中小企业融资难研究
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摘要
中小企业对—国经济的重要作用是毋庸置疑的：从对GDP增长、对就业的拉动、和对科技创新的贡献看,中小企业在一个国家中承担着最重要的角色。国外近几十年和中国改革开放30年的经济成果都—再证明了这一点。然而,中小企业融资问题一直是困扰中小企业发展的一大难题。我国的中小企业融资问题,在融资的可得性上具有世界中小企业普遍存在的问题外,还存在融资关系的不可持续性问题。长期以来,我国中小企业融资中存在企业不讲信用、银行对中小企业“惧贷”、“惜贷”,信息不对称严重,银企关系恶化的现象与问题。中小企业融资总是有“后继乏力”的问题。而另一方面,与中国同样有着间接金融制度为主的金融体系的日本、德国的金融体系与中小企业关系密切,中小企业融资难的问题比中国解决得好。有着直接金融体系的美国有数以万计的社区银行在为中小企业服务,“关系型”贷款的融资模式无论从理论到实践都得到广泛认可。在我国,国有体制为主的金融体系对中小企业存在规模歧视和制度歧视,中小企业自身往往不守信用、逃废银行债务。金融体系与中小企业的合作,似乎从来只存在于口头上,现实中双方永远都是“零和博弈”的关系。基于此,论文从中小企业和金融体系的投融资关系出发,探讨中小企业融资难的问题。
论文以经济人假设、有限理性假设、中小企业融资约束假设、企业生命周期理论与小企业融资周期理论为研究前提。在此基础上,从微观、中观与宏观的角度分别分析中小企业与金融体系的融资关系。在微观层面上,论文讨论了中小企业与金融体系的博弈机理与相互作用的激励约束机制；在中观层面上,论文讨论了与中小企业融资有关的信用支持制度和有关金融体制度的改革问题；在宏观层面上,论文讨论了中小企业融资与宏观经济发展的关系问题。论文从经济人的理性出发,独立分析中小企业和银行各自的经济动机与需求,确定投融资双方在中小企业融资中的激励约束机制、博弈焦点和均衡点。接着,对我国中小企业融资难中的融资关系问题进行博弈论模型的推理和计量模型检验。求出中小企业与银行在中小企业融资博弈中的纳什均衡解以及我国中小企业融资与中国经济发展的内在联系。再分别从中小企业和金融体系的角度,提出了中小企业追求稳定合作的投融资关系应该重视信用价值问题、金融体系发展与中小企业稳定合作融资关系存在的问题与改革思路。最后,论文以发展可持续的合作融资关系的对策与环境分析作为结尾。
论文共分八章。导论部分首先阐明论文研究的基本出发点和总体研究思路,接着介绍了论文的选题背景和研究意义,论文的假设前提和论文所研究的主要问题,诸如：论文的主要内容、论文的研究方法、论文的创新点等。对论文的基本研究框架和研究结果进行了交代。
第二章是论文的文献综述部分。首先在理论上回顾了西方中小企业融资理论：中小企业信贷缺口理论、信贷配给理论、代理理论、小企业融资周期理论,用于论文后面对我国中小企业融资难成因和我国有关中小企业融资金融制度的分析。论文特别较为详细地综述了关系型贷款、中小银行理论、中小企业信贷风险管理方法的文献,作为西方中小企业融资中投融资关系发展的佐证和对我国中小企业投融资关系研究方法的启示。接着是对我国中小企业融资难问题近十年来文献的梳理和对中小企业融资关系问题文献的综述与分析,找出论文进行研究的方向。本章对每一节都进行了详细的小结,对比了西方和中国在这方面理论研究的基本出发点和实证研究方法方面的差异,并说明了这些宝贵的文献对论文研究的帮助。
第三章从经济人的独立角度对银行及其他金融中介和中小企业对稳定合作融资关系的需求进行了理论分析,作为论文的理论前提。其中涉及中小企业融资需求的理论包括企业的生命周期理论和小企业金融生命周期理论,论文结合二者讨论了中小企业的融资需求、融资的制度需求和我国中小企业生命周期与融资需求问题。涉及金融体系的理论问题包括金融中介与借款者关系、商业银行的审慎经营与风险管理、商业银行新的利润增长点以及金融可持续发展的相关问题。论文讨论了在金融约束时代背景下,金融体系与中小企业都有寻找经济租金、获得自身发展的共同需要,说明二者具有“双赢”的理论基础。
第四章对传统的中国中小企业融资关系恶化的原因进行了规范分析和制度分析。包括中小企业的资质问题、银行的传统经营思路问题、信贷配给、信息不对称对银企关系的困扰、我国中小企业融资关系恶化的制度原因。
第五章正式对我国中小企业融资难和融资关系的不可持续性提出了理论上的解释,论文首先运用博弈论的逻辑推理说明我国中小企业与商业银行在现有制度下单纯依靠自身的努力是无法实现合作的,而这种不合作导致了中小企业融资难。接着,论文运用了来自东莞和杭州的两个案例说明博弈论模型的宏观启示是正确的：如果宏观经济发展能够保证有足够多的盈利项目,则该国中小企业信贷能够持续发展。需要其他主体的参与,比如政府的扶植,从而使银行获得保障,能够有动力贷款给中小企业,从而发展银企的合作关系。最后,论文运用计量模型对有公开财务报告的18家地方性中小银行和银行所在地的GDP、失业率进行了相互交叉的四次回归,得出中小企业银行的利润依赖于宏观经济的发展,如GDP的增长、中小企业融资和中小企业银行的利润对宏观经济指标如GDP是有贡献的、中小企业融资和中小企业银行的发展是一种金融产业行为的结论。从实证的角度说明我国的中小企业融资本身是有经济效益的,是金融发展的一部分,也对我国经济的发展有贡献。在宏观经济稳定发展和金融体制改革相配合的前提下,中小企业与金融机构的稳定合作有可能实现
第六章根据前面的推理,提出发展中小企业融资关系的关键是实现信用价值,而我国的现行信用体系排斥中小企业的信用价值。并说明信用价值实现的途径包括：中小企业征信体系、中小企业信用担保体系、商业银行的中小企业信贷风险管理,以及这些方面我国存在的问题。在讨论商业银行的中小企业信贷风险管理这个我国金融实践领域最为头痛的问题时。论文介绍了大量的最新技术：包括财务分析法、信用评分法、复杂金融工具的运用等。并运用财务分析法分析了云南省的中小企业信贷风险。最后,,论文引证了美国、欧洲、日本和韩国的中小企业信用支持体系作为我国的借鉴。
第七章从投资方金融体系的角度说明解决中小企业融资难、发展良好的投融资关系的充分必要性。指出在经济发展的新背景下,银行有压力和动力解决中小企业融资难问题,银行有同中小企业发展良好的融资关系的需求。而不是将中小企业信贷视为不挣钱的包袱,银行不再站在一个“施舍者”的角度,而需要作为平等的市场主体与中小企业发展融资关系,为了金融自身的可持续发展而进行中小企业融资。论文引鉴了美国、西欧、中国台湾地区的中小企业融资制度的内容、特别是银企关系的处理方式以期对我国金融体制的改革有所启示。
本章涉及各种金融主体发展同中小企业融资关系的金融创新、关系型贷款的发展。特别是对关系型贷款进行了一个带有中国特色的典型案例的分析——昆明市农信社市场商户贷款分析。论文介绍了这个有着三个当事人的关系型贷款的发展情况,并运用信启、经济学方法上分析了三方之间与“交易”相连的“关系”,求出各自的效用函数和经济利润。
第八章对从发展中小企业与金融体系的可持续合作投融资关系的角度解决中小企业融资难的对策和所需环境建设给出了建议。包括：信用环境建设、金融环境建设、文化和社会环境建设三个方面。
从论文的论证中可以得出以下基本结论：中小企业与金融机构发展可持续合作关系是符合其各自经济人理性的,也符合我国宏观经济结构和金融发展的变化。在对现有体制进行改革、提升中小企业素质和金融机构服务能力的条件下,可持续的合作关系是可以实现的。而中小企业与金融体系的长期稳定合作能够解决中小企业融资难问题。而中小企业融资行为本身作为金融产业的一部分对宏观经济是有自身贡献的。
论文存在以下几个可能的创新：1.在考虑宏观经济景气的条件下,建立中小企业投融资关系博弈模型同时进行计量模型数据检验。建立了四个考察中小企业融资本身的、中小企业信贷同宏观经济指标相连的回归方程。说明了我国中小企业融资是有益于宏观经济发展的一种金融行为。2.在圣路易斯华盛顿大学导师Philip Dybvig的指导下,对我国的关系型贷款中的与“交易’相连的“关系”部分进行了阐述。国外对关系型贷款的研究大部分都是计量模型的实证研究,而对关系型贷款本身架构的研究非常少。我国就没有这方面的研究。论文对云南省昆明市农村合作银行的“市场商户贷款“中的三方关系进行了了理论上的刻画,用博弈论模型说明其中的经济关系和各自的经济利润。3.在研究方法与研究视角上,将微观主体的重塑和发展与宏观经济发展相联系。将中小企业与商业银行作为独立的经济微观主体博弈思想贯穿全文。既考虑了中小企业的生命周期各个阶段融资需求规律和资金供给渠道,又考虑了金融中介存在的原因、金融中介和借款者关系、商业银行的经营目标与风险管理要求、我国金融发展阶段的变化,突破了以往对中小企业融资微观主体层面仅考虑某一方面的局限。4.将金融机构作为一个积极的、独立的市场主体参与到中小企业融资中。利用国外对金融中介理论、金融中介与借款者关系理论的研究,从金融中介存在的理论原因出发、考虑了金融机构的审慎经营与利润追求约束,讨论金融中介作为经济人与中小企业的投融资关系。借鉴国外金融体系支持中小企业发展的模式；从银行业市场结构、金融创新模式、商业银行信贷经营与管理技术方面；提出了金融中介在实现自身可持续发展中与中小企业相结合的思路。
It is undoubted that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute very much to a country's economy:SMEs bear the most important role in one country, whatever from the growth of GDP, the push of employment and the technology innovation, the SMEs play the most important part. All the economy results, both from foreign countries'several ten years economy growth and from China's thirty years'opening and reforming economy, have tested this point repeatedly. However, the problem of SMEs finance is always a big problem preventing SMEs'development. China's SMEs finance problem not only has other popular funding availability SMEs finance problems, but also has the problem of SMEs finance relationship sustainable.For such a long time, China's SMEs lack of credits, the banks fear loans to SMEs, cut loans to SMEs, information asymmetry, the banks and SMEs'relationship is bad. China's SMEs finance problem always has some problem of development and sustainability. However, Japan's and Germany's financial system set up a good relationship with small businesses, which both have an indirect financial system like China. In US, there are thousands of community banks serve the SMEs, the mode of relationship loan is admitted both by economics and bankers, although US has a big direct financial system. In China, the states owned financial system has both scale and system discrimination to SMEs, and the SMEs often default. The cooperation between financial system and SMEs is always a word, it is always a zero game in the real economy. So, the paper do a study on the Delimma of Small Business in China, based on the relationship between investors and debtors.
The thesis is based on economic person assumption, limited ration assumption, SMEs finance restrains assumption, enterprise life circle (ELC) and the theory of small enterprise finance growth circle. And the thesis analyzed the relationship between SME's and financial system from the microeconomic\macroeconomic and system economic tools and theories.In microeconomics, the thesis talk the game theory and constrains\incentive mechanism between SME's and financial system, in system economics; the thesis talk about the SME's financial support system and the financial system reform related to SME's finance; in macroeconomy, the thesis talk about the SME's and economy development\the SME's finance environment. The thesis analyze the SMEs'and banks'incentive and demand for a good relationship:to determine the game. Then, solve the game and test it in a metriceconomy model. The thesis got the Nash answer and the inter-relation between the China's economy development. The thesis point out the credit value is important to SME and financial system cooperation; the financial system reform related to the SME's finance; the thesis talks the SME's finance environment as the ending.
The first chapter introduce the base and study frame of the thesis, the topic's research meaning, the assumptions; the contents\the research tools and innovations of the thesis.
Chapter two is the literature review part of the thesis. The thesis did a review of western small business finance theories:the small business finance gap, credit rationing theory, agent theory, small business finance cycle theory. The thesis made a detailed review on relationship loan\small banks theory\small business credit management, as the support of western countries SMEs and financial institutions relationship.Then the thesis did the review on China's past ten years research of the delimma of China's SMEs finance, and the relationship between financial instituions and SMEs in China. The thesis makes detail conclusions on each trifle, in order to show what the thesis learn from those good papers.
Chapter3analyzes financial institutions'and SME's demand for a durable cooperation on the base each party is an independent economic person.. In the theories related to SMEs including:enterprise life cycle theory and small business finance cycle theory.Those related to financial system including:financial intermediation theory,the relationship between the financial medium, commercial banks risk management and finance development theory. The thesis point out that under financial constrain, the financial system and SME's both want to find economic rent; and both want to develop themselves. So, it is a double win.
Chapter4analyzes the reasons of bad relationship between SME's and financial systems. Including:the SME's qualifications, the banks traditional running and management, credit rationing, unsymmetrical information, the system problems.
Chapter5gives out formal rational reasons to the delimma of China'small business finance and the unsustainable financing relationship. The chapter first gives out a game model to explain the SMEs and commercial banks cannot cooperation by themselves. And the uncooperation results in the delimma of China'small business finance. Then this chapter gives out the cases from Dongguan and Wenzhou to show the correct of the model:if the macroeconomy can develop very well to provide enough good projects, the SMEs credit can get development. And the SMEs finance also needs government support.At last.the chapter tests the model using the18small banks'profits and local GDP\unemployment, gets the conclusion:the small banks profits is related to the local GDP, the small banks profits contributes to GDP. So, the mall business finance is a part of financing industry. The cooperation between the SME and financial system is possible under some financial constrain.
Chapter6points out the key problem of small business finance:the SME should turn their credit value to true. The old credit system under state owned economy does not accept the SME credit. Then the chapter gives out the methods to valuate the SME credit:the SME credit scoring system, the SME credit guarantee system, commercial banks'credit risk management, and the problems of the methods in China. The chapter introduces several new tools in SME credit risk management:credit scoring, financial analysis, complicated financial tools etc. And the Chapter analyzes the credit risk in Yunnan commercial banks. In the end of the chapter, the thesis introduces the SME credit supporting system in US, European, Japan and Korea.
Chapter7from the investors aspect to slove the delimma of China's small business finance and talk about the investors need to develop a good relationship with SMEs.. This Chapter points out that under the background of economy development, the bank has the demand and big incentive to develops a good relationship with SMEs. The banks will not do charity to SMEs again.The banks can make money from financing small businesses. The banks and SMEs are equal market unit.The chapter also introduces US, European, Taiwan's SME and banks'relationship dealing ways.
The chapter analyzes a relationship loan's case in game theory:Kunming credit union's relationship loan case.The thesis introduces the case management and development conditions which involves three parties in it.The model solved each party's utility function and economic profit.
Chapter8gives out the suggestions about developing a good relationship between SME and financial system's environment construction. Including:credit environment construction, financial environment construction, and culture and society environment construction.
The thesis draws the basic conclusions as following:the SME and financial institutions develop a durable cooperative relationship is from their economy person incentives, and the relationship also matches the China's economy development. Under the donditions of the financial system reform, developing SME qulifications, developing the financial institutions service ability the sustainable cooperation can be turned in true. And this durable cooperative cooperation can solve the delimma of China's SME financing problem. And the small business finance as a part of financial industry can contribute to the economy.
There are following possible innovations of the thesis in the following:1. The thesis sets up a game model under macroeconomy development and test the model.The thesis sets up four empirical regress equations to test the SMEs finance itself and SMEs credit's relation to macroeconomy.lt shows that SMes finance is a kind of finance and good to ecnomy development.2. The thesis give out a theory frame of "relationship", which is related to "transaction". The model is under professor Philip Dybvig's advice.Here the relationship is in a relationship loan case in China. The model gives out three parties's economy relationship and each party's economic profit.3.In the study tools, the thesis considers the micro unity reform with the macro economy development. SMEs and commercial banks are both independent economic person in the game.The thesis considers SME's each life cycle step's finance demands and funds supply, also considers the finaicial intermediation's theory the relationship between financial medium and debtors.The thesis includs the China's financial market problem, the system problem. The thesis use game theory, information economy theory to solve the delimma4.The thesis treats commercial banks independently, actively to do the small business finance. The thesis use the financial intermediation theory, the relationship between financial medium and debtors theory to help the problem solving.The thesis learn from foreign country's financial system support to the SMEs development.advocate a way that the financial intermediation sustainablly develop itself and set up a relationship with SMEs,while considering bank market structure\financial innovation\commercial banks credit management technologies
论文以经济人假设、有限理性假设、中小企业融资约束假设、企业生命周期理论与小企业融资周期理论为研究前提。在此基础上,从微观、中观与宏观的角度分别分析中小企业与金融体系的融资关系。在微观层面上,论文讨论了中小企业与金融体系的博弈机理与相互作用的激励约束机制；在中观层面上,论文讨论了与中小企业融资有关的信用支持制度和有关金融体制度的改革问题；在宏观层面上,论文讨论了中小企业融资与宏观经济发展的关系问题。论文从经济人的理性出发,独立分析中小企业和银行各自的经济动机与需求,确定投融资双方在中小企业融资中的激励约束机制、博弈焦点和均衡点。接着,对我国中小企业融资难中的融资关系问题进行博弈论模型的推理和计量模型检验。求出中小企业与银行在中小企业融资博弈中的纳什均衡解以及我国中小企业融资与中国经济发展的内在联系。再分别从中小企业和金融体系的角度,提出了中小企业追求稳定合作的投融资关系应该重视信用价值问题、金融体系发展与中小企业稳定合作融资关系存在的问题与改革思路。最后,论文以发展可持续的合作融资关系的对策与环境分析作为结尾。
论文共分八章。导论部分首先阐明论文研究的基本出发点和总体研究思路,接着介绍了论文的选题背景和研究意义,论文的假设前提和论文所研究的主要问题,诸如：论文的主要内容、论文的研究方法、论文的创新点等。对论文的基本研究框架和研究结果进行了交代。
第二章是论文的文献综述部分。首先在理论上回顾了西方中小企业融资理论：中小企业信贷缺口理论、信贷配给理论、代理理论、小企业融资周期理论,用于论文后面对我国中小企业融资难成因和我国有关中小企业融资金融制度的分析。论文特别较为详细地综述了关系型贷款、中小银行理论、中小企业信贷风险管理方法的文献,作为西方中小企业融资中投融资关系发展的佐证和对我国中小企业投融资关系研究方法的启示。接着是对我国中小企业融资难问题近十年来文献的梳理和对中小企业融资关系问题文献的综述与分析,找出论文进行研究的方向。本章对每一节都进行了详细的小结,对比了西方和中国在这方面理论研究的基本出发点和实证研究方法方面的差异,并说明了这些宝贵的文献对论文研究的帮助。
第三章从经济人的独立角度对银行及其他金融中介和中小企业对稳定合作融资关系的需求进行了理论分析,作为论文的理论前提。其中涉及中小企业融资需求的理论包括企业的生命周期理论和小企业金融生命周期理论,论文结合二者讨论了中小企业的融资需求、融资的制度需求和我国中小企业生命周期与融资需求问题。涉及金融体系的理论问题包括金融中介与借款者关系、商业银行的审慎经营与风险管理、商业银行新的利润增长点以及金融可持续发展的相关问题。论文讨论了在金融约束时代背景下,金融体系与中小企业都有寻找经济租金、获得自身发展的共同需要,说明二者具有“双赢”的理论基础。
第四章对传统的中国中小企业融资关系恶化的原因进行了规范分析和制度分析。包括中小企业的资质问题、银行的传统经营思路问题、信贷配给、信息不对称对银企关系的困扰、我国中小企业融资关系恶化的制度原因。
第五章正式对我国中小企业融资难和融资关系的不可持续性提出了理论上的解释,论文首先运用博弈论的逻辑推理说明我国中小企业与商业银行在现有制度下单纯依靠自身的努力是无法实现合作的,而这种不合作导致了中小企业融资难。接着,论文运用了来自东莞和杭州的两个案例说明博弈论模型的宏观启示是正确的：如果宏观经济发展能够保证有足够多的盈利项目,则该国中小企业信贷能够持续发展。需要其他主体的参与,比如政府的扶植,从而使银行获得保障,能够有动力贷款给中小企业,从而发展银企的合作关系。最后,论文运用计量模型对有公开财务报告的18家地方性中小银行和银行所在地的GDP、失业率进行了相互交叉的四次回归,得出中小企业银行的利润依赖于宏观经济的发展,如GDP的增长、中小企业融资和中小企业银行的利润对宏观经济指标如GDP是有贡献的、中小企业融资和中小企业银行的发展是一种金融产业行为的结论。从实证的角度说明我国的中小企业融资本身是有经济效益的,是金融发展的一部分,也对我国经济的发展有贡献。在宏观经济稳定发展和金融体制改革相配合的前提下,中小企业与金融机构的稳定合作有可能实现
第六章根据前面的推理,提出发展中小企业融资关系的关键是实现信用价值,而我国的现行信用体系排斥中小企业的信用价值。并说明信用价值实现的途径包括：中小企业征信体系、中小企业信用担保体系、商业银行的中小企业信贷风险管理,以及这些方面我国存在的问题。在讨论商业银行的中小企业信贷风险管理这个我国金融实践领域最为头痛的问题时。论文介绍了大量的最新技术：包括财务分析法、信用评分法、复杂金融工具的运用等。并运用财务分析法分析了云南省的中小企业信贷风险。最后,,论文引证了美国、欧洲、日本和韩国的中小企业信用支持体系作为我国的借鉴。
第七章从投资方金融体系的角度说明解决中小企业融资难、发展良好的投融资关系的充分必要性。指出在经济发展的新背景下,银行有压力和动力解决中小企业融资难问题,银行有同中小企业发展良好的融资关系的需求。而不是将中小企业信贷视为不挣钱的包袱,银行不再站在一个“施舍者”的角度,而需要作为平等的市场主体与中小企业发展融资关系,为了金融自身的可持续发展而进行中小企业融资。论文引鉴了美国、西欧、中国台湾地区的中小企业融资制度的内容、特别是银企关系的处理方式以期对我国金融体制的改革有所启示。
本章涉及各种金融主体发展同中小企业融资关系的金融创新、关系型贷款的发展。特别是对关系型贷款进行了一个带有中国特色的典型案例的分析——昆明市农信社市场商户贷款分析。论文介绍了这个有着三个当事人的关系型贷款的发展情况,并运用信启、经济学方法上分析了三方之间与“交易”相连的“关系”,求出各自的效用函数和经济利润。
第八章对从发展中小企业与金融体系的可持续合作投融资关系的角度解决中小企业融资难的对策和所需环境建设给出了建议。包括：信用环境建设、金融环境建设、文化和社会环境建设三个方面。
从论文的论证中可以得出以下基本结论：中小企业与金融机构发展可持续合作关系是符合其各自经济人理性的,也符合我国宏观经济结构和金融发展的变化。在对现有体制进行改革、提升中小企业素质和金融机构服务能力的条件下,可持续的合作关系是可以实现的。而中小企业与金融体系的长期稳定合作能够解决中小企业融资难问题。而中小企业融资行为本身作为金融产业的一部分对宏观经济是有自身贡献的。
论文存在以下几个可能的创新：1.在考虑宏观经济景气的条件下,建立中小企业投融资关系博弈模型同时进行计量模型数据检验。建立了四个考察中小企业融资本身的、中小企业信贷同宏观经济指标相连的回归方程。说明了我国中小企业融资是有益于宏观经济发展的一种金融行为。2.在圣路易斯华盛顿大学导师Philip Dybvig的指导下,对我国的关系型贷款中的与“交易’相连的“关系”部分进行了阐述。国外对关系型贷款的研究大部分都是计量模型的实证研究,而对关系型贷款本身架构的研究非常少。我国就没有这方面的研究。论文对云南省昆明市农村合作银行的“市场商户贷款“中的三方关系进行了了理论上的刻画,用博弈论模型说明其中的经济关系和各自的经济利润。3.在研究方法与研究视角上,将微观主体的重塑和发展与宏观经济发展相联系。将中小企业与商业银行作为独立的经济微观主体博弈思想贯穿全文。既考虑了中小企业的生命周期各个阶段融资需求规律和资金供给渠道,又考虑了金融中介存在的原因、金融中介和借款者关系、商业银行的经营目标与风险管理要求、我国金融发展阶段的变化,突破了以往对中小企业融资微观主体层面仅考虑某一方面的局限。4.将金融机构作为一个积极的、独立的市场主体参与到中小企业融资中。利用国外对金融中介理论、金融中介与借款者关系理论的研究,从金融中介存在的理论原因出发、考虑了金融机构的审慎经营与利润追求约束,讨论金融中介作为经济人与中小企业的投融资关系。借鉴国外金融体系支持中小企业发展的模式；从银行业市场结构、金融创新模式、商业银行信贷经营与管理技术方面；提出了金融中介在实现自身可持续发展中与中小企业相结合的思路。
It is undoubted that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute very much to a country's economy:SMEs bear the most important role in one country, whatever from the growth of GDP, the push of employment and the technology innovation, the SMEs play the most important part. All the economy results, both from foreign countries'several ten years economy growth and from China's thirty years'opening and reforming economy, have tested this point repeatedly. However, the problem of SMEs finance is always a big problem preventing SMEs'development. China's SMEs finance problem not only has other popular funding availability SMEs finance problems, but also has the problem of SMEs finance relationship sustainable.For such a long time, China's SMEs lack of credits, the banks fear loans to SMEs, cut loans to SMEs, information asymmetry, the banks and SMEs'relationship is bad. China's SMEs finance problem always has some problem of development and sustainability. However, Japan's and Germany's financial system set up a good relationship with small businesses, which both have an indirect financial system like China. In US, there are thousands of community banks serve the SMEs, the mode of relationship loan is admitted both by economics and bankers, although US has a big direct financial system. In China, the states owned financial system has both scale and system discrimination to SMEs, and the SMEs often default. The cooperation between financial system and SMEs is always a word, it is always a zero game in the real economy. So, the paper do a study on the Delimma of Small Business in China, based on the relationship between investors and debtors.
The thesis is based on economic person assumption, limited ration assumption, SMEs finance restrains assumption, enterprise life circle (ELC) and the theory of small enterprise finance growth circle. And the thesis analyzed the relationship between SME's and financial system from the microeconomic\macroeconomic and system economic tools and theories.In microeconomics, the thesis talk the game theory and constrains\incentive mechanism between SME's and financial system, in system economics; the thesis talk about the SME's financial support system and the financial system reform related to SME's finance; in macroeconomy, the thesis talk about the SME's and economy development\the SME's finance environment. The thesis analyze the SMEs'and banks'incentive and demand for a good relationship:to determine the game. Then, solve the game and test it in a metriceconomy model. The thesis got the Nash answer and the inter-relation between the China's economy development. The thesis point out the credit value is important to SME and financial system cooperation; the financial system reform related to the SME's finance; the thesis talks the SME's finance environment as the ending.
The first chapter introduce the base and study frame of the thesis, the topic's research meaning, the assumptions; the contents\the research tools and innovations of the thesis.
Chapter two is the literature review part of the thesis. The thesis did a review of western small business finance theories:the small business finance gap, credit rationing theory, agent theory, small business finance cycle theory. The thesis made a detailed review on relationship loan\small banks theory\small business credit management, as the support of western countries SMEs and financial institutions relationship.Then the thesis did the review on China's past ten years research of the delimma of China's SMEs finance, and the relationship between financial instituions and SMEs in China. The thesis makes detail conclusions on each trifle, in order to show what the thesis learn from those good papers.
Chapter3analyzes financial institutions'and SME's demand for a durable cooperation on the base each party is an independent economic person.. In the theories related to SMEs including:enterprise life cycle theory and small business finance cycle theory.Those related to financial system including:financial intermediation theory,the relationship between the financial medium, commercial banks risk management and finance development theory. The thesis point out that under financial constrain, the financial system and SME's both want to find economic rent; and both want to develop themselves. So, it is a double win.
Chapter4analyzes the reasons of bad relationship between SME's and financial systems. Including:the SME's qualifications, the banks traditional running and management, credit rationing, unsymmetrical information, the system problems.
Chapter5gives out formal rational reasons to the delimma of China'small business finance and the unsustainable financing relationship. The chapter first gives out a game model to explain the SMEs and commercial banks cannot cooperation by themselves. And the uncooperation results in the delimma of China'small business finance. Then this chapter gives out the cases from Dongguan and Wenzhou to show the correct of the model:if the macroeconomy can develop very well to provide enough good projects, the SMEs credit can get development. And the SMEs finance also needs government support.At last.the chapter tests the model using the18small banks'profits and local GDP\unemployment, gets the conclusion:the small banks profits is related to the local GDP, the small banks profits contributes to GDP. So, the mall business finance is a part of financing industry. The cooperation between the SME and financial system is possible under some financial constrain.
Chapter6points out the key problem of small business finance:the SME should turn their credit value to true. The old credit system under state owned economy does not accept the SME credit. Then the chapter gives out the methods to valuate the SME credit:the SME credit scoring system, the SME credit guarantee system, commercial banks'credit risk management, and the problems of the methods in China. The chapter introduces several new tools in SME credit risk management:credit scoring, financial analysis, complicated financial tools etc. And the Chapter analyzes the credit risk in Yunnan commercial banks. In the end of the chapter, the thesis introduces the SME credit supporting system in US, European, Japan and Korea.
Chapter7from the investors aspect to slove the delimma of China's small business finance and talk about the investors need to develop a good relationship with SMEs.. This Chapter points out that under the background of economy development, the bank has the demand and big incentive to develops a good relationship with SMEs. The banks will not do charity to SMEs again.The banks can make money from financing small businesses. The banks and SMEs are equal market unit.The chapter also introduces US, European, Taiwan's SME and banks'relationship dealing ways.
The chapter analyzes a relationship loan's case in game theory:Kunming credit union's relationship loan case.The thesis introduces the case management and development conditions which involves three parties in it.The model solved each party's utility function and economic profit.
Chapter8gives out the suggestions about developing a good relationship between SME and financial system's environment construction. Including:credit environment construction, financial environment construction, and culture and society environment construction.
The thesis draws the basic conclusions as following:the SME and financial institutions develop a durable cooperative relationship is from their economy person incentives, and the relationship also matches the China's economy development. Under the donditions of the financial system reform, developing SME qulifications, developing the financial institutions service ability the sustainable cooperation can be turned in true. And this durable cooperative cooperation can solve the delimma of China's SME financing problem. And the small business finance as a part of financial industry can contribute to the economy.
There are following possible innovations of the thesis in the following:1. The thesis sets up a game model under macroeconomy development and test the model.The thesis sets up four empirical regress equations to test the SMEs finance itself and SMEs credit's relation to macroeconomy.lt shows that SMes finance is a kind of finance and good to ecnomy development.2. The thesis give out a theory frame of "relationship", which is related to "transaction". The model is under professor Philip Dybvig's advice.Here the relationship is in a relationship loan case in China. The model gives out three parties's economy relationship and each party's economic profit.3.In the study tools, the thesis considers the micro unity reform with the macro economy development. SMEs and commercial banks are both independent economic person in the game.The thesis considers SME's each life cycle step's finance demands and funds supply, also considers the finaicial intermediation's theory the relationship between financial medium and debtors.The thesis includs the China's financial market problem, the system problem. The thesis use game theory, information economy theory to solve the delimma4.The thesis treats commercial banks independently, actively to do the small business finance. The thesis use the financial intermediation theory, the relationship between financial medium and debtors theory to help the problem solving.The thesis learn from foreign country's financial system support to the SMEs development.advocate a way that the financial intermediation sustainablly develop itself and set up a relationship with SMEs,while considering bank market structure\financial innovation\commercial banks credit management technologies
引文
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