户籍制度改革中农户土地退出行为研究：重庆的实证
|
摘要
当前,中国正站在发展的十字路口,有人看好,有人唱衰。不可否认的是,潜力巨大,挑战也巨大。从“刘易斯拐点”到“中等收入陷阱”,许多险滩需要突破。在这样的情况下,尤其需要寻找自身蕴藏的巨大潜力。党的“十八大”报告指出“要加快改革户籍制度,有序推进农业转移人口市民化”,由此可见,推进户籍改革,或可成为延续发展红利的一个突破口。加快户籍制度改革,有利于实现农民工由常住人口向户籍人口转变,减少对农民工的制度性歧视,实现“同工同酬”,并维护其合法权益。有利于转移农村剩余劳动力,实现人口向城镇集聚,提高户籍人口城镇化率,实现户籍人口城镇化率与空间城镇化率的同步发展。有利于实现农民工消费观念由乡村向城镇的转变,调动其消费积极性,扩大内需,转变经济增长方式。有利于实现人口、土地、资本等要素城乡间的自由流动,盘活城乡资源。有利于减少农村剩余劳动力,提高农业生产集约化水平,推动农业产业化发展,促进农民收入增长。因为有相对宽松的政策环境,我国一些地区也开展了户籍制度改革的实践,如上海市出台的“外来人员领取《居住证》”政策；广东省开展的“积分入户”工作；山东省、湖南省等取消农业户口与非农业户口之分,建立城乡“一元化”的户籍管理制度；深圳市建设的“中国首个无农村、无农民的城市”；重庆市以农村土地退出为载体,探索户籍制度改革与土地制度改革联动等。由于户籍制度与土地制度有着天然的耦合,在有序推进农业转移人口市民化过程中必然要考虑其农村土地处置问题,这就要求户籍制度改革与土地制度改革联动,因而重庆的户籍制度改革也更受各界关注,也更具有推广意义。基于此,本文以党的“十八大”报告提出的“要加快改革户籍制度,有序推进农业转移人口市民化,努力实现城镇基本公共服务常住人口全覆盖。”为宏观背景,以重庆市户籍制度改革中农村土地退出为实例,从综述相关文献入手,找出相关研究的不足,构建农户土地退出行为的一般分析框架,应用重庆市实地调查数据,采用多种计量经济分析模型,重点探讨了农户兼业行为及其土地退出行为关系,农户土地退出意愿及其影响因素,农户土地退出风险认知及其规避行为,农户参与退地利益集团博弈行为四个方面问题,最后基于农户视角就如何改进现有的农村土地制度安排提出了针对性的建议,主要研究结论如下：
(1)从分析框架来看：首先,在假定农户为理性经济人的前提下,户籍制度改革中农户退出土地并立足城镇的基础是其有稳定的非农收入来源及稳定的住所,离开了这两个条件的农户转户退地行为是灾难性的。其次,在态度改变理论中,“P-O-X模型”分析表明,不平衡状态会导致农户土地退出认知结构中的各种变化,所以农户土地退出态度可以凭借这种不平衡的关系而形成和改变。再次,在公共物品理论中,政府对退地农户的公共物品的供给,单位边际成本刚好等于所有农户退出土地时所获得的土地退出边际收益,构成了本文的研究前提。最后,在农户参与退地收益博弈中,政府具有“先动优势”、农户具有“后动优势”,但农户收益受到政府“先动优势”和村干部的“道德风险”的影响,而被消弱。
(2)从农业兼业行为及其土地退出行为看：首先,农户兼业行为是农业生产的季节性特点,农业比较效益低下及经济社会发展共同作用的结果,在我国大量农户从劳动报酬较低的农业向劳动报酬较高的非农产业转移,同时也表明在劳动报酬提高的同时,我国农户也更倾向于提供更多的劳动。其次,在探讨各要素对农民收入增长影响中,农村投资水平、农地综合效率、农地纯技术效率、农地规模效率与农民收入增长间存在长期稳定的正向均衡关系,且农地综合效率对农民收入增长的贡献度远高于农村投资水平：长期来看,加大农村投资力度,提高农地综合效率、技术效率及规模效率虽有利于促进农民增收,但关键是要提高农地规模效率。短期内,农村投资水平对农民人均纯收入变动的调整为正向,农地纯技术效率对农民人均纯收入变动调整先负后正,农地规模效率对农民纯收入变动的调整先正后负；因而短期内,加大农村投资力度也有利于促进农民收入增长,而提高农地纯技术效率则使农民收入先降低后增长,在规模报酬递减范围内的农地规模效率的提高,同样有利于农民收入增长。再次,在分析农户兼业行为及其土地流转方式响应时,总体认为由于目前农业生产相对非农务工效益较低,故农户家庭中收入总体由农户家庭非农收入决定,即一般当农户转变为非农户时,农户家庭总收入最大,此时多数非农户选择转让方式退出承包地经营活动；且农户对土地流转方式的选择是包含主体—决策—行为—绩效的系列过程,在不同类型农户所追求不同流转目的与效益的驱动下,农户形成土地流转需求；户主年龄是影响各类兼业农户土地流转方式选择的关键因素,而户主性别、农户家庭收入则没有对各类兼业农户的土地流转方式选择产生显著影响：对纯农户与Ⅰ兼农户土地流转选择产生共同显著影响的因素包括户主年龄、户主文化素质、农户土地资源禀赋、农户农业技术培训、农户低保覆盖；对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户的土地流转方式选择产生显著影响的因素包括户主年龄、户主非农就业地点。最后,在分析影响兼业农户土地退出决策因素中,认为基于生产经营目标差异,从纯农户到非农户,其土地退出决策依次受生存安全—土地收益最大化—经济收益最大化—综合收益最大化原则的影响,由此导致影响各类农户土地退出决策的因素存在较大差异；对纯农户与Ⅰ兼农户退地决策产生显著负向影响的因素包括家庭劳动力数量、家庭主要成员参加新农保、宅基地面积、承包地质量,对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户退地决策产生显著负向影响的因素包括户主文化程度、农房价值、村公共设施状况、村距离城镇的距离,而家庭年均收入、家庭年均非农收入对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户退地决策产生显著正向影响。
(3)从农户土地退出意愿及其影响因素看：首先,农户土地退出意愿受到来自城镇与农村的多种因素影响,且农户退地意愿是由多种因素组合所产生的效益决定的。无论是承包地还是宅基地退出,当农户退地后的效益高于退地前时,农户愿意退出土地；当农户退地前后效益相等时,农户不一定退地且存在观望情绪；当退地后效益小于退地前时,则农户不愿意退地。其次,农户退出土地愿意偏低,相比承包地,农户更愿意退出宅基地。再次,户主年龄、家庭主要成员是否已定居城镇、家庭是否有稳定非农收入来源、土地是否有撂荒或闲置、退地补偿或补助发放是否按时足额、退地后生活质量预期,对农户承包地、宅基地退出意愿有显著的正向影响。户主是否在外非农务工、土地是否位于城镇规划范围、退地政策是否多变、退地后是否担心就业问题,对农户承包地、宅基地退出意愿有显著的反向影响。还有,家庭主要成员是否参加新农保、退地后医疗与养老保险预期仅对农户承包地退出意愿有显著的正向影响。最后,土地面积、土地是否有流转仅对农户宅基地退出意愿有显著的反向影响,同时退地后住房预期也仅对农户宅基地退出意愿有显著的止向影响。
(4)从农户土地退出风险认知及其规避行为来看：首先,农户土地退出风险与规避行为受多种因素的影响,农户土地退出风险程度由土地退出边际效用与边际成本共同决定。因而农户只有深入了解土地退出风险,并客观评估自身风险规避能力,才能做出实现最大十地退出效用的决策。其次,农户承包地退出较宅基地退出存在更多风险与更弱的风险规避能力：同一因素可能对农户宅基地、承包地退出风险认知及规避能力产生不同的影响,影响农户宅基地退出风险认知及规避能力的因素少于影响农户承包地退出风险认知及规避能力的因素。再次,从宅基地退出风险认知及规避能力来看：户主年龄、家庭主要成员是否定居城镇、退地后生活质量预期、退地政策的信任程度对农户宅基地退出风险认知有负向影响,而退地后失去稳定住所、退地后无法获得足额补偿对其则有止向影响。户主年龄、家庭有无稳定城镇住所、本村是否在进行农民新村建设、退地后能否按时获得足额补偿款与补助金、退地后能否享受高水平城镇社保对农户宅基地退出风险规避能力有止向影响,而家庭有无养殖经营对此则有负向影响。最后,从承包地退出风险认知及规避能力来看：户主年龄、家庭有无稳定非农收入、家庭主要成员是否参加新农保、退地后生活质量预期、退地政策的信任程度对农户承包地退出风险认知有负向影响,而退地后无法稳定就业影响生计、退地后无法获取养老及医疗费用、退地后无法获得足额补偿对其则有止向影响。户主年龄、户主是否购买商业保险、家庭有无稳定非农收入、退地后能否按时获得足额补偿款与补助金、退地后能否及时获得就业培训与援助、退地后能否享受高水平城镇社保对农户承包地退出风险规避能力有正向影响,而家庭有无养殖经营对此则有负向影响。
(5)从农户参与退地利益集团博弈行为来看：在议价博弈中农户具有“耐心优势”、“后动优势”,处于优势地位,这种优势源于中央政府对农户退地意愿的尊重,然而农户的这种优势是相对的,在地方政府的“先动优势”与村干部的“道德风险”面前,处于信息劣势的农户面临优势地位被削弱的危险。最后,本文从农户角度出发,认为应从落实尊重农户退地意愿,赋予农户退地方案拟定权,给予农户自由选择退地谈判代理人等方面改进退地政策,维护农户土地退出利益。
(6)从农户视角的土地退出制度改进来看：首先,基于制度经济学视角分析了现行农村土地退出制度构架及制度经济效率,总体认为尽管现行的政府主导的强制性与诱致性制度变迁相结合的农村土地退出制度安排相比农户维持农村土地现状更具有效率,但在农户退地后的社会保障以及增加农户退地净现值收益方面还存在问题,因而需要对现行的农村土地退出模式进行优化。其次,就转变为城镇居民并退出承包地的农户而言,除了获得转户居民在就业、教育、养老、卫生及住房等城镇社会保障外,因其进城后无生计资本,更要强化与完善其退地补偿机制,以提高其城镇可持续发展能力,并认为优化承包地退出模式,需要建立体现承包地经济、社会功能价值及其期权价值的退出弹性补偿机制；优化宅基地退出模式,需要建立体现宅基地功能价值的实物补偿、货币补偿及建设补偿退出组合补偿机制。最后,认为完善转户退地农户可持续发展的配套措施、建立转户退地农户权益保护的常态机制及完善转户退地农户政策落实与兑现机制是当前地方政府提高退地农户可持续发展能力的重点。
At present, China is standing at the crossroads of development, some show optimistic attitudes towards the future of China, however, others show opposite attitudes about it. There is no denying that the potential and challenge of development of China is huge. There are many difficulties to overcome from the "Lewis turning point" to "middle-income trap". In these special conditions, it is imperative to find their own huge potential. the Report of18th CPC National Congress pointed out that "to accelerate the reform of the household registration system, to promote the farmers to become the citizens, orderly". It shows that promote household registration reform and continuation of the development dividend is maybe a breakthrough. To promote the reform of the household registration system is conducive to realize the transfer of farmer workers from the resident population to the household population, reduce institutional discrimination of migrant workers, realize the target of "equal pay for equal work", to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. Second conducive to the transfer of rural surplus labor force and population to the towns, to improve the level of the population urbanization rate, synchronous development of the household population urbanization rate space urbanization rate. Third conducive to change the concept of consumption of farmer workers from rural to urban transformation and to mobilize their consumer enthusiasm, expanding domestic consumption demand realizing the transformation of economic growth mode. Fourth conducive to realize the free movement between the elements of urban and rural, such as population, land, capital et al. fifth conducive to reduce the surplus labor force in rural areas, improve the intensification level of agricultural production, and promote the development of agricultural industrialization, increase of farmers'income. Currently, some provinces of our country probe to practice the reform of the households registration system, such as Shanghai put forwards the policy of "residence permit" for foreign farmer workers, Guangdong Province carries out become a native citizen with the condition of reaching an degree. Shandong and Hunan Province intend to cancel the difference between urban and rural household registration management system, to erect the urban and rural "unification" of the household registration management system. Shenzhen construct the China's first "no rural and no farmer city". Chongqing probe to reform household registration system and land manage system, synchronously, basing on farmers returning their lands etc.. Because he household registration system and land system has a natural coupling. During the course of the farmer workers become a urban citizen, we must consider the rural land disposal problem, which requires the linkage of the household registration system reform and land reform, this is the reason why the household registration system in Chongqing be occupied by more people. This paper basing on the macro background of idea of the Report of18th CPC National Congress, and the example of Chongqing's practicing farmer returning their rural lands starts from Summary of relevant literature, identifies the lack of research, then to built the framework of analysis and using a variety of econometric analysis mode to analyse the farmers households'behaviors in the course of returning their lands. The behaviors including the relationship between farmer s households'part-time work and returning their lands, the willingness and influencing factors of farmers'households'returning rural lands, the risk awareness and its avoidance ability of farmers'households'returning rural lands, the game behaviors of farmers'households to participate in the interests distribution. Finally, this paper basing the perspective of farmers'households to put forward the suggestions that amend the policies of returning rural lands. the main conclusions are as follows:
(1) From the views of the analytical framework:first of all, the foundation of farmers' households returning rural land in the course of the reform of the household registration system is that they have stable sources of non-farm income and stable residence, if they had returned lands without these two conditions, the results would be disastrous. Secondly, in the theory of attitude change, the results of "P-0-X" model shows that the state of imbalance will lead to various changes in cognitive structure of farmers'households returning their lands, as a results, the attitudes of farmers'households maybe can be formed by virtue of this unbalanced relationship and change. Again, the theory of public goods shows the premise of this research, which is the supply of public goods of government in the unit marginal cost is just equal to all the farmers'households'marginal revenue when they returning rural lands. At last, in the game behaviors of farmers'households to participate in the interests distribution, the local government has the "first mover advantage", farmers'households have the "after-mover advantage", but the farmers'household'interests encounter the loss in the face of the government" first-mover advantage" and the village cadres "moral hazard".
(2) From the views of the behaviors relationship between farmers'households'part-time work and returning their lands:first of all, the behaviors of farmers'households'part-time work is the result of the seasonal characteristics of the agricultural production, the inefficient agricultural compare benefits and the economic and social development, there are many farmers'households transfer from lower labor remuneration agricultural to nonagricultural industries. with the improvement of labor remuneration, farmers'households are apt to provide more labor. Secondly, during the discussion of the response of farmer'income to rural investment and agricultural land use efficiency, the influence factors including CRSTE, VRSTE,SCALE of agricultural land, the rural investment level have a long stable and positive impact on farmer'income. the contribution to the growth of farmers'income of agricultural land use efficiency'CRSTE is much higher than the rural investment. Consequently, on a long term, although improving the level of rural investment and CRSTE, VRSTE, SCALE have a positive impact on the growth of farmer'income, the growth of farmers'income is much depending on the agricultural land SCALE. In a short term, increasing the level of rural investment will help improve farmer'income, and improving the VRSTE can make farmer'income reduce after the first growth. In the range of decreasing SCALE'returns, the improving of SCALE can also increase farmer'income. Thirdly, during the discussion of the response farmers'households'behaviors of part-time farming to its tilth circulation mode, the common effect factors of the real and type I households choosing their tilth circulation mode including:age of head of households, educational level of head of households, gift of tilths resources, agricultural technology training of households, minimum living guarantee of households; the common effect factors of the type Ⅱ and non-farm households choosing their tilth circulation mode including:age of head of households, the site of non-farm employment; the behavior of characteristic that affecting the real and type I households to choose their tilth circulation mode is apparent more than that of type II and non-farm households'. Finally, in the analysis of impact factors of part-time farmers'household returning their lands, this paper consider that the labor in farmers'households, the main number of farmers'households have a new rural social security, homestead area, contracted land quantities are the common effect factors that have a significant negative impact on the real and type I farmers'households returning rural lands. Impact factors of the head of household education level, the value of rural housing, village public facilities condition, the village from the town's distance are the common effect factors that have a significant negative impact on the non and type II farmers'households returning rural lands. While, impact factors of the average annual family income, the average non-agricultural income are the common effect factors that have a significant positive impact on the non and type II farmers'households returning rural lands.
(3) From the views of an analysis of the willingness and its influencing factors of farmers' households'returning their lands:first of all, farmers'households have a lower willing to return their lands, compared contracted land, farmers'households are apt to return their homestead. Secondly,the head of farmers'households'age, whether, the mainly family members are settled in urban, non-farm families have stable source of income, whether, lands leave unused, whether, housing subsidies are full and on time, life quality expectations have a significant positive effect on farmers' household returning contracted land and homestead. On the other hand, whether,the owner is out the long-term non-agricultural workers, whether, lands lie in the scope of urban planning, land policy is changing, being worried about employment have a significant negative effect on farmers'households returning contracted land and homestead. But whether the principal members of the family to enjoy a new farmers'insurance, the expectations of medical and pension insurance only have a significant negative effect on farmers'households returning contracted land. however, land area, land circulation, the expectations of inhabitation have a have a significant effect on farmers'household returning their homestead.
(4) From the views of an analysis of the risk awareness and aversion and its Influencing factors of farmers'households'returning Lands:first of all, the same factors are likely to have different impacts on the risk awareness and aversion of the household returning homestead and contracted land, meanwhile, the risk awareness and aversion of impact factors of the farmers' household returning homestead is more than that of contracted land. Aspects of the risk awareness and aversion of homestead. the head of the farmers'household'age, whether the mainly family members are settled in urban, the expectations of living level after returning lands, the extents of trusting policy have a significant negative effect on risk awareness of farmers'returning homesteads. however, losing stable residence, unable to acquire enough subsidies after returning lands have a significant positive effect on that. the head of the farmers'household'age, whether family have stable residence, whether processing the construction of the new village, whether acquiring enough subsidies on time, whether enjoying a higher level of urban social security after returning homestead have a significant positive effect on the ability of risk aversion of farmers'returning homestead. However, whether family have a breeding operation have a significant negative effect on that. Aspects of the risk awareness and aversion of contracted land. the head of the farmers'household' age, whether family have a stable income, the family member participate in new rural social security, expectations of quality of life, the extents of trusting policy have a significant negative effect on risk awareness of household returning contracted land. however, unable to acquire a stable career impacting livelihood, unable to unable to get the refund to the pension and health care costs, unable to get full compensation have a significant positive effect on that. the head of the farmers' household'age, whether the head of the household buy a commercial security, whether family have stable non-farm income, whether getting enough subsidies on time, whether getting a timely employment training and assistance, whether enjoying a high level of urban social security after returning contracted land have a significant positive effect on the ability of risk aversion of farmers' returning contracted land. whether family have a breeding operation have a significant negative effect on that.
(5) From the views of the game behaviors of farmer'households to participate in the interests distribution:the farmers households have "patience advantages" and "after the mover advantage", they are in a dominant position, which comes from the respecting the willingness of farmers' households giving up their lands of central government, however, this dominant position is relative, which is being weaken, when farmers'households counter "the first mover advantage" of local government and village cadres "moral hazard". Finally, from the farmers'households'point of view, this paper consider that government should ameliorate their policies of giving up land from respecting the willingness of farmers'households', giving farmers'households the rights of studying out the policies and giving farmers'households the right of choosing the bargaining agent to protect farmers'household's interests.
(6) From the views of basing the perspective of farmers'households to put forward the suggestions that amend the policies of returning rural lands:first of all, this chapter basing on the Institutional Economics analyzes the framework and efficiency of current rural land returning system, the results show that although the current government led mandatory phase and induced institutional change of returning lands are more efficient than that of maintaining the status quo of lands, there exit many questions especially in the aspect of Social Security and increasing the net present value of the income of the farmers'households after returning rural lands. Consequently, we should amend the current system mode of returning rural lands. Secondly, the farmers'households who become urban residents and returning their lands should acquire the urban employment, education, pension, health and housing, meanwhile, government should consummate the compensate mechanism to improve their urban sustainable development capacity because of their losing livelihoods capital after returning lands. This chapter consider that government should establish a flexible compensation mechanism reflects the contracted land economic, the social function of the value and establish the combinations compensation mechanism that embodies the functional value of the homestead including in-kind compensation, monetary compensation, construction compensation. Finally, the chapter consider that local government for the sake of improve the sustainable development capacity of farmers'households returning rural lands should focus on supporting measures to improve the farmers'households'sustainable development, Establishing farmers'households'Protection normal mechanism and improving the capacity of implement the policy for returning rural lands of government.
(1)从分析框架来看：首先,在假定农户为理性经济人的前提下,户籍制度改革中农户退出土地并立足城镇的基础是其有稳定的非农收入来源及稳定的住所,离开了这两个条件的农户转户退地行为是灾难性的。其次,在态度改变理论中,“P-O-X模型”分析表明,不平衡状态会导致农户土地退出认知结构中的各种变化,所以农户土地退出态度可以凭借这种不平衡的关系而形成和改变。再次,在公共物品理论中,政府对退地农户的公共物品的供给,单位边际成本刚好等于所有农户退出土地时所获得的土地退出边际收益,构成了本文的研究前提。最后,在农户参与退地收益博弈中,政府具有“先动优势”、农户具有“后动优势”,但农户收益受到政府“先动优势”和村干部的“道德风险”的影响,而被消弱。
(2)从农业兼业行为及其土地退出行为看：首先,农户兼业行为是农业生产的季节性特点,农业比较效益低下及经济社会发展共同作用的结果,在我国大量农户从劳动报酬较低的农业向劳动报酬较高的非农产业转移,同时也表明在劳动报酬提高的同时,我国农户也更倾向于提供更多的劳动。其次,在探讨各要素对农民收入增长影响中,农村投资水平、农地综合效率、农地纯技术效率、农地规模效率与农民收入增长间存在长期稳定的正向均衡关系,且农地综合效率对农民收入增长的贡献度远高于农村投资水平：长期来看,加大农村投资力度,提高农地综合效率、技术效率及规模效率虽有利于促进农民增收,但关键是要提高农地规模效率。短期内,农村投资水平对农民人均纯收入变动的调整为正向,农地纯技术效率对农民人均纯收入变动调整先负后正,农地规模效率对农民纯收入变动的调整先正后负；因而短期内,加大农村投资力度也有利于促进农民收入增长,而提高农地纯技术效率则使农民收入先降低后增长,在规模报酬递减范围内的农地规模效率的提高,同样有利于农民收入增长。再次,在分析农户兼业行为及其土地流转方式响应时,总体认为由于目前农业生产相对非农务工效益较低,故农户家庭中收入总体由农户家庭非农收入决定,即一般当农户转变为非农户时,农户家庭总收入最大,此时多数非农户选择转让方式退出承包地经营活动；且农户对土地流转方式的选择是包含主体—决策—行为—绩效的系列过程,在不同类型农户所追求不同流转目的与效益的驱动下,农户形成土地流转需求；户主年龄是影响各类兼业农户土地流转方式选择的关键因素,而户主性别、农户家庭收入则没有对各类兼业农户的土地流转方式选择产生显著影响：对纯农户与Ⅰ兼农户土地流转选择产生共同显著影响的因素包括户主年龄、户主文化素质、农户土地资源禀赋、农户农业技术培训、农户低保覆盖；对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户的土地流转方式选择产生显著影响的因素包括户主年龄、户主非农就业地点。最后,在分析影响兼业农户土地退出决策因素中,认为基于生产经营目标差异,从纯农户到非农户,其土地退出决策依次受生存安全—土地收益最大化—经济收益最大化—综合收益最大化原则的影响,由此导致影响各类农户土地退出决策的因素存在较大差异；对纯农户与Ⅰ兼农户退地决策产生显著负向影响的因素包括家庭劳动力数量、家庭主要成员参加新农保、宅基地面积、承包地质量,对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户退地决策产生显著负向影响的因素包括户主文化程度、农房价值、村公共设施状况、村距离城镇的距离,而家庭年均收入、家庭年均非农收入对Ⅱ兼农户与非农户退地决策产生显著正向影响。
(3)从农户土地退出意愿及其影响因素看：首先,农户土地退出意愿受到来自城镇与农村的多种因素影响,且农户退地意愿是由多种因素组合所产生的效益决定的。无论是承包地还是宅基地退出,当农户退地后的效益高于退地前时,农户愿意退出土地；当农户退地前后效益相等时,农户不一定退地且存在观望情绪；当退地后效益小于退地前时,则农户不愿意退地。其次,农户退出土地愿意偏低,相比承包地,农户更愿意退出宅基地。再次,户主年龄、家庭主要成员是否已定居城镇、家庭是否有稳定非农收入来源、土地是否有撂荒或闲置、退地补偿或补助发放是否按时足额、退地后生活质量预期,对农户承包地、宅基地退出意愿有显著的正向影响。户主是否在外非农务工、土地是否位于城镇规划范围、退地政策是否多变、退地后是否担心就业问题,对农户承包地、宅基地退出意愿有显著的反向影响。还有,家庭主要成员是否参加新农保、退地后医疗与养老保险预期仅对农户承包地退出意愿有显著的正向影响。最后,土地面积、土地是否有流转仅对农户宅基地退出意愿有显著的反向影响,同时退地后住房预期也仅对农户宅基地退出意愿有显著的止向影响。
(4)从农户土地退出风险认知及其规避行为来看：首先,农户土地退出风险与规避行为受多种因素的影响,农户土地退出风险程度由土地退出边际效用与边际成本共同决定。因而农户只有深入了解土地退出风险,并客观评估自身风险规避能力,才能做出实现最大十地退出效用的决策。其次,农户承包地退出较宅基地退出存在更多风险与更弱的风险规避能力：同一因素可能对农户宅基地、承包地退出风险认知及规避能力产生不同的影响,影响农户宅基地退出风险认知及规避能力的因素少于影响农户承包地退出风险认知及规避能力的因素。再次,从宅基地退出风险认知及规避能力来看：户主年龄、家庭主要成员是否定居城镇、退地后生活质量预期、退地政策的信任程度对农户宅基地退出风险认知有负向影响,而退地后失去稳定住所、退地后无法获得足额补偿对其则有止向影响。户主年龄、家庭有无稳定城镇住所、本村是否在进行农民新村建设、退地后能否按时获得足额补偿款与补助金、退地后能否享受高水平城镇社保对农户宅基地退出风险规避能力有止向影响,而家庭有无养殖经营对此则有负向影响。最后,从承包地退出风险认知及规避能力来看：户主年龄、家庭有无稳定非农收入、家庭主要成员是否参加新农保、退地后生活质量预期、退地政策的信任程度对农户承包地退出风险认知有负向影响,而退地后无法稳定就业影响生计、退地后无法获取养老及医疗费用、退地后无法获得足额补偿对其则有止向影响。户主年龄、户主是否购买商业保险、家庭有无稳定非农收入、退地后能否按时获得足额补偿款与补助金、退地后能否及时获得就业培训与援助、退地后能否享受高水平城镇社保对农户承包地退出风险规避能力有正向影响,而家庭有无养殖经营对此则有负向影响。
(5)从农户参与退地利益集团博弈行为来看：在议价博弈中农户具有“耐心优势”、“后动优势”,处于优势地位,这种优势源于中央政府对农户退地意愿的尊重,然而农户的这种优势是相对的,在地方政府的“先动优势”与村干部的“道德风险”面前,处于信息劣势的农户面临优势地位被削弱的危险。最后,本文从农户角度出发,认为应从落实尊重农户退地意愿,赋予农户退地方案拟定权,给予农户自由选择退地谈判代理人等方面改进退地政策,维护农户土地退出利益。
(6)从农户视角的土地退出制度改进来看：首先,基于制度经济学视角分析了现行农村土地退出制度构架及制度经济效率,总体认为尽管现行的政府主导的强制性与诱致性制度变迁相结合的农村土地退出制度安排相比农户维持农村土地现状更具有效率,但在农户退地后的社会保障以及增加农户退地净现值收益方面还存在问题,因而需要对现行的农村土地退出模式进行优化。其次,就转变为城镇居民并退出承包地的农户而言,除了获得转户居民在就业、教育、养老、卫生及住房等城镇社会保障外,因其进城后无生计资本,更要强化与完善其退地补偿机制,以提高其城镇可持续发展能力,并认为优化承包地退出模式,需要建立体现承包地经济、社会功能价值及其期权价值的退出弹性补偿机制；优化宅基地退出模式,需要建立体现宅基地功能价值的实物补偿、货币补偿及建设补偿退出组合补偿机制。最后,认为完善转户退地农户可持续发展的配套措施、建立转户退地农户权益保护的常态机制及完善转户退地农户政策落实与兑现机制是当前地方政府提高退地农户可持续发展能力的重点。
At present, China is standing at the crossroads of development, some show optimistic attitudes towards the future of China, however, others show opposite attitudes about it. There is no denying that the potential and challenge of development of China is huge. There are many difficulties to overcome from the "Lewis turning point" to "middle-income trap". In these special conditions, it is imperative to find their own huge potential. the Report of18th CPC National Congress pointed out that "to accelerate the reform of the household registration system, to promote the farmers to become the citizens, orderly". It shows that promote household registration reform and continuation of the development dividend is maybe a breakthrough. To promote the reform of the household registration system is conducive to realize the transfer of farmer workers from the resident population to the household population, reduce institutional discrimination of migrant workers, realize the target of "equal pay for equal work", to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. Second conducive to the transfer of rural surplus labor force and population to the towns, to improve the level of the population urbanization rate, synchronous development of the household population urbanization rate space urbanization rate. Third conducive to change the concept of consumption of farmer workers from rural to urban transformation and to mobilize their consumer enthusiasm, expanding domestic consumption demand realizing the transformation of economic growth mode. Fourth conducive to realize the free movement between the elements of urban and rural, such as population, land, capital et al. fifth conducive to reduce the surplus labor force in rural areas, improve the intensification level of agricultural production, and promote the development of agricultural industrialization, increase of farmers'income. Currently, some provinces of our country probe to practice the reform of the households registration system, such as Shanghai put forwards the policy of "residence permit" for foreign farmer workers, Guangdong Province carries out become a native citizen with the condition of reaching an degree. Shandong and Hunan Province intend to cancel the difference between urban and rural household registration management system, to erect the urban and rural "unification" of the household registration management system. Shenzhen construct the China's first "no rural and no farmer city". Chongqing probe to reform household registration system and land manage system, synchronously, basing on farmers returning their lands etc.. Because he household registration system and land system has a natural coupling. During the course of the farmer workers become a urban citizen, we must consider the rural land disposal problem, which requires the linkage of the household registration system reform and land reform, this is the reason why the household registration system in Chongqing be occupied by more people. This paper basing on the macro background of idea of the Report of18th CPC National Congress, and the example of Chongqing's practicing farmer returning their rural lands starts from Summary of relevant literature, identifies the lack of research, then to built the framework of analysis and using a variety of econometric analysis mode to analyse the farmers households'behaviors in the course of returning their lands. The behaviors including the relationship between farmer s households'part-time work and returning their lands, the willingness and influencing factors of farmers'households'returning rural lands, the risk awareness and its avoidance ability of farmers'households'returning rural lands, the game behaviors of farmers'households to participate in the interests distribution. Finally, this paper basing the perspective of farmers'households to put forward the suggestions that amend the policies of returning rural lands. the main conclusions are as follows:
(1) From the views of the analytical framework:first of all, the foundation of farmers' households returning rural land in the course of the reform of the household registration system is that they have stable sources of non-farm income and stable residence, if they had returned lands without these two conditions, the results would be disastrous. Secondly, in the theory of attitude change, the results of "P-0-X" model shows that the state of imbalance will lead to various changes in cognitive structure of farmers'households returning their lands, as a results, the attitudes of farmers'households maybe can be formed by virtue of this unbalanced relationship and change. Again, the theory of public goods shows the premise of this research, which is the supply of public goods of government in the unit marginal cost is just equal to all the farmers'households'marginal revenue when they returning rural lands. At last, in the game behaviors of farmers'households to participate in the interests distribution, the local government has the "first mover advantage", farmers'households have the "after-mover advantage", but the farmers'household'interests encounter the loss in the face of the government" first-mover advantage" and the village cadres "moral hazard".
(2) From the views of the behaviors relationship between farmers'households'part-time work and returning their lands:first of all, the behaviors of farmers'households'part-time work is the result of the seasonal characteristics of the agricultural production, the inefficient agricultural compare benefits and the economic and social development, there are many farmers'households transfer from lower labor remuneration agricultural to nonagricultural industries. with the improvement of labor remuneration, farmers'households are apt to provide more labor. Secondly, during the discussion of the response of farmer'income to rural investment and agricultural land use efficiency, the influence factors including CRSTE, VRSTE,SCALE of agricultural land, the rural investment level have a long stable and positive impact on farmer'income. the contribution to the growth of farmers'income of agricultural land use efficiency'CRSTE is much higher than the rural investment. Consequently, on a long term, although improving the level of rural investment and CRSTE, VRSTE, SCALE have a positive impact on the growth of farmer'income, the growth of farmers'income is much depending on the agricultural land SCALE. In a short term, increasing the level of rural investment will help improve farmer'income, and improving the VRSTE can make farmer'income reduce after the first growth. In the range of decreasing SCALE'returns, the improving of SCALE can also increase farmer'income. Thirdly, during the discussion of the response farmers'households'behaviors of part-time farming to its tilth circulation mode, the common effect factors of the real and type I households choosing their tilth circulation mode including:age of head of households, educational level of head of households, gift of tilths resources, agricultural technology training of households, minimum living guarantee of households; the common effect factors of the type Ⅱ and non-farm households choosing their tilth circulation mode including:age of head of households, the site of non-farm employment; the behavior of characteristic that affecting the real and type I households to choose their tilth circulation mode is apparent more than that of type II and non-farm households'. Finally, in the analysis of impact factors of part-time farmers'household returning their lands, this paper consider that the labor in farmers'households, the main number of farmers'households have a new rural social security, homestead area, contracted land quantities are the common effect factors that have a significant negative impact on the real and type I farmers'households returning rural lands. Impact factors of the head of household education level, the value of rural housing, village public facilities condition, the village from the town's distance are the common effect factors that have a significant negative impact on the non and type II farmers'households returning rural lands. While, impact factors of the average annual family income, the average non-agricultural income are the common effect factors that have a significant positive impact on the non and type II farmers'households returning rural lands.
(3) From the views of an analysis of the willingness and its influencing factors of farmers' households'returning their lands:first of all, farmers'households have a lower willing to return their lands, compared contracted land, farmers'households are apt to return their homestead. Secondly,the head of farmers'households'age, whether, the mainly family members are settled in urban, non-farm families have stable source of income, whether, lands leave unused, whether, housing subsidies are full and on time, life quality expectations have a significant positive effect on farmers' household returning contracted land and homestead. On the other hand, whether,the owner is out the long-term non-agricultural workers, whether, lands lie in the scope of urban planning, land policy is changing, being worried about employment have a significant negative effect on farmers'households returning contracted land and homestead. But whether the principal members of the family to enjoy a new farmers'insurance, the expectations of medical and pension insurance only have a significant negative effect on farmers'households returning contracted land. however, land area, land circulation, the expectations of inhabitation have a have a significant effect on farmers'household returning their homestead.
(4) From the views of an analysis of the risk awareness and aversion and its Influencing factors of farmers'households'returning Lands:first of all, the same factors are likely to have different impacts on the risk awareness and aversion of the household returning homestead and contracted land, meanwhile, the risk awareness and aversion of impact factors of the farmers' household returning homestead is more than that of contracted land. Aspects of the risk awareness and aversion of homestead. the head of the farmers'household'age, whether the mainly family members are settled in urban, the expectations of living level after returning lands, the extents of trusting policy have a significant negative effect on risk awareness of farmers'returning homesteads. however, losing stable residence, unable to acquire enough subsidies after returning lands have a significant positive effect on that. the head of the farmers'household'age, whether family have stable residence, whether processing the construction of the new village, whether acquiring enough subsidies on time, whether enjoying a higher level of urban social security after returning homestead have a significant positive effect on the ability of risk aversion of farmers'returning homestead. However, whether family have a breeding operation have a significant negative effect on that. Aspects of the risk awareness and aversion of contracted land. the head of the farmers'household' age, whether family have a stable income, the family member participate in new rural social security, expectations of quality of life, the extents of trusting policy have a significant negative effect on risk awareness of household returning contracted land. however, unable to acquire a stable career impacting livelihood, unable to unable to get the refund to the pension and health care costs, unable to get full compensation have a significant positive effect on that. the head of the farmers' household'age, whether the head of the household buy a commercial security, whether family have stable non-farm income, whether getting enough subsidies on time, whether getting a timely employment training and assistance, whether enjoying a high level of urban social security after returning contracted land have a significant positive effect on the ability of risk aversion of farmers' returning contracted land. whether family have a breeding operation have a significant negative effect on that.
(5) From the views of the game behaviors of farmer'households to participate in the interests distribution:the farmers households have "patience advantages" and "after the mover advantage", they are in a dominant position, which comes from the respecting the willingness of farmers' households giving up their lands of central government, however, this dominant position is relative, which is being weaken, when farmers'households counter "the first mover advantage" of local government and village cadres "moral hazard". Finally, from the farmers'households'point of view, this paper consider that government should ameliorate their policies of giving up land from respecting the willingness of farmers'households', giving farmers'households the rights of studying out the policies and giving farmers'households the right of choosing the bargaining agent to protect farmers'household's interests.
(6) From the views of basing the perspective of farmers'households to put forward the suggestions that amend the policies of returning rural lands:first of all, this chapter basing on the Institutional Economics analyzes the framework and efficiency of current rural land returning system, the results show that although the current government led mandatory phase and induced institutional change of returning lands are more efficient than that of maintaining the status quo of lands, there exit many questions especially in the aspect of Social Security and increasing the net present value of the income of the farmers'households after returning rural lands. Consequently, we should amend the current system mode of returning rural lands. Secondly, the farmers'households who become urban residents and returning their lands should acquire the urban employment, education, pension, health and housing, meanwhile, government should consummate the compensate mechanism to improve their urban sustainable development capacity because of their losing livelihoods capital after returning lands. This chapter consider that government should establish a flexible compensation mechanism reflects the contracted land economic, the social function of the value and establish the combinations compensation mechanism that embodies the functional value of the homestead including in-kind compensation, monetary compensation, construction compensation. Finally, the chapter consider that local government for the sake of improve the sustainable development capacity of farmers'households returning rural lands should focus on supporting measures to improve the farmers'households'sustainable development, Establishing farmers'households'Protection normal mechanism and improving the capacity of implement the policy for returning rural lands of government.
引文
[1]杨志武,钟甫宁.农户生产决策研究综述[J].生产力研究,2011,(9)：209-211.
[2]毕继业,朱道林,王秀芬.耕地保护中农户行为国内研究综述[J].中国土地科学,24(11)：76-78.
[3]黄安胜.国内外农户投资行为研究综述[J].经济研究导刊,2008,(14)：99-102.
[4]西奥多·舒尔茨.梁小民译.改造传统农业[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999.
[5]A·恰亚诺夫.农民的经济组织[M].北京：中国编译出版社,1996：307-310.
[6]宋圭武.对小农问题的若干思考[J].农业经济问题,1999,(12)：37-42.
[7]林毅夫.小农与经济理性[J].农村经济与社会,1988,(3)：31-33.
[8]史清华.农户家庭经济资源利用效率及其配置方向比较[J].中国农村经经济,2000,(8)：58-61.
[9]陈其霆. 理性的农户与农村经济的可持续发展[J]. 兰州大学学报(社会科学版),2001,29(4)：164-167.
[10]傅晨,狄瑞珍.贫苦农户行为研究[J].中国农村观察,2000,(2)：39-42.
[11]秦晖.农民中国：历史反思与现实选择[M].郑州：河南人民出版社,2003.122-124.
[12]乔勇,丁士军.农村居民医疗门诊点选择：理性中的非理性—基于四川省阆中市的农户调查[J].农村经济,(2)：76-78.
[13]钟涨宝,陈小伍,王绪朗.有限理性与农地流转过程中的农户行为选择[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2007,29(6)：114-120.
[14]高强.发达国家农户兼业化的经验及启示[J].中国农村经济,1999(9)：77-79.
[15]向国成,韩绍凤.农户兼业化：基于分工视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2005(8)：4-9.
[16]贺振华.农户兼业的一个分析框架[J].中国农村观察,2005(1)：2-5.
[17]梁义成,MarcusW. Feldman,李树茁等[J].离土与离乡：西部山区农户的非农兼业研究.世界经济文汇,2010(2)：14-20.
[18]郝海广,李秀彬,辛良杰等.农户兼业行为及其原因探析[J].农业技术经济,2010(3)：14-20.
[19]Meert, H., G. VanHuylenbroeck, T. Vernimmen, M. Bourgeois and E. van Heck:"Farm Household Survival Strategies and Diversification on Marginal Farms", Journal of Rural Studies,21(1),81-97,2005.
[20]Xia,Q.J.and C. Simmons:Diversify and Prosper:Peasant Households Participating in Emerging Markets in Northeast Rural China, China Economic Review,15(4),375-397, 2004.
[21]Demurger S, Fournier M, Yang WY:Rural households'decisions towards income diversification:Evidence from a township in northern China, China Economic Review, 20(Suppl.1), S32-S44,2010.
[22]秦秀红.兼业农户、现代农户与国家食物安全[J].中国农学通报,2010,26(17)：447-450.
[23](日)速水佑次郎,(美)弗农·拉坦.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[24](日)速水佑次郎,(日)神门善久.农业经济论新版[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2003.
[25]周民德.兼业农户在农村发展中的作用[J].中国农村经济,1994,(7)：56-58.
[26]罗湖平,胡项连,魏来.“两型”社会建设中的农户土地转出意愿分析—以长沙大河西先导区为例[J].西北人口,2011,32(5)：19-22.
[27]邬静琼.农户家庭农地流转行为研究[D].浙江大学,2002.
[28]杨军炜.甘肃河西走廊传统粮区农户土地流转特征研究[J].甘肃农业大学学报,2004,(4)470-474.
[29]陈秧分,刘彦随,翟荣新. 基于农户调查的东部沿海地区农地规模经营意愿及其影响因素分析[J].资源科学,2009,31(7)：1102-1108.
[30]焦玉良.鲁中传统农业区农户土地流转意愿的实证研究[J].山东农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(1)：285-287.
[31]孙保敬,南灵. 农户农地转出意愿的影响因素分析—基于陕西省白水县农户调查问卷的实证分析[J].广东农业科学,2010,(6)：336-338.
[32]冯玲玲,邱道持,赵亚萍等. 重庆市璧山县农户农地流转意愿研究[J].广西农业科学,2008,39(4)：551-554.
[33]钟太洋,黄贤金,孔苹.农地产权与农户土地租赁意愿研究[J].中国土地科学,2005,19(1)：49-53.
[34]徐倩,夏敏. 农户宅基地使用权流转意愿及其影响因素研究—以山东省齐河县为例[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(21)：11394-11396.
[35]南亚刚,陈景升.农户宅基地使用权流转意愿分析—以吉林市为例[J].商业经济,2011,(11)：14-18.
[36]赵国玲,杨钢桥.农户宅基地流转意愿影响因素分析—以武汉市江夏区为例[J].中国房地产,2010,(12)：65-68.
[37]刘旦.基于Logistic模型的农民宅基地置换意愿分析—基于江西的调查和农户视角[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2010,(6)：43-47.
[38]姜太碧,朱文.农户加入农民专业合作组织意愿的Logit模型分析—以四川省成都、南充、宜宾、广元地区农户为例[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2009,(3)：140-145.
[39]郭红东,方文豪,钱崔红.我国农户参与农业经济合作住址意愿和行为[J].农业经济,2005,(11)：31-34.
[40]郭红东,陈敏.农户参与专业合作社的意愿及影响因素[J].商业研究,2010,(6)：168-170.
[41]王朝华,秦富.农户土地征用意愿的影响因素分析[J].技术经济,2007,(9)：94-97.
[42]王朝华.对农户土地征用意愿的调查分析[J].农业经济,2009,(2)：38-42.
[43]王伟林,黄贤金,陈志刚.发达地区农户被征地意愿及其影响因素—基于苏州农户调查的实证研究[J].中国土地科学,2009,23(4)：77-82.
[44]乔立娟,王文青,聂立川.农业产业化进程中农户风险防范机制研究[J].农村经济与科技,2011,22(8)：78-83.
[45]陆文聪,西爱琴.农户农业生产的风险反应：以浙江为例的MOTAD模型分析[J].中国农村经济,2005,(12)：68-72.
[46]何伟.农业产业化中农户经营风险因素分析[J].科技情报开发与经济,2009,19(16)：140-144.
[47]查斯虎,张雨萍,刘慧娥等.“公司+农户”营模式风险及其防范[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2006,6(3)：25-28.
[48]李彬.“公司+农户”契约非完全性与违约风险分析[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,23(3)：97-100.
[49]黄祖辉,黄忠良.农户土地规模经营中的风险及其管理[J].农业现代化研究,1996,17(4)：191-193.
[50]徐珍源,孔祥智.转出土地流转期限影响因素实证分析—基于转出农户收益与风险视角[J].农业技术经济,2010,(7)：30-34.
[51]袁中许.农户土地抵押贷款风险与均衡模型构建[J].统计与决策,2010,(14)：50-54.
[52]巩前文,穆向丽,田志宏.农户过量施肥风险认知及规避能力的影响因素分析—基于江汉平原284个农户的问卷调查[J].中国农村经济,2010,(10):66-70.
[53]高海东,陈海,郗静等.基于博弈论的农户土地利用行为研究—以陕西省米脂县孟岔村为例[J].干旱地区农业研究,2009,27(5)：245-250.
[54]许恒周.耕地保护：农户、地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析[J].经济体制改革,2001,(4)：65-70.
[55]郭翔宇,王颜齐.农户与村干部土地流转纠纷的博弈分析[J].农业经济与管理,2010,(1)：38-42.
[56]陶银球,杨珑.土地流转过程中农户博弈的分析框架[J].统计与决策,2010,(8)：63-65.
[57]曹阳,王春超,李鲲鹏.农户、地方政府和中央政府决策中的三重博弈—以农村土地流转为例[J].产经评论,2011,(1)：80-87.
[58]王颜齐,郭翔宇.“反租倒包”农地流转中农户博弈行为特征分析[J].农业经济问题,2010,(5)：34-36.
[59]王亚静,祁春节.我国契约农业中龙头企业与农户的博弈分析[J].农业技术经济,2007,(5)：25-30.
[60]刘慧,尹海东.农户与农村合作组织在农业投资中的博弈分析[J].农机化研究,2010,(4)：46-49.
[61]王火根.“龙头企业+农户”博弈模型研究[J].商业研究,2010,(9)：180-183.
[62]刘云龙,谢水清.龙头企业+农户的农村合作经济模式下的角色博弈研究[J].重庆交通大学学报(社科版),2009,9(4)：61-65.
[63]吕庆立,曾德刚,周智生. 农户参与合作组织的演化博弈分析[J].经济研究导刊,2011,(14)：26-30.
[64]栾大鹏,刘俊浩.农户建立合作组织意愿的博弈分析[J].农村经济,2010,(1)：118-120.
[65]景为,侯军岐,刘录民.农业产业化龙头企业与农户博弈实证分析[J].中国农业科技导报,2008,10(3)：116-119.
[66]黄婧,孙秋.农业产业化中公司+农户模式合作困境的博弈分析[J].贵州农业科学2009,37(12)：219-223。
[67]屈晓娟.基于城市化进程中失地农户权益受损的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2008,(22)：141-145.
[68]李江南,宋玲.耕地保护中农户利益补偿量的博弈[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(22)：12151-12152。
[69]李江南,宋杨.征地中农户与地方政府农户利益补偿量的博弈理论分析[J].内蒙古农业科技,2010(3)：4-6
[70]刘晓忠.户籍改革与土地改革联动进行并不妥[N].证券时报/2011年/1月/14日/第A03版.
[71]陶然,史晨,汪晖等.“刘易斯转折点悖论”与中国户籍—土地—财税制度联动改革[J].国际经济评论,2010(3)：120-147.
[72]陆铭,陈钊.为什么土地和户籍制度需要联动改革—基于中国城市和区域发展的理论和实证研究[J].学术月刊,2009,41(9)：78-82.
[73]陶然,徐志刚.城市化过程中户籍与农地制度的变革及其政策组合[J].上海城市管理职业技术学院学报城市管理,2008,(2)：11-16.
[74]陈学法.二元结构变迁中的户籍制度与土地制度变革[J].宏观经济研究,2009,12()：51-55.
[75]陶然,曹广忠.户籍和土地制度改革是两个重要方面—对许玉明争鸣观点的回应[J].改革,2009,(4)：151-154.
[76]吴小艳.户籍制度改革背景下农村土地制度的变革—湖北省监利县若干调查实例的分析[J].襄樊学院学报,2006,27(6)：21-28.
[77]郭英.中国土地制度与户籍制度联动改革的对策研究[J].经济研究导刊,2011,(4)：31-35.
[78]徐增阳,陈玉华,吴小艳.户籍制度与农村土地制度的变革[J].调查世界,2007,(7)：17-22.
[79]汤玉权.论户籍制度改革与农村土地制度的变革[J].东南学术,2006,(1)：83.
[80]陶然,刘凯.中国户籍制度改革的突破口[J].人口与发展,2009,(6)：41-45.
[81]黄少安、孙涛.城乡户口相对价值的变化、推拉理论与“非转农”现象—侧重于户籍 制度和农村土地产权制度的分析[C].社会主义经济理论研究集萃—全国高校社会主义经济理论与实践研讨会第21次会议论文(2007)
[82]陆铭.增长新引擎：土地与户籍制度的联动改革[N].21世纪经济报道/2009年/7月/1日/第002版.
[83]王菊英,王晓明.城乡户籍制度改革与农村土地集体所有权变革的思考[J].吉林省经济管理干部学院学报：2008,22(4)：20-25.
[84]王菊英.二元户籍制度改革与农村土地集体所有之关系论析[J].贵州大学学报(社会科学版),2009,27(2)：36-40.
[85]张康林.实行平等的—元户籍制度营造自由的土地承包经营权流转环境[J].南昌人学学报(人文社会科学版),2009,(1)：58-62.
[86]吴元波.我国土地产权制度、户籍制度与小城镇发展探析[J].农村经济,2004,(2)：70-75.
[87]樊纲.中国户籍与土地制度阻碍城市化进程[J].IT时代周刊,2006,6：17.
[88]柳建平.中国农村土地制度及改革研究—基于农村劳动力流动及人口城市化视角的分析[J].中州学刊,2011,(5)：72-76.
[89]陶然,汪晖.中国尚未完之转型中的土地制度改革：挑战与出路[J].国际经济评论,2010,(2)：72-76.
[90]张丽艳,王洪涛,王国辉.创建户籍改革、社保完善与土地流转的联动机制研究[J].经济纵横,2009,(9)：89-93.
[91]杨重光.城市化过程中土地政策调整与人口户籍变更[J].中国土地科学,2000,14(6)：6-10.
[92]陈锡文.农民进城放不放弃承包地完全由他自己决定[N].农民日报/2011年/3月/18日/第001版
[93]王艳玲.关注农民权益构建和谐社会—兼论户籍制度和土地使用权改革[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报(社会科学版),2010,29(5)：176-180.
[94]赵振军.谨慎推进户籍制度改革[J].理论与改革,2006,(5)：40.
[95]吴康明,陈霄.农民土地退出意愿与关键环节拿捏：重庆例证[J].改革,2011,(10)：61-66.
[96]张—鸣.户籍改革中农民土地权利与社会保障待遇[J].广西政法管理干部学院学报,2011,26(4)：21-25.
[97]张晓梅.户籍制度下土地承包经营权人在土地征收时的权益保障[J].前沿,2010,(10)：96-100.
[98]陶然.户籍改革意义何在—劳动力还是宅基地[N].社会科学报/2010年/9月/30日/第002版
[99]贺雪峰.为什么要警惕土地换户籍[J].北京农业,2011,(3)：5-6.
[100]梅哲、陈霄.城乡统筹背景下农村土地制度创新—对重庆农村土地制度改革的调查研究[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,50(3)：18-24.
[101]周也奇,朱玉碧.推进重庆市户籍改革的土地退出机制构建探讨—基于重庆市北碚区歇马镇转户农民土地退出的意愿调查[J].中国外贸,2011,(7)：186-188.
[102]曾昭盛.重庆户籍制度改革背景下的农村土地制度研究[J].科学咨询(科技·管理),2010,(12)：8-9.
[103]滕亚为.户籍改革中农村土地退出补偿机制研究—以重庆市为例[J].国家行政学院学报,2011,(4)：101-104.
[104]张蔚.快速城镇化进程中农村土地退出机制研究—基于重庆市户籍制度改革的实证[D].西南大学硕士学位论文,2011.
[105]黄志亮,刘昌用.户籍制度改革的重庆模式探索[J].国家行政学院学报,2011,(2)：104-108.
[106]党国英.重庆户籍制度改革正逢其时.北京青年报,2010-08-04
[107]漆先望.“土地换社保”破解“半城市化”难题[J].宏观经济管理,2011,(1)：62-63.
[108]四川省经济发展研究院课题组.“以土地换社保”—健全进城农民社会保障体系的基本思路[J].天府新论,2005,(2)：52-54.
[109]张晓晖.双溪村故事：土地换社保[J].人才资源开发,2011,(6)：46-48.
[110]黎诚,赵凯.“农地年薪制”+“土地换社保”新型征地补偿方式的可行性探讨—以陕西杨凌农业高新技术产业示范区为例[J].安徽农业科学,2006,34(20)：5404-5405.
[111]倪明胜.“以宅基地换房”：天津新农村建设的创新选择[J].中国乡村建设,2009,(1)：81-83.
[112]白莹.“宅基地换房”—天津户籍制度改革的有益尝试[J].行政与法,2010,(12)：16-18.
[113]崔丽娟.天津“宅基地换房”与重庆“双交换”模式比较与借鉴[J].天津经济,2010,(3)：43-47.
[114]吴胜杰.统筹城乡发展中农民市民化的政策突破—以重庆市九龙坡区先行示范改革为例[J].农村经济,2008,(12)：34-36.
[115]张红星,桑铁柱.农民利益保护与交易机制的改进—来自天津“宅基地换房”模式的经验[J].农业经济问题,2010,(5)：10-18.
[116]林宝,隆学文.“土地换社保”政策要慎重推行[J].中国党政干部论坛,2008,(5)：41-43.
[117]陈华威.“土地换社保”掩盖下失地农民的利益受损分析[J].经济视角,2011,(6)：22-24.
[118]周显祥.关于现行土地换社保政策的探讨[J].国土资源情报,2005,(11)：37-39.
[119]夏锋.土地换社保不是长期制度安排[J].农业经济管理,2009,(9)：32.
[120]杨魏欣.“宅基地换房”问题与对策分析[J].现代商贸工业,2010,(4)：146-148.
[121]詹明民.农村宅基地换房中存在问题的法律思考[J].东方企业文化,2010,(3)：47.
[122]周京奎,吴晓燕,胡云霞.集体建设用地流转模式创新的调查研究—以天津滨海新区东丽区华明镇宅基地换房为例[J].调查世界,2010,(7)：24-27.
[123]程同顺,杜福芳.快速城市化进程中的失地农民问题—以天津市华明镇“宅基地换房”为例[J].重庆社会主义学院学报,2011,(3)：93-96.
[124]向勇.如何维护农民在“宅基地换房”中的权益—以嘉兴市“两分两换”为例[J].兴学院学报,2011,23(2)：49-52.
[125]刘辉群,常树荣.推进天津市城乡一体化发展的路径与策略—基于“宅基地换房”视角[J].天津盛业大学学报,2010,30(4)：32-38.
[126]曹小明.以“土地换社保”—浙江嘉兴失地农民社会保障体系建设的探索、实践与发展思考[J].党政干部论坛,2004,(10)：23-26.
[127]向勇.宅基地换房经营主体制度创新探讨[J].嘉兴学院学报,2010,22(4)：36-39.
[128]何源源.宅基地换房模式分析及金融支持建议[J].房地产金融,2008,(12)：55-58.
[129]张良悦.户籍对价、劳动力迁移与土地流转[J].财经科学,2011,(1):118-121.
[130]侯东民.户籍制度改革：农民进城释放土地是重要使命[N].第一财经日报/2007年/4月/3日/第A07版.
[131]漆先望,吴敏,伍鑫等.土地换社保农民变市民—改革户籍制度的可行思路[J].四川省情,2008,(3)：31-32.
[132]陶然.户籍改革意义何在—劳动力还是宅基地[N].社会科学报/2010年/9月/30日/第002版.
[133]贺雪峰.为什么要警惕土地换户籍[J].北京农业,2011,(3)：5-6.
[134]赵振军.谨慎推进户籍制度改革[J].理论与改革,2006,(5)：40.
[135]刘奇.农民变市民该不该交出土地[J].发展,2011,(2)：10-13.
[136]张怡然,邱道持,李艳等.农民工进城落户与宅基地退出影响因素分析—基于重庆市开县357份农民工的调查问卷[J].中国软科学,2011,(2)62-64.
[137]张秀智,丁锐.经济欠发达与偏远农村地区宅基退出机制分析：案例研究[J].中国农村观察,2009,(6)：23-27.
[138]张秀智,丁锐.政府财政投资是影响宅基地退出的主要因素[J].经济研究参考,2008,(18)16-18.
[139]张德松.关于建立宅基地退出机制的探讨[J].浙江国土资源,2009,(10)：36-39.
[140]黄星.建立宅基地退出机制的思考[J].国土资源导刊,2009,(6)：62-64.
[141]欧阳安蛟,蔡锋铭,陈立定.农村宅基地退出机制建立探讨[J].中国土地科学,2009,23(10)：26-30.
[142]岳永兵.浅议宅基地退出机制[J].西部资源,2010,(5)：29-31.
[143]徐小峰,胡银根,魏西云等.农村宅基地退出与补偿的几点思考[J].国土资源情报,2011,(8)：31-35.
[144]陈霄.农民宅基地退出意愿的影响因素——基于重庆市“两翼”地区1012户农户的实证分析究[J].中国农村观察,2012,(3)：26-36.
[145]张世全,彭显文,冯长春等.商丘市构建农村宅基地退出机制探讨[J].地域研究与开发,2012,31(2)：82-86.
[146]王竹林,王征兵.农民工市民化的制度阐释[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：94-98.
[147]楚德江.我国农地承包权退出机制的困境与政策选择[J].农村经济,2011,(2)：38-43.
[148]王建友.完善农户农村土地承包经营权的退出机制[J].农业经济管理,2011,(3)：47-50.
[149]钟涨宝,聂建亮.建立健全农村土地承包经营权退出机制初探[J].理论与改革,2010,(5)：78-81.
[150]吕天强.建立农村土地退出机制促使务工农民市民化[J].南阳师范学院学报(社会科学版),2004,3(10)：48-52.
[151]颜明权.农民工市民化过程社会公正实现研究[D].吉林大学博士学位论文,2007.
[152]严燕,杨庆媛,张佰林等.非农就业对农户土地退出意愿影响的实证研究[J].西南大学学报(自然科学版),2012,36(4)：128-132.
[153]王兆林,杨庆媛.农户农村土地退出意愿综合影响因素探讨[J].农机化研究,2012(10),49-61.
[154]胡星斗.中国户籍制度的命运：完善抑或废除[J].学术研究,2009,(10)：65-70.
[155]蔡防.户籍改革可延人口红利突破中等收入陷阱。http：//www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/11-13/4325941.shtml
[156]尹希果,马大来,陈彪.重庆市统筹城乡户籍制度改革的制度变迁分析[J].探索,2011,(2)：138-142.
[157]韩明漠.农村社会学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2001：31-33.
[158]尤小文.农户：一个概念的探讨[J].中国农村经济,1999,(5)：17-19.
[159]卜范达,韩喜平.“农户经营”内涵的探析[J].当代经济研究,2003,(9)：37-41.
[160]谭淑豪,曲福田,黄贤金.市场经济环境下不同类型农户土地利用行为差异及土地保护政策分析[J],南京农业大学学报,2001,24(2)：110-114.
[161]周婧,杨庆媛,信桂新等.贫困山区农户兼业行为及其居民点用地形态—基于重庆市云阳县568户农户调查,地理研究,2010,29(10)：1768-1778.
[162]陈晓红,汪朝霞.苏州农户兼业行为的因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2007(4)：25-26.
[163](美)加里·贝克尔.人类行为的经济分析[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008年.
[164]熊小林.统筹城乡发展：调整城乡利益格局的交点、难点及城镇化路径—“中国城乡统筹发展：现状与展望研讨会暨第五届中国经济论坛”综述.中国农村经济,2010(11)：93-94.
[165]王兆林,杨庆媛,张佰林,藏波.户籍制度改革中农户土地退出意愿及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2011,(11)：49-61.
[166](英)卡尔·波兰尼.大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源[M].杭州：浙江人民出版社,2007.
[167](美)詹姆斯·斯科特.农民的道义经济学：东南亚的反叛与生存[M].南京：译林出版社,2001.
[168](美)黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[M].北京：中华书局,2000.
[169]H. C. Kelman. Compliance, identification and internalization:Three processes of Attitude change. Journal of Conflict Resolution,1958(2):51-60.
[170]L. Festinger & J. Carlsmith. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,1959(58):203-210.
[171]F. Heidey. The psychology of interpersonal relations. NY:Wiley,1958.
[172]Samuelson The pure theory of public expenditures [J].The Review of Economic sand Statistics,1954(36):387-389.
[173](美)冯·诺伊曼(John von Neumann),摩根斯顿(Oskar Morgenstern)[M].北京：生活.读书.新知三联书店,2004.
[174](美)道格拉斯·盖尔.一般均衡的策略基础——动态匹配与讨价还价博弈[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[175]Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1986), "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling ", Rand Journal of Economics,17,176-188.
[176]李广东.微观主体行为差异下的耕地保护经济补偿机制构建——三峡生态脆弱区的实证分析[D],西南大学硕士学位论文,2011年。
[177]Inderjit Singh, lyn Squire & John Strauss. Agricultural Household Model:Extension, Application and Policy. The John Hopkins University Press,1986
[178]洪建国.农户使用农机行为研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2010.
[179]杨俊.不同类型农户耕地投入行为及其效率研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2011.
[180]王兆林,杨庆媛.西南地区农村投资水平和农地利用效率对农民农业收入影响分析[J].经济地理,2012,32(8)：124-130.
[181]许庆,田士超,徐志刚等.农地制度、土地细碎化与农民收入不平等[J],经济研究,2008,(2)：83-84.
[182]林毅夫.CCER"中国经济2010”纽约论坛简报之一.http://www.ccer.edu.cn/cn /ReadNews.asp? NewsID=10856,2010-02.
[183]涂维亮,杨学文.农业投资与农民收入相关性研究[J],农业技术经济,2000,(5)：15-18.
[184]卢启程,李怡佳.西部省区支农财政投入与农民收入的关系研究——以云南省为例[J],改革与战略,2008,24(3)：74-76.
[185]姚林香,肖建华.财政投入对中国农民收入的影响——基于协整方法的时间序列分析[J],金融与经济,2010,(12)：17-19.
[186]李功奎、钟甫宁.农地细碎化、劳动力利用与农民收入——基于江苏省经济欠发达地区的实证研究[J],中国农村经济,2006,(4)：42-48.
[187]杨渝红、欧名豪.土地经营规模、农村剩余劳动力转移与农民收入关系研究——基于省际面板数据的检验析[J],资源科学,2009,31(2)：310-316.
[188]Odedokun:Alternative Econometric Approaches for Analyzing the Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Growth:Time-series Evidence from LDCs, Journal of Development Economics,1996,50(1):119-146.
[189]Pagano, M.:The Flotation of Companies on the Stock Market:A Co-ordination Failure Model, European Economic Review,1993,(36):763-81.
[190]Murinde, V.:Emerging Stock Markets:A Survey of Leading Issues, Discussion Paper Series in Financial and BankingEconomics, Cardiff Business School, FABER/94/3/1/B, 1994.
[191]Shunbo Yao and Yajun Guo, et al:An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of China's Land Conversion Program on Farmers'Income Growth and Labor Transfer[J]. Environmental Management, (3):2008,502-512.
[192]Parente, Steven and Prescott, Edward:Technology Adoption and Growth, Working paper No.3733 (NBER, Cambridge, MA)June,1991.
[193]温涛,冉光和,熊德平.中国金融发展与农民收入增长[J],经济研究,2005,(2)：30-40.
[194]Chiswick.B:The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men, Journal of Political Economy,1978,86(5):pp.897-921,
[195]Borjas George:Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. The American Economic Review.,1987,77:pp.531-553
[196]Demurger S, Fournier M, Yang WY:Rural households'decisions towards income diversification:Evidence from a township in northern China, China Economic Review, 20(Suppl.1), S32-S44,2010.
[197]唐博文,罗小峰,秦军.农户采用不同属性技术影响因素分析[J],中国农村经济[J],2010,(6)：49-55.
[198]王魏.甘肃省户籍制度改革现状及对策研究.经济研究导刊,2010(6)：212-214.
[199]朱泽.“民工潮”问题的现状、成因和对策.中国农村经济,1993(12)： 20-24.
[200]陆益龙.1949年后的中国户籍制度：结构与变迁.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2002(2)：123-126.
[201]Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang. The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes. The China Quarterly,1999,160(12):pp.818-855.
[202]夏纪军.人口流动性、公共收入与支出—户籍制度变迁动因分析[J].经济研究,2004(10)：56-65.
[203]王威海,周乃宁,张雄等.户籍制度改革的动力、阻力与途径探讨[J].理论导刊,2008(3)：16-18.
[204]蔡防,都阳,王美艳.户籍制度与劳动力市场保护[J].经济研究,2001(12)：41-45.
[205]杨重光.城市化过程中土地政策调整与人口户籍变更[J].中国土地科学,2000(6)：6-8.
[206]吴海盛,邓明.基于村庄内部差异视角的农村居民养老模式选择意愿及其影响因素 分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(11)：75-78.
[207](美)蒋中一,凯尔文·温赖特.数理经济学的基本方法(第四版)[M].北京大学出版社,2010.
[208]蔡昉.“民工荒”现象：成因及政策涵义分析[J].开放导报,2010(2)：5-9.
[209]黄祖辉,黄忠良.农户土地规模经营中的风险及其管理[J].农业现代化研究,1996,17(4)：192-196.
[210]陈传波,丁士军.对农户风险及其处理策略的分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(11)：66-70.
[211]周萍入、齐振宏：消费者对转基因食品健康风险与生态风险认知实证研究[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012,(1)：5-11.
[212]Shaked,A.&Sutton,J.:Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica:52(6):1351-1364,1984.
[213]晋洪涛,史清华,俞宁.谈判权、程序公平与征地制度改革[J].中国农村经济,2010,(12)：4-16.
[214]陈剑波.农地制度：所有权问题还是委托—代理问题?[J].经济研究,2006,(7)：83-91.
[215]诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效,上海：上海三联书店中译本,1994.
[216](美)丹尼尔·W·布罗姆利.经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[217]吴康明.转户进城农民土地退出的影响因素和路径研究[J].西南大学博士论文,2011.
[218]胡元聪,王珊珊.城乡统筹背景下重庆市农村公共服务供给机制的完善——基于借鉴韩国新村运动的视角[J].科技与经济,2010,2(23)：51-54.
[219]骆东奇,周于翔,姜文.基于农户调查的重庆市农村土地流转研究[J].中国土地科学,2009,5(23)：46-49.
[220]曲福田,冯淑怡,俞红.土地价格及分配关系与农地非农化经济机制研究[J].中国农村经济,2001(12)：54-60.
[221]王仕菊,黄贤金,陈志刚等.基于耕地价值的征地补偿标准[J].中国土地科学,2008,22(11)：44-50.
[222]赵旭.农地征收补偿标准研究——基于可持续发展及模糊实物期权双重视角[J].西华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2012,5(31)：70-77.
[2]毕继业,朱道林,王秀芬.耕地保护中农户行为国内研究综述[J].中国土地科学,24(11)：76-78.
[3]黄安胜.国内外农户投资行为研究综述[J].经济研究导刊,2008,(14)：99-102.
[4]西奥多·舒尔茨.梁小民译.改造传统农业[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999.
[5]A·恰亚诺夫.农民的经济组织[M].北京：中国编译出版社,1996：307-310.
[6]宋圭武.对小农问题的若干思考[J].农业经济问题,1999,(12)：37-42.
[7]林毅夫.小农与经济理性[J].农村经济与社会,1988,(3)：31-33.
[8]史清华.农户家庭经济资源利用效率及其配置方向比较[J].中国农村经经济,2000,(8)：58-61.
[9]陈其霆. 理性的农户与农村经济的可持续发展[J]. 兰州大学学报(社会科学版),2001,29(4)：164-167.
[10]傅晨,狄瑞珍.贫苦农户行为研究[J].中国农村观察,2000,(2)：39-42.
[11]秦晖.农民中国：历史反思与现实选择[M].郑州：河南人民出版社,2003.122-124.
[12]乔勇,丁士军.农村居民医疗门诊点选择：理性中的非理性—基于四川省阆中市的农户调查[J].农村经济,(2)：76-78.
[13]钟涨宝,陈小伍,王绪朗.有限理性与农地流转过程中的农户行为选择[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2007,29(6)：114-120.
[14]高强.发达国家农户兼业化的经验及启示[J].中国农村经济,1999(9)：77-79.
[15]向国成,韩绍凤.农户兼业化：基于分工视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2005(8)：4-9.
[16]贺振华.农户兼业的一个分析框架[J].中国农村观察,2005(1)：2-5.
[17]梁义成,MarcusW. Feldman,李树茁等[J].离土与离乡：西部山区农户的非农兼业研究.世界经济文汇,2010(2)：14-20.
[18]郝海广,李秀彬,辛良杰等.农户兼业行为及其原因探析[J].农业技术经济,2010(3)：14-20.
[19]Meert, H., G. VanHuylenbroeck, T. Vernimmen, M. Bourgeois and E. van Heck:"Farm Household Survival Strategies and Diversification on Marginal Farms", Journal of Rural Studies,21(1),81-97,2005.
[20]Xia,Q.J.and C. Simmons:Diversify and Prosper:Peasant Households Participating in Emerging Markets in Northeast Rural China, China Economic Review,15(4),375-397, 2004.
[21]Demurger S, Fournier M, Yang WY:Rural households'decisions towards income diversification:Evidence from a township in northern China, China Economic Review, 20(Suppl.1), S32-S44,2010.
[22]秦秀红.兼业农户、现代农户与国家食物安全[J].中国农学通报,2010,26(17)：447-450.
[23](日)速水佑次郎,(美)弗农·拉坦.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[24](日)速水佑次郎,(日)神门善久.农业经济论新版[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2003.
[25]周民德.兼业农户在农村发展中的作用[J].中国农村经济,1994,(7)：56-58.
[26]罗湖平,胡项连,魏来.“两型”社会建设中的农户土地转出意愿分析—以长沙大河西先导区为例[J].西北人口,2011,32(5)：19-22.
[27]邬静琼.农户家庭农地流转行为研究[D].浙江大学,2002.
[28]杨军炜.甘肃河西走廊传统粮区农户土地流转特征研究[J].甘肃农业大学学报,2004,(4)470-474.
[29]陈秧分,刘彦随,翟荣新. 基于农户调查的东部沿海地区农地规模经营意愿及其影响因素分析[J].资源科学,2009,31(7)：1102-1108.
[30]焦玉良.鲁中传统农业区农户土地流转意愿的实证研究[J].山东农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(1)：285-287.
[31]孙保敬,南灵. 农户农地转出意愿的影响因素分析—基于陕西省白水县农户调查问卷的实证分析[J].广东农业科学,2010,(6)：336-338.
[32]冯玲玲,邱道持,赵亚萍等. 重庆市璧山县农户农地流转意愿研究[J].广西农业科学,2008,39(4)：551-554.
[33]钟太洋,黄贤金,孔苹.农地产权与农户土地租赁意愿研究[J].中国土地科学,2005,19(1)：49-53.
[34]徐倩,夏敏. 农户宅基地使用权流转意愿及其影响因素研究—以山东省齐河县为例[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(21)：11394-11396.
[35]南亚刚,陈景升.农户宅基地使用权流转意愿分析—以吉林市为例[J].商业经济,2011,(11)：14-18.
[36]赵国玲,杨钢桥.农户宅基地流转意愿影响因素分析—以武汉市江夏区为例[J].中国房地产,2010,(12)：65-68.
[37]刘旦.基于Logistic模型的农民宅基地置换意愿分析—基于江西的调查和农户视角[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2010,(6)：43-47.
[38]姜太碧,朱文.农户加入农民专业合作组织意愿的Logit模型分析—以四川省成都、南充、宜宾、广元地区农户为例[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2009,(3)：140-145.
[39]郭红东,方文豪,钱崔红.我国农户参与农业经济合作住址意愿和行为[J].农业经济,2005,(11)：31-34.
[40]郭红东,陈敏.农户参与专业合作社的意愿及影响因素[J].商业研究,2010,(6)：168-170.
[41]王朝华,秦富.农户土地征用意愿的影响因素分析[J].技术经济,2007,(9)：94-97.
[42]王朝华.对农户土地征用意愿的调查分析[J].农业经济,2009,(2)：38-42.
[43]王伟林,黄贤金,陈志刚.发达地区农户被征地意愿及其影响因素—基于苏州农户调查的实证研究[J].中国土地科学,2009,23(4)：77-82.
[44]乔立娟,王文青,聂立川.农业产业化进程中农户风险防范机制研究[J].农村经济与科技,2011,22(8)：78-83.
[45]陆文聪,西爱琴.农户农业生产的风险反应：以浙江为例的MOTAD模型分析[J].中国农村经济,2005,(12)：68-72.
[46]何伟.农业产业化中农户经营风险因素分析[J].科技情报开发与经济,2009,19(16)：140-144.
[47]查斯虎,张雨萍,刘慧娥等.“公司+农户”营模式风险及其防范[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2006,6(3)：25-28.
[48]李彬.“公司+农户”契约非完全性与违约风险分析[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,23(3)：97-100.
[49]黄祖辉,黄忠良.农户土地规模经营中的风险及其管理[J].农业现代化研究,1996,17(4)：191-193.
[50]徐珍源,孔祥智.转出土地流转期限影响因素实证分析—基于转出农户收益与风险视角[J].农业技术经济,2010,(7)：30-34.
[51]袁中许.农户土地抵押贷款风险与均衡模型构建[J].统计与决策,2010,(14)：50-54.
[52]巩前文,穆向丽,田志宏.农户过量施肥风险认知及规避能力的影响因素分析—基于江汉平原284个农户的问卷调查[J].中国农村经济,2010,(10):66-70.
[53]高海东,陈海,郗静等.基于博弈论的农户土地利用行为研究—以陕西省米脂县孟岔村为例[J].干旱地区农业研究,2009,27(5)：245-250.
[54]许恒周.耕地保护：农户、地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析[J].经济体制改革,2001,(4)：65-70.
[55]郭翔宇,王颜齐.农户与村干部土地流转纠纷的博弈分析[J].农业经济与管理,2010,(1)：38-42.
[56]陶银球,杨珑.土地流转过程中农户博弈的分析框架[J].统计与决策,2010,(8)：63-65.
[57]曹阳,王春超,李鲲鹏.农户、地方政府和中央政府决策中的三重博弈—以农村土地流转为例[J].产经评论,2011,(1)：80-87.
[58]王颜齐,郭翔宇.“反租倒包”农地流转中农户博弈行为特征分析[J].农业经济问题,2010,(5)：34-36.
[59]王亚静,祁春节.我国契约农业中龙头企业与农户的博弈分析[J].农业技术经济,2007,(5)：25-30.
[60]刘慧,尹海东.农户与农村合作组织在农业投资中的博弈分析[J].农机化研究,2010,(4)：46-49.
[61]王火根.“龙头企业+农户”博弈模型研究[J].商业研究,2010,(9)：180-183.
[62]刘云龙,谢水清.龙头企业+农户的农村合作经济模式下的角色博弈研究[J].重庆交通大学学报(社科版),2009,9(4)：61-65.
[63]吕庆立,曾德刚,周智生. 农户参与合作组织的演化博弈分析[J].经济研究导刊,2011,(14)：26-30.
[64]栾大鹏,刘俊浩.农户建立合作组织意愿的博弈分析[J].农村经济,2010,(1)：118-120.
[65]景为,侯军岐,刘录民.农业产业化龙头企业与农户博弈实证分析[J].中国农业科技导报,2008,10(3)：116-119.
[66]黄婧,孙秋.农业产业化中公司+农户模式合作困境的博弈分析[J].贵州农业科学2009,37(12)：219-223。
[67]屈晓娟.基于城市化进程中失地农户权益受损的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2008,(22)：141-145.
[68]李江南,宋玲.耕地保护中农户利益补偿量的博弈[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(22)：12151-12152。
[69]李江南,宋杨.征地中农户与地方政府农户利益补偿量的博弈理论分析[J].内蒙古农业科技,2010(3)：4-6
[70]刘晓忠.户籍改革与土地改革联动进行并不妥[N].证券时报/2011年/1月/14日/第A03版.
[71]陶然,史晨,汪晖等.“刘易斯转折点悖论”与中国户籍—土地—财税制度联动改革[J].国际经济评论,2010(3)：120-147.
[72]陆铭,陈钊.为什么土地和户籍制度需要联动改革—基于中国城市和区域发展的理论和实证研究[J].学术月刊,2009,41(9)：78-82.
[73]陶然,徐志刚.城市化过程中户籍与农地制度的变革及其政策组合[J].上海城市管理职业技术学院学报城市管理,2008,(2)：11-16.
[74]陈学法.二元结构变迁中的户籍制度与土地制度变革[J].宏观经济研究,2009,12()：51-55.
[75]陶然,曹广忠.户籍和土地制度改革是两个重要方面—对许玉明争鸣观点的回应[J].改革,2009,(4)：151-154.
[76]吴小艳.户籍制度改革背景下农村土地制度的变革—湖北省监利县若干调查实例的分析[J].襄樊学院学报,2006,27(6)：21-28.
[77]郭英.中国土地制度与户籍制度联动改革的对策研究[J].经济研究导刊,2011,(4)：31-35.
[78]徐增阳,陈玉华,吴小艳.户籍制度与农村土地制度的变革[J].调查世界,2007,(7)：17-22.
[79]汤玉权.论户籍制度改革与农村土地制度的变革[J].东南学术,2006,(1)：83.
[80]陶然,刘凯.中国户籍制度改革的突破口[J].人口与发展,2009,(6)：41-45.
[81]黄少安、孙涛.城乡户口相对价值的变化、推拉理论与“非转农”现象—侧重于户籍 制度和农村土地产权制度的分析[C].社会主义经济理论研究集萃—全国高校社会主义经济理论与实践研讨会第21次会议论文(2007)
[82]陆铭.增长新引擎：土地与户籍制度的联动改革[N].21世纪经济报道/2009年/7月/1日/第002版.
[83]王菊英,王晓明.城乡户籍制度改革与农村土地集体所有权变革的思考[J].吉林省经济管理干部学院学报：2008,22(4)：20-25.
[84]王菊英.二元户籍制度改革与农村土地集体所有之关系论析[J].贵州大学学报(社会科学版),2009,27(2)：36-40.
[85]张康林.实行平等的—元户籍制度营造自由的土地承包经营权流转环境[J].南昌人学学报(人文社会科学版),2009,(1)：58-62.
[86]吴元波.我国土地产权制度、户籍制度与小城镇发展探析[J].农村经济,2004,(2)：70-75.
[87]樊纲.中国户籍与土地制度阻碍城市化进程[J].IT时代周刊,2006,6：17.
[88]柳建平.中国农村土地制度及改革研究—基于农村劳动力流动及人口城市化视角的分析[J].中州学刊,2011,(5)：72-76.
[89]陶然,汪晖.中国尚未完之转型中的土地制度改革：挑战与出路[J].国际经济评论,2010,(2)：72-76.
[90]张丽艳,王洪涛,王国辉.创建户籍改革、社保完善与土地流转的联动机制研究[J].经济纵横,2009,(9)：89-93.
[91]杨重光.城市化过程中土地政策调整与人口户籍变更[J].中国土地科学,2000,14(6)：6-10.
[92]陈锡文.农民进城放不放弃承包地完全由他自己决定[N].农民日报/2011年/3月/18日/第001版
[93]王艳玲.关注农民权益构建和谐社会—兼论户籍制度和土地使用权改革[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报(社会科学版),2010,29(5)：176-180.
[94]赵振军.谨慎推进户籍制度改革[J].理论与改革,2006,(5)：40.
[95]吴康明,陈霄.农民土地退出意愿与关键环节拿捏：重庆例证[J].改革,2011,(10)：61-66.
[96]张—鸣.户籍改革中农民土地权利与社会保障待遇[J].广西政法管理干部学院学报,2011,26(4)：21-25.
[97]张晓梅.户籍制度下土地承包经营权人在土地征收时的权益保障[J].前沿,2010,(10)：96-100.
[98]陶然.户籍改革意义何在—劳动力还是宅基地[N].社会科学报/2010年/9月/30日/第002版
[99]贺雪峰.为什么要警惕土地换户籍[J].北京农业,2011,(3)：5-6.
[100]梅哲、陈霄.城乡统筹背景下农村土地制度创新—对重庆农村土地制度改革的调查研究[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,50(3)：18-24.
[101]周也奇,朱玉碧.推进重庆市户籍改革的土地退出机制构建探讨—基于重庆市北碚区歇马镇转户农民土地退出的意愿调查[J].中国外贸,2011,(7)：186-188.
[102]曾昭盛.重庆户籍制度改革背景下的农村土地制度研究[J].科学咨询(科技·管理),2010,(12)：8-9.
[103]滕亚为.户籍改革中农村土地退出补偿机制研究—以重庆市为例[J].国家行政学院学报,2011,(4)：101-104.
[104]张蔚.快速城镇化进程中农村土地退出机制研究—基于重庆市户籍制度改革的实证[D].西南大学硕士学位论文,2011.
[105]黄志亮,刘昌用.户籍制度改革的重庆模式探索[J].国家行政学院学报,2011,(2)：104-108.
[106]党国英.重庆户籍制度改革正逢其时.北京青年报,2010-08-04
[107]漆先望.“土地换社保”破解“半城市化”难题[J].宏观经济管理,2011,(1)：62-63.
[108]四川省经济发展研究院课题组.“以土地换社保”—健全进城农民社会保障体系的基本思路[J].天府新论,2005,(2)：52-54.
[109]张晓晖.双溪村故事：土地换社保[J].人才资源开发,2011,(6)：46-48.
[110]黎诚,赵凯.“农地年薪制”+“土地换社保”新型征地补偿方式的可行性探讨—以陕西杨凌农业高新技术产业示范区为例[J].安徽农业科学,2006,34(20)：5404-5405.
[111]倪明胜.“以宅基地换房”：天津新农村建设的创新选择[J].中国乡村建设,2009,(1)：81-83.
[112]白莹.“宅基地换房”—天津户籍制度改革的有益尝试[J].行政与法,2010,(12)：16-18.
[113]崔丽娟.天津“宅基地换房”与重庆“双交换”模式比较与借鉴[J].天津经济,2010,(3)：43-47.
[114]吴胜杰.统筹城乡发展中农民市民化的政策突破—以重庆市九龙坡区先行示范改革为例[J].农村经济,2008,(12)：34-36.
[115]张红星,桑铁柱.农民利益保护与交易机制的改进—来自天津“宅基地换房”模式的经验[J].农业经济问题,2010,(5)：10-18.
[116]林宝,隆学文.“土地换社保”政策要慎重推行[J].中国党政干部论坛,2008,(5)：41-43.
[117]陈华威.“土地换社保”掩盖下失地农民的利益受损分析[J].经济视角,2011,(6)：22-24.
[118]周显祥.关于现行土地换社保政策的探讨[J].国土资源情报,2005,(11)：37-39.
[119]夏锋.土地换社保不是长期制度安排[J].农业经济管理,2009,(9)：32.
[120]杨魏欣.“宅基地换房”问题与对策分析[J].现代商贸工业,2010,(4)：146-148.
[121]詹明民.农村宅基地换房中存在问题的法律思考[J].东方企业文化,2010,(3)：47.
[122]周京奎,吴晓燕,胡云霞.集体建设用地流转模式创新的调查研究—以天津滨海新区东丽区华明镇宅基地换房为例[J].调查世界,2010,(7)：24-27.
[123]程同顺,杜福芳.快速城市化进程中的失地农民问题—以天津市华明镇“宅基地换房”为例[J].重庆社会主义学院学报,2011,(3)：93-96.
[124]向勇.如何维护农民在“宅基地换房”中的权益—以嘉兴市“两分两换”为例[J].兴学院学报,2011,23(2)：49-52.
[125]刘辉群,常树荣.推进天津市城乡一体化发展的路径与策略—基于“宅基地换房”视角[J].天津盛业大学学报,2010,30(4)：32-38.
[126]曹小明.以“土地换社保”—浙江嘉兴失地农民社会保障体系建设的探索、实践与发展思考[J].党政干部论坛,2004,(10)：23-26.
[127]向勇.宅基地换房经营主体制度创新探讨[J].嘉兴学院学报,2010,22(4)：36-39.
[128]何源源.宅基地换房模式分析及金融支持建议[J].房地产金融,2008,(12)：55-58.
[129]张良悦.户籍对价、劳动力迁移与土地流转[J].财经科学,2011,(1):118-121.
[130]侯东民.户籍制度改革：农民进城释放土地是重要使命[N].第一财经日报/2007年/4月/3日/第A07版.
[131]漆先望,吴敏,伍鑫等.土地换社保农民变市民—改革户籍制度的可行思路[J].四川省情,2008,(3)：31-32.
[132]陶然.户籍改革意义何在—劳动力还是宅基地[N].社会科学报/2010年/9月/30日/第002版.
[133]贺雪峰.为什么要警惕土地换户籍[J].北京农业,2011,(3)：5-6.
[134]赵振军.谨慎推进户籍制度改革[J].理论与改革,2006,(5)：40.
[135]刘奇.农民变市民该不该交出土地[J].发展,2011,(2)：10-13.
[136]张怡然,邱道持,李艳等.农民工进城落户与宅基地退出影响因素分析—基于重庆市开县357份农民工的调查问卷[J].中国软科学,2011,(2)62-64.
[137]张秀智,丁锐.经济欠发达与偏远农村地区宅基退出机制分析：案例研究[J].中国农村观察,2009,(6)：23-27.
[138]张秀智,丁锐.政府财政投资是影响宅基地退出的主要因素[J].经济研究参考,2008,(18)16-18.
[139]张德松.关于建立宅基地退出机制的探讨[J].浙江国土资源,2009,(10)：36-39.
[140]黄星.建立宅基地退出机制的思考[J].国土资源导刊,2009,(6)：62-64.
[141]欧阳安蛟,蔡锋铭,陈立定.农村宅基地退出机制建立探讨[J].中国土地科学,2009,23(10)：26-30.
[142]岳永兵.浅议宅基地退出机制[J].西部资源,2010,(5)：29-31.
[143]徐小峰,胡银根,魏西云等.农村宅基地退出与补偿的几点思考[J].国土资源情报,2011,(8)：31-35.
[144]陈霄.农民宅基地退出意愿的影响因素——基于重庆市“两翼”地区1012户农户的实证分析究[J].中国农村观察,2012,(3)：26-36.
[145]张世全,彭显文,冯长春等.商丘市构建农村宅基地退出机制探讨[J].地域研究与开发,2012,31(2)：82-86.
[146]王竹林,王征兵.农民工市民化的制度阐释[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：94-98.
[147]楚德江.我国农地承包权退出机制的困境与政策选择[J].农村经济,2011,(2)：38-43.
[148]王建友.完善农户农村土地承包经营权的退出机制[J].农业经济管理,2011,(3)：47-50.
[149]钟涨宝,聂建亮.建立健全农村土地承包经营权退出机制初探[J].理论与改革,2010,(5)：78-81.
[150]吕天强.建立农村土地退出机制促使务工农民市民化[J].南阳师范学院学报(社会科学版),2004,3(10)：48-52.
[151]颜明权.农民工市民化过程社会公正实现研究[D].吉林大学博士学位论文,2007.
[152]严燕,杨庆媛,张佰林等.非农就业对农户土地退出意愿影响的实证研究[J].西南大学学报(自然科学版),2012,36(4)：128-132.
[153]王兆林,杨庆媛.农户农村土地退出意愿综合影响因素探讨[J].农机化研究,2012(10),49-61.
[154]胡星斗.中国户籍制度的命运：完善抑或废除[J].学术研究,2009,(10)：65-70.
[155]蔡防.户籍改革可延人口红利突破中等收入陷阱。http：//www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/11-13/4325941.shtml
[156]尹希果,马大来,陈彪.重庆市统筹城乡户籍制度改革的制度变迁分析[J].探索,2011,(2)：138-142.
[157]韩明漠.农村社会学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2001：31-33.
[158]尤小文.农户：一个概念的探讨[J].中国农村经济,1999,(5)：17-19.
[159]卜范达,韩喜平.“农户经营”内涵的探析[J].当代经济研究,2003,(9)：37-41.
[160]谭淑豪,曲福田,黄贤金.市场经济环境下不同类型农户土地利用行为差异及土地保护政策分析[J],南京农业大学学报,2001,24(2)：110-114.
[161]周婧,杨庆媛,信桂新等.贫困山区农户兼业行为及其居民点用地形态—基于重庆市云阳县568户农户调查,地理研究,2010,29(10)：1768-1778.
[162]陈晓红,汪朝霞.苏州农户兼业行为的因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2007(4)：25-26.
[163](美)加里·贝克尔.人类行为的经济分析[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008年.
[164]熊小林.统筹城乡发展：调整城乡利益格局的交点、难点及城镇化路径—“中国城乡统筹发展：现状与展望研讨会暨第五届中国经济论坛”综述.中国农村经济,2010(11)：93-94.
[165]王兆林,杨庆媛,张佰林,藏波.户籍制度改革中农户土地退出意愿及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2011,(11)：49-61.
[166](英)卡尔·波兰尼.大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源[M].杭州：浙江人民出版社,2007.
[167](美)詹姆斯·斯科特.农民的道义经济学：东南亚的反叛与生存[M].南京：译林出版社,2001.
[168](美)黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[M].北京：中华书局,2000.
[169]H. C. Kelman. Compliance, identification and internalization:Three processes of Attitude change. Journal of Conflict Resolution,1958(2):51-60.
[170]L. Festinger & J. Carlsmith. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,1959(58):203-210.
[171]F. Heidey. The psychology of interpersonal relations. NY:Wiley,1958.
[172]Samuelson The pure theory of public expenditures [J].The Review of Economic sand Statistics,1954(36):387-389.
[173](美)冯·诺伊曼(John von Neumann),摩根斯顿(Oskar Morgenstern)[M].北京：生活.读书.新知三联书店,2004.
[174](美)道格拉斯·盖尔.一般均衡的策略基础——动态匹配与讨价还价博弈[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[175]Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1986), "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling ", Rand Journal of Economics,17,176-188.
[176]李广东.微观主体行为差异下的耕地保护经济补偿机制构建——三峡生态脆弱区的实证分析[D],西南大学硕士学位论文,2011年。
[177]Inderjit Singh, lyn Squire & John Strauss. Agricultural Household Model:Extension, Application and Policy. The John Hopkins University Press,1986
[178]洪建国.农户使用农机行为研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2010.
[179]杨俊.不同类型农户耕地投入行为及其效率研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2011.
[180]王兆林,杨庆媛.西南地区农村投资水平和农地利用效率对农民农业收入影响分析[J].经济地理,2012,32(8)：124-130.
[181]许庆,田士超,徐志刚等.农地制度、土地细碎化与农民收入不平等[J],经济研究,2008,(2)：83-84.
[182]林毅夫.CCER"中国经济2010”纽约论坛简报之一.http://www.ccer.edu.cn/cn /ReadNews.asp? NewsID=10856,2010-02.
[183]涂维亮,杨学文.农业投资与农民收入相关性研究[J],农业技术经济,2000,(5)：15-18.
[184]卢启程,李怡佳.西部省区支农财政投入与农民收入的关系研究——以云南省为例[J],改革与战略,2008,24(3)：74-76.
[185]姚林香,肖建华.财政投入对中国农民收入的影响——基于协整方法的时间序列分析[J],金融与经济,2010,(12)：17-19.
[186]李功奎、钟甫宁.农地细碎化、劳动力利用与农民收入——基于江苏省经济欠发达地区的实证研究[J],中国农村经济,2006,(4)：42-48.
[187]杨渝红、欧名豪.土地经营规模、农村剩余劳动力转移与农民收入关系研究——基于省际面板数据的检验析[J],资源科学,2009,31(2)：310-316.
[188]Odedokun:Alternative Econometric Approaches for Analyzing the Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Growth:Time-series Evidence from LDCs, Journal of Development Economics,1996,50(1):119-146.
[189]Pagano, M.:The Flotation of Companies on the Stock Market:A Co-ordination Failure Model, European Economic Review,1993,(36):763-81.
[190]Murinde, V.:Emerging Stock Markets:A Survey of Leading Issues, Discussion Paper Series in Financial and BankingEconomics, Cardiff Business School, FABER/94/3/1/B, 1994.
[191]Shunbo Yao and Yajun Guo, et al:An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of China's Land Conversion Program on Farmers'Income Growth and Labor Transfer[J]. Environmental Management, (3):2008,502-512.
[192]Parente, Steven and Prescott, Edward:Technology Adoption and Growth, Working paper No.3733 (NBER, Cambridge, MA)June,1991.
[193]温涛,冉光和,熊德平.中国金融发展与农民收入增长[J],经济研究,2005,(2)：30-40.
[194]Chiswick.B:The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men, Journal of Political Economy,1978,86(5):pp.897-921,
[195]Borjas George:Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. The American Economic Review.,1987,77:pp.531-553
[196]Demurger S, Fournier M, Yang WY:Rural households'decisions towards income diversification:Evidence from a township in northern China, China Economic Review, 20(Suppl.1), S32-S44,2010.
[197]唐博文,罗小峰,秦军.农户采用不同属性技术影响因素分析[J],中国农村经济[J],2010,(6)：49-55.
[198]王魏.甘肃省户籍制度改革现状及对策研究.经济研究导刊,2010(6)：212-214.
[199]朱泽.“民工潮”问题的现状、成因和对策.中国农村经济,1993(12)： 20-24.
[200]陆益龙.1949年后的中国户籍制度：结构与变迁.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2002(2)：123-126.
[201]Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang. The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes. The China Quarterly,1999,160(12):pp.818-855.
[202]夏纪军.人口流动性、公共收入与支出—户籍制度变迁动因分析[J].经济研究,2004(10)：56-65.
[203]王威海,周乃宁,张雄等.户籍制度改革的动力、阻力与途径探讨[J].理论导刊,2008(3)：16-18.
[204]蔡防,都阳,王美艳.户籍制度与劳动力市场保护[J].经济研究,2001(12)：41-45.
[205]杨重光.城市化过程中土地政策调整与人口户籍变更[J].中国土地科学,2000(6)：6-8.
[206]吴海盛,邓明.基于村庄内部差异视角的农村居民养老模式选择意愿及其影响因素 分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(11)：75-78.
[207](美)蒋中一,凯尔文·温赖特.数理经济学的基本方法(第四版)[M].北京大学出版社,2010.
[208]蔡昉.“民工荒”现象：成因及政策涵义分析[J].开放导报,2010(2)：5-9.
[209]黄祖辉,黄忠良.农户土地规模经营中的风险及其管理[J].农业现代化研究,1996,17(4)：192-196.
[210]陈传波,丁士军.对农户风险及其处理策略的分析[J].中国农村经济,2003,(11)：66-70.
[211]周萍入、齐振宏：消费者对转基因食品健康风险与生态风险认知实证研究[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012,(1)：5-11.
[212]Shaked,A.&Sutton,J.:Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica:52(6):1351-1364,1984.
[213]晋洪涛,史清华,俞宁.谈判权、程序公平与征地制度改革[J].中国农村经济,2010,(12)：4-16.
[214]陈剑波.农地制度：所有权问题还是委托—代理问题?[J].经济研究,2006,(7)：83-91.
[215]诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效,上海：上海三联书店中译本,1994.
[216](美)丹尼尔·W·布罗姆利.经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[217]吴康明.转户进城农民土地退出的影响因素和路径研究[J].西南大学博士论文,2011.
[218]胡元聪,王珊珊.城乡统筹背景下重庆市农村公共服务供给机制的完善——基于借鉴韩国新村运动的视角[J].科技与经济,2010,2(23)：51-54.
[219]骆东奇,周于翔,姜文.基于农户调查的重庆市农村土地流转研究[J].中国土地科学,2009,5(23)：46-49.
[220]曲福田,冯淑怡,俞红.土地价格及分配关系与农地非农化经济机制研究[J].中国农村经济,2001(12)：54-60.
[221]王仕菊,黄贤金,陈志刚等.基于耕地价值的征地补偿标准[J].中国土地科学,2008,22(11)：44-50.
[222]赵旭.农地征收补偿标准研究——基于可持续发展及模糊实物期权双重视角[J].西华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2012,5(31)：70-77.