大型疏浚工程委托代理的定价与激励研究
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摘要
疏浚工程是跨学科的交叉学科,涉及到海洋、河流、船舶技术、环保、经济、管理等众多复杂问题,疏浚工程的成本不仅关系到疏浚企业的利润和发展,更关系到业主开发的力度和积极性。从某种意义上讲,疏浚工程的成本决定了整个国民经济的运营成本。因此,疏浚工程一直是众多学者和企业界研究与实践的重要课题。
分析疏浚工程的成本构成和影响疏浚工程成本与收益的因素,应用委托代理理论分析了疏浚工程管理中的委托代理关系。对作为项目经理的代理人进行了分类。利用动态博弈建立了大型疏浚工程的成本收益计算模型,求出了模型的均衡解。结合外部代理人的特点,提出了选择激励外部代理人的方法。由于外部代理人只有其良好的信誉作质押,在选择外部代理人作项目经理时,必须在代理人协议中规定控制成本、控制工期和检查的节点。为防止合谋行为的发生,委托人要派遣独立的测量人员进行监测。
分包是疏浚工程外部代理的另一种方式。应用委托代理理论和方法,建立了大型疏浚工程的分包定价模型,求出了最佳分包工程量。通过模型的分析,提出了基于价格和小时产量双筛选的分包方选择程序,建立了工程量激励和价格、工程量双激励的分包方激励机制。工程分包可以降低总包方的工程成本、提高生产进度,并对内部代理人形成成本约束和竞争约束,从而改善疏浚企业的效益。
分析了企业内部代理人特点,利用委托代理理论和方法,建立了长期激励模型,通过增加长期激励约束、贴现率、收益增长率和退休金,求出了长期激励模型的解。在长期激励模型中,内部代理人的长期收益高于外部代理人的短期收益,给代理人提供了更强的激励；由于存在质押,代理人和委托人的目标更趋一致,进一步强化了对代理人的激励；内部代理人的长期激励模型降低了代理人达不到收益产量的风险,也因此降低了委托人的风险；内部代理人的长期激励模型中,代理人的收益仍然与代理人的小时产量相关。
运用“公平偏好”理论对代理人的激励进行了分析,建立了基于公平的疏浚工程激励机制,讨论了船型、中标价格对激励的影响。研究表明,在委托人管理多代理人建立激励机制时,要注意技术设备对代理人收益的影响,并要消除这些影响因素,否则会因激励不公平影响代理人的积极性。疏浚工程的中标价格对代理人的影响较大,必须要制定内部土方价格即定额,否则会导致转移支付或转嫁损失,即转嫁风险。提出了船型修正系数,通过修正部分消除了船型对代理人激励的影响。
分析了疏浚工程的委托代理特点及其代理风险,对疏浚工程中委托代理风险的内涵和表现形式进行了分析,并提出了相应的风险防范与控制措施,对疏浚工程的管理工作有一定的指导意义。
The dredging engineering is an interdisciplinary subject, involving in numerous complicated problems such as ocean, rivers, ship technology, environmental protection, economy and management. The cost of the dredging engineering not only concerns the profit and development of the dredging enterprise, but also concerns the developing dynamics and positivity of the owner. In a sense the cost of the dredging engineering determines the operating cost of the whole national economy. Therefore, the dredging engineering is always the important project for the research and practice of multiple scholars and business circles.
Analyze the cost composition of the dredging engineering and the factors of influencing the cost and profit of the dredging engineering, and apply the entrusted agency theory to analyze the entrustment relationship during the dredging engineering management. Classify the agent as the project manager. Utilize the dynamic game to build the cost benefit computation model of large-scale dredging engineering, and obtain the equilibrium solution of the model. Combine the characteristics of the external agent, and put forward the method of selecting for motivating the external agent. The external agent just has the well-deserved reputation as the pledge, thus it is necessary to stipulate the control cost, control construction period and checking nodal points in the agent agreement while selecting the external agent as the project manager. In order to prevent the occurrence of the collusive behavior, the client should dispatch the independent measurement personnel to monitor.
The subcontracting is another mode for the external agency of the dredging engineering. Apply the method of entrusted agency theory to build the subcontracting pricing model for large-scale dredging engineering, and evaluate the best subcontracting quantities. Through the model analysis, put forward the option program of the subcontractor with double screening on basis of the price and hour output, establish the motivation system of the subcontractor with quantities motivation, and double motivations as price and quantities. The engineering subcontracting can reduce the engineering cost of the main contractor, enhance the production progress, form the cost constraint and competition constraint on the internal agent, and accordingly improve the benefit of the dredging enterprise.
Analyze the characteristics of the internal agent in the enterprise, utilize the entrusted agency theory and method, build the long-term motivation model, and obtain the solution of the long-term motivation model through increasing the long-term motivation constraint, discount rate, growth rate of earnings and retirement pension. In long-term motivation model, the long-term earnings of the internal agent are higher than the short-term earnings of the external agent, which provides stronger motivation for the agent. Due to the pledge, the goals of the agent and client tend towards conformity, which further reinforces the motivation for the agent. The long-term motivation model of internal agent lowers the risk that the agent fails to achieve the earnings and output, and lowers the risk of the client. In the long-term motivation model of the internal agent, the earnings of the agent are still relevant to the hour output of the agent.
Utilize the theory of fairness preference to analyze the motivation of the agent, build the equity-based motivation competition of the dredging engineering, and discuss the influences of the ship type and bid-winning price on the motivation. The research indicates that it is necessary to notice the influences of the technical equipments on the earnings of the agent and eliminate these influencing factors when the client manages multiple agents to build the motivation system, or the positivity of the agent shall be influenced due to the unfair motivation. The bid-winning price of the dredging engineering has comparatively large influences on the agent, and the internal earthwork price as well as quota must be formulated, or it shall result in the damage of the transfer payment or shift, i.e. shift risk. The correction coefficient of the ship type is raised, and the influence of the ship type on the agent motivation is eliminated by the correction parts.
Analyze the entrusted agency characteristics and agency risks of the dredging engineering, and analyze the connotation and manifestation of the entrusted agency risks during the dredging engineering, and put forward the corresponding risk prevention and control measures, which have some guiding significances for the management of the dredging engineering.
分析疏浚工程的成本构成和影响疏浚工程成本与收益的因素,应用委托代理理论分析了疏浚工程管理中的委托代理关系。对作为项目经理的代理人进行了分类。利用动态博弈建立了大型疏浚工程的成本收益计算模型,求出了模型的均衡解。结合外部代理人的特点,提出了选择激励外部代理人的方法。由于外部代理人只有其良好的信誉作质押,在选择外部代理人作项目经理时,必须在代理人协议中规定控制成本、控制工期和检查的节点。为防止合谋行为的发生,委托人要派遣独立的测量人员进行监测。
分包是疏浚工程外部代理的另一种方式。应用委托代理理论和方法,建立了大型疏浚工程的分包定价模型,求出了最佳分包工程量。通过模型的分析,提出了基于价格和小时产量双筛选的分包方选择程序,建立了工程量激励和价格、工程量双激励的分包方激励机制。工程分包可以降低总包方的工程成本、提高生产进度,并对内部代理人形成成本约束和竞争约束,从而改善疏浚企业的效益。
分析了企业内部代理人特点,利用委托代理理论和方法,建立了长期激励模型,通过增加长期激励约束、贴现率、收益增长率和退休金,求出了长期激励模型的解。在长期激励模型中,内部代理人的长期收益高于外部代理人的短期收益,给代理人提供了更强的激励；由于存在质押,代理人和委托人的目标更趋一致,进一步强化了对代理人的激励；内部代理人的长期激励模型降低了代理人达不到收益产量的风险,也因此降低了委托人的风险；内部代理人的长期激励模型中,代理人的收益仍然与代理人的小时产量相关。
运用“公平偏好”理论对代理人的激励进行了分析,建立了基于公平的疏浚工程激励机制,讨论了船型、中标价格对激励的影响。研究表明,在委托人管理多代理人建立激励机制时,要注意技术设备对代理人收益的影响,并要消除这些影响因素,否则会因激励不公平影响代理人的积极性。疏浚工程的中标价格对代理人的影响较大,必须要制定内部土方价格即定额,否则会导致转移支付或转嫁损失,即转嫁风险。提出了船型修正系数,通过修正部分消除了船型对代理人激励的影响。
分析了疏浚工程的委托代理特点及其代理风险,对疏浚工程中委托代理风险的内涵和表现形式进行了分析,并提出了相应的风险防范与控制措施,对疏浚工程的管理工作有一定的指导意义。
The dredging engineering is an interdisciplinary subject, involving in numerous complicated problems such as ocean, rivers, ship technology, environmental protection, economy and management. The cost of the dredging engineering not only concerns the profit and development of the dredging enterprise, but also concerns the developing dynamics and positivity of the owner. In a sense the cost of the dredging engineering determines the operating cost of the whole national economy. Therefore, the dredging engineering is always the important project for the research and practice of multiple scholars and business circles.
Analyze the cost composition of the dredging engineering and the factors of influencing the cost and profit of the dredging engineering, and apply the entrusted agency theory to analyze the entrustment relationship during the dredging engineering management. Classify the agent as the project manager. Utilize the dynamic game to build the cost benefit computation model of large-scale dredging engineering, and obtain the equilibrium solution of the model. Combine the characteristics of the external agent, and put forward the method of selecting for motivating the external agent. The external agent just has the well-deserved reputation as the pledge, thus it is necessary to stipulate the control cost, control construction period and checking nodal points in the agent agreement while selecting the external agent as the project manager. In order to prevent the occurrence of the collusive behavior, the client should dispatch the independent measurement personnel to monitor.
The subcontracting is another mode for the external agency of the dredging engineering. Apply the method of entrusted agency theory to build the subcontracting pricing model for large-scale dredging engineering, and evaluate the best subcontracting quantities. Through the model analysis, put forward the option program of the subcontractor with double screening on basis of the price and hour output, establish the motivation system of the subcontractor with quantities motivation, and double motivations as price and quantities. The engineering subcontracting can reduce the engineering cost of the main contractor, enhance the production progress, form the cost constraint and competition constraint on the internal agent, and accordingly improve the benefit of the dredging enterprise.
Analyze the characteristics of the internal agent in the enterprise, utilize the entrusted agency theory and method, build the long-term motivation model, and obtain the solution of the long-term motivation model through increasing the long-term motivation constraint, discount rate, growth rate of earnings and retirement pension. In long-term motivation model, the long-term earnings of the internal agent are higher than the short-term earnings of the external agent, which provides stronger motivation for the agent. Due to the pledge, the goals of the agent and client tend towards conformity, which further reinforces the motivation for the agent. The long-term motivation model of internal agent lowers the risk that the agent fails to achieve the earnings and output, and lowers the risk of the client. In the long-term motivation model of the internal agent, the earnings of the agent are still relevant to the hour output of the agent.
Utilize the theory of fairness preference to analyze the motivation of the agent, build the equity-based motivation competition of the dredging engineering, and discuss the influences of the ship type and bid-winning price on the motivation. The research indicates that it is necessary to notice the influences of the technical equipments on the earnings of the agent and eliminate these influencing factors when the client manages multiple agents to build the motivation system, or the positivity of the agent shall be influenced due to the unfair motivation. The bid-winning price of the dredging engineering has comparatively large influences on the agent, and the internal earthwork price as well as quota must be formulated, or it shall result in the damage of the transfer payment or shift, i.e. shift risk. The correction coefficient of the ship type is raised, and the influence of the ship type on the agent motivation is eliminated by the correction parts.
Analyze the entrusted agency characteristics and agency risks of the dredging engineering, and analyze the connotation and manifestation of the entrusted agency risks during the dredging engineering, and put forward the corresponding risk prevention and control measures, which have some guiding significances for the management of the dredging engineering.
引文
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