我国垃圾处理行业中得到了较快发展,很多垃圾焚烧处理项目采用了这种模式。
由于对垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目在建设、运营中可能面临的风险研究不够充分,政府与项目公司签订的特许权协议不合理,导致我国有一些正在建设、运营的项目存在许多问题。本文站在政府(特许权人)的角度,从垃圾焚烧BOT项目的基本功能、社会属性出发,对其风险分担问题及在风险分担条件下特许期决策进行了系统研究。
首先,本文运用案例分析法和现场调查法,分析研究了13个典型的案例,识别出垃圾焚烧BOT项目在建设和运营中存在政府决策风险、技术风险、民意风险、垃圾供应风险、费用支付风险、建设运营管理风险等18种风险。进一步利用问卷调查法研究得到了技术风险、垃圾供应风险、费用支付风险、垃圾处理与排放风险、民意风险等12项风险为垃圾焚烧BOT项目关键风险。研究认为产生这些风险的主要原因是目前我国的生活垃圾没有进行有效的分类,许多焚烧设备不完全符合我国垃圾的特质,焚烧中会产生二次污染；其次,政府为了吸纳社会资本参与到垃圾处理可能存在着招标门槛低、控制不严的情况,导致部分信誉不好、技术实力不强、管理水平不高的项目公司进入到垃圾焚烧处理行业中来,第三,在建设运营中,政府主管存在着监管不力的现象,甚至部分工作人员存在寻租的情况。
其次,针对垃圾焚烧BOT项目的关键风险,在政府与项目公司之间如何进行分担进行了系统研究。论文按照风险分担的“四大原则”,结合风险分担的“三个阶段”,设计出了政府与项目公司之间风险分担的流程图；采用问卷调查法及分析理论文献方法,研究了政府应全部承担和与项目公司共同承担的风险范围,并提出政府对分担的风险应采取的管理对策；运用合作博弈论建立政府与项目公司共同分担风险的比例确定模型,对政府与项目公司共同分担的风险进行定量分析。
第三,揭示了政府分担的风险对特许期决策影响的路径,即通过影响特许期决策的因素最终影响特许期决策；在此基础上,分析了政府分担的主要风险对特许期决策因素的影响,并提出了政府在进行特许期决策时应如何考虑这些风险因素的建议。
第四,先运用博弈理论建立了政府与项目公司的特许期决策动态博弈模型,为政府决策垃圾焚烧BOT项目的基准特许期提供了理论依据和方法；然后,在投标人按照给定的基准特许期确定了特许报价的基础上,运用净现值法模型对特许期进行二次决策。研究中结合政府分担的风险,对净现值法模型中的参数确定进行了分析,给出了运用净现值法确定特许期的步骤,并结合案例进行了分析。
最后,结合中山市南部组团垃圾综合处理基地垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目,分析了政府分担风险及应采取的措施,并用论文研究给出的政府特许期决策的过程和方法对该项目的特许期进行了论证分析。
There is a substantial increase in the proportion of waste incineration with the increase in the amount of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) production and the constraints of the land resources. It subjects to financial constraints because it is difficult for the government to collect a lot of money to build incineration plants. The introduction of social capital to participate in the waste disposal industry is an effective way to solve the financial difficulties. BOT is a good financing mode to attract social capital to participate in the construction of public infrastructure. Now the BOT mode quickly developed in the MSW disposal industry in China. A lot of waste incineration project chose this model.
Because of the risk analysis of waste incineration power generation BOT projects is inadequate and the concession agreement signed by the Government and the project company is unreasonable. Some of the projects in China, which are under construction or operation, have many problems. In the Government's point of view,this paper studied how to allocate the key risks and how to decide the concession period of waste incineration BOT project from its basic function and social property.
First, case analysis and investigation were used in this study.13 typical cases were analyzed,18 kinds of risks of waste incineration BOT projects in the construction and operation were identified,such as decision, popular will, technology,MSW supply,pay off,construction and operation.and finance risk, etc; 12 key risks were concluded through a questionnaire,such as technology,MSW supply,pay off,popular will and MSW disposal risk etc. The main cause of these risks is that the MSW is not effectively classified and the equipment does not meet the requirement and waste incineration will produce secondary pollution. Second, in order to attract social capital to participate in the MSW disposal, the government may lower the tender threshold, this can give rise to introducing of some companies with bad reputation, low technical level and management level into the waste incineration industry. Third, during the construction and operation phases, the government's improper regulation and the officer's activities of rent-seeking are also the main reason for these risks.
Secondly, it is systematically analyzed that how to allocate the key risks between the government and the project company. A flow chart of risk allocation between the government and the project company is designed in accordance with "four principles" and "three stages" of risk allocation. The risk range that the government should bear or allocate with the company is studied through a questionnaire and an analysis of theoretical literature. The Management Countermeasures on the risks allocated by the government was also proposed. The model which is used to identify the proportion of risk allocation between government and the project company is established according to the cooperative game theory.
Third, The impact path of risks allocated by government on the decision-making process in the concession period is revealed that is in a way that ultimately influenced by the factors affecting the decision-making of the concession period. On this basis, the impact of the key risks allocated by the Government on the factors of decision-making of the concession period is analyzed and some suggestions are proposed to help the government to face with these risk factors during the concession period decisions.
Fourth, the dynamic game model for the decision-making process in the concession period between government and company is established according to the game theory, which provides a theoretical basis and methods for government's decision-making on waste incineration BOT projects. Then, on the basis of concession bidding provided by the bidder according to the concession reference, the second decision for the concession period is made with the model of the NPV approach. This study, combining with the government's risk allocation, determines the model parameters of the NPV approach, provides the steps of how to determine the concession period using this method and gives a case study of the risks allocated by the government.
Finally, the risks allocated and measures adopted by the government are analyzed through a waste incineration power generation BOT project in the MSW disposal depot in southern cluster of Zhongshan. The decision-making process and methods of the concession period proposed in this study are demonstrated in this project.
由于对垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目在建设、运营中可能面临的风险研究不够充分,政府与项目公司签订的特许权协议不合理,导致我国有一些正在建设、运营的项目存在许多问题。本文站在政府(特许权人)的角度,从垃圾焚烧BOT项目的基本功能、社会属性出发,对其风险分担问题及在风险分担条件下特许期决策进行了系统研究。
首先,本文运用案例分析法和现场调查法,分析研究了13个典型的案例,识别出垃圾焚烧BOT项目在建设和运营中存在政府决策风险、技术风险、民意风险、垃圾供应风险、费用支付风险、建设运营管理风险等18种风险。进一步利用问卷调查法研究得到了技术风险、垃圾供应风险、费用支付风险、垃圾处理与排放风险、民意风险等12项风险为垃圾焚烧BOT项目关键风险。研究认为产生这些风险的主要原因是目前我国的生活垃圾没有进行有效的分类,许多焚烧设备不完全符合我国垃圾的特质,焚烧中会产生二次污染；其次,政府为了吸纳社会资本参与到垃圾处理可能存在着招标门槛低、控制不严的情况,导致部分信誉不好、技术实力不强、管理水平不高的项目公司进入到垃圾焚烧处理行业中来,第三,在建设运营中,政府主管存在着监管不力的现象,甚至部分工作人员存在寻租的情况。
其次,针对垃圾焚烧BOT项目的关键风险,在政府与项目公司之间如何进行分担进行了系统研究。论文按照风险分担的“四大原则”,结合风险分担的“三个阶段”,设计出了政府与项目公司之间风险分担的流程图；采用问卷调查法及分析理论文献方法,研究了政府应全部承担和与项目公司共同承担的风险范围,并提出政府对分担的风险应采取的管理对策；运用合作博弈论建立政府与项目公司共同分担风险的比例确定模型,对政府与项目公司共同分担的风险进行定量分析。
第三,揭示了政府分担的风险对特许期决策影响的路径,即通过影响特许期决策的因素最终影响特许期决策；在此基础上,分析了政府分担的主要风险对特许期决策因素的影响,并提出了政府在进行特许期决策时应如何考虑这些风险因素的建议。
第四,先运用博弈理论建立了政府与项目公司的特许期决策动态博弈模型,为政府决策垃圾焚烧BOT项目的基准特许期提供了理论依据和方法；然后,在投标人按照给定的基准特许期确定了特许报价的基础上,运用净现值法模型对特许期进行二次决策。研究中结合政府分担的风险,对净现值法模型中的参数确定进行了分析,给出了运用净现值法确定特许期的步骤,并结合案例进行了分析。
最后,结合中山市南部组团垃圾综合处理基地垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目,分析了政府分担风险及应采取的措施,并用论文研究给出的政府特许期决策的过程和方法对该项目的特许期进行了论证分析。
There is a substantial increase in the proportion of waste incineration with the increase in the amount of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) production and the constraints of the land resources. It subjects to financial constraints because it is difficult for the government to collect a lot of money to build incineration plants. The introduction of social capital to participate in the waste disposal industry is an effective way to solve the financial difficulties. BOT is a good financing mode to attract social capital to participate in the construction of public infrastructure. Now the BOT mode quickly developed in the MSW disposal industry in China. A lot of waste incineration project chose this model.
Because of the risk analysis of waste incineration power generation BOT projects is inadequate and the concession agreement signed by the Government and the project company is unreasonable. Some of the projects in China, which are under construction or operation, have many problems. In the Government's point of view,this paper studied how to allocate the key risks and how to decide the concession period of waste incineration BOT project from its basic function and social property.
First, case analysis and investigation were used in this study.13 typical cases were analyzed,18 kinds of risks of waste incineration BOT projects in the construction and operation were identified,such as decision, popular will, technology,MSW supply,pay off,construction and operation.and finance risk, etc; 12 key risks were concluded through a questionnaire,such as technology,MSW supply,pay off,popular will and MSW disposal risk etc. The main cause of these risks is that the MSW is not effectively classified and the equipment does not meet the requirement and waste incineration will produce secondary pollution. Second, in order to attract social capital to participate in the MSW disposal, the government may lower the tender threshold, this can give rise to introducing of some companies with bad reputation, low technical level and management level into the waste incineration industry. Third, during the construction and operation phases, the government's improper regulation and the officer's activities of rent-seeking are also the main reason for these risks.
Secondly, it is systematically analyzed that how to allocate the key risks between the government and the project company. A flow chart of risk allocation between the government and the project company is designed in accordance with "four principles" and "three stages" of risk allocation. The risk range that the government should bear or allocate with the company is studied through a questionnaire and an analysis of theoretical literature. The Management Countermeasures on the risks allocated by the government was also proposed. The model which is used to identify the proportion of risk allocation between government and the project company is established according to the cooperative game theory.
Third, The impact path of risks allocated by government on the decision-making process in the concession period is revealed that is in a way that ultimately influenced by the factors affecting the decision-making of the concession period. On this basis, the impact of the key risks allocated by the Government on the factors of decision-making of the concession period is analyzed and some suggestions are proposed to help the government to face with these risk factors during the concession period decisions.
Fourth, the dynamic game model for the decision-making process in the concession period between government and company is established according to the game theory, which provides a theoretical basis and methods for government's decision-making on waste incineration BOT projects. Then, on the basis of concession bidding provided by the bidder according to the concession reference, the second decision for the concession period is made with the model of the NPV approach. This study, combining with the government's risk allocation, determines the model parameters of the NPV approach, provides the steps of how to determine the concession period using this method and gives a case study of the risks allocated by the government.
Finally, the risks allocated and measures adopted by the government are analyzed through a waste incineration power generation BOT project in the MSW disposal depot in southern cluster of Zhongshan. The decision-making process and methods of the concession period proposed in this study are demonstrated in this project.
引文
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