两种概率表征的贝叶斯推理的加工过程
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摘要
贝叶斯推理是概率推理的重要组成部分,基础率忽视、框架效应现象一直是该领域研究的重要课题。尽管人们在概率表征形式、概率表征的信息特征、问题的呈现方式对贝叶斯推理的影响方面做了大量的研究,但还缺乏一个整合的理论模型。本研究在推理的双重加工理论和生态理性的视野下来揭示贝叶斯推理的认知加工特点和现实适应性。该研究对揭示人们在不确定性情况下进行推理、判断和决策的认知心理规律具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本研究有四个实验,1)系统地考察了概率信息的表征形式对贝叶斯推理的影响,2)利用现实的、标准的贝叶斯问题探讨了不同概率表征的贝叶斯推理题的试题结构的同质性,3)在不同的推理策略下,分析了基础率水平对百分比、自然频次表征的贝叶斯后验概率值的推算的影响,4)从事件性质、主体相关性、事件的重要程度三个因素来揭示贝叶斯推理的框架效应的本质。该研究提出了“推理的试题和知识双重加工的扩展模型”。
本研究获得了以下主要结论:
1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。
2)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,判断过程并不是经由贝叶斯推算得出概率,再做出判断。
3)在实验一中,三种概率表征(百分比、自然频次、概率词)下,自然频次表征更适合于被试正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异,说明其优越性并不是进化的结果。
4)贝叶斯推理的策略分为规则(正确规则、错误规则)、内容(命题知识、概率简捷式)和直觉;个人意愿对整个推理过程会有一定程度的影响。
5)不同概率表征的贝叶斯推理结论正确的差异性源于试题结构与推理者知识结构匹配的吻合程度,与概率的表征形式无关。
6)基础率并未得到忽视。
7)贝叶斯推理的框架效应本质上是个人意愿的效果。
Bayesian reasoning is an important part of probability reasoning, base-rate neglect and framing effects are always of great importance in this reseach. However, people have done a lot of work on the influence of probability representation, information structure and question form on Bayesian inference, but an integrated theoretical has not been obtained. In the sight of dual-process theories of reasoning and ecological rationality, this study tries to explore cognitive rule of Bayesian reasoning and adaptive strategies. This study is important for exploring cognitive rule of reasoning, judgment, decision making under uncertain condition.
There are four experiments in the study,1) effects of probability representation on Bayesian reasoning, 2) homogeneities of construct of items between realistic, normal Bayesian problem , 3) influence of base rate on Bayesian inference, 4) framing effect on Bayesian reasoning. This study concludes The Expanded Model of Item and Knowledge.
The main findings of this study are as follows:
1) Process of verbal probability format on Bayesian reasoning is process of judgment.
2) Results of Bayesian judgement are better than those of calculation.
3) Frequency format is better than other format, but there are differences among participants of different subject.
4) Strategies of Bayesian reasoning include right rule, error rule, proposition, probability heuristics and intuition. Desire impact on process of reasoning.
5) It is the structure of item, not probability format, causes the difference of results of posterior probability.
6) Base-rate neglect does not exist.
7) Framing effect really is from the influence of personal desire.
本研究有四个实验,1)系统地考察了概率信息的表征形式对贝叶斯推理的影响,2)利用现实的、标准的贝叶斯问题探讨了不同概率表征的贝叶斯推理题的试题结构的同质性,3)在不同的推理策略下,分析了基础率水平对百分比、自然频次表征的贝叶斯后验概率值的推算的影响,4)从事件性质、主体相关性、事件的重要程度三个因素来揭示贝叶斯推理的框架效应的本质。该研究提出了“推理的试题和知识双重加工的扩展模型”。
本研究获得了以下主要结论:
1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。
2)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,判断过程并不是经由贝叶斯推算得出概率,再做出判断。
3)在实验一中,三种概率表征(百分比、自然频次、概率词)下,自然频次表征更适合于被试正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异,说明其优越性并不是进化的结果。
4)贝叶斯推理的策略分为规则(正确规则、错误规则)、内容(命题知识、概率简捷式)和直觉;个人意愿对整个推理过程会有一定程度的影响。
5)不同概率表征的贝叶斯推理结论正确的差异性源于试题结构与推理者知识结构匹配的吻合程度,与概率的表征形式无关。
6)基础率并未得到忽视。
7)贝叶斯推理的框架效应本质上是个人意愿的效果。
Bayesian reasoning is an important part of probability reasoning, base-rate neglect and framing effects are always of great importance in this reseach. However, people have done a lot of work on the influence of probability representation, information structure and question form on Bayesian inference, but an integrated theoretical has not been obtained. In the sight of dual-process theories of reasoning and ecological rationality, this study tries to explore cognitive rule of Bayesian reasoning and adaptive strategies. This study is important for exploring cognitive rule of reasoning, judgment, decision making under uncertain condition.
There are four experiments in the study,1) effects of probability representation on Bayesian reasoning, 2) homogeneities of construct of items between realistic, normal Bayesian problem , 3) influence of base rate on Bayesian inference, 4) framing effect on Bayesian reasoning. This study concludes The Expanded Model of Item and Knowledge.
The main findings of this study are as follows:
1) Process of verbal probability format on Bayesian reasoning is process of judgment.
2) Results of Bayesian judgement are better than those of calculation.
3) Frequency format is better than other format, but there are differences among participants of different subject.
4) Strategies of Bayesian reasoning include right rule, error rule, proposition, probability heuristics and intuition. Desire impact on process of reasoning.
5) It is the structure of item, not probability format, causes the difference of results of posterior probability.
6) Base-rate neglect does not exist.
7) Framing effect really is from the influence of personal desire.
引文
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