上市公司股权再融资方式选择研究
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摘要
公司股权再融资行为在微观上影响公司的资本成本、资本结构、现金流量安排和控制权配置,在宏观上影响整体资本市场的资金配置效率和广大投资者的利益,随着我国资本市场的发展,上市公司股权再融资问题成为一个需要并值得研究的课题。有数据显示,从1991年到2008年底,我国证券市场股权再融资额为11321.47亿元,其中配股融资额2733.94亿元,增发融资额8587.53亿元(而同期A股境内IPO融资额为12884.37亿),可见股权再融资的总体规模已经接近IPO融资规模,股权再融资已成为我国上市公司后续融资的重要方式。国内外学者对上市公司股权再融资问题的研究对本文的写作具有极大的启发意义,笔者立足于国内外文献,在前人的成果之上对股权再融资方式选择问题进行研究,结合我国证券市场不同时期先后出现“配股热”、“公开增发热”、“定向增发热”的现象,考虑中国上市公司所处的制度背景环境,对中国上市公司股权再融资方式选择的研究显得更为重要和具有现实意义。现有文献对股权再融资方式选择虽然从政策规定、发行条件、股权结构、代理成本等方面进行了研究,但缺少对上市公司股权再融资方式选择影响因素的系统分析,同时从现有研究来看,以股权再融资行为的经济后果对股权再融资方式进行选择及评价的研究比较少,因此本论文以此为切入点,对我国上市公司三种主要的股权再融资方式,即配股、公开增发和定向增发展开研究,通过事前股权再融资方式合理选择及事后三种股权再融资方式业绩的合理评价来把握股权再融资行为,以期降低公司股权再融资成本,提高融资效率,实现股权再融资目标,提升公司市场价值。
本论文沿着“研究背景→文献综述→影响因素分析(包括理论模型与实证检验)→公告效应比较→长期业绩比较→结论与政策建议”的思路进行研究,主要内容包括梳理国内外关于股权再融资方式、股权再融资公告效应及长期业绩的研究,将信息不对称理论和财富再分配效应理论与股权再融资方式选择相结合,立足于中国证券市场和上市公司实际状况,继承融合资本结构经典理论,探索拓展上市公司股权再融资前沿课题,运用博弈方法分析再融资监管政策,采用Logistic模型考察股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的公告效应和长期业绩,并将三种方式的短期与长期业绩进行比较。全文由八章组成。
第一章主要阐述了论文的研究背景与研究意义、研究内容与研究目标、研究方法及本文的创新与不足。
第二章根据本论文的研究思路,从股权再融资方式选择、股权再融资公告效应、股权再融资长期业绩三方面梳理国内外的文献,通过对文献的梳理提出了本文研究的关键问题。
第三章介绍了上市公司股权再融资理论与股权再融资方式选择理论,在再融资方式选择理论中分别介绍了支持配股、支持公开增发、支持定向增发的理论,并结合中国的制度背景分析了对中国上市公司具有指导意义的理论,即信息不对称理论和财富再分配效应理论。
第四章对中国上市公司股权再融资的制度背景进行分析,介绍了配股、公开增发和定向增发三种股权再融资方式各自的特点及发展概况,回顾了三种股权再融资方式的政策变迁,并运用博弈方法中的缺口模型以增发政策为例进行分析,研究表明再融资监管政策显著影响上市公司业绩分布,增发政策产生增发资格线,监管政策引发信息失真,这表明净资产收益率尽管是再融资监管政策的重点关注指标,但配股公司与增发公司在净资产收益率方面不存在显著差异,那些打算进行股权再融资的公司为了获取再融资资格都会不惜代价迎合监管要求,再融资预案是在揣摩监管机构的意图,上市公司自身丧失了对再融资方式进行选择的必要理性。
第五章从理论和实证两个角度探讨了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,其中理论模型为控制权私人收益模型和财富再分配效应模型,前者从理论角度阐述了控制权私人收益对上市公司股权再融资决策及股权再融资方式选择的影响,分析表明考虑控制权私人收益后控股股东进行股权融资概率提高,小股东的利益进一步减少,但结合中国的制度背景考虑,控制权私人收益并不是中国上市公司控股股东股权再融资方式选择决策的依据；后者从财富效应角度考察配股与增发方式下非流通股股东与流通股股东(实际上也就是控股股东与小股东)的收益,分析表明在中国证券市场上,公开增发方式对非流通股股东最有利,但定向增发方式下,非流通股股东在一定程度上“牺牲”了自身利益,流通股股东利益受损害的程度有所减弱。本章在两个理论模型后运用Logistic回归分析实证检验了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,考察了预计股权再融资净额、公司资产总额、净资产收益率、第一大股东持股比例、市盈率、流通股比例、资产负债率、前五大股东持股比例之和、过去三年平均主营业务增长率九个影响因素,实证结论表明预计股权再融资净额、资产负债率、前五大股东持股比例之和、流通股比例越大的公司越倾向于采用增发方式,反之,则采用配股方式。
第六章运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的公告效应,并将三者公告效应的程度进行比较,在预期收益率的计算中采用最小二乘市场模型。研究表明,中国上市公司定向增发新股的公告效应要好于配股和公开增发新股的公告效应。
第七章运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的长期市场业绩,并将三者长期市场业绩表现进行比较。研究表明,定向增发公司长期市场业绩高于公开增发公司和配股公司。从增加公司价值的角度讲,应大力提倡上市公司选择定向增发方式进行股权再融资。
第八章从政策研究、理论研究、实证研究三方面概括本文的研究结论,同时提出相关的政策建议,具体包括完善股权再融资监管政策、加强对上市公司股权再融资的监管、进一步改善上市公司股权结构、积极鼓励定向增发方式等。
股权再融资问题是一个研究内容非常丰富的课题,国内外学者对此做出了卓有成效的奠基和探索,他们的研究对本文的写作具有极大的启发和借鉴意义,本文的研究在前人基础上也进行了积极的探索,在写作过程中形成的主要创新之处包括：
第一,论文全面分析了我国上市公司三种主要股权再融资方式配股、公开增发、定向增发的发展概况,系统回顾了三种方式各自的政策变迁,并尝试用博弈方法分析增发资格线,扩展了该问题的研究内容。
第二,论文首次采用logistic模型系统分析了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,实证检验了不同股权再融资方式下公司特性上的差异,研究结论对于我国上市公司股权再融资方式选择具有指导意义。
第三,已有文献对股权再融资方式的研究仍有不足之处,本文另辟蹊径,从股权再融资方式选择出发,建立再融资方式与业绩之间的关系,研究不同再融资方式下公司的业绩表现及如何通过股权再融资后的业绩选择股权再融资方式,这在一定程度上丰富了该领域的研究成果。
令人遗憾的是,受到定向增发出现时间较晚所限,在比较三种股权再融资方式长期收益时只能比较再融资后18个月的收益,随着时间的推进及样本数量的增加,未来可以进行更长时间段的研究。股权再融资问题研究内容很丰富,本文以股权再融资方式选择为出发点对比研究了三种方式的公告效应和长期股票收益率,随着研究的深入,未来从理论上进一步探讨公告效应和长期收益变化的原因也将是未来很有意义的研究课题
Seasoned equity offerings (SEO) is related to the company's cost of capital, capital structure, cash flow arrangement and control structure from the micro level, related to capital allocation efficiency and the interests of investors from macro point of view, with the development of Chinese capital market, SEO of listed companies become more important. The financing amount of SEO is close to IPO; SEO has become an important way of follow-up financing. The research of scholars about SEO at home and abroad gives a great sense of inspiration for writing this dissertation, allowing the author to carry out an integrated and extended analysis on the results of previous literatures. This dissertation does research on SEO flotation methods choice. This will be more significant and practical in China.
At the same time, there are relatively small literatures from the perspective of SEO consequence to flotation methods choice, so as a starting point; this dissertation does research on three major SEO flotation methods in China, that is, share placements, public offerings and private placement. We hope that listed companies can conduct SEO behavior according to rational choice and evaluation, this may reduce the company's SEO costs, improve financial efficiency to achieve SEO goals and enhance the company's market value.
This dissertation intends to follow the thinking of "Research background→Literature Review→Analysis of influencing factors (including the theoretical model and empirical test)→announcement effect comparison→long-term market performance comparison→Conclusions and policy recommendations". The main contents include SEO flotation methods; SEO announcement effect and long-term market performance, combining the theory of information asymmetry and wealth redistribution effects with SEO flotation methods choice based on Chinese capital market and listed companies. This dissertation integrates classical theory of capital structure, explores cutting-edge issues of SEO, and uses the game theory to analyze SEO regulatory policies, uses Logistic model to analyze influencing factors about flotation methods choice, company size, binary ownership structure and other factors are included in the empirical test. We use event study to examine announcement effects and long-term market performance of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and then we compare the short-term and long-term performance of the three kinds of flotation methods. There are eight chapters in this dissertation.
Chapter 1 focuses primarily on the research background and research significance, research content, research methods, and structural arrangements.
In Chapter 2, we review literatures from the SEO flotation methods choice, SEO announcement effect, and SEO long-term market performance at home and abroad, and then we raised main issues in our research.
Chapter 3 describes the theories about SEO and SEO flotation methods choice, the theories support for share placements, public offerings and private placement respectively. From the view of institutional context in China, the theory of asymmetric information and wealth redistribution effect are instructive.
Chapter 4 analyzes SEO institutional context of listed companies in China, introduces characteristics and development of share placements, public offerings and private placement, recalling the policy change of the three kinds of SEO flotation methods, and uses the gap model of the game method to analyze public offerings policy. Consequences show that regulatory policies have significant impact on performance of listed companies; public offerings policy induces public offerings qualification line, regulatory policies lead to information distortion, which also shows that there is no significant difference about ROE among the share placements companies, public offerings companies and private placement companies, though regulatory policies pay attention to ROE. Listed companies will do at all costs to meet the regulatory requirements in order to obtain SEO qualification, losing the reason to choose SEO methods.
Chapter 5 discusses influencing factors of SEO flotation methods choice from the theoretical and empirical perspective. There are two theoretical models, the private benefits of control model and the redistribution of wealth effect model, the former discusses the private benefits of control effects to SEO decision-making and SEO flotation methods choice, the latter analyzes the interests of non-outstanding shareholders and the outstanding shareholders (in fact they are the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders) in share placements, public offerings and private placement. The analysis shows that the controlling shareholders increase the probability of SEO after considering private benefits of control, although SEO will reduce the interests of minority shareholders, in China, private benefits of control does not affect the controlling shareholders SEO flotation method choice decision-making of listed companies. The analysis also shows that in Chinese capital market, non-outstanding shareholders prefer to public offerings and private placement. However, non-outstanding shareholders sacrifice their interests in private placement to a certain extent, the interests of outstanding shareholders has been increased. After the two theoretical models, we use Logistic regression analysis to test empirically influencing factors of SEO flotation methods choice, the expected amount of SEO, total assets, ROE, the largest shareholder equity ratio, price-earnings ratio, the proportion of outstanding shares, asset-liability ratio, equity ratio of the top five shareholders and average growth rate of main business in the past three-year are included. We found that the greater the expected amount of SEO, asset-liability ratio, equity ratio of the top five shareholders, the proportion of the outstanding shares, the more companies inclined to adopt public offerings and private placement, the conclusion reacts the reform of non-outstanding shares.
Chapter 6 examines announcement effect of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and compares the empirical findings in the use of event study. We use OLS market model to calculate the expected rate of return, the normal return is the estimated value of the particular trading day returns. The announcement effect of private placement for companies in China is better than public offerings's, and the announcement effect of public offerings is better than share placement's.
Chapter 7 examines long-term market performance of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and compares the empirical findings in the use of event study. The long-term market performance of private placement for companies in China is better than public offerings's and share placement's. From the perspective of value maximization, private placement should be vigorously promoted; it is the best SEO method for Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this dissertation from policy research, theoretical research, empirical research and makes relevant policy recommendations, specifically including improving SEO regulatory policies, enhancing the SEO regulation of listed companies, improving the shareholding structure, encouraging private placement and so on.
The SEO is a very rich research field, scholars at home and abroad have made a fruitful foundation, their research have a great sense of inspiration for writing this dissertation, this dissertation carries out an active exploration based on existing research, and there are three major innovations views:
Firstly, the dissertation makes a comprehensive analysis about the development of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and reviews the policy changes about the three methods. The first time the author uses game theory to analyze public offerings qualification line, extending the research content.
Secondly, the first time the dissertation uses Logistic model to analyze influencing factors of SEO flotation method choice, and examines empirically the differences of company's features among share placements, public offerings and private placement. The conclusions can give some guidance for Chinese listed companies.
Thirdly, the existing literature on SEO flotation method choice is still inadequate; this dissertation is different from the previous research that analyzes the changes of SEO short-term and long-term performance from other points of view. We proceed to establish the relationship between SEO flotation methods choice and performance; we pay attention to how choices affect the performance and how to choose SEO methods through performance evaluation after SEO.
Unfortunately, due to the late emergence of private placement, in comparing long-term market performance, we can only do research about 18 months, as time goes on and the number of samples increases, we can do research during even longer period in the future. Also, we can analyze the reason of announcement effect and long-term performance changes from theoretical view.
本论文沿着“研究背景→文献综述→影响因素分析(包括理论模型与实证检验)→公告效应比较→长期业绩比较→结论与政策建议”的思路进行研究,主要内容包括梳理国内外关于股权再融资方式、股权再融资公告效应及长期业绩的研究,将信息不对称理论和财富再分配效应理论与股权再融资方式选择相结合,立足于中国证券市场和上市公司实际状况,继承融合资本结构经典理论,探索拓展上市公司股权再融资前沿课题,运用博弈方法分析再融资监管政策,采用Logistic模型考察股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的公告效应和长期业绩,并将三种方式的短期与长期业绩进行比较。全文由八章组成。
第一章主要阐述了论文的研究背景与研究意义、研究内容与研究目标、研究方法及本文的创新与不足。
第二章根据本论文的研究思路,从股权再融资方式选择、股权再融资公告效应、股权再融资长期业绩三方面梳理国内外的文献,通过对文献的梳理提出了本文研究的关键问题。
第三章介绍了上市公司股权再融资理论与股权再融资方式选择理论,在再融资方式选择理论中分别介绍了支持配股、支持公开增发、支持定向增发的理论,并结合中国的制度背景分析了对中国上市公司具有指导意义的理论,即信息不对称理论和财富再分配效应理论。
第四章对中国上市公司股权再融资的制度背景进行分析,介绍了配股、公开增发和定向增发三种股权再融资方式各自的特点及发展概况,回顾了三种股权再融资方式的政策变迁,并运用博弈方法中的缺口模型以增发政策为例进行分析,研究表明再融资监管政策显著影响上市公司业绩分布,增发政策产生增发资格线,监管政策引发信息失真,这表明净资产收益率尽管是再融资监管政策的重点关注指标,但配股公司与增发公司在净资产收益率方面不存在显著差异,那些打算进行股权再融资的公司为了获取再融资资格都会不惜代价迎合监管要求,再融资预案是在揣摩监管机构的意图,上市公司自身丧失了对再融资方式进行选择的必要理性。
第五章从理论和实证两个角度探讨了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,其中理论模型为控制权私人收益模型和财富再分配效应模型,前者从理论角度阐述了控制权私人收益对上市公司股权再融资决策及股权再融资方式选择的影响,分析表明考虑控制权私人收益后控股股东进行股权融资概率提高,小股东的利益进一步减少,但结合中国的制度背景考虑,控制权私人收益并不是中国上市公司控股股东股权再融资方式选择决策的依据；后者从财富效应角度考察配股与增发方式下非流通股股东与流通股股东(实际上也就是控股股东与小股东)的收益,分析表明在中国证券市场上,公开增发方式对非流通股股东最有利,但定向增发方式下,非流通股股东在一定程度上“牺牲”了自身利益,流通股股东利益受损害的程度有所减弱。本章在两个理论模型后运用Logistic回归分析实证检验了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,考察了预计股权再融资净额、公司资产总额、净资产收益率、第一大股东持股比例、市盈率、流通股比例、资产负债率、前五大股东持股比例之和、过去三年平均主营业务增长率九个影响因素,实证结论表明预计股权再融资净额、资产负债率、前五大股东持股比例之和、流通股比例越大的公司越倾向于采用增发方式,反之,则采用配股方式。
第六章运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的公告效应,并将三者公告效应的程度进行比较,在预期收益率的计算中采用最小二乘市场模型。研究表明,中国上市公司定向增发新股的公告效应要好于配股和公开增发新股的公告效应。
第七章运用事件研究法考察配股、公开增发和定向增发的长期市场业绩,并将三者长期市场业绩表现进行比较。研究表明,定向增发公司长期市场业绩高于公开增发公司和配股公司。从增加公司价值的角度讲,应大力提倡上市公司选择定向增发方式进行股权再融资。
第八章从政策研究、理论研究、实证研究三方面概括本文的研究结论,同时提出相关的政策建议,具体包括完善股权再融资监管政策、加强对上市公司股权再融资的监管、进一步改善上市公司股权结构、积极鼓励定向增发方式等。
股权再融资问题是一个研究内容非常丰富的课题,国内外学者对此做出了卓有成效的奠基和探索,他们的研究对本文的写作具有极大的启发和借鉴意义,本文的研究在前人基础上也进行了积极的探索,在写作过程中形成的主要创新之处包括：
第一,论文全面分析了我国上市公司三种主要股权再融资方式配股、公开增发、定向增发的发展概况,系统回顾了三种方式各自的政策变迁,并尝试用博弈方法分析增发资格线,扩展了该问题的研究内容。
第二,论文首次采用logistic模型系统分析了股权再融资方式选择的影响因素,实证检验了不同股权再融资方式下公司特性上的差异,研究结论对于我国上市公司股权再融资方式选择具有指导意义。
第三,已有文献对股权再融资方式的研究仍有不足之处,本文另辟蹊径,从股权再融资方式选择出发,建立再融资方式与业绩之间的关系,研究不同再融资方式下公司的业绩表现及如何通过股权再融资后的业绩选择股权再融资方式,这在一定程度上丰富了该领域的研究成果。
令人遗憾的是,受到定向增发出现时间较晚所限,在比较三种股权再融资方式长期收益时只能比较再融资后18个月的收益,随着时间的推进及样本数量的增加,未来可以进行更长时间段的研究。股权再融资问题研究内容很丰富,本文以股权再融资方式选择为出发点对比研究了三种方式的公告效应和长期股票收益率,随着研究的深入,未来从理论上进一步探讨公告效应和长期收益变化的原因也将是未来很有意义的研究课题
Seasoned equity offerings (SEO) is related to the company's cost of capital, capital structure, cash flow arrangement and control structure from the micro level, related to capital allocation efficiency and the interests of investors from macro point of view, with the development of Chinese capital market, SEO of listed companies become more important. The financing amount of SEO is close to IPO; SEO has become an important way of follow-up financing. The research of scholars about SEO at home and abroad gives a great sense of inspiration for writing this dissertation, allowing the author to carry out an integrated and extended analysis on the results of previous literatures. This dissertation does research on SEO flotation methods choice. This will be more significant and practical in China.
At the same time, there are relatively small literatures from the perspective of SEO consequence to flotation methods choice, so as a starting point; this dissertation does research on three major SEO flotation methods in China, that is, share placements, public offerings and private placement. We hope that listed companies can conduct SEO behavior according to rational choice and evaluation, this may reduce the company's SEO costs, improve financial efficiency to achieve SEO goals and enhance the company's market value.
This dissertation intends to follow the thinking of "Research background→Literature Review→Analysis of influencing factors (including the theoretical model and empirical test)→announcement effect comparison→long-term market performance comparison→Conclusions and policy recommendations". The main contents include SEO flotation methods; SEO announcement effect and long-term market performance, combining the theory of information asymmetry and wealth redistribution effects with SEO flotation methods choice based on Chinese capital market and listed companies. This dissertation integrates classical theory of capital structure, explores cutting-edge issues of SEO, and uses the game theory to analyze SEO regulatory policies, uses Logistic model to analyze influencing factors about flotation methods choice, company size, binary ownership structure and other factors are included in the empirical test. We use event study to examine announcement effects and long-term market performance of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and then we compare the short-term and long-term performance of the three kinds of flotation methods. There are eight chapters in this dissertation.
Chapter 1 focuses primarily on the research background and research significance, research content, research methods, and structural arrangements.
In Chapter 2, we review literatures from the SEO flotation methods choice, SEO announcement effect, and SEO long-term market performance at home and abroad, and then we raised main issues in our research.
Chapter 3 describes the theories about SEO and SEO flotation methods choice, the theories support for share placements, public offerings and private placement respectively. From the view of institutional context in China, the theory of asymmetric information and wealth redistribution effect are instructive.
Chapter 4 analyzes SEO institutional context of listed companies in China, introduces characteristics and development of share placements, public offerings and private placement, recalling the policy change of the three kinds of SEO flotation methods, and uses the gap model of the game method to analyze public offerings policy. Consequences show that regulatory policies have significant impact on performance of listed companies; public offerings policy induces public offerings qualification line, regulatory policies lead to information distortion, which also shows that there is no significant difference about ROE among the share placements companies, public offerings companies and private placement companies, though regulatory policies pay attention to ROE. Listed companies will do at all costs to meet the regulatory requirements in order to obtain SEO qualification, losing the reason to choose SEO methods.
Chapter 5 discusses influencing factors of SEO flotation methods choice from the theoretical and empirical perspective. There are two theoretical models, the private benefits of control model and the redistribution of wealth effect model, the former discusses the private benefits of control effects to SEO decision-making and SEO flotation methods choice, the latter analyzes the interests of non-outstanding shareholders and the outstanding shareholders (in fact they are the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders) in share placements, public offerings and private placement. The analysis shows that the controlling shareholders increase the probability of SEO after considering private benefits of control, although SEO will reduce the interests of minority shareholders, in China, private benefits of control does not affect the controlling shareholders SEO flotation method choice decision-making of listed companies. The analysis also shows that in Chinese capital market, non-outstanding shareholders prefer to public offerings and private placement. However, non-outstanding shareholders sacrifice their interests in private placement to a certain extent, the interests of outstanding shareholders has been increased. After the two theoretical models, we use Logistic regression analysis to test empirically influencing factors of SEO flotation methods choice, the expected amount of SEO, total assets, ROE, the largest shareholder equity ratio, price-earnings ratio, the proportion of outstanding shares, asset-liability ratio, equity ratio of the top five shareholders and average growth rate of main business in the past three-year are included. We found that the greater the expected amount of SEO, asset-liability ratio, equity ratio of the top five shareholders, the proportion of the outstanding shares, the more companies inclined to adopt public offerings and private placement, the conclusion reacts the reform of non-outstanding shares.
Chapter 6 examines announcement effect of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and compares the empirical findings in the use of event study. We use OLS market model to calculate the expected rate of return, the normal return is the estimated value of the particular trading day returns. The announcement effect of private placement for companies in China is better than public offerings's, and the announcement effect of public offerings is better than share placement's.
Chapter 7 examines long-term market performance of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and compares the empirical findings in the use of event study. The long-term market performance of private placement for companies in China is better than public offerings's and share placement's. From the perspective of value maximization, private placement should be vigorously promoted; it is the best SEO method for Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this dissertation from policy research, theoretical research, empirical research and makes relevant policy recommendations, specifically including improving SEO regulatory policies, enhancing the SEO regulation of listed companies, improving the shareholding structure, encouraging private placement and so on.
The SEO is a very rich research field, scholars at home and abroad have made a fruitful foundation, their research have a great sense of inspiration for writing this dissertation, this dissertation carries out an active exploration based on existing research, and there are three major innovations views:
Firstly, the dissertation makes a comprehensive analysis about the development of share placements, public offerings and private placement, and reviews the policy changes about the three methods. The first time the author uses game theory to analyze public offerings qualification line, extending the research content.
Secondly, the first time the dissertation uses Logistic model to analyze influencing factors of SEO flotation method choice, and examines empirically the differences of company's features among share placements, public offerings and private placement. The conclusions can give some guidance for Chinese listed companies.
Thirdly, the existing literature on SEO flotation method choice is still inadequate; this dissertation is different from the previous research that analyzes the changes of SEO short-term and long-term performance from other points of view. We proceed to establish the relationship between SEO flotation methods choice and performance; we pay attention to how choices affect the performance and how to choose SEO methods through performance evaluation after SEO.
Unfortunately, due to the late emergence of private placement, in comparing long-term market performance, we can only do research about 18 months, as time goes on and the number of samples increases, we can do research during even longer period in the future. Also, we can analyze the reason of announcement effect and long-term performance changes from theoretical view.
引文
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②即使由管理者做出,管理者也以控股股东利益最大化为目标,管理者与控股股东合谋是控制权私人收益实现的手段。
①目前都采用间接方法,主要有两种：一种是以Barclay和Holdmess (1989)为代表的基于大宗股权转让的交易溢价来估计控制权私人收益水平；一种是以Zingales(1995)和Nenove (2003)为代表的基于不同投票权的股票价值计算的投票权溢价来估计控制权私人收益水平。
② Alexander Dyck, Luigi Zingales,2004, "Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison", Journal of Finance, Vol.59, PP.537-600.
① Xueping Wu, Zheng Wang,2002, "Why Do Firms Choose Value-Destroying Rights Offerings? Theory and Evidence from Hong Kong", working paper.
①管征.上市公司股权再融资[M].第1版.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2006：154-176.
①管征.上市公司股权再融资[M].第1版.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2006：178-182.
① Blazenko,1987, "Managerial Preference, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Structure", Journal of Finance, Vol 42, pp.839-862.
①“股权相对集中于第一大股东、高度集中于前五大股东是中国上市公司股权结构的最突出表现”林乐芬.“上市公司股权集中度实证研究”[J].《经济学研究》.2005(11)
①这里所说的“日数据的特性”包括非正态分布以及非同步交易等。
② Brown, Stephen J., Warner, Jerold B.,1985, "Using Daily Stock Returns the Case of Event Studies", vol.14, pp.3-31.
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②即使由管理者做出,管理者也以控股股东利益最大化为目标,管理者与控股股东合谋是控制权私人收益实现的手段。
①目前都采用间接方法,主要有两种：一种是以Barclay和Holdmess (1989)为代表的基于大宗股权转让的交易溢价来估计控制权私人收益水平；一种是以Zingales(1995)和Nenove (2003)为代表的基于不同投票权的股票价值计算的投票权溢价来估计控制权私人收益水平。
② Alexander Dyck, Luigi Zingales,2004, "Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison", Journal of Finance, Vol.59, PP.537-600.
① Xueping Wu, Zheng Wang,2002, "Why Do Firms Choose Value-Destroying Rights Offerings? Theory and Evidence from Hong Kong", working paper.
①管征.上市公司股权再融资[M].第1版.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2006：154-176.
①管征.上市公司股权再融资[M].第1版.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2006：178-182.
① Blazenko,1987, "Managerial Preference, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Structure", Journal of Finance, Vol 42, pp.839-862.
①“股权相对集中于第一大股东、高度集中于前五大股东是中国上市公司股权结构的最突出表现”林乐芬.“上市公司股权集中度实证研究”[J].《经济学研究》.2005(11)
①这里所说的“日数据的特性”包括非正态分布以及非同步交易等。
② Brown, Stephen J., Warner, Jerold B.,1985, "Using Daily Stock Returns the Case of Event Studies", vol.14, pp.3-31.
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