建设项目环境影响评价中利益相关者博弈分析
|
摘要
环境影响评价制度作为一项公共政策已经在我国实施有30年的时间,它的存在对我国环境的保护和污染的防治都产生了积极有效地作用。尤其是2003年环评法的实施对于环评制度的发展和进一步完善有着重大的意义。但是环评法实施后,环境影响评价制度依然面临着巨大的压力。一方面,项目单位和地方政府由于惯性和内在的发展经济的冲动而漠视环保部门权力的现象一直存在。另一方面,环评法规定的公众参与制度、听证制度还远远没有建立起来。非但如此,许多建设项目公众连知情权都没有。
本文通过引入利益相关者理论对环境影响评价的利益相关者做了博弈分析。关于环境影响评价制度目前的探讨中,并没有出现从利益相关者的角度进行阐述的。本文从此角度进行阐述和分析,对于环评制度认识的加深和完善有一定的意义。环境影响评价制度作为防治污染的第一道关口,实施过程中遇到了越来越多的阻力,多个利益相关者的参与与斗争在很大程度上决定了环境影响评价制度的实施效果。本文对环境影响评价参与者的利益诉求以及博弈方式的考察,相信对我国环境影响评价制度的具体实践的完善有一定的意义。
本文考察了中国建设项目环境影响评价中的利益相关者的特点和地位,讨论了政府、项目建设方、评价方、公众之间的博弈机制,博弈结果显示,中央政府规制行为的可信度是确保建设项目环境影响评价制度有效实施的决定性因素,地方政府能否贯彻执行环境影响评价制度对制度的实施有着重要影响。在监督不完善的情况下,项目建设方与评价方存在合谋违规的强烈动机。而公众由于自身以及法律环境以及制度的不完善造成了其参与不足,从而缺乏对政府、企业、评价方的有效约束。在此基础上,本文提出了改进和落实环境影响评价制度的建议。本文通过利益博弈的角度对环境影响评价制度实施的研究对于加深认识环境影响评价制度中存在的问题提供了一个很好的思路。
论文研究内容主要是四部分。首先提出环境影响评价的概念和发展历程,并引人环境影响评价利益相关者的概念以及界定方法。接着论述利益相关者在整个环境影响评价的博弈分析中的地位。然后用博弈的方式来分析利益相关者在整个博弈过程中的相互作用和关系。这些博弈有博弈参与者内部博弈和外部博弈组成。内部博弈有:政府之间的博弈,环评机构之间的博弈,企业之间的博弈,公众之间的博弈以及评审委员会之间的博弈。其中政府之间的博弈又有中央政府同地方政府的博弈,地方政府同地方环保部门的博弈。本文通过对上述博弈的分析和阐述,深入分析了环境影响评价制度所存在的问题,并根据博弈显示的结果最终得出解决的措施和对策。
该论文在环境影响评价中引进了博弈分析这一具体实用的研究工具来解释问题同样是目前研究工作中的一大创新。采用博弈分析尤其是多利益相关者的博弈是解决问题的前提和关键。环境影响评价存在众多的缺陷和漏洞但是研究的方法来说大多还是沉溺于理论方面的研究,有些更是趋向于泛泛而谈。没有深度的研究和夸夸其谈的文章随处可见,对于环境影响评价,如果没有一个好的研究方法将会对看清问题毫无益处,也使解决问题举步维艰。因此方法上的创新是本文的一大特色。
Environmental impact assessment system as a public policy has been implemented in our country 30 years, its presence have had a positive role for China's environmental protection and pollution prevention. In particular, in 2003 the implementation of the law of EIA improve the development and has great significance for the EIA system. However, after the implementation of the EIA Act, environmental impact assessment system is still facing with tremendous pressure. On the one hand, the project units and local governments has been ignoring the power of the environmental protection department as a result of inertia and inherent impulse of economic development . On the other hand, the EIA public participation law system, hearing system is far from established. Instead of this, many public construction projects are not even the right to know.
In this paper, Through the introduction of stakeholder theory, I evaluate the environmental impact of stakeholder analysis done a game. At present, on the environmental impact assessment of the system, I do not see the article of view from the stakeholders point. My analysis for environmental impact assessment system has a certain significance to enhance and improve the understanding of EIA. As the first barrier to control pollution, Environmental impact assessment system has encountered an increasing number of resistance. The game between the multi-stakeholder determined the effect of the system. In this paper, I inspected the interests of participants of environmental impact assessment , as well as the way of the game, I believe that my research has a certain significance on China's environmental impact assessment system.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) has played an important role for environmental protection in our country since its implementation. In the implementation process of EIA, the central government, local governments, enterprises, environmental impact assessment unit, and the public play complex games. Their strengths and strategy have deeply influenced their choice in the game. Through analysis of the game, local government's attitude towards environmental protection has a profound impact on the entire game, as well as other persons’strategic choices. In particular, the choice strategy of the central government and ministry of environmental protection has affected the choice of the local government in a certain extent. Weak public participation makes it difficult in improving the existed game. At present, the EIA system is not perfect, so the choice of the parties will choice better game strategy to seek the game's balance point that they can be more satisfied with.
Papers mainly include four parts. First of all, I put forward the concept of environmental impact assessment and development process, followed by environmental impact assessment of the concept of stakeholders and to define methods. Then Then I discussed the the status of stakeholders in the evaluation of environmental impact. And then I used the way of the game to analyze the interaction and relationships of stakeholders in the process of the entire game. Internal game and external game comprise the game the game.. Internal games are: the game between governments, between EIA game, the game between enterprises, the game between the public and the game between the Vetting Committee. Game one between the Government and the Central Government of the game with the local government, local government with local environmental protection departments of the game. Based on the above analysis and on the game, I analysis of the problems of environmental impact assessment system, and in accordance with the final outcome of the game ,I find the measures and countermeasures to resolve these problem.
The paper has a major innovation in the introduction of environmental impact assessment of the game analysis of this specific research tools that is useful to explain the issue of the current research work. In particular, the use of game analysis of multi-stakeholders is the prerequisite and the key to solve the problem of the game. Environmental Impact Assessment has a large number of defects and loopholes . Most research methods, or indulge in theoretical research, and some of them are general and tend to talk about. Not the depth of research and rhetoric of the article can be seen everywhere, for environmental impact assessment, the absence of a good research methods will be of little benefit to see the problem, and be also very difficult to solve the problem. Thus the innovation of method is a major feature of this article.
本文通过引入利益相关者理论对环境影响评价的利益相关者做了博弈分析。关于环境影响评价制度目前的探讨中,并没有出现从利益相关者的角度进行阐述的。本文从此角度进行阐述和分析,对于环评制度认识的加深和完善有一定的意义。环境影响评价制度作为防治污染的第一道关口,实施过程中遇到了越来越多的阻力,多个利益相关者的参与与斗争在很大程度上决定了环境影响评价制度的实施效果。本文对环境影响评价参与者的利益诉求以及博弈方式的考察,相信对我国环境影响评价制度的具体实践的完善有一定的意义。
本文考察了中国建设项目环境影响评价中的利益相关者的特点和地位,讨论了政府、项目建设方、评价方、公众之间的博弈机制,博弈结果显示,中央政府规制行为的可信度是确保建设项目环境影响评价制度有效实施的决定性因素,地方政府能否贯彻执行环境影响评价制度对制度的实施有着重要影响。在监督不完善的情况下,项目建设方与评价方存在合谋违规的强烈动机。而公众由于自身以及法律环境以及制度的不完善造成了其参与不足,从而缺乏对政府、企业、评价方的有效约束。在此基础上,本文提出了改进和落实环境影响评价制度的建议。本文通过利益博弈的角度对环境影响评价制度实施的研究对于加深认识环境影响评价制度中存在的问题提供了一个很好的思路。
论文研究内容主要是四部分。首先提出环境影响评价的概念和发展历程,并引人环境影响评价利益相关者的概念以及界定方法。接着论述利益相关者在整个环境影响评价的博弈分析中的地位。然后用博弈的方式来分析利益相关者在整个博弈过程中的相互作用和关系。这些博弈有博弈参与者内部博弈和外部博弈组成。内部博弈有:政府之间的博弈,环评机构之间的博弈,企业之间的博弈,公众之间的博弈以及评审委员会之间的博弈。其中政府之间的博弈又有中央政府同地方政府的博弈,地方政府同地方环保部门的博弈。本文通过对上述博弈的分析和阐述,深入分析了环境影响评价制度所存在的问题,并根据博弈显示的结果最终得出解决的措施和对策。
该论文在环境影响评价中引进了博弈分析这一具体实用的研究工具来解释问题同样是目前研究工作中的一大创新。采用博弈分析尤其是多利益相关者的博弈是解决问题的前提和关键。环境影响评价存在众多的缺陷和漏洞但是研究的方法来说大多还是沉溺于理论方面的研究,有些更是趋向于泛泛而谈。没有深度的研究和夸夸其谈的文章随处可见,对于环境影响评价,如果没有一个好的研究方法将会对看清问题毫无益处,也使解决问题举步维艰。因此方法上的创新是本文的一大特色。
Environmental impact assessment system as a public policy has been implemented in our country 30 years, its presence have had a positive role for China's environmental protection and pollution prevention. In particular, in 2003 the implementation of the law of EIA improve the development and has great significance for the EIA system. However, after the implementation of the EIA Act, environmental impact assessment system is still facing with tremendous pressure. On the one hand, the project units and local governments has been ignoring the power of the environmental protection department as a result of inertia and inherent impulse of economic development . On the other hand, the EIA public participation law system, hearing system is far from established. Instead of this, many public construction projects are not even the right to know.
In this paper, Through the introduction of stakeholder theory, I evaluate the environmental impact of stakeholder analysis done a game. At present, on the environmental impact assessment of the system, I do not see the article of view from the stakeholders point. My analysis for environmental impact assessment system has a certain significance to enhance and improve the understanding of EIA. As the first barrier to control pollution, Environmental impact assessment system has encountered an increasing number of resistance. The game between the multi-stakeholder determined the effect of the system. In this paper, I inspected the interests of participants of environmental impact assessment , as well as the way of the game, I believe that my research has a certain significance on China's environmental impact assessment system.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) has played an important role for environmental protection in our country since its implementation. In the implementation process of EIA, the central government, local governments, enterprises, environmental impact assessment unit, and the public play complex games. Their strengths and strategy have deeply influenced their choice in the game. Through analysis of the game, local government's attitude towards environmental protection has a profound impact on the entire game, as well as other persons’strategic choices. In particular, the choice strategy of the central government and ministry of environmental protection has affected the choice of the local government in a certain extent. Weak public participation makes it difficult in improving the existed game. At present, the EIA system is not perfect, so the choice of the parties will choice better game strategy to seek the game's balance point that they can be more satisfied with.
Papers mainly include four parts. First of all, I put forward the concept of environmental impact assessment and development process, followed by environmental impact assessment of the concept of stakeholders and to define methods. Then Then I discussed the the status of stakeholders in the evaluation of environmental impact. And then I used the way of the game to analyze the interaction and relationships of stakeholders in the process of the entire game. Internal game and external game comprise the game the game.. Internal games are: the game between governments, between EIA game, the game between enterprises, the game between the public and the game between the Vetting Committee. Game one between the Government and the Central Government of the game with the local government, local government with local environmental protection departments of the game. Based on the above analysis and on the game, I analysis of the problems of environmental impact assessment system, and in accordance with the final outcome of the game ,I find the measures and countermeasures to resolve these problem.
The paper has a major innovation in the introduction of environmental impact assessment of the game analysis of this specific research tools that is useful to explain the issue of the current research work. In particular, the use of game analysis of multi-stakeholders is the prerequisite and the key to solve the problem of the game. Environmental Impact Assessment has a large number of defects and loopholes . Most research methods, or indulge in theoretical research, and some of them are general and tend to talk about. Not the depth of research and rhetoric of the article can be seen everywhere, for environmental impact assessment, the absence of a good research methods will be of little benefit to see the problem, and be also very difficult to solve the problem. Thus the innovation of method is a major feature of this article.
引文
[1][英]米切尔.黑尧,赵成根译.现代国家的政策过程[M].北京:中国青年出版社,2004:109
[2]叶文虎,栾胜基主编.环境质量评价学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,1992
[3]王灿发,于文轩.“圆明园铺膜事件”对环境影响评价法的拷问[J].环境经济,2005,(11)
[4]梅宏.我国环境影响评价法的问题与对策[J].亚太经济,2005,(4)
[5]李晓红,田凤云.环境影响评价中公众参与方法探讨[J].煤炭工程,2007,(4)
[6]陈维春,何晖.环境影响评价制度中的公众参与浅析[J].求实,2006,(S2)
[7]柴西龙等.建设项目环境影响评价公众参与模式研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2005,(6)
[8]张松滨.环境影响评价必须实行政府垄断.上海城市管理职业技术学院学报,2001,(6)
[9]郭羽.建设项目环境影响评价制度中实质审查的反思[J].科技信息,2007,(24)
[10]陈国阶.环境影响评价要有新的突破[J].中国人口资源与环境,2006,(6)
[11]刘用泉.建设项目环境影响评价的思考[J].福建环境,2003,20(2):24-26
[12]王伟慧.环境影响评价工作中存在的几点问题及建议[J].科技信息,2006,(4)
[13]张金艳.我国环境影响评价中的公众参与[J].河南省政府管理干部学院学报,2007,(2)
[14]张晓磊.环境影响评价制度中的公众参与问题研究――比较行政法的视角[D].济南:山东大学,2007
[15]候小阁等.环境影响评价中公众行为选择概念模型[J].北京大学学报(自然科学版),2007,(4)
[16]李天威.环境影响评价中公众参与机制和方法探讨[J].环境科学研究,1999,(2)
[17]谢炜.中国公共政策执行过程中的利益博弈[D].上海:华东师范大学,2007
[18]Sinclair,James A(1992). The nimby game:Implementation of New Jersey’s hazardous waste disposal facility siting policy,University of Southern California,p.4089
[19]Wiesmann,Jurgen(2000). Regulationg China’s state enterprises:Environmental policy as a bargaining game,university of colorado at denver,p.3452
[20]Alemagi dieudonne,Venana sondo,JüRGEN ertel. constraints to environmental impact assessment pratice: a case study of cameroon [J].Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy andManagement.2007,9(3):357-380
[21]Ross William A;Morrison-Saunders Angus;Marshall Ross. Common sense in environmental impact assessment:it is not as common as it should be[J].Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal,Volume 24,Number 1,1 March 2006,pp.3-22(20)
[22]刘长喜.利益相关者、社会契约与企业社会责任[D].上海:复旦大学,2005
[23]Mendelow A.proceedings of second internationsl conference on information systems.Cambridge,1991
[24]范例.环境保护中的利益博弈研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2005
[25]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海,上海人民出版社,2004:1-2.
[26]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海,上海人民出版社,2004:3-6.
[27][美]布坎南.自由、市场和国家[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989
[28]赵慧等.关于环境影响评价问题的思考与建议[J].周口师范学院学报,2007,24(1)
[29]赵全军.中央与地方政府及地方政府间利益关系分析[J].行政论坛,2002,(02)
[30]柳俊峰.中央和地方政府的利益博弈分析及对策研究”[J],西南交通大学学报(社会科学版),2004,5(3):68-72
[31]吴湘玲.我国地方政府经济行为探讨[J].武汉大学学报,1997,(4)
[32]章柯.潘岳:与传统利益格局斗争到底[N].人民代表报,2007,2(4):5
[33]乔刚.环境管理体制若干问题探讨[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005
[34]武从斌.减少部门条块分割,形成协助制度[J].行政与法,2003,(04)
[35]张沉.潘岳披陈4年锥心感受流域限批已是“环保风暴”最后一招[N].经济观察报,2007,7(9):12
[36]王灿发.论我国环境管理体制立法存在的问题及其完善途径[J].中国政法大学学报,21(4)
[37][美]曼瑟尔.奥尔森著,陈郁等译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1995:191-192
[38]林英.环评风暴,意义何在[N].光明日报,2005,3(23)
[39]王国生.过渡时期地方政府与中央政府的纵向博弈及其经济效应[J].南京大学学报,2001,(1)
[40]杨连强.利益差别与政策博弈:中央与地方关系的另类解读[J].重庆社会科学,2006,(7)
[41]周国雄.公共政策执行阻滞的博弈分析——以环境污染治理为例[J].同济大学学报,2007,(04)
[42]方芳,陈祖洪.潘岳强调要把好项目环评审批关[N].中国环境报,2004,12(14)
[43]潘岳.加强环境影响评价管理的几点意见[J].环境保护,2005,2(14)
[44]周羿翔.国家环保总局官员坦言:地方环保部门作假严重[N].文摘报,2007,2(08)
[45]环保总局将颁环境影响评价机构管理新办法[EB/OL]. http://china.dayoo.com/gb/content/2005-08/08/content_2167937.htm.2005-08-08
[46]郭羽.建设项目环境影响评价制度中实质审查的反思[J].科技信息,2007,(24)
[47]蔡守秋.环境影响评价法律制度的发展趋势及建议[J].上海环境科学,2002,(21)
[48]陈国阶.环境影响评价要有新的突破[J].中国人口资源与环境,2006,(6)
[49]孙秀艳.环评机构将与政府部门“完全脱钩、彻底脱利”[N].人民日报,2008,11(5),(010)
[50]陈谦.从环评看未来的希望[J].中国环境报,2005,2(25)
[51]张梓太.对国家环保总局批评的质疑[J].法学,2005,(6)
[52]李佳鹏.北师大有关负责人喊冤:并非逃避而是经过慎重研究[N].经济参考报,2005,5(12)
[53]刘世昕.圆明园暴露环评难言之隐拿人钱财与人消灾[N].中国青年报,2005,5(12)
[54]王海等.行政不作为,污染环境的“刽子手”[N].市场报,2006,9(18)
[55]江剑平,谭今来.改善当前我国环境资源管理体制探析[J].城市环境与城市生态,2005,18(1)
[56]马珊.浅论我国环境影响评价中的公众参与[J].法制与社会,2006,(4)
[57]李玉文,孙洪刚.我国环境影响评价公众参与的现状和对策[J].环境科学动态,2007,(1)
[2]叶文虎,栾胜基主编.环境质量评价学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,1992
[3]王灿发,于文轩.“圆明园铺膜事件”对环境影响评价法的拷问[J].环境经济,2005,(11)
[4]梅宏.我国环境影响评价法的问题与对策[J].亚太经济,2005,(4)
[5]李晓红,田凤云.环境影响评价中公众参与方法探讨[J].煤炭工程,2007,(4)
[6]陈维春,何晖.环境影响评价制度中的公众参与浅析[J].求实,2006,(S2)
[7]柴西龙等.建设项目环境影响评价公众参与模式研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2005,(6)
[8]张松滨.环境影响评价必须实行政府垄断.上海城市管理职业技术学院学报,2001,(6)
[9]郭羽.建设项目环境影响评价制度中实质审查的反思[J].科技信息,2007,(24)
[10]陈国阶.环境影响评价要有新的突破[J].中国人口资源与环境,2006,(6)
[11]刘用泉.建设项目环境影响评价的思考[J].福建环境,2003,20(2):24-26
[12]王伟慧.环境影响评价工作中存在的几点问题及建议[J].科技信息,2006,(4)
[13]张金艳.我国环境影响评价中的公众参与[J].河南省政府管理干部学院学报,2007,(2)
[14]张晓磊.环境影响评价制度中的公众参与问题研究――比较行政法的视角[D].济南:山东大学,2007
[15]候小阁等.环境影响评价中公众行为选择概念模型[J].北京大学学报(自然科学版),2007,(4)
[16]李天威.环境影响评价中公众参与机制和方法探讨[J].环境科学研究,1999,(2)
[17]谢炜.中国公共政策执行过程中的利益博弈[D].上海:华东师范大学,2007
[18]Sinclair,James A(1992). The nimby game:Implementation of New Jersey’s hazardous waste disposal facility siting policy,University of Southern California,p.4089
[19]Wiesmann,Jurgen(2000). Regulationg China’s state enterprises:Environmental policy as a bargaining game,university of colorado at denver,p.3452
[20]Alemagi dieudonne,Venana sondo,JüRGEN ertel. constraints to environmental impact assessment pratice: a case study of cameroon [J].Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy andManagement.2007,9(3):357-380
[21]Ross William A;Morrison-Saunders Angus;Marshall Ross. Common sense in environmental impact assessment:it is not as common as it should be[J].Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal,Volume 24,Number 1,1 March 2006,pp.3-22(20)
[22]刘长喜.利益相关者、社会契约与企业社会责任[D].上海:复旦大学,2005
[23]Mendelow A.proceedings of second internationsl conference on information systems.Cambridge,1991
[24]范例.环境保护中的利益博弈研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2005
[25]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海,上海人民出版社,2004:1-2.
[26]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海,上海人民出版社,2004:3-6.
[27][美]布坎南.自由、市场和国家[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989
[28]赵慧等.关于环境影响评价问题的思考与建议[J].周口师范学院学报,2007,24(1)
[29]赵全军.中央与地方政府及地方政府间利益关系分析[J].行政论坛,2002,(02)
[30]柳俊峰.中央和地方政府的利益博弈分析及对策研究”[J],西南交通大学学报(社会科学版),2004,5(3):68-72
[31]吴湘玲.我国地方政府经济行为探讨[J].武汉大学学报,1997,(4)
[32]章柯.潘岳:与传统利益格局斗争到底[N].人民代表报,2007,2(4):5
[33]乔刚.环境管理体制若干问题探讨[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005
[34]武从斌.减少部门条块分割,形成协助制度[J].行政与法,2003,(04)
[35]张沉.潘岳披陈4年锥心感受流域限批已是“环保风暴”最后一招[N].经济观察报,2007,7(9):12
[36]王灿发.论我国环境管理体制立法存在的问题及其完善途径[J].中国政法大学学报,21(4)
[37][美]曼瑟尔.奥尔森著,陈郁等译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1995:191-192
[38]林英.环评风暴,意义何在[N].光明日报,2005,3(23)
[39]王国生.过渡时期地方政府与中央政府的纵向博弈及其经济效应[J].南京大学学报,2001,(1)
[40]杨连强.利益差别与政策博弈:中央与地方关系的另类解读[J].重庆社会科学,2006,(7)
[41]周国雄.公共政策执行阻滞的博弈分析——以环境污染治理为例[J].同济大学学报,2007,(04)
[42]方芳,陈祖洪.潘岳强调要把好项目环评审批关[N].中国环境报,2004,12(14)
[43]潘岳.加强环境影响评价管理的几点意见[J].环境保护,2005,2(14)
[44]周羿翔.国家环保总局官员坦言:地方环保部门作假严重[N].文摘报,2007,2(08)
[45]环保总局将颁环境影响评价机构管理新办法[EB/OL]. http://china.dayoo.com/gb/content/2005-08/08/content_2167937.htm.2005-08-08
[46]郭羽.建设项目环境影响评价制度中实质审查的反思[J].科技信息,2007,(24)
[47]蔡守秋.环境影响评价法律制度的发展趋势及建议[J].上海环境科学,2002,(21)
[48]陈国阶.环境影响评价要有新的突破[J].中国人口资源与环境,2006,(6)
[49]孙秀艳.环评机构将与政府部门“完全脱钩、彻底脱利”[N].人民日报,2008,11(5),(010)
[50]陈谦.从环评看未来的希望[J].中国环境报,2005,2(25)
[51]张梓太.对国家环保总局批评的质疑[J].法学,2005,(6)
[52]李佳鹏.北师大有关负责人喊冤:并非逃避而是经过慎重研究[N].经济参考报,2005,5(12)
[53]刘世昕.圆明园暴露环评难言之隐拿人钱财与人消灾[N].中国青年报,2005,5(12)
[54]王海等.行政不作为,污染环境的“刽子手”[N].市场报,2006,9(18)
[55]江剑平,谭今来.改善当前我国环境资源管理体制探析[J].城市环境与城市生态,2005,18(1)
[56]马珊.浅论我国环境影响评价中的公众参与[J].法制与社会,2006,(4)
[57]李玉文,孙洪刚.我国环境影响评价公众参与的现状和对策[J].环境科学动态,2007,(1)