水资源二级产权设置与流域生态补偿研究
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摘要
水是生命之源,生产之要,生态之基。水资源不仅需要满足人类的生存和发展之需,而且要满足整个地球生命体的生存和发展需要；水资源不仅具备经济价值,更具有环境、生态、审美等多样性价值。然而,长期以来,人类视水资源为自在之物,可自由免费获取,使得水资源未能得到足够的重视和珍惜,保护水资源得不到应有的补偿,破坏水环境得不到应有的惩罚。正是由于人类在水资源问题上的错误认识与相关权责界定的缺失,导致了水资源被滥用且日益短缺以及水环境恶化。因此,我国亟须重构水资源权责制度并建立流域生态补偿机制,通过重塑水资源保护与利用中的公平正义,促进社会、经济与生态、资源和环境的持续协调发展。
生态补偿概念是本文的基础。生态补偿概念的界定要以对因环境保护或环境破坏而权利利益受损者的补偿为核心要素,进而明确生态补偿是对社会主体而不是自然主体的补偿,特别是不能把生态环境建设及污染治理看作是生态补偿；生态环境建设工程的公共财政支出是否属于生态补偿要以是否包含对因环境问题而权利利益受损者补偿为标准；环境税费可能成为生态补偿的资金来源但其制度本身却并不属于生态补偿；生态补偿与生态补偿机制有本质的区别,生态补偿是个较为抽象的概念,生态补偿机制是生态补偿的实践操作设计。流域生态补偿是以公平正义为核心价值调节流域行政区域间水资源环境外部性问题引起的权利利益冲突的手段,包括对水资源环境贡献区域的补偿和对水资源环境损害区域的处罚。
从研究文献来看,在国际上与前述生态补偿含义相近的概念是生态环境服务付费,遵循谁受益谁付费的原则。国内学术界对流域生态补偿的研究更盛,但均没有从水资源产权角度予以深入研究,而是舍本逐末,忙于建构数理模型测成本、算效益,使得流域生态补偿的研究缺乏根基,难以有效实践。从理论说,外部性内部化理论是流域生态补偿产生的理论根源,外部性是在特定的经济活动中,未参与决策的一方受到了经济活动的影响,并且缺乏有效的反馈机制进行补偿时产生；当前流域上下游间的区域外部性则是产生流域生态补偿的根本原因。外部性本质是产权问题,区域外部性本质上是流域上下游行政区域间关于水资源环境产权界定不清导致,要解决外部性,关键在界定产权。因此,水资源产权制度是流域生态补偿韵制度基础。同时,实现公平正义是流域生态补偿的价值目标。在水资源保护与利用方面,上下游区域间权利与责任的严重不对等与利益冲突的根源在于相关制度缺乏应有的正义原则。解决的办法就是进行制度变革,明确流域水资源环境的权、责、利归属,在此基础上建立流域生态补偿制度,使水资源的保护与利用的相关制度具有正义性。
综观国内外的流域生态补偿实践,归纳起来,国际上主要体现为四种实践类型的经验值得借鉴：政府间合作式流域生态补偿、政府主导对流域生态保护者的直接补偿、企业参与的对流域生态保护者的补偿、环境总量控制下的市场交易补偿。但也存在的一些问题,需要我们予以完善：一是市场交易式补偿的分散性、滞后性；二是水资源补偿还有待产权理论创新的支撑；三是政府间的调控与参与力度需加强。我国的流域生态补偿实践可以归纳为三种类型：流域源头保护为主的项目补偿,流域水污染控制责任制及跨区补偿,基于水资源短缺的水权交易补偿。其中以项目补偿为主,以水污染控制为目标的流域跨区补偿实践呈明显上升趋势,水权交易补偿模式还只是在特定区域内存在。三种实践类型各有优势,对于调节上下游区域间的利益矛盾、促进流域水生态资源环境的可持续利用起到了较好的效果,但也存在诸多缺陷,如未从关键因素—水资源产权设置入手解决区域外部性问题,未从断面水质水量出发建立系统的水资源补偿机制。亟待在实践中进行水资源产权制度创新,在水资源单一国家所有制的基础上丰富与明晰水资源环境权益,以建立完善的跨区水资源环境补偿机制。
就现实中的水资源产权制度而言,核心是所有权问题。水本是天然之物、自然所生,没有原始所有人；同时,水资源因其在流域人类生存中所具有的公共资源属性及其流动形态,也决定了它在现实社会中不应成为任何个人的私有财产。因此,各国均依据国家主权以法律的形式将领土范围内的水资源确认为国家所有,或设置为代表全体公民利益的国家所有,以保障每个公民的用水权益,从而使国家成为水资源最初始的所有者,并构建为国家对水资源形成必要的宏观管理权。
从历代的水资源产权制度看,我国有着水资源单一国家所有制和统一管理水资源的传统；新中国成立后,在我国生产资料曾长期实行单一公有制的制度路径下,水资源自然为单一的国家所有。因此,水资源的终极所有权和宏观调控管理所有权也就理所当然地由国家享有。但是,目前的问题是,这种笼统的国家所有,导致的是水资源的具体所有权主体权属不清,水资源的相关权责无法得到明确界定：一方面,水资源属国家所有,国家有权全面支配和调动、分配水资源,水源地政府与居民无权干涉,只能被动接受；另一方面,笼统的国家所有规定使水资源成为全体人民的共有之物,人们可以通过分水政策免费获得或超低价无节制使用水资源,同时又借水的流动属性不负责任地排放污水。这严重淡化了水资源保护意识,也使涵养与保护水资源行为得不到补偿,导致了典型的“公地悲剧”
当前,学术界虽然已在研究水资源产权及流域生态补偿问题,但均是以默认笼统的水资源国家所有为前提,使用的“水权”“初始水权”“水资源产权”等概念,均是立足于政府根据人口与经济发展无偿分配水资源政策基础之上,研究水资源使用权或取水权,而缺乏对水资源所有权问题的进一步研究。因此,目前国家的水资源所有者权益,实际已被虚置而无法得到有效管理和利用,从而加剧了我国可利用水资源的短缺和水环境的不断恶化。
流域生态补偿亟须水资源产权制度创新。应明确水资源国家所有权的内涵是其基于主权性质对国内水资源的“终极宏观调控管理所有权”,而非财产权意义上的所有权。《物权法》中所有权指“所有权人对自己的不动产或者动产,依法享有占有、使用、收益和处分的权利”,其权利主体为自然人或法人,国家在一国之内不具备独立的法律人格。因此,水资源国家所有权,在国与国事务中才能体现所有权中的诸多权利。但在国家领土内部,国家所有权主要体现为国家对水资源的“终极宏观调控管理所有权”。所谓“终极宏观调控管理所有权”,是指国家依据公平原则,为维护全体人民的共同利益,对水资源行使宏观管理的权利,它由国务院水行政部门行使并作出的安排,具体包括国家对水资源宏观管理的立法权、社会发展规划权、水资源生态补偿实施权、水资源配置权和执法惩治权,从而保证水资源及其环境的可持续利用。
明确水资源的“区域财产收益权”。我国大部分流域都具有跨行政区域特征,每一江河水资源为其流经地的各级政府所实际支配、占有和使用,各区域都具有相对独立的利益,存在激烈的区域竞争,必然引发跨界水资源与水环境冲突,造成水资源与环境危机。因此,国家所据有的水资源所有(初始)权,应在其宏观管理中依据法律和各地区的经济利益进行再分割,将它具体分割为财产收益、处分和使用等各项权能;其中“水资源财产收益权”本是一种“区域财富”,应明确为水资源贡献区地的“财富收益”,改变这种“区域财富”的所有权,势必影响财富分配的公正公平。
现实中的国家所有水资源是按地区人口与经济发展无偿分配,以上游为主的水资源贡献地区无形中被剥夺了“水资源财产收益权”。国家法律笼统规定各地方政府承担保护水资源环境的责任和拥有利用资源环境的权利,但水资源保护与资源利用之间却存在明显的冲突；上游地区相应承担过多的保护水资源环境的责任,而享受较少的利用水资源环境的权利,下游地区则相反；上下游间责任与权利严重不对等。长此以往,上游必然置法律规定的保护责任于不顾,利用其流域上的天然优势,过度利用水资源量和水环境排污容量,造成流域生态环境恶化。
这里的关键问题是,水资源具体的权责在区域间界定不清和有违公平公正。目前国内流域生态补偿的相关实践,主要立足从水质责任制角度出发,但由于没有水资源权责制度的支持,缺乏足够合理的依据,且偏离流域生态补偿之应有含义。因此从逻辑上讲,完整的流域生态补偿框架,应首先对上游贡献合格的水资源给予资源性补偿,然后才是基于断面水质的奖罚责任制。
国家在履行水资源宏观调控管理所有权职责时,要秉持维护社会公正的首要原则,充分考虑水资源贡献区域的利益,首先在法律制度上承认区域水资源的贡献,把水资源具体的财产收益权分配给水资源环境贡献区域,从而建立起水资源的国家终极宏观调控管理所有权与区域水资源财产所有权的二级产权制度,使水资源贡献区域获得应有的资源收益；然后再根据人口、生态、社会发展和市场机制等因素,将水资源所有权的具体使用、处分等权利在流域各行政区域间进行下一个层次的分配。
在建立水资源二级产权制度的基础上,构建流域生态补偿机制。要借助目前流域管理对水质与水量的准确测量技术,根据流域断面设置,将流域水资源区分为“出境水”、“入境水”、“生态水”、“洪水下泄水”、“源区水资源贡献水”、“区域水资源贡献水”；形成水资源贡献水=入境水-出境水-生态水-洪水下泄水,从而计算出流域源区和中间区域的水资源贡献水量,以便实施对流域区间“水资源贡献水”进行不同补偿标准的生态补偿,首先使流域源区和中间区域获得水资源财产收益；在此基础上,再根据河流生态要求与流域水量使用权分配,建立严厉的水质水量奖惩责任制和水权交易机制,为在全流域建立系统、完整的水资源跨区补偿机制奠定较为科学的制度基础。
在这里,流域水资源生态补偿奖惩标准的高低至关重要,标准过高无法推行,标准过低,发挥不了作用,但理论研究中保护水资源的直接投入成本、发展机会成本、环境生态价值、地区差别、政府财力状况、经济发展阶段以及水资源价值等等均可列为考虑因素或具有借鉴意义。至于最终结果,则可要看相关政府间的谈判与博弈。
国家整体统筹和实施流域水资源生态补偿工作。跨行政区流域水资源及其生态补偿的实施,因其鲜明的公共物品形态,构成了国家及其政府必须承担的基本职能。应依据流域范围由上级政府主导推动,下级政府承担具体实施：跨省的大中型河流的流域生态补偿由中央政府推动,省域内中小型河流的流域生态补偿由省级政府推动,各自成立流域生态补偿委员会负责资金的筹措、使用、管理和监督,补偿资金由政府筹措。
本文选取在中央政府主导下已经实施流域水环境补偿的跨皖浙两省的新安江流域作为案例,分析已有补偿实践的问题,并采用上述理论和框架予以重新建构,探索新安江流域生态补偿新模式。现有新安江流域补偿机制实质是简单的对赌协议,只涉及水质,不涉及上下游间的水资源产权问题,更没有对水资源进行补偿,没有充分体现权、责、利的统一和公平的正义。重新建构的结果是从水资源和水质两方面确定产权归属及利益补偿,中央、浙江省、安徽省均需提高补偿力度。
Water is source of life, key of production and base of ecology. Therefore, water resources meet not only the need of human survival and social development, but also that of the Earth as a whole. It carries economic value, as well as environmental, ecological, and aesthetic values. However, for a long time, water resources have been regarded as something natural, something freely available. Consequently, water resources have not been paid due attention and cherish, water resources protection couldn't get due compensation and destruction of the water environment has not been duly punished. It is due to human's wrong understanding on the issue of water resources and the lack of delineation of responsibilities that led to the abuse of water and increasing shortages and deteriorating of water environment. Therefore, it is urgent for China to reconstruct the system of the powers and responsibilities of water resources and to establish the mechanism of watershed ecological compensation, to promote the sustainable and coordinated development of society, economy and ecology, resources and environment through reshaping social justice in the protection and utilization of water resources.
The ecological compensation concept is the basis of this article. On defining the concept of ecological compensation, the core elements are the compensation for the impaired in rights and the interests due to environmental protection and environmental damage, and then clearing ecological compensation is compensation for social subjects rather than natural body, especially not the ecological environment construction and pollution governance. Public finance expenditures of the ecological environment construction projects are ecological compensation with the standard as to whether to include the compensation of the damage to environmental issues and rights and interests. Environmental taxes may become a source of ecological compensation funds, but the system itself is not part of the ecological compensation. There are essential differences between ecological compensation and ecological compensation mechanism. Ecological compensation is a more abstract concept, while ecological compensation mechanism is the practical design of ecological compensation. Watershed ecological compensation that is based on fairness and justice as core values is a means to regulate the conflicts of rights and interests with external issues of water resources and environment between administrative regions in the watershed area, including compensation for environmental contribution to the region's water resources and punishment to water resources environmental damage region.
Literature review shows that the international concept similar to ecological compensation is the payment for ecological services, which follows the "the beneficiary pays" principle. In China, studies flourished in watershed ecological compensation, but not in-depth from the perspective of water resources property right, constructing mathematical model of measuring cost and efficiency. As a result, without solid foundation, the study of watershed ecological compensation becomes difficult to be effectively put into practice. Theoretically, the internalization of externalities theory is the theoretical roots of watershed ecological compensation. Externality comes into being in specific economic activities when the party who did not involve in the decision-making influenced by economic activity, and the lack of effective feedback mechanism. Currently, the externality of the region between the upstream and downstream is the root cause of a watershed ecological compensation mechanism. The nature of externality is the issue of property rights. Regional externality is rooted in the ill-defined property rights of water resources and environment between the administrative regions of the basin upstream and downstream. I can say that the key to solve the problem of externalities is to define property rights. Therefore, the property rights system of water resources forms the basis of watershed ecological compensation system. At the same time, to achieve fairness and justice is the value targets of watershed ecological compensation. In the protection and utilization of water resources, the root of unequal rights and responsibilities and the conflict of interest between the upstream and downstream areas is due to the lack of justice principles in related systems. To solve this problem, it is urgent to reform institutions, making clear the rights, responsibilities and benefits of watershed water resources environments, establishing the implementation of watershed ecological compensation system to justify relevant systems of protecting and utilizing water resources.
Comprehensive observation of watershed ecological compensation practice at home and abroad shows that there are mainly four practical modes worth learning: intergovernmental cooperation watershed ecological compensation, direct compensation for watershed ecological protector of government-led, compensation for watershed ecological protector of enterprises to participate, market transaction compensation mode under the control of environment total. However, some problems remain, such as dispersion and lag of market transaction compensation mode, the need of support from property rights theory innovation for water resources, the urgency to strengthen regulation and involvement in the government. While in china, three modes can be summarized in watershed ecological compensation practice: the project compensation mainly to protect watered headwaters, watered water pollution control accountability and spanned compensation, water rights trading compensation based on water shortages. Among them, the project compensation mode takes the main position. While the spanned compensation practice targeted to water pollution control shows a rising trend, water rights trading compensation mode occurs only in specific regions. All these models have their advantages, having achieved good results in the regulation of the conflict of interest between the upstream and downstream region, promoting the sustainable use of watershed ecological resources environment. Nevertheless there are many defects, such as, not from the key factors-defining the water property rights to solve the problem of regional externalities, not creating a system of water resources compensation mechanism from a cross-section of water quality and quantity. Therefore, it is urgent to promote the water rights system innovation in practice, making clear the rights and interests of water sources richness and clarity on the basis of a single state ownership, to create a perfect spanned water resources and environment compensation mechanism.
In terms of the powers and responsibilities system of water resources in practice, the core is the issue of ownership. As natural object, water belongs to nobody, thus, there is no original owner. Meanwhile, because of the attributes of public resources in the watershed of human existence and its current form, water resources should not become private property of any individual in the real world. Therefore, countries are recognized as owner of water resources within the territorial scope of all form of law, based on national sovereignty, or set for all the countries on behalf of the interests of all citizens to protect every citizen's water interests, enabling the country to become the original owner of water resources, and building the necessary macroeconomic management over the state of water resources.
Judging from the water systems of property rights in history, it is Chinese tradition to practice single-state-ownership system and unified management of water resources. After the founding of People Republic of China, all means of production was stated-owned for a long time, and water resources naturally belonged to the government. Therefore, the ultimate ownership of water resources and the macro-control management naturally belonged to the state. However, the current problem is that such a sweeping national ownership resulting in specific ownership of water resources is unclear, and the associated water rights and responsibilities cannot be clearly defined. On one hand, possessing the ownership of water resources, the central government has rights to dispose, mobilize and allocate water resources, while local governments and residents have no right to interfere, but to accept passively. On the other hand, the sweeping regulation of water resources ownership belonging to state makes water resources shared things of all people who can obtain free of charge through the watershed policy or super cheap uncontrolled use of water resources. At the same time they discharged of sewage irresponsibly by the water flow properties. This severely diluted the awareness of water conservation, so that the behavior of the conservation and protection of water resources were not compensated, which resulted in the typical "tragedy of the commons".
Currently, some studies have been made in the field of the water property rights and watershed ecological compensation. However, all of them were based on the default general state ownership of water resources, using the concepts of "water rights","initial water rights" and "water source right", which was also based on the water resources policy of the government to freely distribute water resources in accordance with the population and economic development, exploring water-using rights or watering rights, neglecting further study of water resources ownership. Therefore, currently the owner' rights and interests of the country's water resources have been dummy actually, which resulted in exacerbating shortages of the available water resources and deteriorating of water environment, because of lacking of the effective management and use.
It is urgent to bring forth new ideas into the property rights system of water resources for watershed ecological compensation. National ownership of water resources is defined as ownership of the ultimate macro-control management at home on the basis of sovereign nature, rather than property rights on ownership. Property Law defines the ownership as "the owner of a realty or chattel is entitled to possess, utilize, seek profits from and dispose of the realty or chattel in accordance with law." Their rights body is a natural or legal person, and the country within a country does not have a separate legal personality. Therefore, the national ownership of water resources can reflect many of the rights of ownership in the state-to-state affairs. But within the national territory, national ownership involves that countries have the ultimate ownership of macro-control management. The so-called "the ultimate ownership of macro-control management" means that countries have ultimate macroeconomic regulation and control of water resources management ownership based on the principle of fairness, in order to safeguard the common interests of all the people by the water administrative department of the State Council to exercise and make arrangements, including the legislative powers of the national macro-management of water resources, the right to social development planning, the implementation rights to water resources ecological compensation, water allocation and the right to enforce laws against, so as to ensure that the sustainable use of water resources and its environment.
The property usufruct of water resources area should be clear. Most of our watersheds have the characteristic of crossing administrative regions, and the local governments of their flows have the rights to dominate, possess and use every rivers and water resources. Because of the relatively independent interests among each region, there is intensive competition, which will inevitably lead to a conflict of cross-border water resources and environment, resulting in water resources and environmental crisis. Therefore, the state-owned water resources (initial) rights should be divided within macroeconomic management in accordance with law and the economic benefits, specifically into property income, sanctions and the use of power. As regional wealth,"Water property usufruct of this kind of wealth in the region" should be a clear contribution to the area of water resources regions. A change of the ownership of "regional wealth" is bound to affect the fair and equitable distribution of wealth.
In reality, the national water resources are distributed payment-free according to regional population and economic development, so up-stream regions of water resources are virtually deprived of "Water property usufruct". In state laws and general provisions, local governments should take the obligations to protect water resources environments while enjoy the rights to use water resources and the environment. However, there are obvious conflicts between water conservation and resource utilization. Up-stream regions take more responsibilities for the protection of water resources and environment, and having less right to enjoy water resources environment; while down-stream areas take less responsibilities and enjoy more right. As a result, it is seriously unequal in responsibility and right between upstream and downstream. In a long time, the upstream regions will inevitably despite the legal responsibility to protect, with its natural advantages in the watershed, and over-exploitation of water resources and water environment sewage capacity, resulting in the deterioration of the ecological environment in the catchment.
What matters here is that the specific powers and responsibilities of the water resources among regions are ill-defined and contrary to justice. At present, Chinese watershed ecological compensation practices are mainly based on the responsibility system of water quality, without the support of the water resources in terms of system, lacking sufficient and reasonable basis, and deviated from what the watershed ecological compensation should mean. Logically, the complete framework of watershed ecological compensation system should put first the compensation of resource to upstream contributions and then responsibility system of reward and punishment based on the section of water quality.
In the performance of macroeconomic regulation and control of water resources management ownership responsibilities, the central government should uphold the maintenance of the primary principles of social justice, fully considering the interests of the contribution to the area of water resources. First, the contribution of regional water resources should be recognized in the legal system, the specific water resources property usufruct should be assigned to the contribution region of water resources and environment, to establish two-level property rights system of the national ultimate macroeconomic control management ownership and regional water resources property ownership, ensuring the due resource revenue to the area of water resources. And then, the specific use of the water resource ownership and disposition rights are allocated to the next level in the basin administrative regions based on the factors of population, ecological, social development, and the market mechanism.
Watershed ecological compensation mechanism should be constructed on the basis of two-level property rights system of Water Resources. With the accurate measurement technology of watershed management on water quality and quantity, according to basin sectional installation, the contribution to the water of the watershed source region and the intermediate region can be calculated. In order to implement different standards of ecological compensation for the watershed range,"Water contribution to the water", first make the watershed source region and the intermediate regional access to water resources and property income; On this basis, according to the river ecological requirements and the basin water use allocation rights, stringent water quality and quantity of incentive accountability and water rights trading mechanism would be established to lay more scientific institutional basis for complete water the spanned compensation mechanism in the whole basin system.
Here, the level of incentive standard is critical to basin water resources ecological compensation. If too high, the standard cannot be implemented, while too low, it cannot work. However, some theoretical factors as direct input costs to protect water resources, the opportunity cost of opportunity, the value of the environment and ecology, regional differences, government financial situation, the stage of economic development, as well as water resources value should all be taken into consideration or reference, with a result lying in negotiations and Games between the relevant governments.
Nation coordinates and implements ecological compensation work of basin water resources. Implementation of basin water resources and its ecological compensation across districts constitute the basic functions of the country and its government because of its distinctive public goods morphology. Dominated by the higher levels of government based on a basin-wide, lower levels of government to assume a specific implementation, watershed ecological compensation for inter-provincial large and medium-sized river is driven by the central government, the province's small and medium-sized river by the provincial government, each set up a watershed ecological compensation committee responsible for fund raising, use, management and supervision, and compensation funds for financing by the government.
This thesis, taking Xin'anjiang basin cross Anhui and Zhejiang provinces as a case study, analyses the existing compensation practices in implemented basin water environment compensation under the auspices of the central government, reconstructing the above theoretical framework to explore Xin'anjiang Ecological Compensation Mode. The existing Xin'anjiang watered compensation mechanism is essentially a simple agreement on gambling, involving the water quality alone, not involving the issues of property rights between upstream and downstream water resources and compensation for water resources, without full embodiment if the rights, responsibilities and interests unified and fair justice. The result of reconstruct is to determine property ownership and equity compensation both from perspectives of water resources and water quality, strengthening compensation by both government of Zhejiang Province and Anhui Province.
生态补偿概念是本文的基础。生态补偿概念的界定要以对因环境保护或环境破坏而权利利益受损者的补偿为核心要素,进而明确生态补偿是对社会主体而不是自然主体的补偿,特别是不能把生态环境建设及污染治理看作是生态补偿；生态环境建设工程的公共财政支出是否属于生态补偿要以是否包含对因环境问题而权利利益受损者补偿为标准；环境税费可能成为生态补偿的资金来源但其制度本身却并不属于生态补偿；生态补偿与生态补偿机制有本质的区别,生态补偿是个较为抽象的概念,生态补偿机制是生态补偿的实践操作设计。流域生态补偿是以公平正义为核心价值调节流域行政区域间水资源环境外部性问题引起的权利利益冲突的手段,包括对水资源环境贡献区域的补偿和对水资源环境损害区域的处罚。
从研究文献来看,在国际上与前述生态补偿含义相近的概念是生态环境服务付费,遵循谁受益谁付费的原则。国内学术界对流域生态补偿的研究更盛,但均没有从水资源产权角度予以深入研究,而是舍本逐末,忙于建构数理模型测成本、算效益,使得流域生态补偿的研究缺乏根基,难以有效实践。从理论说,外部性内部化理论是流域生态补偿产生的理论根源,外部性是在特定的经济活动中,未参与决策的一方受到了经济活动的影响,并且缺乏有效的反馈机制进行补偿时产生；当前流域上下游间的区域外部性则是产生流域生态补偿的根本原因。外部性本质是产权问题,区域外部性本质上是流域上下游行政区域间关于水资源环境产权界定不清导致,要解决外部性,关键在界定产权。因此,水资源产权制度是流域生态补偿韵制度基础。同时,实现公平正义是流域生态补偿的价值目标。在水资源保护与利用方面,上下游区域间权利与责任的严重不对等与利益冲突的根源在于相关制度缺乏应有的正义原则。解决的办法就是进行制度变革,明确流域水资源环境的权、责、利归属,在此基础上建立流域生态补偿制度,使水资源的保护与利用的相关制度具有正义性。
综观国内外的流域生态补偿实践,归纳起来,国际上主要体现为四种实践类型的经验值得借鉴：政府间合作式流域生态补偿、政府主导对流域生态保护者的直接补偿、企业参与的对流域生态保护者的补偿、环境总量控制下的市场交易补偿。但也存在的一些问题,需要我们予以完善：一是市场交易式补偿的分散性、滞后性；二是水资源补偿还有待产权理论创新的支撑；三是政府间的调控与参与力度需加强。我国的流域生态补偿实践可以归纳为三种类型：流域源头保护为主的项目补偿,流域水污染控制责任制及跨区补偿,基于水资源短缺的水权交易补偿。其中以项目补偿为主,以水污染控制为目标的流域跨区补偿实践呈明显上升趋势,水权交易补偿模式还只是在特定区域内存在。三种实践类型各有优势,对于调节上下游区域间的利益矛盾、促进流域水生态资源环境的可持续利用起到了较好的效果,但也存在诸多缺陷,如未从关键因素—水资源产权设置入手解决区域外部性问题,未从断面水质水量出发建立系统的水资源补偿机制。亟待在实践中进行水资源产权制度创新,在水资源单一国家所有制的基础上丰富与明晰水资源环境权益,以建立完善的跨区水资源环境补偿机制。
就现实中的水资源产权制度而言,核心是所有权问题。水本是天然之物、自然所生,没有原始所有人；同时,水资源因其在流域人类生存中所具有的公共资源属性及其流动形态,也决定了它在现实社会中不应成为任何个人的私有财产。因此,各国均依据国家主权以法律的形式将领土范围内的水资源确认为国家所有,或设置为代表全体公民利益的国家所有,以保障每个公民的用水权益,从而使国家成为水资源最初始的所有者,并构建为国家对水资源形成必要的宏观管理权。
从历代的水资源产权制度看,我国有着水资源单一国家所有制和统一管理水资源的传统；新中国成立后,在我国生产资料曾长期实行单一公有制的制度路径下,水资源自然为单一的国家所有。因此,水资源的终极所有权和宏观调控管理所有权也就理所当然地由国家享有。但是,目前的问题是,这种笼统的国家所有,导致的是水资源的具体所有权主体权属不清,水资源的相关权责无法得到明确界定：一方面,水资源属国家所有,国家有权全面支配和调动、分配水资源,水源地政府与居民无权干涉,只能被动接受；另一方面,笼统的国家所有规定使水资源成为全体人民的共有之物,人们可以通过分水政策免费获得或超低价无节制使用水资源,同时又借水的流动属性不负责任地排放污水。这严重淡化了水资源保护意识,也使涵养与保护水资源行为得不到补偿,导致了典型的“公地悲剧”
当前,学术界虽然已在研究水资源产权及流域生态补偿问题,但均是以默认笼统的水资源国家所有为前提,使用的“水权”“初始水权”“水资源产权”等概念,均是立足于政府根据人口与经济发展无偿分配水资源政策基础之上,研究水资源使用权或取水权,而缺乏对水资源所有权问题的进一步研究。因此,目前国家的水资源所有者权益,实际已被虚置而无法得到有效管理和利用,从而加剧了我国可利用水资源的短缺和水环境的不断恶化。
流域生态补偿亟须水资源产权制度创新。应明确水资源国家所有权的内涵是其基于主权性质对国内水资源的“终极宏观调控管理所有权”,而非财产权意义上的所有权。《物权法》中所有权指“所有权人对自己的不动产或者动产,依法享有占有、使用、收益和处分的权利”,其权利主体为自然人或法人,国家在一国之内不具备独立的法律人格。因此,水资源国家所有权,在国与国事务中才能体现所有权中的诸多权利。但在国家领土内部,国家所有权主要体现为国家对水资源的“终极宏观调控管理所有权”。所谓“终极宏观调控管理所有权”,是指国家依据公平原则,为维护全体人民的共同利益,对水资源行使宏观管理的权利,它由国务院水行政部门行使并作出的安排,具体包括国家对水资源宏观管理的立法权、社会发展规划权、水资源生态补偿实施权、水资源配置权和执法惩治权,从而保证水资源及其环境的可持续利用。
明确水资源的“区域财产收益权”。我国大部分流域都具有跨行政区域特征,每一江河水资源为其流经地的各级政府所实际支配、占有和使用,各区域都具有相对独立的利益,存在激烈的区域竞争,必然引发跨界水资源与水环境冲突,造成水资源与环境危机。因此,国家所据有的水资源所有(初始)权,应在其宏观管理中依据法律和各地区的经济利益进行再分割,将它具体分割为财产收益、处分和使用等各项权能;其中“水资源财产收益权”本是一种“区域财富”,应明确为水资源贡献区地的“财富收益”,改变这种“区域财富”的所有权,势必影响财富分配的公正公平。
现实中的国家所有水资源是按地区人口与经济发展无偿分配,以上游为主的水资源贡献地区无形中被剥夺了“水资源财产收益权”。国家法律笼统规定各地方政府承担保护水资源环境的责任和拥有利用资源环境的权利,但水资源保护与资源利用之间却存在明显的冲突；上游地区相应承担过多的保护水资源环境的责任,而享受较少的利用水资源环境的权利,下游地区则相反；上下游间责任与权利严重不对等。长此以往,上游必然置法律规定的保护责任于不顾,利用其流域上的天然优势,过度利用水资源量和水环境排污容量,造成流域生态环境恶化。
这里的关键问题是,水资源具体的权责在区域间界定不清和有违公平公正。目前国内流域生态补偿的相关实践,主要立足从水质责任制角度出发,但由于没有水资源权责制度的支持,缺乏足够合理的依据,且偏离流域生态补偿之应有含义。因此从逻辑上讲,完整的流域生态补偿框架,应首先对上游贡献合格的水资源给予资源性补偿,然后才是基于断面水质的奖罚责任制。
国家在履行水资源宏观调控管理所有权职责时,要秉持维护社会公正的首要原则,充分考虑水资源贡献区域的利益,首先在法律制度上承认区域水资源的贡献,把水资源具体的财产收益权分配给水资源环境贡献区域,从而建立起水资源的国家终极宏观调控管理所有权与区域水资源财产所有权的二级产权制度,使水资源贡献区域获得应有的资源收益；然后再根据人口、生态、社会发展和市场机制等因素,将水资源所有权的具体使用、处分等权利在流域各行政区域间进行下一个层次的分配。
在建立水资源二级产权制度的基础上,构建流域生态补偿机制。要借助目前流域管理对水质与水量的准确测量技术,根据流域断面设置,将流域水资源区分为“出境水”、“入境水”、“生态水”、“洪水下泄水”、“源区水资源贡献水”、“区域水资源贡献水”；形成水资源贡献水=入境水-出境水-生态水-洪水下泄水,从而计算出流域源区和中间区域的水资源贡献水量,以便实施对流域区间“水资源贡献水”进行不同补偿标准的生态补偿,首先使流域源区和中间区域获得水资源财产收益；在此基础上,再根据河流生态要求与流域水量使用权分配,建立严厉的水质水量奖惩责任制和水权交易机制,为在全流域建立系统、完整的水资源跨区补偿机制奠定较为科学的制度基础。
在这里,流域水资源生态补偿奖惩标准的高低至关重要,标准过高无法推行,标准过低,发挥不了作用,但理论研究中保护水资源的直接投入成本、发展机会成本、环境生态价值、地区差别、政府财力状况、经济发展阶段以及水资源价值等等均可列为考虑因素或具有借鉴意义。至于最终结果,则可要看相关政府间的谈判与博弈。
国家整体统筹和实施流域水资源生态补偿工作。跨行政区流域水资源及其生态补偿的实施,因其鲜明的公共物品形态,构成了国家及其政府必须承担的基本职能。应依据流域范围由上级政府主导推动,下级政府承担具体实施：跨省的大中型河流的流域生态补偿由中央政府推动,省域内中小型河流的流域生态补偿由省级政府推动,各自成立流域生态补偿委员会负责资金的筹措、使用、管理和监督,补偿资金由政府筹措。
本文选取在中央政府主导下已经实施流域水环境补偿的跨皖浙两省的新安江流域作为案例,分析已有补偿实践的问题,并采用上述理论和框架予以重新建构,探索新安江流域生态补偿新模式。现有新安江流域补偿机制实质是简单的对赌协议,只涉及水质,不涉及上下游间的水资源产权问题,更没有对水资源进行补偿,没有充分体现权、责、利的统一和公平的正义。重新建构的结果是从水资源和水质两方面确定产权归属及利益补偿,中央、浙江省、安徽省均需提高补偿力度。
Water is source of life, key of production and base of ecology. Therefore, water resources meet not only the need of human survival and social development, but also that of the Earth as a whole. It carries economic value, as well as environmental, ecological, and aesthetic values. However, for a long time, water resources have been regarded as something natural, something freely available. Consequently, water resources have not been paid due attention and cherish, water resources protection couldn't get due compensation and destruction of the water environment has not been duly punished. It is due to human's wrong understanding on the issue of water resources and the lack of delineation of responsibilities that led to the abuse of water and increasing shortages and deteriorating of water environment. Therefore, it is urgent for China to reconstruct the system of the powers and responsibilities of water resources and to establish the mechanism of watershed ecological compensation, to promote the sustainable and coordinated development of society, economy and ecology, resources and environment through reshaping social justice in the protection and utilization of water resources.
The ecological compensation concept is the basis of this article. On defining the concept of ecological compensation, the core elements are the compensation for the impaired in rights and the interests due to environmental protection and environmental damage, and then clearing ecological compensation is compensation for social subjects rather than natural body, especially not the ecological environment construction and pollution governance. Public finance expenditures of the ecological environment construction projects are ecological compensation with the standard as to whether to include the compensation of the damage to environmental issues and rights and interests. Environmental taxes may become a source of ecological compensation funds, but the system itself is not part of the ecological compensation. There are essential differences between ecological compensation and ecological compensation mechanism. Ecological compensation is a more abstract concept, while ecological compensation mechanism is the practical design of ecological compensation. Watershed ecological compensation that is based on fairness and justice as core values is a means to regulate the conflicts of rights and interests with external issues of water resources and environment between administrative regions in the watershed area, including compensation for environmental contribution to the region's water resources and punishment to water resources environmental damage region.
Literature review shows that the international concept similar to ecological compensation is the payment for ecological services, which follows the "the beneficiary pays" principle. In China, studies flourished in watershed ecological compensation, but not in-depth from the perspective of water resources property right, constructing mathematical model of measuring cost and efficiency. As a result, without solid foundation, the study of watershed ecological compensation becomes difficult to be effectively put into practice. Theoretically, the internalization of externalities theory is the theoretical roots of watershed ecological compensation. Externality comes into being in specific economic activities when the party who did not involve in the decision-making influenced by economic activity, and the lack of effective feedback mechanism. Currently, the externality of the region between the upstream and downstream is the root cause of a watershed ecological compensation mechanism. The nature of externality is the issue of property rights. Regional externality is rooted in the ill-defined property rights of water resources and environment between the administrative regions of the basin upstream and downstream. I can say that the key to solve the problem of externalities is to define property rights. Therefore, the property rights system of water resources forms the basis of watershed ecological compensation system. At the same time, to achieve fairness and justice is the value targets of watershed ecological compensation. In the protection and utilization of water resources, the root of unequal rights and responsibilities and the conflict of interest between the upstream and downstream areas is due to the lack of justice principles in related systems. To solve this problem, it is urgent to reform institutions, making clear the rights, responsibilities and benefits of watershed water resources environments, establishing the implementation of watershed ecological compensation system to justify relevant systems of protecting and utilizing water resources.
Comprehensive observation of watershed ecological compensation practice at home and abroad shows that there are mainly four practical modes worth learning: intergovernmental cooperation watershed ecological compensation, direct compensation for watershed ecological protector of government-led, compensation for watershed ecological protector of enterprises to participate, market transaction compensation mode under the control of environment total. However, some problems remain, such as dispersion and lag of market transaction compensation mode, the need of support from property rights theory innovation for water resources, the urgency to strengthen regulation and involvement in the government. While in china, three modes can be summarized in watershed ecological compensation practice: the project compensation mainly to protect watered headwaters, watered water pollution control accountability and spanned compensation, water rights trading compensation based on water shortages. Among them, the project compensation mode takes the main position. While the spanned compensation practice targeted to water pollution control shows a rising trend, water rights trading compensation mode occurs only in specific regions. All these models have their advantages, having achieved good results in the regulation of the conflict of interest between the upstream and downstream region, promoting the sustainable use of watershed ecological resources environment. Nevertheless there are many defects, such as, not from the key factors-defining the water property rights to solve the problem of regional externalities, not creating a system of water resources compensation mechanism from a cross-section of water quality and quantity. Therefore, it is urgent to promote the water rights system innovation in practice, making clear the rights and interests of water sources richness and clarity on the basis of a single state ownership, to create a perfect spanned water resources and environment compensation mechanism.
In terms of the powers and responsibilities system of water resources in practice, the core is the issue of ownership. As natural object, water belongs to nobody, thus, there is no original owner. Meanwhile, because of the attributes of public resources in the watershed of human existence and its current form, water resources should not become private property of any individual in the real world. Therefore, countries are recognized as owner of water resources within the territorial scope of all form of law, based on national sovereignty, or set for all the countries on behalf of the interests of all citizens to protect every citizen's water interests, enabling the country to become the original owner of water resources, and building the necessary macroeconomic management over the state of water resources.
Judging from the water systems of property rights in history, it is Chinese tradition to practice single-state-ownership system and unified management of water resources. After the founding of People Republic of China, all means of production was stated-owned for a long time, and water resources naturally belonged to the government. Therefore, the ultimate ownership of water resources and the macro-control management naturally belonged to the state. However, the current problem is that such a sweeping national ownership resulting in specific ownership of water resources is unclear, and the associated water rights and responsibilities cannot be clearly defined. On one hand, possessing the ownership of water resources, the central government has rights to dispose, mobilize and allocate water resources, while local governments and residents have no right to interfere, but to accept passively. On the other hand, the sweeping regulation of water resources ownership belonging to state makes water resources shared things of all people who can obtain free of charge through the watershed policy or super cheap uncontrolled use of water resources. At the same time they discharged of sewage irresponsibly by the water flow properties. This severely diluted the awareness of water conservation, so that the behavior of the conservation and protection of water resources were not compensated, which resulted in the typical "tragedy of the commons".
Currently, some studies have been made in the field of the water property rights and watershed ecological compensation. However, all of them were based on the default general state ownership of water resources, using the concepts of "water rights","initial water rights" and "water source right", which was also based on the water resources policy of the government to freely distribute water resources in accordance with the population and economic development, exploring water-using rights or watering rights, neglecting further study of water resources ownership. Therefore, currently the owner' rights and interests of the country's water resources have been dummy actually, which resulted in exacerbating shortages of the available water resources and deteriorating of water environment, because of lacking of the effective management and use.
It is urgent to bring forth new ideas into the property rights system of water resources for watershed ecological compensation. National ownership of water resources is defined as ownership of the ultimate macro-control management at home on the basis of sovereign nature, rather than property rights on ownership. Property Law defines the ownership as "the owner of a realty or chattel is entitled to possess, utilize, seek profits from and dispose of the realty or chattel in accordance with law." Their rights body is a natural or legal person, and the country within a country does not have a separate legal personality. Therefore, the national ownership of water resources can reflect many of the rights of ownership in the state-to-state affairs. But within the national territory, national ownership involves that countries have the ultimate ownership of macro-control management. The so-called "the ultimate ownership of macro-control management" means that countries have ultimate macroeconomic regulation and control of water resources management ownership based on the principle of fairness, in order to safeguard the common interests of all the people by the water administrative department of the State Council to exercise and make arrangements, including the legislative powers of the national macro-management of water resources, the right to social development planning, the implementation rights to water resources ecological compensation, water allocation and the right to enforce laws against, so as to ensure that the sustainable use of water resources and its environment.
The property usufruct of water resources area should be clear. Most of our watersheds have the characteristic of crossing administrative regions, and the local governments of their flows have the rights to dominate, possess and use every rivers and water resources. Because of the relatively independent interests among each region, there is intensive competition, which will inevitably lead to a conflict of cross-border water resources and environment, resulting in water resources and environmental crisis. Therefore, the state-owned water resources (initial) rights should be divided within macroeconomic management in accordance with law and the economic benefits, specifically into property income, sanctions and the use of power. As regional wealth,"Water property usufruct of this kind of wealth in the region" should be a clear contribution to the area of water resources regions. A change of the ownership of "regional wealth" is bound to affect the fair and equitable distribution of wealth.
In reality, the national water resources are distributed payment-free according to regional population and economic development, so up-stream regions of water resources are virtually deprived of "Water property usufruct". In state laws and general provisions, local governments should take the obligations to protect water resources environments while enjoy the rights to use water resources and the environment. However, there are obvious conflicts between water conservation and resource utilization. Up-stream regions take more responsibilities for the protection of water resources and environment, and having less right to enjoy water resources environment; while down-stream areas take less responsibilities and enjoy more right. As a result, it is seriously unequal in responsibility and right between upstream and downstream. In a long time, the upstream regions will inevitably despite the legal responsibility to protect, with its natural advantages in the watershed, and over-exploitation of water resources and water environment sewage capacity, resulting in the deterioration of the ecological environment in the catchment.
What matters here is that the specific powers and responsibilities of the water resources among regions are ill-defined and contrary to justice. At present, Chinese watershed ecological compensation practices are mainly based on the responsibility system of water quality, without the support of the water resources in terms of system, lacking sufficient and reasonable basis, and deviated from what the watershed ecological compensation should mean. Logically, the complete framework of watershed ecological compensation system should put first the compensation of resource to upstream contributions and then responsibility system of reward and punishment based on the section of water quality.
In the performance of macroeconomic regulation and control of water resources management ownership responsibilities, the central government should uphold the maintenance of the primary principles of social justice, fully considering the interests of the contribution to the area of water resources. First, the contribution of regional water resources should be recognized in the legal system, the specific water resources property usufruct should be assigned to the contribution region of water resources and environment, to establish two-level property rights system of the national ultimate macroeconomic control management ownership and regional water resources property ownership, ensuring the due resource revenue to the area of water resources. And then, the specific use of the water resource ownership and disposition rights are allocated to the next level in the basin administrative regions based on the factors of population, ecological, social development, and the market mechanism.
Watershed ecological compensation mechanism should be constructed on the basis of two-level property rights system of Water Resources. With the accurate measurement technology of watershed management on water quality and quantity, according to basin sectional installation, the contribution to the water of the watershed source region and the intermediate region can be calculated. In order to implement different standards of ecological compensation for the watershed range,"Water contribution to the water", first make the watershed source region and the intermediate regional access to water resources and property income; On this basis, according to the river ecological requirements and the basin water use allocation rights, stringent water quality and quantity of incentive accountability and water rights trading mechanism would be established to lay more scientific institutional basis for complete water the spanned compensation mechanism in the whole basin system.
Here, the level of incentive standard is critical to basin water resources ecological compensation. If too high, the standard cannot be implemented, while too low, it cannot work. However, some theoretical factors as direct input costs to protect water resources, the opportunity cost of opportunity, the value of the environment and ecology, regional differences, government financial situation, the stage of economic development, as well as water resources value should all be taken into consideration or reference, with a result lying in negotiations and Games between the relevant governments.
Nation coordinates and implements ecological compensation work of basin water resources. Implementation of basin water resources and its ecological compensation across districts constitute the basic functions of the country and its government because of its distinctive public goods morphology. Dominated by the higher levels of government based on a basin-wide, lower levels of government to assume a specific implementation, watershed ecological compensation for inter-provincial large and medium-sized river is driven by the central government, the province's small and medium-sized river by the provincial government, each set up a watershed ecological compensation committee responsible for fund raising, use, management and supervision, and compensation funds for financing by the government.
This thesis, taking Xin'anjiang basin cross Anhui and Zhejiang provinces as a case study, analyses the existing compensation practices in implemented basin water environment compensation under the auspices of the central government, reconstructing the above theoretical framework to explore Xin'anjiang Ecological Compensation Mode. The existing Xin'anjiang watered compensation mechanism is essentially a simple agreement on gambling, involving the water quality alone, not involving the issues of property rights between upstream and downstream water resources and compensation for water resources, without full embodiment if the rights, responsibilities and interests unified and fair justice. The result of reconstruct is to determine property ownership and equity compensation both from perspectives of water resources and water quality, strengthening compensation by both government of Zhejiang Province and Anhui Province.
引文
①本文得到江西省高校人文社科重点研究基地‘生态文明与现代中国研究中心’的资助。
②本文研究所涉及的水资源仅指处于自然状态的且可供人类利用的地表淡水资源,地下水、人气水、冰川水、海洋水、经过加工的商品水均不在本研究范畴之中。
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②010年6月1日,《辽宁省人民政府关于调整水资源费征收标准的通知》。其中还规定新开征水利工程取水征收标准为每立方米0.05元。
③《江苏省南水北调工程基金提高水资源费标准》,江苏省地表水水资源费征收标准将由0.13元／立方米调增到0.2元/立方米,http://www.gov.cn/fwxx/sh/2006-06/06/content_301111.htm。
④《淄博市水资源费征收使用管理实施办法》自2012年2月起施行。
⑤2006年1月12日省政府令第285号发布的《湖北省水资源费征收管理办法》及省物价局、省财政厅、省水利厅关于调整水资源费征收标准(试行)及有关问题的通知。
⑥安徽省物价局、财政厅、水利厅皖价费[2004)13号文,2004年1月18日印发《关于调整水资源费征收标准的通知》。
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②2009年3月30日,河北省人民政府办公厅：《河北省人民政府办公厅关于实行跨界断面水质目标责任考核的通知》
③《湖北排污权交易COD成交价较首次增长17倍》,http://www.cebbank.com/Info/19309950
④嘉兴在线新闻网：《排污权交易量价齐升》,http://www.cnjxol.com/xwzx/jxxw/jjxw/content/2009-10/21/content_1187937.htm
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