风险投资运营微观监控机制研究
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摘要
在跨世纪的社会经济发展战略中，发展高新技术产业无疑是世界各国产业结构提升的重要手段，也是一个国家获得长期竞争优势的主要源泉之一。经过了二十多年的飞速发展，我国高新技术产业已经取得了可喜的成果，但是与欧美等发达国家相比仍存在着巨大的差距。为了加快我国高新技术产业的发展，亟需构建对其提供有效动力的风险投资运营微观监控机制。这需要借鉴西方发达国家风险投资运营微观监控机制的成功经验，并掌握风险投资运营微观监控机制的运作机理，尤其是内生性动力机制—内在激励和约束机制的代理成本的组成及其作用；以此指导我国建立起有效的风险投资运营微观监控机制，推动我国风险投资的加速发展。
本文旨在研究和揭示风险投资运营微观监控机制的各种特殊机制。论文主要运用委托代理学、契约经济学和信息经济学以及相关的经济学前沿理论，以现代市场经济国家的风险投资实践为经验背景，采用实证研究与规范研究相结合的研究方法，对风险投资运营微观监控机制进行全面系统地研究。
风险投资运营微观监控机制包括投资安排机制、参与管理机制、风险控制机制、企业治理机制、内在激励机制和约束机制等特殊机制。各种特殊微观运营监控机制相互作用，相互影响。内在激励机制和约束机制作为风险投资发展的内生性动力机制，起着关键作用，内在激励和约束机制实际上就是如何减少风险投资家和企业家的代理成本，最大化地实现投资者的利益。本文通过建立风险投资委托代理模型，从理论上研究风险投资家和风险企业家之间的代理成本的构成及其制约因素，以此建立有效的激励和约束机制；并总结了国际成熟的投资安排机制、参与管理机制、风险控制机制、企业治理机制等特殊风险投资运营微观监控机制经验。最后，基于前文对风险投资运营微观监控机制的分析，构建了尚处初级阶段的中国风险投资运营微观监控机制的发展模式。
In the development strategy of social economic, developing high tech industry is the key point of economy development in every nation, and is one of the main sources to gain long-term national competitive advantage. After more than twenty years' development, China's high technology industry has got the first step. There is a huge gap in the high tech industry between China and the developed country. In order to speed up the development of our high tech industry, we must build up the microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, which offer our high tech industry efficient momentum. So we need to make use of the successful experiences of developed country, and master the principium of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, especially the structures & effect of incentive & restriction mechanism, which can instruct us how to set up effective microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
This paper focuses on all sorts of special mechanisms of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation. It is based on the theory of the principal agent , contract economic and information, along the line of venture capital practice of the modern market economical nation, adopting the means of theoretical and demonstrative research, the paper makes an entirely systematic research on the microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
The microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation includes investment arranging mechanism , joining management mechanism , corporate governance mechanism , incentive & restriction mechanism and so on. Every microcosmic monitor mechanism affects one another. The incentive & restriction mechanism, which is the internal dynamical mechanism, is the key point of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, actually it is how to reduce the agency cost between venture capitalist and entrepreneur and maximize the investor profit. Based on researching the structures & effect factor of agency cost through building up the model of venture capital principal agent, the paper sets up
effective incentive & restriction mechanism. The paper summarizes the international mature experiences of investment arranging mechanism, joining management mechanism , corporate governance mechanism and so on microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation. Finally, based on the analysis of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, the author builds up China's developmental model of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
本文旨在研究和揭示风险投资运营微观监控机制的各种特殊机制。论文主要运用委托代理学、契约经济学和信息经济学以及相关的经济学前沿理论，以现代市场经济国家的风险投资实践为经验背景，采用实证研究与规范研究相结合的研究方法，对风险投资运营微观监控机制进行全面系统地研究。
风险投资运营微观监控机制包括投资安排机制、参与管理机制、风险控制机制、企业治理机制、内在激励机制和约束机制等特殊机制。各种特殊微观运营监控机制相互作用，相互影响。内在激励机制和约束机制作为风险投资发展的内生性动力机制，起着关键作用，内在激励和约束机制实际上就是如何减少风险投资家和企业家的代理成本，最大化地实现投资者的利益。本文通过建立风险投资委托代理模型，从理论上研究风险投资家和风险企业家之间的代理成本的构成及其制约因素，以此建立有效的激励和约束机制；并总结了国际成熟的投资安排机制、参与管理机制、风险控制机制、企业治理机制等特殊风险投资运营微观监控机制经验。最后，基于前文对风险投资运营微观监控机制的分析，构建了尚处初级阶段的中国风险投资运营微观监控机制的发展模式。
In the development strategy of social economic, developing high tech industry is the key point of economy development in every nation, and is one of the main sources to gain long-term national competitive advantage. After more than twenty years' development, China's high technology industry has got the first step. There is a huge gap in the high tech industry between China and the developed country. In order to speed up the development of our high tech industry, we must build up the microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, which offer our high tech industry efficient momentum. So we need to make use of the successful experiences of developed country, and master the principium of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, especially the structures & effect of incentive & restriction mechanism, which can instruct us how to set up effective microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
This paper focuses on all sorts of special mechanisms of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation. It is based on the theory of the principal agent , contract economic and information, along the line of venture capital practice of the modern market economical nation, adopting the means of theoretical and demonstrative research, the paper makes an entirely systematic research on the microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
The microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation includes investment arranging mechanism , joining management mechanism , corporate governance mechanism , incentive & restriction mechanism and so on. Every microcosmic monitor mechanism affects one another. The incentive & restriction mechanism, which is the internal dynamical mechanism, is the key point of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, actually it is how to reduce the agency cost between venture capitalist and entrepreneur and maximize the investor profit. Based on researching the structures & effect factor of agency cost through building up the model of venture capital principal agent, the paper sets up
effective incentive & restriction mechanism. The paper summarizes the international mature experiences of investment arranging mechanism, joining management mechanism , corporate governance mechanism and so on microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation. Finally, based on the analysis of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation, the author builds up China's developmental model of microcosmic monitor mechanism of venture capital operation.
引文
[1] Admati, A. and P. Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the Role for Venture Capitalist, The Journal of Finance, 1994; 49:371-402
[2] Barry, B., et al, The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies, Journal of Financial Economics, 1990; 27:447-471
[3] Gompers, P., Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, The Journal of Finance, 1995; 1 (5): 1461-1488
[4] Lerner, J., Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, The Journal of Finance, 1995; 1 (1): 301-317
[5] Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege., Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998; 22:703-735
[6] Frederick H. Mull, Towards a Positive Theory of Venture Capital,
Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy, Athens, Georgia, 1990
[7] Trester Jeffery. J., Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998:22:675-699
[8] Gorman, M. and W. Sahlman, What Do Venture Capitalists Do, Journal of Business Venturing, 1989: 4:231-248
[9] 陈郁，所有权、控制权与激励—代理经济学文选：上海人民出版社，1998
[10] 保罗·冈帕斯，乔希·勒纳，风险投资周期：经济科学出版社，2002
[11] 张维迎，博弈论与信息经济学：上海人民出版社，1996
[12] 俞自由，李松涛，赵荣信，风险投资理论与实践：上海财经大学出版社，2001
[13] 吴冬梅，公司治理结构运行与模式：经济管理出版社，2001
[14] 钱水土，中国风险投资的发展模式与运行机制研究：中国社会科学出版社，2002
[15] 北京科技风险投资股份有限公司，风险投资的公司治理：中国经济出版社，2003
[16] 卢后盾，傅斌著，中国高新技术风险投资运作与案例分析：中国税务出版社，2002
[17] 张春霖，存在道德风险的委托代理问题：理论分析及其应用中的问题，经济研究，1995；8：3-8
[18] 罗海平，美国风险资本运营的微观监控机制及其借鉴，世界经济，2001；50-54
[19] 樊行健，李锋，风险投资体系的双重代理与财务目标趋同效应，会计研究，2002；2：45-48
[20] 奚玉芹，王金桃，激励与约束：风险投资中的道德风险防范，科学学与科学技术管理，2001；2：49-52
[21] 李平，关于公司治理几个问题的思考，湖南大学学报，2002；16(5)：44-47
[22] 崔如波，股权结构、治理绩效与国企改革，中共中央党校学报，2002：6
(2)：42-47
[23] 华锦阳，试论公司治理对企业技术创新的影响，自然辨证法通讯，2002；24(137)：52-57
[24] 窦祥胜，陈天慈，国外风险企业发展的成功经验，南方经济，2002；1：70-72
[25] 朱东辰，博士论文：创业投资业与外部经济间的互动发展机理研究：浙江大学经济学院，2003
[26] 严震，风险投资与企业经营管理，财经窗，2001；196：12-14
[27] 劳剑东，李湛，论创业投资的治理结构与风险控制机制，当代经济科学，2001；23(3)：13-18
[28] 施东晖，经理期权计划在美国公司的兴起和影响，世界经济，2000；7：63-67
[29] 梁彤缨，黄建欢，陆正华，高技术中小企业的代理成本与最优融资决策，科研管理，2002；23(4)：83-88
[30] 将卫平，我国风险资本筹集的对策探讨，财政理论与实践，2000；21(105)：28-30
[31] 冯静，风险资本与企业资本结构安排，投资与合作，1999；12：47-50
[32] 窦祥胜，我国风险企业发展中存在的问题及解决对策，新疆财经，1999；5：41-43
[33] 吴雅丽，浅析我国科技风险资本投资机制，西安金融，2000；5：28-30
[2] Barry, B., et al, The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies, Journal of Financial Economics, 1990; 27:447-471
[3] Gompers, P., Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, The Journal of Finance, 1995; 1 (5): 1461-1488
[4] Lerner, J., Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, The Journal of Finance, 1995; 1 (1): 301-317
[5] Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege., Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998; 22:703-735
[6] Frederick H. Mull, Towards a Positive Theory of Venture Capital,
Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy, Athens, Georgia, 1990
[7] Trester Jeffery. J., Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998:22:675-699
[8] Gorman, M. and W. Sahlman, What Do Venture Capitalists Do, Journal of Business Venturing, 1989: 4:231-248
[9] 陈郁，所有权、控制权与激励—代理经济学文选：上海人民出版社，1998
[10] 保罗·冈帕斯，乔希·勒纳，风险投资周期：经济科学出版社，2002
[11] 张维迎，博弈论与信息经济学：上海人民出版社，1996
[12] 俞自由，李松涛，赵荣信，风险投资理论与实践：上海财经大学出版社，2001
[13] 吴冬梅，公司治理结构运行与模式：经济管理出版社，2001
[14] 钱水土，中国风险投资的发展模式与运行机制研究：中国社会科学出版社，2002
[15] 北京科技风险投资股份有限公司，风险投资的公司治理：中国经济出版社，2003
[16] 卢后盾，傅斌著，中国高新技术风险投资运作与案例分析：中国税务出版社，2002
[17] 张春霖，存在道德风险的委托代理问题：理论分析及其应用中的问题，经济研究，1995；8：3-8
[18] 罗海平，美国风险资本运营的微观监控机制及其借鉴，世界经济，2001；50-54
[19] 樊行健，李锋，风险投资体系的双重代理与财务目标趋同效应，会计研究，2002；2：45-48
[20] 奚玉芹，王金桃，激励与约束：风险投资中的道德风险防范，科学学与科学技术管理，2001；2：49-52
[21] 李平，关于公司治理几个问题的思考，湖南大学学报，2002；16(5)：44-47
[22] 崔如波，股权结构、治理绩效与国企改革，中共中央党校学报，2002：6
(2)：42-47
[23] 华锦阳，试论公司治理对企业技术创新的影响，自然辨证法通讯，2002；24(137)：52-57
[24] 窦祥胜，陈天慈，国外风险企业发展的成功经验，南方经济，2002；1：70-72
[25] 朱东辰，博士论文：创业投资业与外部经济间的互动发展机理研究：浙江大学经济学院，2003
[26] 严震，风险投资与企业经营管理，财经窗，2001；196：12-14
[27] 劳剑东，李湛，论创业投资的治理结构与风险控制机制，当代经济科学，2001；23(3)：13-18
[28] 施东晖，经理期权计划在美国公司的兴起和影响，世界经济，2000；7：63-67
[29] 梁彤缨，黄建欢，陆正华，高技术中小企业的代理成本与最优融资决策，科研管理，2002；23(4)：83-88
[30] 将卫平，我国风险资本筹集的对策探讨，财政理论与实践，2000；21(105)：28-30
[31] 冯静，风险资本与企业资本结构安排，投资与合作，1999；12：47-50
[32] 窦祥胜，我国风险企业发展中存在的问题及解决对策，新疆财经，1999；5：41-43
[33] 吴雅丽，浅析我国科技风险资本投资机制，西安金融，2000；5：28-30