消防企业高管人员组合激励研究
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摘要
随着经济社会的不断发展和社会分工的不断细化,越来越多的具有专业管理知识但不具备生产资料的人才出现在劳动力市场上,同时也有一批拥有生产资料所有权但缺少专业管理知识的人需要寻找合适的人选代为使用生产资料寻求利益收入,这种供给与需要就形成了交易,形成了双方之间委托—代理的关系。从泰勒的科学管理理论开始,社会分工理论就随着经济发展不断深化,“专业的人做专业的事”的理念被运用到很多领域。具体而言：一方面,它使专业化分工思想扩展到管理领域；另一方面,它也带来很多委托人与代理人之间存在着非对称信息难题,如管理人员寻租现象、短期化行为严重。委托人与代理人之间非对称信息难题的解决有待于对代理人进行激励和约束,其中激励是对代理人主要、积极的引导方式,它能引导代理人朝着委托人的方向主动努力。就企业而言,对企业高管的激励既可以提高其满意度和工作积极性,又能提高企业经营和收益水平,因而是一种双赢的做法。
本文通过对人性假设理论、经济学中的制度激励理论、管理学中的管理激励理论及相关理论等进行归纳和概括,对国内外相关研究进行分析和总结,就我国消防企业在实践中出现的激励问题提出假设。根据本文假设以我国28家消防企业的高管做为调查对象,得到了180份有效问卷。在此基础上运用SPSS16.0和AMOS17.0统计软件工具,通过探测性因子分析、描述性统计、均值分析和方差分析等分析方法对研究假设进行了检验,对现阶段我国消防企业高管所处的需要层次、高管对需要的重要性、激励现状及激励效果等进行深入分析。并根据上述结论为我国企业有效对高管进行激励及所采用的激励组合效用最大化提供必要的理论支持,为改进我国企业高管激励、提高高管工作积极性等提供实证参考。为实现上述目标,本文通过六部分内容进行探讨。
第一部分,绪论。绪论主要介绍了本文的研究背景、意义以及研究的主要内容和研究技术路线进行了阐述。本文发现,无论是从管理学角度、管理实践角度,亦或是经济学角度而言,企业对高管进行组合激励都是迫切所需并有待根据具体情况完善的。在我国,消防企业的竞争力比较薄弱,提高其竞争力的一个关键就是加强企业经营管理队伍的建设,从组合激励角度加强我国消防企业高管队伍建设成为本文研究的切入点。
第二部分,相关文献综述。本部分就国内外相关理论和实证研究进行了整理归纳,包括人性假设理论、需要理论、激励理论以及激励效果等研究成果,通过对相关文献解读和评述为本文的研究主体奠定了坚实的理论基础。在理论层面,“复杂人”假说从人性的角度出发说明了个体的差异性,为本文研究奠定了理论基础。“复杂人”假说为需要多样性提供了根本支持,但分类方法却是众说纷纭,本文试图通过问卷调查对高管这个特殊的人群的需要进行归纳。另外,锦标赛理论为高管获得较高收入提供了有力的依据,心理契约理论使本文认识到非物质激励的重要性。在实证研究层面,通过梳理发现,多数学者关注年薪、股权激励对公司财务绩效的影响,对物质与非物质组合激励的效果研究较少,未考虑高管工作积极性受激励的直接影响,因而本文以高管的工作积极性作为对激励效果的研究变量。
第三部分,消防企业高管组合激励模型与假设。在第二部分的基础上,笔者构建了初步的理论模型以及假设,并就模型中的基本变量进行了界定并设定了调查方式及问卷,包括高管的需要、企业与个体特征、高管激励方式以及激励的作用效果。基于个体间需要差异源于差异化特征和满足高管需要进而提高其工作积极性的激励实质,本文构建了高管激励满意水平通过影响高管需要满足水平从而对高管的工作积极性进行影响的初步模型,并就各变量之间的关系进行了详细且有论证的假设。鉴于高管需要这一变量未得到广大学者的统一分类方式,需要通过问卷调查探索得出,故在本文第四部分对高管需要进行单独研究。
第四部分,消防企业高管需要理论与实证分析。这一部分首先确定本文所研究的高管范围,本文将“高管”定义为在企业中拥有决策权,对企业的绩效和长远发展有着重要影响的管理人员,包括董事长、总经理、副总经理和部门经理。接着本文进行了深度访谈以及大量的问卷调查并进行探索性因子分析,对高管的需要变量进行深入研究,得到了四种类型的需要：生存需要、权力需要、关系需要及自我实现需要,并就每种类型的需要进行了概念界定以及理论分析。
第五部分,消防企业高管组合激励实证分析。本部分对我国消防企业高管激励方式及工作积极性变量的信度与效度进行了检验,检验结果显示信度与效度均符合研究要求。接着对各变量间的关系进行了实证分析,包括：不同企业特征、个体特征的高管对不同激励方式重视程度分析,不同企业特征、个体特征的高管对不同需要的重视程度分析,组合激励的满意水平对高管工作积极性的影响分析,组合激励的满意程度对高管需要满足程度的影响分析,高管需要满足程度对工作积极性的影响分析以及需要满足程度的中介作用分析,最终部分证实了之前的研究假设,并支持了初步研究模型,在此基础之上就最终研究结果进行了总结。
第六部分,研究结论与启示。根据第五部分的实证分析结果,本文得出了重要的研究结论,分别是：高管间特征差异影响各激励方式及需要的重要性评判,高管对激励现状存在不满,激励对于高管的工作积极性有正向的影响,在激励对工作积极性的影响过程中需要的满足程度起到中介作用。在以上研究的基础之上,本文提出了几点对策与建议,在设计高管激励机制时应该遵循以高管复式需要为出发点、以公正合理的考核为激励基础的原则,在具体的高管组合激励模式设计中,需要完善高管的薪酬结构,注意在激励方式的选择上坚持灵活性和多样化。接着本文提出了几种常见的组合激励模式供参考,包括生存需要主导型、关系需要主导型、权力需要主导型、自我实现需要主导型高管组合激励模式共四种,每种模式中包含若干种主要的激励方式。当判断出高管的主导需要时,根据本文提出的激励模式就能够有的放矢地使用激励方式使其需要得到满足。站在宏观的角度上,笔者认为应该从健全职业经理人市场、完善相关法律法规、建立薪酬委员会这几点入手。
最后本文指出了研究中存在的不足,包括外部效度相较于内部效度而言偏低、样本选取具有地域局限、调查问卷负激励题项不足、非物质激励欠缺定量测量等方面。笔者希望未来可以通过进一步分析探索需要的影响因素、扩大样本采集、加强对非物质激励的研究以弥补本文存在的不足,将高管组合激励的研究继续深入并拓展下去。
纵观全文,本文始终贯穿着个体特征——激励方式——需要满足——激励效果这一主线加以研究,运用实证的方法对这些变量之间的相关性做了证明,并最终得出结论,分析存在的问题并提出建议,脉络清晰合理。希望后续可以在个体特征上进一步扩展或深化、研究对象上能够突破消防企业而运用到其他行业中、组合激励方式上能够探索其他分类方式、或者就某一种激励方式进行进一步深入得研究,以期为如何激励高管提供一些借鉴并引起对高管激励的重视。
本文的创新点在于文章实证研究了消防企业高管的需要及其组合激励,开创性地构建了消防企业高管的组合激励模式,为以后的高管组合激励研究提供了一种新颖的模式。
The concept of labor division deepens with the economic development since Taylor's scientific management theory, and the thought of "Professional people do professional thing" gets more and more popular which was used to the process of the division at first. With the development and spreading of management theory, several people who have plenty of knowledge about management but own little production materials appear in the labor market, and at the same time, some people who own production materials without management knowledge need to find people who can make money with the use of production materials, so the principal-agent relationship has been formed due to the existence of supply and demand. On one hand, it pulls professional division to the management field, but on the other hand, it accompanys with some difficulties such as rent-seeking phenomenon and lot behaviors which caused by the asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. In order to solve the problems, there is need to motivate and restrain the agent. It is motivation that means a lot to senior managers because its positivity which not only can guide and satisfy the agent but also benefit the enterprise.
The research aimed at28fire companies in our country and finally obtained180valid questionnaires. The research analyzed and summarized humanity hypothesis theory、the system economics theory of incentives、the management incentive theory of Management Science and related theory of the previous relevant researches at home and abroad, and put forward the assumption according to the problems appeared in the practice of Chinese fire companies. Based on the SPSS16.0and AMOS17.0statistical software tools, the research tested the hypotheses through the exploratory factor analysis, descriptive statistics, the mean and variance analysis and other analysis methods and inquired into the importance、effect as well as present stage of executives'demand. What the purpose is to provide the necessary theoretical support for executive incentive and to solve the incentive problems and to improve the enthusiasm of the staff.
The first part, the introduction. The introduction introduces the background of this study, the significance of the main content of the study and research techniques routes are described. The study found that both from a management perspective, the perspective of the management practices, executives or economics point of view, the combination of incentives are urgently required and needs to be improved. In our country, fire the competitiveness of enterprises is relatively weak, a key point to solve the problem is to strengthen the business management team building, strengthen the construction of the management team to become the entry point of this angle from a combination of incentives.
The second part, the relevant literature review. This section was done by the previous theoretical knowledge summarization, including the research results of the theory of human nature assumptions, demand theory, motivation theory, and incentive effects."Complex" hypothesis starting from the human point of view shows the individual differences, and laid a theoretical foundation for this study."Complex" hypothesis point of view a fundamental support for the needs of diversity, the needs of species diversity is very easy to be understood, but their classification is controversial, for each classification method has its own rationality, but for executives of this particular crowd how to classify the authors did not dare to jump to conclusions, we can only attempt to summarize executives conducted a questionnaire survey. Tournament theory provides a strong basis for executives to earn more income, and psychological contract theory makes us realize the importance of non-material incentives. By a study combing the incentive effects, the majority of scholars are concerned about the annual salary, equity incentive on the company's financial performance, the less the effect of a combination of tangible and intangible incentives, and financial indicators executives the impact of non-direct and timeliness by internal and external factors together, and executives working enthusiasm is a direct impact on the incentives, and thus the enthusiasm of executives as incentive effects variables. Combing through the relevant literature has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the research subject of this article.
The third part, the Fire executives portfolio and incentive model and assumptions. On the basis of the second part, this paper constructed a preliminary theoretical model and assumptions, and the basic variables in the model to define and set the method of investigation and questionnaires, including the needs of enterprises and individual characteristics of executives, executives incentives and the incentive effect, As executives demand variable is not a unified classification of the majority of scholars, exploring obtained through questionnaires, it is listed in the fourth part of the executives demand a separate study.
The needs of different individuals from differences in the characteristics of corporate and individual characteristics of a control variable. On executive incentives in real terms through to meet the needs of executives to improve their work, and this, the paper constructs a satisfaction level of executive incentive executives actively meet the level executives demand impact model and on the relationship between each variable detailed demonstration assumptions.
The fourth part, demand theory and empirical analysis of the fire industry executives. This part of the first analyzed executives come to this research range from executives concept, the definition of "executive" decision-making power in the enterprise management has an important impact on corporate performance and long-term development staff, including the chairman, general manager, deputy general manager and department manager. Then needs to executives demand variables in-depth study, conducted depth interviews and questionnaire survey and exploratory factor analysis, four types of needs:survival needs, power requirements, the relationship between demand and self-realization, and demand for each type of concept definition and theoretical analysis.
The fifth part, the combination of fire corporate executives incentives Empirical Analysis. This section of the reliability and validity of the incentives and motivation variables tested, the test results indicate the reliability and validity are in line with research requirements. Then conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between variables, including:the characteristics of different enterprises, individual characteristics of executives on the importance of different incentives, different firm characteristics, individual characteristics of executives on the importance of the different needs of the combination of incentive the satisfactory level executives work analysis, the level of satisfaction of the combination of incentives on executive needs to meet the degree of impact analysis, executives demand satisfaction of the intermediary role of work and demand satisfaction, and ultimately partially confirmed the previous hypotheses, and to support the initial research model, a summary of the final results on this basis.
The sixth part, the conclusions and enlightenment. The fifth part of the empirical results, we draw important conclusions of the study are:the characteristic differences between executives affect the judgment of the importance of various incentives and demand, executives incentive status quo exists dissatisfaction incentives for executives enthusiasm for work has a positive influence and play an intermediary role in the satisfaction of the needs of the incentive to work actively influence the process. The basis of the above studies, we proposed some countermeasures and suggestions should be followed in the design executive incentives to executives duplex needs as a starting point the principle of a fair and reasonable assessment of incentive-based; Based on the above two design principles in the specific combination of executive incentive model design, you need to perfect the structure of executive compensation, pay attention to adhere to the flexibility and diversification in the choice of incentives; then this paper, several combinations of incentive model for reference. needs for survival-oriented, the relationship between demand-led, power demand-led, self-demand-oriented executives combination of incentives to a total of four, each mode contains a number of major incentives, when we judge the executives of the leading needs targeted incentives to make their needs are met; standing on a macro point of view, I believe that should improve the market of professional managers, and improve relevant laws and regulations, the establishment of the Remuneration Committee, points to start. Finally, the paper pointed out the shortcomings in the study, including the external validity compared to the low side in terms of internal validity, the sample selected geographical limitations, the survey questionnaire negative incentive items less than non-material incentives lack of quantitative measurement. Knowing their shortcomings, so I hope that the future can be further analysis to explore the factors of the impact on demand, to expand the sample collection, and strengthen the non-material incentives to compensate for the shortcomings, the incentives of executives combination further and expand down.
Throughout the full text of this article runs through the individual characteristics-incentives-to meet demand-the main line of the incentive effect, the use of empirical methods to prove the correlation between these variables, and ultimately concluded that,analysis of existing problems and make recommendations, the context is clear and reasonable. Hope you can follow-up on the individual characteristics of the further expansion or deepening of the fire protection industry can be a breakthrough in the study applied to other industries, the combination of incentives can explore other classification, or on a particular incentive to further have to study, in order to how to motivate executives and aroused the attention of the executive incentive.
The innovation of this paper is that the article Empirical Study of the needs of the fire protection industry executives and combinations thereof, incentives, ground-breaking building fire a combination of incentive of corporate executives, and provides a new incentive for executives combination model.
本文通过对人性假设理论、经济学中的制度激励理论、管理学中的管理激励理论及相关理论等进行归纳和概括,对国内外相关研究进行分析和总结,就我国消防企业在实践中出现的激励问题提出假设。根据本文假设以我国28家消防企业的高管做为调查对象,得到了180份有效问卷。在此基础上运用SPSS16.0和AMOS17.0统计软件工具,通过探测性因子分析、描述性统计、均值分析和方差分析等分析方法对研究假设进行了检验,对现阶段我国消防企业高管所处的需要层次、高管对需要的重要性、激励现状及激励效果等进行深入分析。并根据上述结论为我国企业有效对高管进行激励及所采用的激励组合效用最大化提供必要的理论支持,为改进我国企业高管激励、提高高管工作积极性等提供实证参考。为实现上述目标,本文通过六部分内容进行探讨。
第一部分,绪论。绪论主要介绍了本文的研究背景、意义以及研究的主要内容和研究技术路线进行了阐述。本文发现,无论是从管理学角度、管理实践角度,亦或是经济学角度而言,企业对高管进行组合激励都是迫切所需并有待根据具体情况完善的。在我国,消防企业的竞争力比较薄弱,提高其竞争力的一个关键就是加强企业经营管理队伍的建设,从组合激励角度加强我国消防企业高管队伍建设成为本文研究的切入点。
第二部分,相关文献综述。本部分就国内外相关理论和实证研究进行了整理归纳,包括人性假设理论、需要理论、激励理论以及激励效果等研究成果,通过对相关文献解读和评述为本文的研究主体奠定了坚实的理论基础。在理论层面,“复杂人”假说从人性的角度出发说明了个体的差异性,为本文研究奠定了理论基础。“复杂人”假说为需要多样性提供了根本支持,但分类方法却是众说纷纭,本文试图通过问卷调查对高管这个特殊的人群的需要进行归纳。另外,锦标赛理论为高管获得较高收入提供了有力的依据,心理契约理论使本文认识到非物质激励的重要性。在实证研究层面,通过梳理发现,多数学者关注年薪、股权激励对公司财务绩效的影响,对物质与非物质组合激励的效果研究较少,未考虑高管工作积极性受激励的直接影响,因而本文以高管的工作积极性作为对激励效果的研究变量。
第三部分,消防企业高管组合激励模型与假设。在第二部分的基础上,笔者构建了初步的理论模型以及假设,并就模型中的基本变量进行了界定并设定了调查方式及问卷,包括高管的需要、企业与个体特征、高管激励方式以及激励的作用效果。基于个体间需要差异源于差异化特征和满足高管需要进而提高其工作积极性的激励实质,本文构建了高管激励满意水平通过影响高管需要满足水平从而对高管的工作积极性进行影响的初步模型,并就各变量之间的关系进行了详细且有论证的假设。鉴于高管需要这一变量未得到广大学者的统一分类方式,需要通过问卷调查探索得出,故在本文第四部分对高管需要进行单独研究。
第四部分,消防企业高管需要理论与实证分析。这一部分首先确定本文所研究的高管范围,本文将“高管”定义为在企业中拥有决策权,对企业的绩效和长远发展有着重要影响的管理人员,包括董事长、总经理、副总经理和部门经理。接着本文进行了深度访谈以及大量的问卷调查并进行探索性因子分析,对高管的需要变量进行深入研究,得到了四种类型的需要：生存需要、权力需要、关系需要及自我实现需要,并就每种类型的需要进行了概念界定以及理论分析。
第五部分,消防企业高管组合激励实证分析。本部分对我国消防企业高管激励方式及工作积极性变量的信度与效度进行了检验,检验结果显示信度与效度均符合研究要求。接着对各变量间的关系进行了实证分析,包括：不同企业特征、个体特征的高管对不同激励方式重视程度分析,不同企业特征、个体特征的高管对不同需要的重视程度分析,组合激励的满意水平对高管工作积极性的影响分析,组合激励的满意程度对高管需要满足程度的影响分析,高管需要满足程度对工作积极性的影响分析以及需要满足程度的中介作用分析,最终部分证实了之前的研究假设,并支持了初步研究模型,在此基础之上就最终研究结果进行了总结。
第六部分,研究结论与启示。根据第五部分的实证分析结果,本文得出了重要的研究结论,分别是：高管间特征差异影响各激励方式及需要的重要性评判,高管对激励现状存在不满,激励对于高管的工作积极性有正向的影响,在激励对工作积极性的影响过程中需要的满足程度起到中介作用。在以上研究的基础之上,本文提出了几点对策与建议,在设计高管激励机制时应该遵循以高管复式需要为出发点、以公正合理的考核为激励基础的原则,在具体的高管组合激励模式设计中,需要完善高管的薪酬结构,注意在激励方式的选择上坚持灵活性和多样化。接着本文提出了几种常见的组合激励模式供参考,包括生存需要主导型、关系需要主导型、权力需要主导型、自我实现需要主导型高管组合激励模式共四种,每种模式中包含若干种主要的激励方式。当判断出高管的主导需要时,根据本文提出的激励模式就能够有的放矢地使用激励方式使其需要得到满足。站在宏观的角度上,笔者认为应该从健全职业经理人市场、完善相关法律法规、建立薪酬委员会这几点入手。
最后本文指出了研究中存在的不足,包括外部效度相较于内部效度而言偏低、样本选取具有地域局限、调查问卷负激励题项不足、非物质激励欠缺定量测量等方面。笔者希望未来可以通过进一步分析探索需要的影响因素、扩大样本采集、加强对非物质激励的研究以弥补本文存在的不足,将高管组合激励的研究继续深入并拓展下去。
纵观全文,本文始终贯穿着个体特征——激励方式——需要满足——激励效果这一主线加以研究,运用实证的方法对这些变量之间的相关性做了证明,并最终得出结论,分析存在的问题并提出建议,脉络清晰合理。希望后续可以在个体特征上进一步扩展或深化、研究对象上能够突破消防企业而运用到其他行业中、组合激励方式上能够探索其他分类方式、或者就某一种激励方式进行进一步深入得研究,以期为如何激励高管提供一些借鉴并引起对高管激励的重视。
本文的创新点在于文章实证研究了消防企业高管的需要及其组合激励,开创性地构建了消防企业高管的组合激励模式,为以后的高管组合激励研究提供了一种新颖的模式。
The concept of labor division deepens with the economic development since Taylor's scientific management theory, and the thought of "Professional people do professional thing" gets more and more popular which was used to the process of the division at first. With the development and spreading of management theory, several people who have plenty of knowledge about management but own little production materials appear in the labor market, and at the same time, some people who own production materials without management knowledge need to find people who can make money with the use of production materials, so the principal-agent relationship has been formed due to the existence of supply and demand. On one hand, it pulls professional division to the management field, but on the other hand, it accompanys with some difficulties such as rent-seeking phenomenon and lot behaviors which caused by the asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. In order to solve the problems, there is need to motivate and restrain the agent. It is motivation that means a lot to senior managers because its positivity which not only can guide and satisfy the agent but also benefit the enterprise.
The research aimed at28fire companies in our country and finally obtained180valid questionnaires. The research analyzed and summarized humanity hypothesis theory、the system economics theory of incentives、the management incentive theory of Management Science and related theory of the previous relevant researches at home and abroad, and put forward the assumption according to the problems appeared in the practice of Chinese fire companies. Based on the SPSS16.0and AMOS17.0statistical software tools, the research tested the hypotheses through the exploratory factor analysis, descriptive statistics, the mean and variance analysis and other analysis methods and inquired into the importance、effect as well as present stage of executives'demand. What the purpose is to provide the necessary theoretical support for executive incentive and to solve the incentive problems and to improve the enthusiasm of the staff.
The first part, the introduction. The introduction introduces the background of this study, the significance of the main content of the study and research techniques routes are described. The study found that both from a management perspective, the perspective of the management practices, executives or economics point of view, the combination of incentives are urgently required and needs to be improved. In our country, fire the competitiveness of enterprises is relatively weak, a key point to solve the problem is to strengthen the business management team building, strengthen the construction of the management team to become the entry point of this angle from a combination of incentives.
The second part, the relevant literature review. This section was done by the previous theoretical knowledge summarization, including the research results of the theory of human nature assumptions, demand theory, motivation theory, and incentive effects."Complex" hypothesis starting from the human point of view shows the individual differences, and laid a theoretical foundation for this study."Complex" hypothesis point of view a fundamental support for the needs of diversity, the needs of species diversity is very easy to be understood, but their classification is controversial, for each classification method has its own rationality, but for executives of this particular crowd how to classify the authors did not dare to jump to conclusions, we can only attempt to summarize executives conducted a questionnaire survey. Tournament theory provides a strong basis for executives to earn more income, and psychological contract theory makes us realize the importance of non-material incentives. By a study combing the incentive effects, the majority of scholars are concerned about the annual salary, equity incentive on the company's financial performance, the less the effect of a combination of tangible and intangible incentives, and financial indicators executives the impact of non-direct and timeliness by internal and external factors together, and executives working enthusiasm is a direct impact on the incentives, and thus the enthusiasm of executives as incentive effects variables. Combing through the relevant literature has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the research subject of this article.
The third part, the Fire executives portfolio and incentive model and assumptions. On the basis of the second part, this paper constructed a preliminary theoretical model and assumptions, and the basic variables in the model to define and set the method of investigation and questionnaires, including the needs of enterprises and individual characteristics of executives, executives incentives and the incentive effect, As executives demand variable is not a unified classification of the majority of scholars, exploring obtained through questionnaires, it is listed in the fourth part of the executives demand a separate study.
The needs of different individuals from differences in the characteristics of corporate and individual characteristics of a control variable. On executive incentives in real terms through to meet the needs of executives to improve their work, and this, the paper constructs a satisfaction level of executive incentive executives actively meet the level executives demand impact model and on the relationship between each variable detailed demonstration assumptions.
The fourth part, demand theory and empirical analysis of the fire industry executives. This part of the first analyzed executives come to this research range from executives concept, the definition of "executive" decision-making power in the enterprise management has an important impact on corporate performance and long-term development staff, including the chairman, general manager, deputy general manager and department manager. Then needs to executives demand variables in-depth study, conducted depth interviews and questionnaire survey and exploratory factor analysis, four types of needs:survival needs, power requirements, the relationship between demand and self-realization, and demand for each type of concept definition and theoretical analysis.
The fifth part, the combination of fire corporate executives incentives Empirical Analysis. This section of the reliability and validity of the incentives and motivation variables tested, the test results indicate the reliability and validity are in line with research requirements. Then conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between variables, including:the characteristics of different enterprises, individual characteristics of executives on the importance of different incentives, different firm characteristics, individual characteristics of executives on the importance of the different needs of the combination of incentive the satisfactory level executives work analysis, the level of satisfaction of the combination of incentives on executive needs to meet the degree of impact analysis, executives demand satisfaction of the intermediary role of work and demand satisfaction, and ultimately partially confirmed the previous hypotheses, and to support the initial research model, a summary of the final results on this basis.
The sixth part, the conclusions and enlightenment. The fifth part of the empirical results, we draw important conclusions of the study are:the characteristic differences between executives affect the judgment of the importance of various incentives and demand, executives incentive status quo exists dissatisfaction incentives for executives enthusiasm for work has a positive influence and play an intermediary role in the satisfaction of the needs of the incentive to work actively influence the process. The basis of the above studies, we proposed some countermeasures and suggestions should be followed in the design executive incentives to executives duplex needs as a starting point the principle of a fair and reasonable assessment of incentive-based; Based on the above two design principles in the specific combination of executive incentive model design, you need to perfect the structure of executive compensation, pay attention to adhere to the flexibility and diversification in the choice of incentives; then this paper, several combinations of incentive model for reference. needs for survival-oriented, the relationship between demand-led, power demand-led, self-demand-oriented executives combination of incentives to a total of four, each mode contains a number of major incentives, when we judge the executives of the leading needs targeted incentives to make their needs are met; standing on a macro point of view, I believe that should improve the market of professional managers, and improve relevant laws and regulations, the establishment of the Remuneration Committee, points to start. Finally, the paper pointed out the shortcomings in the study, including the external validity compared to the low side in terms of internal validity, the sample selected geographical limitations, the survey questionnaire negative incentive items less than non-material incentives lack of quantitative measurement. Knowing their shortcomings, so I hope that the future can be further analysis to explore the factors of the impact on demand, to expand the sample collection, and strengthen the non-material incentives to compensate for the shortcomings, the incentives of executives combination further and expand down.
Throughout the full text of this article runs through the individual characteristics-incentives-to meet demand-the main line of the incentive effect, the use of empirical methods to prove the correlation between these variables, and ultimately concluded that,analysis of existing problems and make recommendations, the context is clear and reasonable. Hope you can follow-up on the individual characteristics of the further expansion or deepening of the fire protection industry can be a breakthrough in the study applied to other industries, the combination of incentives can explore other classification, or on a particular incentive to further have to study, in order to how to motivate executives and aroused the attention of the executive incentive.
The innovation of this paper is that the article Empirical Study of the needs of the fire protection industry executives and combinations thereof, incentives, ground-breaking building fire a combination of incentive of corporate executives, and provides a new incentive for executives combination model.
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