我国汽车产业资本结构影响因素的动态研究
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摘要
资本结构问题是一个具有重大理论价值和实践意义的研究课题。资本结构与企业的税收地位、财务状况和代理成本直接相关,它不仅影响企业的资本成本和治理结构,而且影响企业的总体价值。资本结构还会影响企业经营绩效,进而影响一个国家或地区的总体经济增长和稳定。优化企业的资本结构直接关系到提升上市企业素质和投资价值、增强投资者信心以及促进证券市场的健康发展。由于各国企业处于不同的经济环境,不同的企业制度安排、金融市场发育程度等存在差异,也使得各国不同产业企业的资本结构不尽相同。因此,资本结构调整要根据不同国家、不同产业所处的经济环境和现实状况而定。如何完善企业治理结构,如何提高企业业绩,促进资本市场理性的发展,是宏观经济快速健康发展的关键,企业资本结构的优化是解决上述问题的关键所在。
本文在对资本结构理论及其影响因素实证研究的回顾基础上,分析了汽车产业融资方式和资本结构特征;比较了产业间资本结构的差异和国家间汽车产业资本结构的特点;根据资本结构理论模型并结合我国的制度环境,理论分析宏观经济因素和企业特征因素对资本结构选择的影响,从动态角度实证研究宏观经济因素和企业特征因素对资本结构选择的影响,并且采用结构向量自回归模型和动态面板模型研究了汽车产业资本结构的调整方向。
Capital structure of the automobile industry has its own characteristics, such as asset-liability ratio is low, the high proportion of current liabilities. Meanwhile, the automobile industry of China is developing fast, and the split share structure reform is ongoing. The capital structure of the automobile industry has a special system environment, such as equity structure is relatively unique, investor protection is not perfect, development of capital markets and corporate governance mechanisms have defects and other issues. So, what factors affect the choice of capital structure of China's automobile industry? What direction should capital structure of automobile industry adjust? Whether it should simply enhance the asset-liability ratio at the same time facing a high risk or keep stable? These questions are worth discussing and studying.
Based on the review of the capital structure theories and its empirical research of determinants, the paper analyses the capital structure characteristics of the automobile industry. Based on the capital structure theoretical model, combined with China's institutional environment, the paper theoretically analyses the macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics factors on the impact of capital structure choice. Then the paper empirically researches the macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics factors that can affect the capital structure choice from a dynamic point of view, using structural vector auto-regression model and dynamic panel data model to research the direction of the capital structure.
In particular, the main contents of this paper are as follows:
ChapterⅠ, Introduction. This chapter discusses research background, the main content and framework. Theoretical basis, research methods of this study are also given.
ChapterⅡ, Capital structure theory and empirical research review. This chapter introduces the theory of capital structure, the main branches of models and basic concepts, trying to describe the development of the capital structure through the development process and the concerns of various theories. The chapter discusses the main arguments and research results of a systematic theory of capital structure, such as trade-off theory, agency theory, financial contract theory, signaling theory, pecking order theory, the product and market theory, behavioral finance theory. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign empirical research of capital structure is reviewed, and evaluating the problems and shortcomings of the existing literature.
ChapterⅢ, The financing of China's automobile industry and the status of the capital structure. The chapter analyzes the financing of the automobile industry. Because different financing methods have different advantages and disadvantages, when enterprises select appropriate forms of financing, they should consider their own characteristics and needs, thus different capital structures will be formed. Then the chapter statistically analyzes the operating status and characteristics of capital structure of the automobile industry, and compares with the major automobile firm's capital structure characteristics of the other countries.
ChapterⅣ, Macroeconomic factors impact on the capital structure of the automobile industry. Using structural vector auto-regression model and the impulse response function, the chapter empirically studies the macroeconomic factors which affect the choice of the capital structure, such as GDP growth, inflation rate, the size of the capital markets, interest rates, average tax rates, the central government expenditure and the local fiscal expenditure.
ChapterⅤ, Micro-factors dynamically impact on the capital structure of the automobile industry. The chapter uses co-integration panel data methods to empirically study on the determinants of capital structure of China's 18 automobile firms listed in 1998-2007.
ChapterⅥ, Suggestions. According to the results obtained in this paper, this chapter provides countermeasures and proposals in order to optimize the capital structure of the automobile industry, refine the government policies, the financial policy-making and the governance structures of the public enterprises.
ChapterⅦ, Conclusions and prospects. Based on the research of the previous chapters, it summaries the main findings , the innovations and points out the lack of research and future research directions.
Results of theoretical and empirical research are as follows:
1. Asset-liability ratio of automobile industry is low, and the proportion of current liabilities is very high, while the proportion of long-term debt is low. Automobile industry depends on equity financing with a strong preference. There are significant differences in capital structure between enterprises, and there are also some differences between industries. Compared with three-year asset-liability ratio of the world 500 strong enterprises in the automobile industry, the rate of FAW Group's assets and liabilities is at the intermediate level.
2. Capital structure of China's automobile industry is influenced by macro-economic growth, and is greatly impacted by the lending interest rate and the fiscal expenditure. But there isn’t significant relationship with the inflation rates, the tax rates and the size of capital market financing. This phenomenon is related with the certain stage of China's automobile industry development. In the vector auto-regressive model, the asset-liability ratio is significantly impacted by its lagged, but the coefficients are all negative, indicating that asset-liability ratio has a return tendency. Through the impulse response function model, we can see that the macro factors on the rate of corporate assets and liabilities have different degrees of time lag. The capital structure of China's automobile industry's response to the macro-economic factors is special, which is related with the development of China's capital market and the automobile industry. Although the gradual adjustment of enterprises themselves is market-oriented, but the capital structure is still greatly impacted by the state fiscal policy, in particular, responds to local fiscal expenditure significantly.
3. In consistent with the Pecking Order theory, companies in the long and short term will choose low-cost internal financing. In the long-term trends, the firm's fund management capabilities are positively correlated with the debt ratios, but the short-term relationship is not significant. Short-term solvency of enterprises and capital structure presents a more complex relationship, which should be affected by the enterprise's financial laxity. Both in the short term or the long-term, large enterprises that have strong ability for growth-will not delivery benefits to the others, so they tend to reduce the debt ratios. Non-debt tax shield has a substitution effect on the liability in the long-run equilibrium, but in the short-term is not obvious. The impact on the capital structure of firm size is positive, which has relationship with the liabilities structure and the credit system. Through the error correction model can be seen, in the short-term capital structure of China's automobile industry will be adjusted of -0.396384 degree back to a balanced state. There is reverse adjustment mechanism. Empirical results using dynamic panel data model can be seen that, capital structure of the automobile industry is obviously impacted by its lag1, but not significantly with the lag items increases.
Innovation and conclusions:
1. Macro-environment: (1) Compared with developed countries, China's financial market is not perfect. Consideration of enterprises major is how to obtain funds, rather than choosing what kind of methods to finance. Therefore, to optimize the capital structure of the automobile industry must improve the financial markets. At present, the most urgent part of the development is the corporate bond market. (2) We need to re-recognize the capital market functions, strengthen investor protection legislation, to effectively protect the interests of the creditors.
2. Micro-enterprises: (1) A reasonable choice of financing; (2) Focus on the capital structure coordinated with the development of the external environment; (3) The establishment of capital structure adjustment mechanism; (4) The enterprise scale; (5) Focus on the asset composition; (6) Focus on the growth opportunities; (7) Adjustment of state-owned shares; (8) Investment diversification; (9) Information disclosure. China's automobile industry as the main body of listed companies, should use debt to be a good tool to enhance their market value. At the same time, it should also alert high-risks that high debt rate will lead, to avoid blindly imitating the developed countries. The fundamental goal of optimizing capital structure is to find a reasonable level of debt, rather than simply improving the debt ratios. To match the benefits and the cost of capital is the optimal choice.
本文在对资本结构理论及其影响因素实证研究的回顾基础上,分析了汽车产业融资方式和资本结构特征;比较了产业间资本结构的差异和国家间汽车产业资本结构的特点;根据资本结构理论模型并结合我国的制度环境,理论分析宏观经济因素和企业特征因素对资本结构选择的影响,从动态角度实证研究宏观经济因素和企业特征因素对资本结构选择的影响,并且采用结构向量自回归模型和动态面板模型研究了汽车产业资本结构的调整方向。
Capital structure of the automobile industry has its own characteristics, such as asset-liability ratio is low, the high proportion of current liabilities. Meanwhile, the automobile industry of China is developing fast, and the split share structure reform is ongoing. The capital structure of the automobile industry has a special system environment, such as equity structure is relatively unique, investor protection is not perfect, development of capital markets and corporate governance mechanisms have defects and other issues. So, what factors affect the choice of capital structure of China's automobile industry? What direction should capital structure of automobile industry adjust? Whether it should simply enhance the asset-liability ratio at the same time facing a high risk or keep stable? These questions are worth discussing and studying.
Based on the review of the capital structure theories and its empirical research of determinants, the paper analyses the capital structure characteristics of the automobile industry. Based on the capital structure theoretical model, combined with China's institutional environment, the paper theoretically analyses the macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics factors on the impact of capital structure choice. Then the paper empirically researches the macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics factors that can affect the capital structure choice from a dynamic point of view, using structural vector auto-regression model and dynamic panel data model to research the direction of the capital structure.
In particular, the main contents of this paper are as follows:
ChapterⅠ, Introduction. This chapter discusses research background, the main content and framework. Theoretical basis, research methods of this study are also given.
ChapterⅡ, Capital structure theory and empirical research review. This chapter introduces the theory of capital structure, the main branches of models and basic concepts, trying to describe the development of the capital structure through the development process and the concerns of various theories. The chapter discusses the main arguments and research results of a systematic theory of capital structure, such as trade-off theory, agency theory, financial contract theory, signaling theory, pecking order theory, the product and market theory, behavioral finance theory. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign empirical research of capital structure is reviewed, and evaluating the problems and shortcomings of the existing literature.
ChapterⅢ, The financing of China's automobile industry and the status of the capital structure. The chapter analyzes the financing of the automobile industry. Because different financing methods have different advantages and disadvantages, when enterprises select appropriate forms of financing, they should consider their own characteristics and needs, thus different capital structures will be formed. Then the chapter statistically analyzes the operating status and characteristics of capital structure of the automobile industry, and compares with the major automobile firm's capital structure characteristics of the other countries.
ChapterⅣ, Macroeconomic factors impact on the capital structure of the automobile industry. Using structural vector auto-regression model and the impulse response function, the chapter empirically studies the macroeconomic factors which affect the choice of the capital structure, such as GDP growth, inflation rate, the size of the capital markets, interest rates, average tax rates, the central government expenditure and the local fiscal expenditure.
ChapterⅤ, Micro-factors dynamically impact on the capital structure of the automobile industry. The chapter uses co-integration panel data methods to empirically study on the determinants of capital structure of China's 18 automobile firms listed in 1998-2007.
ChapterⅥ, Suggestions. According to the results obtained in this paper, this chapter provides countermeasures and proposals in order to optimize the capital structure of the automobile industry, refine the government policies, the financial policy-making and the governance structures of the public enterprises.
ChapterⅦ, Conclusions and prospects. Based on the research of the previous chapters, it summaries the main findings , the innovations and points out the lack of research and future research directions.
Results of theoretical and empirical research are as follows:
1. Asset-liability ratio of automobile industry is low, and the proportion of current liabilities is very high, while the proportion of long-term debt is low. Automobile industry depends on equity financing with a strong preference. There are significant differences in capital structure between enterprises, and there are also some differences between industries. Compared with three-year asset-liability ratio of the world 500 strong enterprises in the automobile industry, the rate of FAW Group's assets and liabilities is at the intermediate level.
2. Capital structure of China's automobile industry is influenced by macro-economic growth, and is greatly impacted by the lending interest rate and the fiscal expenditure. But there isn’t significant relationship with the inflation rates, the tax rates and the size of capital market financing. This phenomenon is related with the certain stage of China's automobile industry development. In the vector auto-regressive model, the asset-liability ratio is significantly impacted by its lagged, but the coefficients are all negative, indicating that asset-liability ratio has a return tendency. Through the impulse response function model, we can see that the macro factors on the rate of corporate assets and liabilities have different degrees of time lag. The capital structure of China's automobile industry's response to the macro-economic factors is special, which is related with the development of China's capital market and the automobile industry. Although the gradual adjustment of enterprises themselves is market-oriented, but the capital structure is still greatly impacted by the state fiscal policy, in particular, responds to local fiscal expenditure significantly.
3. In consistent with the Pecking Order theory, companies in the long and short term will choose low-cost internal financing. In the long-term trends, the firm's fund management capabilities are positively correlated with the debt ratios, but the short-term relationship is not significant. Short-term solvency of enterprises and capital structure presents a more complex relationship, which should be affected by the enterprise's financial laxity. Both in the short term or the long-term, large enterprises that have strong ability for growth-will not delivery benefits to the others, so they tend to reduce the debt ratios. Non-debt tax shield has a substitution effect on the liability in the long-run equilibrium, but in the short-term is not obvious. The impact on the capital structure of firm size is positive, which has relationship with the liabilities structure and the credit system. Through the error correction model can be seen, in the short-term capital structure of China's automobile industry will be adjusted of -0.396384 degree back to a balanced state. There is reverse adjustment mechanism. Empirical results using dynamic panel data model can be seen that, capital structure of the automobile industry is obviously impacted by its lag1, but not significantly with the lag items increases.
Innovation and conclusions:
1. Macro-environment: (1) Compared with developed countries, China's financial market is not perfect. Consideration of enterprises major is how to obtain funds, rather than choosing what kind of methods to finance. Therefore, to optimize the capital structure of the automobile industry must improve the financial markets. At present, the most urgent part of the development is the corporate bond market. (2) We need to re-recognize the capital market functions, strengthen investor protection legislation, to effectively protect the interests of the creditors.
2. Micro-enterprises: (1) A reasonable choice of financing; (2) Focus on the capital structure coordinated with the development of the external environment; (3) The establishment of capital structure adjustment mechanism; (4) The enterprise scale; (5) Focus on the asset composition; (6) Focus on the growth opportunities; (7) Adjustment of state-owned shares; (8) Investment diversification; (9) Information disclosure. China's automobile industry as the main body of listed companies, should use debt to be a good tool to enhance their market value. At the same time, it should also alert high-risks that high debt rate will lead, to avoid blindly imitating the developed countries. The fundamental goal of optimizing capital structure is to find a reasonable level of debt, rather than simply improving the debt ratios. To match the benefits and the cost of capital is the optimal choice.
引文
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