行为公司金融理论视角下的中国上市公司并购投融资行为研究
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摘要
并购重组是证券市场中的一个永恒的主题,随着全球化的不断推进,世界范围内的并购活动愈演愈烈。在我国,受到加入WTO和国有企业改革的影响,并购活动达到了前所未有的高潮。然而并购在为企业迅速扩张提供捷径的同时,也带来了巨大的风险。在现实的并购活动中,存在着大量的异常资本配置现象以及非理性并购决策行为。传统的金融理论在对并购行为进行分析时忽视了管理者、投资者在决策中的心理因素影响,同时又过于注重使用数量模型进行定量分析。其所设定的前提条件过于理想和严格,往往与实际情况相脱离,因而使得传统金融理论对于并购中的这些“异象”的解释显得力不从心。
伴随着20世纪80年代行为金融理论的兴起,行为公司金融作为公司金融理论与行为金融理论相互融合的产物也随之产生。行为公司金融突破了传统公司金融理论的理性框架和研究范式,注重对参与人的心理和实际行为进行分析,使它的假设更加贴近资本市场的现实,从一种全新的视角来研究外部市场的无效性和内部管理层的非理性对公司的融资、投资及股利政策等各方面的影响。在公司并购领域,行为公司金融对于一系列“金融异象”进行了积极的论证和有益的探索,在一定程度上弥补了传统金融理论在这一领域的研究空白。
从理论意义上说,将行为公司金融理论用于公司并购研究是对并购理论的丰富和发展,有益于对并购实践进行更加贴切的解释;同时对行为公司金融也会产生积极的作用,有助于行为金融学形成完善的学科框架。从实践角度来看,资本市场的无效率和股票价格与实际价值的偏离都会影响上市公司的并购重组行为;在制度设计存在缺陷的情况下,上市公司的经理人更有可能利用资本市场的非效率性放大自身的过度自信心理。因此在我国证券市场发展不够成熟,国有企业正在深化改革,还较为普遍地存在委托.代理问题的情况下,投资者和管理者的非理性行为很可能结合,从而导致股市泡沫的加剧和公司的非理性扩展并购。因而,引入行为公司金融理论,并结合我国实际情况对并购市场加以研究,对我国的监管主体和市场行为主体都将有重大的意义。
基于转型时期的特定背景,本文在我国资本市场融资环境和上市公司特有的控制权配置格局下,综合运用了规范研究与实证研究相结合、截面的静态研究与时间序列的动态研究相结合的方法,从行为公司金融理论的研究视角,以上市公司股权融资偏好以及低效率并购的过度投资行为作为研究的切入点,在对中国上市公司并购融资、并购投资的现状以及行为公司金融的应用前提进行充分分析的基础上,深入探讨了非理性投资者以及非理性管理者对于公司并购投融资行为的影响,并提出相应的对策建议。
论文的主要工作包括三个方面:(1)提出了基于行为公司金融视角的公司并购投融资行为的研究框架。论文结合现有文献,对国内外并购投融资行为及行为公司金融相关的研究理论和实证成果进行了梳理;在对我国企业并购融资、投资的现状进行分析的同时,解析市场时机理论及管理者过度自信理论在我国应用的现实条件。在上述研究基础上提出了本文的分析框架(2)根据投资者非理性模型和管理者非理性模型,分别从公司并购动因、并购融资以及并购投资支出三个方面对市场时机选择理论和管理者过度自信理论的理论基础及模型进行解析;选取2003-2007年的上市公司样本,构建回归模型,实证检验了市净率和过度自信变量对并购决策、并购融资结构以及并购投资规模的影响。(3)根据本文的研究结论,有针对性地提出弱化上市公司的股权融资偏好、有效引导公司的控制权转移以及从制度硬约束和行为成本软约束两个方面规范上市公司的非理性并购行为等对策建议。
本文的主要结论:(1)我国证券市场对公司定价因素对上市公司之间的并购有着重要影响。证券市场对上市公司并购双方作出了显著不同的评价,并购公司的市场价值偏离账面价值的程度要高于目标公司。(2)上市公司在选择并购融资工具时,管理者预测到的市场时机因素确实能够对公司的股权融资产生显著的正向影响。从短期来看,一旦管理者认为公司的市场价格偏高,在融资工具的选择上就会偏向权益融资。(3)在非完全有效的市场中,股票定价的偏差会导致股权融资时机和供给条件的差异,进而对投资水平产生影响。对于并购上市公司而言,其股票价值被高估的程度越大,就越倾向于大规模的并购投资支出。(4)管理者的自信程度与并购决策呈现出不显著的正相关关系。上市公司的管理者出于自身利益的长远考虑,对于并购活动并未表现出与其自信程度相一致的行为偏好。(5)管理者过度自信程度与并购公司的资本结构和债务期限结构显著正相关。即过度自信导致管理者高估并购投资项目的盈利能力,低估决策的风险,进而选择激进的资本结构和债务期限结构。(6)管理者对于并购投资持有较高的谨慎态度,其自信程度与并购投资支出不显著负相关。但过度自信的管理者在进行并购投资时对现金流表现出了强烈的偏好。
本文主要有以下三方面的创新:
第一,从行为公司金融理论这个新的视角对中国上市公司并购中的融资、投资行为进行分析和研究,拓展了行为公司金融研究的范畴,弥补了传统公司并购理论的不足,丰富和完善了并购研究的理论体系,构建了行为公司金融视角下的公司并购投融资行为研究框架。
第二,结合我国上市公司治理结构的现状,构建了高管人员过度自信对公司并购投资支出影响的实证检验模型。作为一种尝试,对于模型中的投资一现金流的敏感性分析采用经营活动和融资活动双重分析路径,实证结果比单一的现金流分析更加符合我国资本市场融资环境的现实。
第三,采用并购上市公司样本来代替传统的IPO公司样本,同时考虑到我国的实际情况,样本在时间分布上以股权分置改革为界限,通过股票全流通前后资本市场条件的对比,使得市场时机理论对公司融资行为的解释以及对股票定价偏差通过融资政策影响投资行为的解释更具有说服力。
Merger and Acquisition of the stock market is an eternal subject, with the continuous advance of globalization, the global M & A activity increasing. In our country, by the WTO accession and the impact of state-owned enterprise reform, M & A activity reached unprecedented high tide. However, mergers and acquisitions in the enterprise to provide a shortcut to rapid expansion has also brought enormous risks.
M&A Activity in reality there are many unusual phenomenon of capital allocation as well as non-rational decision-making mergers and acquisitions. M&A because of the traditional theory ignores the managers, investors in decision-making by psychological factors, and at the same time the number of models focus too much on the use of quantitative analysis, the premise set strict conditions and separated from the actual situation, thus making traditional financial theory to these phenomena explain the weak.
Along with the 20th century, the 80's the rise of behavioral finance theory, behavioral corporate finance as corporate finance theory and behavioral finance theory of mutual integration of the resulting product also. Behavioral Corporate Finance breakthrough of modern corporate finance theory and economics paradigm of a rational framework.Focus on the people involved in the psychological and behavioral analysis of the assumptions it closer to the actual situation in the capital market, from a new perspective to study the invalidity of the external market and internal management of the company's non-rational financing, investment, dividend policy and other implications. M & A at the field, behavioral corporate finance for a series of "financial vision" for a positive argument and beneficial to explore, to a certain extent make up for the traditional financial theory blank.
From a theoretical sense, to conduct corporate finance theory for the study of company mergers and acquisitions M&A theoretical study on the enrichment and development of the theory of practice conducive to a more appropriate explanation; At the same time, acts of corporate finance will have a positive effect, help Study in the Behavioral Finance to develop a satisfactory framework for the disciplines. From a practical point of view, inefficient capital markets and stock prices and the real value of deviation will affect the merger and reorganization of listed companies act; Design flaws in the system, the managers of listed companies are more likely to use capital markets to enlarge its own non-efficiency of over-confidence psychological. Therefore, in the development of China's securities market is not mature enough, is to deepen reform of state-owned enterprises, but also, more generally, the existence of principal - agent problem, investors and managers of non-rational behavior is likely to combine, resulting in the exacerbation of the stock market bubble and corporate irrational expansion of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the introduction of acts of corporate finance theory, combined with the actual situation of China's M & A market study on China's main regulatory and market actors will have great significance.
Based on the specific context of the transition period, this article in our capital markets and listed companies financing environment-specific pattern of control over the configuration, the integrated use of the norms of research and empirical studies combine cross-section study of static and dynamic time series study method of combining , from the acts of corporate finance theory perspective to equity financing preference of listed companies as well as mergers and acquisitions of over-investment in inefficient acts as the entry point, Chinese listed companies in mergers and acquisitions financing, mergers and acquisitions investment in the status quo, as well as the application of acts of corporate finance to carry out a full analysis of the premise, based on in-depth exploration into non-rational investors and irrational managers of the company M & A investment and financing behavior, and proposed a corresponding the countermeasures and proposals.
The main conclusions: (1) China's securities market the company's pricing factors on mergers and acquisitions among listed companies have an important impact. Stock market mergers and acquisitions of listed companies both sides to make a significant different evaluation, mergers and acquisitions the company's market value of the degree of deviation from the book value is higher than the target company. (2) mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in the choice of financing instrument, the managers forecast that the market is right factors have to be able to finance the company's shares have a significant positive impact. In the short term, once the managers think the company's market price of the high side, at the choice of financing instrument on the rights and interests of the financing will be biased. (3) in full force and effect in non-market, stock prices will lead to deviations from equity financing and supply conditions of the time difference, and thus have an impact on the level of investment. For mergers and acquisitions of listed companies, its stock value has been over-estimated the extent of the greater, the greater the preference for large-scale mergers and acquisitions investment spending. (4) the degree of confidence managers and M & A decision-making showed no significant positive correlation between. Managers of listed companies for their own long-term benefits to consider, for M & A activity did not show the degree of confidence is consistent with their behavior preferences. (5) managers over the degree of confidence with the acquisition of the company's capital structure and debt maturity structure of a significant positive correlation. Over-confidence that led to acquisition managers to overestimate the profitability of investment projects, to underestimate the risk of decision-making, and then select the radical capital structure and debt maturity structure. (6) for the acquisition of investment managers to hold higher the cautious attitude of the confidence the extent of their investment spending and M & A negative correlation was not significant. However, managers of over-confidence in M & A investment of cash flow showed a strong preference.
This paper has the following three innovations:
First, from the acts of corporate finance theory in this new perspective on mergers and acquisitions in Chinese listed companies to finance, investment analysis and research, corporate finance act expanded scope of study to make up for the traditional theory of the inadequacy of corporate mergers and acquisitions, has enriched and perfected M & A study of the theoretical system, build a behavior from the Perspective of Corporate Finance M & A research framework for investment and financing behavior.
Secondly, the use of M & A sample of listed companies to replace the traditional IPO companies Empirical Test sample "window opportunity" the company's financing structure of the short-term impact, the effect is even more prominent and significant; time distribution of samples to 2005 for share-trading reform boundaries, full circulation through the stock of capital market conditions before and after comparison, the market timing theory of corporate finance acts as well as the deviation of the stock price impact of financing policy, through the interpretation of investment behavior is more convincing.
Third, the combination of governance structure of listed companies in China the status quo, build confidence executives over the company's acquisition of the impact of investment spending empirical test model. Investment - cash flow sensitivity analysis using cash flow from operating activities and financing activities, cash flow analysis of the dual path, making our country more in line with the conclusion of the study of capital market financing environmental realities.
伴随着20世纪80年代行为金融理论的兴起,行为公司金融作为公司金融理论与行为金融理论相互融合的产物也随之产生。行为公司金融突破了传统公司金融理论的理性框架和研究范式,注重对参与人的心理和实际行为进行分析,使它的假设更加贴近资本市场的现实,从一种全新的视角来研究外部市场的无效性和内部管理层的非理性对公司的融资、投资及股利政策等各方面的影响。在公司并购领域,行为公司金融对于一系列“金融异象”进行了积极的论证和有益的探索,在一定程度上弥补了传统金融理论在这一领域的研究空白。
从理论意义上说,将行为公司金融理论用于公司并购研究是对并购理论的丰富和发展,有益于对并购实践进行更加贴切的解释;同时对行为公司金融也会产生积极的作用,有助于行为金融学形成完善的学科框架。从实践角度来看,资本市场的无效率和股票价格与实际价值的偏离都会影响上市公司的并购重组行为;在制度设计存在缺陷的情况下,上市公司的经理人更有可能利用资本市场的非效率性放大自身的过度自信心理。因此在我国证券市场发展不够成熟,国有企业正在深化改革,还较为普遍地存在委托.代理问题的情况下,投资者和管理者的非理性行为很可能结合,从而导致股市泡沫的加剧和公司的非理性扩展并购。因而,引入行为公司金融理论,并结合我国实际情况对并购市场加以研究,对我国的监管主体和市场行为主体都将有重大的意义。
基于转型时期的特定背景,本文在我国资本市场融资环境和上市公司特有的控制权配置格局下,综合运用了规范研究与实证研究相结合、截面的静态研究与时间序列的动态研究相结合的方法,从行为公司金融理论的研究视角,以上市公司股权融资偏好以及低效率并购的过度投资行为作为研究的切入点,在对中国上市公司并购融资、并购投资的现状以及行为公司金融的应用前提进行充分分析的基础上,深入探讨了非理性投资者以及非理性管理者对于公司并购投融资行为的影响,并提出相应的对策建议。
论文的主要工作包括三个方面:(1)提出了基于行为公司金融视角的公司并购投融资行为的研究框架。论文结合现有文献,对国内外并购投融资行为及行为公司金融相关的研究理论和实证成果进行了梳理;在对我国企业并购融资、投资的现状进行分析的同时,解析市场时机理论及管理者过度自信理论在我国应用的现实条件。在上述研究基础上提出了本文的分析框架(2)根据投资者非理性模型和管理者非理性模型,分别从公司并购动因、并购融资以及并购投资支出三个方面对市场时机选择理论和管理者过度自信理论的理论基础及模型进行解析;选取2003-2007年的上市公司样本,构建回归模型,实证检验了市净率和过度自信变量对并购决策、并购融资结构以及并购投资规模的影响。(3)根据本文的研究结论,有针对性地提出弱化上市公司的股权融资偏好、有效引导公司的控制权转移以及从制度硬约束和行为成本软约束两个方面规范上市公司的非理性并购行为等对策建议。
本文的主要结论:(1)我国证券市场对公司定价因素对上市公司之间的并购有着重要影响。证券市场对上市公司并购双方作出了显著不同的评价,并购公司的市场价值偏离账面价值的程度要高于目标公司。(2)上市公司在选择并购融资工具时,管理者预测到的市场时机因素确实能够对公司的股权融资产生显著的正向影响。从短期来看,一旦管理者认为公司的市场价格偏高,在融资工具的选择上就会偏向权益融资。(3)在非完全有效的市场中,股票定价的偏差会导致股权融资时机和供给条件的差异,进而对投资水平产生影响。对于并购上市公司而言,其股票价值被高估的程度越大,就越倾向于大规模的并购投资支出。(4)管理者的自信程度与并购决策呈现出不显著的正相关关系。上市公司的管理者出于自身利益的长远考虑,对于并购活动并未表现出与其自信程度相一致的行为偏好。(5)管理者过度自信程度与并购公司的资本结构和债务期限结构显著正相关。即过度自信导致管理者高估并购投资项目的盈利能力,低估决策的风险,进而选择激进的资本结构和债务期限结构。(6)管理者对于并购投资持有较高的谨慎态度,其自信程度与并购投资支出不显著负相关。但过度自信的管理者在进行并购投资时对现金流表现出了强烈的偏好。
本文主要有以下三方面的创新:
第一,从行为公司金融理论这个新的视角对中国上市公司并购中的融资、投资行为进行分析和研究,拓展了行为公司金融研究的范畴,弥补了传统公司并购理论的不足,丰富和完善了并购研究的理论体系,构建了行为公司金融视角下的公司并购投融资行为研究框架。
第二,结合我国上市公司治理结构的现状,构建了高管人员过度自信对公司并购投资支出影响的实证检验模型。作为一种尝试,对于模型中的投资一现金流的敏感性分析采用经营活动和融资活动双重分析路径,实证结果比单一的现金流分析更加符合我国资本市场融资环境的现实。
第三,采用并购上市公司样本来代替传统的IPO公司样本,同时考虑到我国的实际情况,样本在时间分布上以股权分置改革为界限,通过股票全流通前后资本市场条件的对比,使得市场时机理论对公司融资行为的解释以及对股票定价偏差通过融资政策影响投资行为的解释更具有说服力。
Merger and Acquisition of the stock market is an eternal subject, with the continuous advance of globalization, the global M & A activity increasing. In our country, by the WTO accession and the impact of state-owned enterprise reform, M & A activity reached unprecedented high tide. However, mergers and acquisitions in the enterprise to provide a shortcut to rapid expansion has also brought enormous risks.
M&A Activity in reality there are many unusual phenomenon of capital allocation as well as non-rational decision-making mergers and acquisitions. M&A because of the traditional theory ignores the managers, investors in decision-making by psychological factors, and at the same time the number of models focus too much on the use of quantitative analysis, the premise set strict conditions and separated from the actual situation, thus making traditional financial theory to these phenomena explain the weak.
Along with the 20th century, the 80's the rise of behavioral finance theory, behavioral corporate finance as corporate finance theory and behavioral finance theory of mutual integration of the resulting product also. Behavioral Corporate Finance breakthrough of modern corporate finance theory and economics paradigm of a rational framework.Focus on the people involved in the psychological and behavioral analysis of the assumptions it closer to the actual situation in the capital market, from a new perspective to study the invalidity of the external market and internal management of the company's non-rational financing, investment, dividend policy and other implications. M & A at the field, behavioral corporate finance for a series of "financial vision" for a positive argument and beneficial to explore, to a certain extent make up for the traditional financial theory blank.
From a theoretical sense, to conduct corporate finance theory for the study of company mergers and acquisitions M&A theoretical study on the enrichment and development of the theory of practice conducive to a more appropriate explanation; At the same time, acts of corporate finance will have a positive effect, help Study in the Behavioral Finance to develop a satisfactory framework for the disciplines. From a practical point of view, inefficient capital markets and stock prices and the real value of deviation will affect the merger and reorganization of listed companies act; Design flaws in the system, the managers of listed companies are more likely to use capital markets to enlarge its own non-efficiency of over-confidence psychological. Therefore, in the development of China's securities market is not mature enough, is to deepen reform of state-owned enterprises, but also, more generally, the existence of principal - agent problem, investors and managers of non-rational behavior is likely to combine, resulting in the exacerbation of the stock market bubble and corporate irrational expansion of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the introduction of acts of corporate finance theory, combined with the actual situation of China's M & A market study on China's main regulatory and market actors will have great significance.
Based on the specific context of the transition period, this article in our capital markets and listed companies financing environment-specific pattern of control over the configuration, the integrated use of the norms of research and empirical studies combine cross-section study of static and dynamic time series study method of combining , from the acts of corporate finance theory perspective to equity financing preference of listed companies as well as mergers and acquisitions of over-investment in inefficient acts as the entry point, Chinese listed companies in mergers and acquisitions financing, mergers and acquisitions investment in the status quo, as well as the application of acts of corporate finance to carry out a full analysis of the premise, based on in-depth exploration into non-rational investors and irrational managers of the company M & A investment and financing behavior, and proposed a corresponding the countermeasures and proposals.
The main conclusions: (1) China's securities market the company's pricing factors on mergers and acquisitions among listed companies have an important impact. Stock market mergers and acquisitions of listed companies both sides to make a significant different evaluation, mergers and acquisitions the company's market value of the degree of deviation from the book value is higher than the target company. (2) mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in the choice of financing instrument, the managers forecast that the market is right factors have to be able to finance the company's shares have a significant positive impact. In the short term, once the managers think the company's market price of the high side, at the choice of financing instrument on the rights and interests of the financing will be biased. (3) in full force and effect in non-market, stock prices will lead to deviations from equity financing and supply conditions of the time difference, and thus have an impact on the level of investment. For mergers and acquisitions of listed companies, its stock value has been over-estimated the extent of the greater, the greater the preference for large-scale mergers and acquisitions investment spending. (4) the degree of confidence managers and M & A decision-making showed no significant positive correlation between. Managers of listed companies for their own long-term benefits to consider, for M & A activity did not show the degree of confidence is consistent with their behavior preferences. (5) managers over the degree of confidence with the acquisition of the company's capital structure and debt maturity structure of a significant positive correlation. Over-confidence that led to acquisition managers to overestimate the profitability of investment projects, to underestimate the risk of decision-making, and then select the radical capital structure and debt maturity structure. (6) for the acquisition of investment managers to hold higher the cautious attitude of the confidence the extent of their investment spending and M & A negative correlation was not significant. However, managers of over-confidence in M & A investment of cash flow showed a strong preference.
This paper has the following three innovations:
First, from the acts of corporate finance theory in this new perspective on mergers and acquisitions in Chinese listed companies to finance, investment analysis and research, corporate finance act expanded scope of study to make up for the traditional theory of the inadequacy of corporate mergers and acquisitions, has enriched and perfected M & A study of the theoretical system, build a behavior from the Perspective of Corporate Finance M & A research framework for investment and financing behavior.
Secondly, the use of M & A sample of listed companies to replace the traditional IPO companies Empirical Test sample "window opportunity" the company's financing structure of the short-term impact, the effect is even more prominent and significant; time distribution of samples to 2005 for share-trading reform boundaries, full circulation through the stock of capital market conditions before and after comparison, the market timing theory of corporate finance acts as well as the deviation of the stock price impact of financing policy, through the interpretation of investment behavior is more convincing.
Third, the combination of governance structure of listed companies in China the status quo, build confidence executives over the company's acquisition of the impact of investment spending empirical test model. Investment - cash flow sensitivity analysis using cash flow from operating activities and financing activities, cash flow analysis of the dual path, making our country more in line with the conclusion of the study of capital market financing environmental realities.
引文
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