外资并购中的国有股权定价问题研究
摘要
20世纪90年代以来,全球范围内的企业跨国并购活动风起云涌。为适应国际形势的发展变化和兑现加入WTO承诺的需要,自2001年起,中国政府放松了对外资开放领域的限制,出台了一系列有利于外资参与国有企业改组改造的法律法规。在这样的背景下,国际社会许多大型跨国公司和金融资本开始大举并购国有企业。特别是2005年股权分置制度改革以来,外资并购国有企业,特别是并购具有行业龙头地位的优质大型国有企业的行动更加踊跃。并购必然涉及定价的问题。在引入外资的过程中,确定合理的股权价格是一件并不容易的事情。目前,我国的资本市场发育不完善、国有企业产权交易不健全、涉及股权定价的政策法规相对滞后和模糊,这使得外资并购国有股权的定价活动十分杂乱。另外,国有企业的特殊背景和严重的委托代理问题,还往往导致定价过程掺杂着一些非价格因素,国有企业经理层、地方政府、中介机构、外商等都在其中扮演着重要角色。
随着外资并购事件不断增多,外资并购的范围不断扩大,社会影响力不断增大,在转让过程中国有股权是否存在流失的讨论也愈来愈引起人们的关注。有人提出“引资贱卖国有资产论”,认为外资在参股时严重低估了国有股权的价值和发展潜力,出现了国有股权转让价格偏低的现象。但也有人提出“贱卖有理论”,理由之一是,外资具有国际先进的管理理念和管理经验,引进这些“战略投资者”可以促进国有企业的改制,理由之二是,好西瓜不舍得卖,等到西瓜坏了才出手就更不值钱了,即“好西瓜鲜卖论”。可见,外资并购中的国有股权定价问题已成为一个十分引人关注的问题。人们普遍关心的是:在外资并购中,国有资产是否被贱卖?国有股权应该如何科学定价?如何体现公允价值和保证国有资产不流失?等等。
本文沿着“问题提出→文献综述→现状描述→问卷调查分析→实证分析→理论分析→定价模型构建→政策建议”的基本思路,对外资并购中的国有股权定价问题进行探讨。
研究过程中,本文采用了调查研究、案例分析、统计分析、计量分析等实证研究方法,和比较分析、博弈分析、SWOT分析、经济学分析等规范研究方法,注重规范分析与实证分析相结合,定性分析与定量分析相结合。
本文共分为七章。
第一章是绪论。介绍论文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、研究方法、创新点以及本文的结构安排。
第二章是文献综述。着重评价国内外有关并购动因与绩效、并购中目标公司定价方法、国有股权定价以及外资并购等方面的代表性文献,并指出现有文献的不足。
第三章是外资并购国有企业股权定价方法的比较与评价。论文比较分析了三种国际上常见的股权估价方法,即资产价值法、市场比较法和收益贴现法。在我国,国有股权并购价格曾先后采取了资产法和市场法。论文结合问卷调查的结果,阐述了当前我国国有股权定价方法的不足,并提出选择国有股权定价方法需要注意的若干问题。本文认为,国有股权转让定价的“市场化”是一个方向,在现阶段,只能尽可能的提高“市场化”程度,而不能完全“市场化”;股权价值是资产价值、市场反应和收益水平三方面的综合体现;定价时还要考虑各种定性因素的影响。
第四章是外资并购中影响国有股权定价的财务因素分析。首先,在数据收集的基础上,对影响国有股权定价的财务因素进行因子分析,经过浓缩和提炼,得到7个影响因子,即成长因子、负债因子、市场评价因子、长期资产管理因子等。论文初步建立了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的多元线性回归模型,并运用SPSS统计分析工具对模型进行了参数估计和显著性检验,从中找出影响国有股权定价的3个关键因子,依次是市场评价因子、成长因子和负债因子。最后,构建了外资并购中国有股权定价的财务估价模型。
第五章是外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素分析。首先,阐述了外资并购中各参与方(包括国有企业、外资、政府、国有企业管理层等)的行为动机。其次,应用SWOT工具分析了国有企业在外资并购中所具有的优势与劣势,所面临的机会与挑战。然后,基于博弈理论,建立外资方与国有企业的讨价还价博弈模型,揭示双方的博弈以及其他各方(包括政府、国有企业管理层等)的参与与国有股权价格确定之间的内在逻辑联系。最后,在以上分析的基础上,概括出外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素。
第六章是外资并购国有企业股权定价模型的构建。在第3、4、5章分析的基础上,论文提出确定国有股权并购价格需要经历五个阶段。国有股权的并购交易价格由两部分构成,即国有股权的财务价值和并购方愿意支付的并购协同溢价。国有股权的财务价值是由企业的市场评价、收益能力及资产负债状况综合决定的。并购方愿意支付的并购协同溢价取决于国有企业的资源、产业地位、发展前景以及并购双方的讨价还价能力等非财务因素。采取层次分析法可以确定各项非财务因素的权重,进而确立定价模型的最终形式。
第七章为结论与政策建议。论文归纳和阐述了得出的主要结论,在此基础上,对国有企业、监管部门及其他方面提出了若干政策建议。论文认为,国有企业以及国有股东要认真分析外资的动机和需求,充分认识自身的优势和劣势,只有这样才能在外资并购中争取到有利于自身的并购价格。监管部门应尽快引入国有股权的价格发现机制,完善外资并购的信息披露制度,加快立法以规范政府行为。
论文的创新点主要体现在:(1)揭示了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的财务因素,并建立了财务估价模型;(2)分析了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素,并明确了其权重的确定方法;(3)将讨价还价博弈模型引入了外资并购国有企业股权定价问题的研究中;(4)构建了外资并购国有企业股权的定价模型。
论文的研究局限性主要在于:(1)由于资料收集困难,实证分析部分只研究了上市公司的情况,没有将非上市公司纳入实证研究对象,另外,调查问卷和实证分析的样本数不太大;(2)受资料所限,论文中的案例剖析尚不够深入,没有结合典型案例对并购双方谈判细节、国有股权并购价格的形成过程等问题展开具体讨论;(3)由于本人水平和能力有限,没有对外资并购国有股权的内在动因、行为效果、定价机制、并购价格的决定过程等问题进行深入研究。
Since the 1990's, multi-enterprises’cross-border Merger & Acquisition has been surging within the global scope. To be adapted to changes of the international environment and to fulfil Chinese government’s commitments in the process of joining WTO, Chinese government has relaxed its restrictions on foreign investment and has introduced a series of laws and regulations to permit foreign investors to participate in the reorganization and transformation of state-owned enterprises since 2001. Many large multinational corporations and financial capitals in the world began to merge and acquire China’s SOEs. In particular, in 2005, with the non-tradable share reform, many famous foreign enterprises paid more attention to Chinese leading SOEs, and showed more enthusiasm in the big backbone SOEs in some industries.M&A inevitably involves the issue of pricing. But it is not easy to determine a reasonable equity price in the process of the introduction of foreign capitals. China's capital market is under-developing, the property right transactions of SOEs are imperfect, and the policies and regulations about equity pricing are lagging behind and ambiguous, which makes the pricing of state-owned equity very messy in the process of M&A. The special background and severe principal-agent problem of SOEs also lead to some non-price element in the pricing process. The managers of SOEs, local governments and intermediary institutions play important roles in the pricing process.
With foreign investors’M&A cases increasing and their influence enlarging, people pay more attention in the discussion about whether or not there is any loss of state-owned assets during foreign investors’M&A. Some think that the value and growth potential of SOEs are seriously under-valued and the transfer price of state-owned equity is too low when foreign investors merge and acquire it. Others believe that the low transfer price is reasonable. One reason is that foreign investors have experience and advanced management, so the introduction of these strategic investors contributes to the restructuring of SOEs. The second reason is that if we don’t sell the good assets, it is worth nothing when it becomes bad. The discussion shows that how to evaluate the state-owned equity is the point at issue in foreign investor’M&A. People are concerned about questions like“Is there any loss of state-owned assets during the M&A process of foreign investors?”“How should the price of state-owned equity be objective?”“How should we reflect the fair value and avoid the loss of state-owned assets?”And so on.
This paper makes scientific research along the following train of thought: raising the issue→documentary summary→problem description→survey analysis→empirical analysis→theoritical analysis→recommendations of the pricing model→giving suggestion.
This article combines empirical analysis with normal analysis, and qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis. The empirical research methods used in the article include survey studies, case studies, statistical analysis and quantitative analysis. The normal research methods used include comparative analysis, game analysis, and economic analysis.
It is divided into seven chapters.
The first chaptert is introduction. It introduces the research background, research value, research methods, research train of thought and innovation, as well as the structure and organization of the paper.
The second chapter is the ducument review. It commends the representative ducuments about the motivation and performance studies about M&A, studies in the pricing methods in M&A, studies in the pricing of stated-owned equity and studies in foreign investors M&A. Then it points out these ducuments’defects.
The third chapter is comparisons and comments of pricing methods when foreign investors’merge and acquire the state-owned equity in China. First, it compares and comments the three common evaluation methods: asset valuation method, market comparison method and earning discount method. Asset valuation method and market comparison method have been applied in different periods in China. Combined with the questionnaire, it points out the shortcomings of current pricing method for stated-owned equity in China. It believes that, market-oriented pricing of state-owned equity is a goal. In current period, what we should do is to increase the market-oriented degree as much as possible, but the price should not be wholly determined by market. The value of equity is reflected by the value of the assets, the reaction to the market and the ability of earning totally. And qualitative factors should also be considered in pricing process.
The fourth chapter is empirical analysis of the financial factors that affect the price of stated-owned equity in foreign investors’M&A. Based on data collection, it carries out factor analysis of various financial indicators from the state-owned listed companies, and extracts seven factors. They are growth factor, solvency factor, market reaction factor, management efficiency factor for long-term assets, and so on. It gives a preliminary estimate of the stared-owned equity valuation model with the seven factors. Then it estimates the coefficients in the model, tests the significance of the estimated coefficients and finds out the three key factors among them by using SPSS statistic software. They are market reaction factor, growth factor and solvency factor in order. Finaly, it builds stated-owned equity pricing model with three key financial factors found out.
The fifth chapter is analysis of non-financial factors which affect the state-owned equity’s price in foreign investor’s M&A. First it analyzes the behavioral motivation of the involved parties in foreign investors’M&A, including the SOEs, foreign investors, government, managers of the SOEs. Second, it realizes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges of the SOEs in foreign investors’M&A. Third, based on game theory, it builds up a bargaining game model between SOEs and foreign investors, revealing the inherent link between the price determinant and the participant of the two sides, as well as other parties in M&A. Finally, it explains the important non-financial factors that will influense the state-owned equity’s transaction price.
The sixth chapter is the structuring of the stated-owned equity pricing model in foreign investors’M&A. Based on chapter 3, 4 and 5, it puts forward the five periods to determine the trasaction price of state-owned equity in M&A. The trasaction price of state-owned equity in M&A consists of two components. They are the financial value and the premium that the buyers are ready to pay in M&A. The financial value of the state-owned equity depends on market reaction factor, growth factor and solvency factor. The premium that the buyers are ready to pay in M&A depends on the resourses, industrial standing, development prospect, and so on. It determines the weights of non-financial factors by using the analytic hierarchy method, and establishes the final form of pricing model at last.
The seventh chapter is conclusions and suggestions. It summarizes and elaborates the main conclusions, and then gives some suggestions to the SOEs, supervise authorities and some other parties. Fanally, it points out the limitation and prospect of the paper. It suggests that, the SOEs and their shareholders should analyze the motivations and demands of foreigners carefully and fully understand their own strengths and weaknesses to win a beneficial transaction price in foreigner’M&A. Regulatory authorities should introduce the price discovery mechanism in M&A as soon as possible, improve the information disclosure system and speed up legislation to regulate government behavior.
The innovations are mainly embodied in the following aspects: (a) it revealed the key financial factors and set up a financial evaluation model for state-owned equity; (b) it analysed the non-financial factors and explained the method to determine their weights; (c) it also set up a bargaining game model of foreign investors’M&A of the SOEs; (d) eventually it built up a pricing model.
The limitations of this study include: (a) the samples of empirical analysis were constituted in state-owned listed companies only, the non-listed companies were not included in empirical analysis and the samples of questionnaire and empirical analysis were not enough; (b) due to inadequate reference material, it did not make thorough case studies, and did not discuss the details of bargaining between buyer and sellor and the forming of the price of stated-owned equity; (c) limitated by individual capacity, it didn’t analyze the motivation, behaviourial result, pricing process of in M&A deeply.
随着外资并购事件不断增多,外资并购的范围不断扩大,社会影响力不断增大,在转让过程中国有股权是否存在流失的讨论也愈来愈引起人们的关注。有人提出“引资贱卖国有资产论”,认为外资在参股时严重低估了国有股权的价值和发展潜力,出现了国有股权转让价格偏低的现象。但也有人提出“贱卖有理论”,理由之一是,外资具有国际先进的管理理念和管理经验,引进这些“战略投资者”可以促进国有企业的改制,理由之二是,好西瓜不舍得卖,等到西瓜坏了才出手就更不值钱了,即“好西瓜鲜卖论”。可见,外资并购中的国有股权定价问题已成为一个十分引人关注的问题。人们普遍关心的是:在外资并购中,国有资产是否被贱卖?国有股权应该如何科学定价?如何体现公允价值和保证国有资产不流失?等等。
本文沿着“问题提出→文献综述→现状描述→问卷调查分析→实证分析→理论分析→定价模型构建→政策建议”的基本思路,对外资并购中的国有股权定价问题进行探讨。
研究过程中,本文采用了调查研究、案例分析、统计分析、计量分析等实证研究方法,和比较分析、博弈分析、SWOT分析、经济学分析等规范研究方法,注重规范分析与实证分析相结合,定性分析与定量分析相结合。
本文共分为七章。
第一章是绪论。介绍论文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、研究方法、创新点以及本文的结构安排。
第二章是文献综述。着重评价国内外有关并购动因与绩效、并购中目标公司定价方法、国有股权定价以及外资并购等方面的代表性文献,并指出现有文献的不足。
第三章是外资并购国有企业股权定价方法的比较与评价。论文比较分析了三种国际上常见的股权估价方法,即资产价值法、市场比较法和收益贴现法。在我国,国有股权并购价格曾先后采取了资产法和市场法。论文结合问卷调查的结果,阐述了当前我国国有股权定价方法的不足,并提出选择国有股权定价方法需要注意的若干问题。本文认为,国有股权转让定价的“市场化”是一个方向,在现阶段,只能尽可能的提高“市场化”程度,而不能完全“市场化”;股权价值是资产价值、市场反应和收益水平三方面的综合体现;定价时还要考虑各种定性因素的影响。
第四章是外资并购中影响国有股权定价的财务因素分析。首先,在数据收集的基础上,对影响国有股权定价的财务因素进行因子分析,经过浓缩和提炼,得到7个影响因子,即成长因子、负债因子、市场评价因子、长期资产管理因子等。论文初步建立了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的多元线性回归模型,并运用SPSS统计分析工具对模型进行了参数估计和显著性检验,从中找出影响国有股权定价的3个关键因子,依次是市场评价因子、成长因子和负债因子。最后,构建了外资并购中国有股权定价的财务估价模型。
第五章是外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素分析。首先,阐述了外资并购中各参与方(包括国有企业、外资、政府、国有企业管理层等)的行为动机。其次,应用SWOT工具分析了国有企业在外资并购中所具有的优势与劣势,所面临的机会与挑战。然后,基于博弈理论,建立外资方与国有企业的讨价还价博弈模型,揭示双方的博弈以及其他各方(包括政府、国有企业管理层等)的参与与国有股权价格确定之间的内在逻辑联系。最后,在以上分析的基础上,概括出外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素。
第六章是外资并购国有企业股权定价模型的构建。在第3、4、5章分析的基础上,论文提出确定国有股权并购价格需要经历五个阶段。国有股权的并购交易价格由两部分构成,即国有股权的财务价值和并购方愿意支付的并购协同溢价。国有股权的财务价值是由企业的市场评价、收益能力及资产负债状况综合决定的。并购方愿意支付的并购协同溢价取决于国有企业的资源、产业地位、发展前景以及并购双方的讨价还价能力等非财务因素。采取层次分析法可以确定各项非财务因素的权重,进而确立定价模型的最终形式。
第七章为结论与政策建议。论文归纳和阐述了得出的主要结论,在此基础上,对国有企业、监管部门及其他方面提出了若干政策建议。论文认为,国有企业以及国有股东要认真分析外资的动机和需求,充分认识自身的优势和劣势,只有这样才能在外资并购中争取到有利于自身的并购价格。监管部门应尽快引入国有股权的价格发现机制,完善外资并购的信息披露制度,加快立法以规范政府行为。
论文的创新点主要体现在:(1)揭示了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的财务因素,并建立了财务估价模型;(2)分析了外资并购中影响国有股权定价的非财务因素,并明确了其权重的确定方法;(3)将讨价还价博弈模型引入了外资并购国有企业股权定价问题的研究中;(4)构建了外资并购国有企业股权的定价模型。
论文的研究局限性主要在于:(1)由于资料收集困难,实证分析部分只研究了上市公司的情况,没有将非上市公司纳入实证研究对象,另外,调查问卷和实证分析的样本数不太大;(2)受资料所限,论文中的案例剖析尚不够深入,没有结合典型案例对并购双方谈判细节、国有股权并购价格的形成过程等问题展开具体讨论;(3)由于本人水平和能力有限,没有对外资并购国有股权的内在动因、行为效果、定价机制、并购价格的决定过程等问题进行深入研究。
Since the 1990's, multi-enterprises’cross-border Merger & Acquisition has been surging within the global scope. To be adapted to changes of the international environment and to fulfil Chinese government’s commitments in the process of joining WTO, Chinese government has relaxed its restrictions on foreign investment and has introduced a series of laws and regulations to permit foreign investors to participate in the reorganization and transformation of state-owned enterprises since 2001. Many large multinational corporations and financial capitals in the world began to merge and acquire China’s SOEs. In particular, in 2005, with the non-tradable share reform, many famous foreign enterprises paid more attention to Chinese leading SOEs, and showed more enthusiasm in the big backbone SOEs in some industries.M&A inevitably involves the issue of pricing. But it is not easy to determine a reasonable equity price in the process of the introduction of foreign capitals. China's capital market is under-developing, the property right transactions of SOEs are imperfect, and the policies and regulations about equity pricing are lagging behind and ambiguous, which makes the pricing of state-owned equity very messy in the process of M&A. The special background and severe principal-agent problem of SOEs also lead to some non-price element in the pricing process. The managers of SOEs, local governments and intermediary institutions play important roles in the pricing process.
With foreign investors’M&A cases increasing and their influence enlarging, people pay more attention in the discussion about whether or not there is any loss of state-owned assets during foreign investors’M&A. Some think that the value and growth potential of SOEs are seriously under-valued and the transfer price of state-owned equity is too low when foreign investors merge and acquire it. Others believe that the low transfer price is reasonable. One reason is that foreign investors have experience and advanced management, so the introduction of these strategic investors contributes to the restructuring of SOEs. The second reason is that if we don’t sell the good assets, it is worth nothing when it becomes bad. The discussion shows that how to evaluate the state-owned equity is the point at issue in foreign investor’M&A. People are concerned about questions like“Is there any loss of state-owned assets during the M&A process of foreign investors?”“How should the price of state-owned equity be objective?”“How should we reflect the fair value and avoid the loss of state-owned assets?”And so on.
This paper makes scientific research along the following train of thought: raising the issue→documentary summary→problem description→survey analysis→empirical analysis→theoritical analysis→recommendations of the pricing model→giving suggestion.
This article combines empirical analysis with normal analysis, and qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis. The empirical research methods used in the article include survey studies, case studies, statistical analysis and quantitative analysis. The normal research methods used include comparative analysis, game analysis, and economic analysis.
It is divided into seven chapters.
The first chaptert is introduction. It introduces the research background, research value, research methods, research train of thought and innovation, as well as the structure and organization of the paper.
The second chapter is the ducument review. It commends the representative ducuments about the motivation and performance studies about M&A, studies in the pricing methods in M&A, studies in the pricing of stated-owned equity and studies in foreign investors M&A. Then it points out these ducuments’defects.
The third chapter is comparisons and comments of pricing methods when foreign investors’merge and acquire the state-owned equity in China. First, it compares and comments the three common evaluation methods: asset valuation method, market comparison method and earning discount method. Asset valuation method and market comparison method have been applied in different periods in China. Combined with the questionnaire, it points out the shortcomings of current pricing method for stated-owned equity in China. It believes that, market-oriented pricing of state-owned equity is a goal. In current period, what we should do is to increase the market-oriented degree as much as possible, but the price should not be wholly determined by market. The value of equity is reflected by the value of the assets, the reaction to the market and the ability of earning totally. And qualitative factors should also be considered in pricing process.
The fourth chapter is empirical analysis of the financial factors that affect the price of stated-owned equity in foreign investors’M&A. Based on data collection, it carries out factor analysis of various financial indicators from the state-owned listed companies, and extracts seven factors. They are growth factor, solvency factor, market reaction factor, management efficiency factor for long-term assets, and so on. It gives a preliminary estimate of the stared-owned equity valuation model with the seven factors. Then it estimates the coefficients in the model, tests the significance of the estimated coefficients and finds out the three key factors among them by using SPSS statistic software. They are market reaction factor, growth factor and solvency factor in order. Finaly, it builds stated-owned equity pricing model with three key financial factors found out.
The fifth chapter is analysis of non-financial factors which affect the state-owned equity’s price in foreign investor’s M&A. First it analyzes the behavioral motivation of the involved parties in foreign investors’M&A, including the SOEs, foreign investors, government, managers of the SOEs. Second, it realizes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges of the SOEs in foreign investors’M&A. Third, based on game theory, it builds up a bargaining game model between SOEs and foreign investors, revealing the inherent link between the price determinant and the participant of the two sides, as well as other parties in M&A. Finally, it explains the important non-financial factors that will influense the state-owned equity’s transaction price.
The sixth chapter is the structuring of the stated-owned equity pricing model in foreign investors’M&A. Based on chapter 3, 4 and 5, it puts forward the five periods to determine the trasaction price of state-owned equity in M&A. The trasaction price of state-owned equity in M&A consists of two components. They are the financial value and the premium that the buyers are ready to pay in M&A. The financial value of the state-owned equity depends on market reaction factor, growth factor and solvency factor. The premium that the buyers are ready to pay in M&A depends on the resourses, industrial standing, development prospect, and so on. It determines the weights of non-financial factors by using the analytic hierarchy method, and establishes the final form of pricing model at last.
The seventh chapter is conclusions and suggestions. It summarizes and elaborates the main conclusions, and then gives some suggestions to the SOEs, supervise authorities and some other parties. Fanally, it points out the limitation and prospect of the paper. It suggests that, the SOEs and their shareholders should analyze the motivations and demands of foreigners carefully and fully understand their own strengths and weaknesses to win a beneficial transaction price in foreigner’M&A. Regulatory authorities should introduce the price discovery mechanism in M&A as soon as possible, improve the information disclosure system and speed up legislation to regulate government behavior.
The innovations are mainly embodied in the following aspects: (a) it revealed the key financial factors and set up a financial evaluation model for state-owned equity; (b) it analysed the non-financial factors and explained the method to determine their weights; (c) it also set up a bargaining game model of foreign investors’M&A of the SOEs; (d) eventually it built up a pricing model.
The limitations of this study include: (a) the samples of empirical analysis were constituted in state-owned listed companies only, the non-listed companies were not included in empirical analysis and the samples of questionnaire and empirical analysis were not enough; (b) due to inadequate reference material, it did not make thorough case studies, and did not discuss the details of bargaining between buyer and sellor and the forming of the price of stated-owned equity; (c) limitated by individual capacity, it didn’t analyze the motivation, behaviourial result, pricing process of in M&A deeply.
引文
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①数据来源:中国并购评论。
②数据来源:中国股权分置改革网http://www.cs.com.cn
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①数据来源:中国并购交易网http://www.mergers-china.com
②数据来源:中国并购交易网http://www.mergers-china.com
③数据来源:深交所网站,徐工科技(000425)公司临时公告。
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③数据来源:UNCTAD, World investment Report 2006.
④绿地投资是指国际直接投资,即FDI。
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①数据来源:中国并购评论。
②数据来源:中国股权分置改革网http://www.cs.com.cn
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①数据来源:中国并购交易网http://www.mergers-china.com
②数据来源:中国并购交易网http://www.mergers-china.com
③数据来源:深交所网站,徐工科技(000425)公司临时公告。
①数据来源:搜狐财经网站。
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③数据来源:UNCTAD, World investment Report 2006.
④绿地投资是指国际直接投资,即FDI。
⑤数据来源:根据商务部官方网站资料整理。
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①尧秋根.中国外资并购市场国际背景与市场转型[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2007:155-156
①谢茂拾.代理人问题催生大型国企向外资“贱卖”——以外资并购徐工集团与双汇集团为例[J].中国发展观察,2006(10):31-32
①曹雁翎.外资并购我国国有企业问题研究[J].东北财经大学学报,2003(4):28-32
①http://news.sohu.com/20081030/n260340520.shtml
①我国企业外资并购和对外并购的发展趋势、问题与建议[R] .深圳证券交易所研究报告,2007年。
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①资料来源:中国并购交易网http://www.mergers-china.com
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