独立与管制：美国独立管制机构经验评析
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摘要
从传统普通法管制到现代行政管制的转型是一个渐进的过程。独立管制机构的出现是这一进程的开端。如何让大产业为公共利益服务?这是民主政治必须解决的问题,也是1887年议会设置ICC(州际商业委员会)的动力。作为第一个独立管制机构,州际商业委员会为未来独立管制机构的设置确立了基本范式。独立管制机构与政府管制任务的结合形成一种特殊的制度模式——独立管制机制。通过独立管制机构的调试和发展,构建独立管制机构以实现政府管制任务,成为现代管制不同于传统管制之处。普通法管制秩序的守护者是法院,而现代管制的守护者则是行政机关,尤其是独立管制机构。
从20世纪60年代开始,管制改革对独立管制机构进行了激烈的攻击。管制改革和降低管制思维成为此后政府决策的主导。联邦能源管制委员会和环境保护局正是在这一背景下组建的新型独立管制机构。除了组织机构的微调,管制模式也在发生变革。这种变化向传统的独立管制机制提出了挑战。独立管制机构是否能够适应新的变化,在降低管制和再管制中作出应有的贡献,这仍是一个留待未来回答的问题。美国独立管制的历史和经验,以及管制改革引介的市场化模式,为世界其他国家建设现代政府机构的努力提供了颇具价值的经验与教训。
独立管制机构是在应对新的社会经济问题时产生的。独立管制机构独特的组织机构,包括委员会制,交错任期制,严格的免职条款,对专家的尊重,以及不同形态的管制模型,使得独立管制机构成为十分有效的法律实施工具。降低管制以来的管制实践,为加深对独立管制机制的认识提供了新的视角。作为一种组织形态,其效用的发挥与组织环境密切相关,组织成员与整体政治环境都在影响着组织效用的正常发挥。独立管制机构的有效性,不仅立足于机构的组织,也取决于在变化的政治环境中任命的组织成员。独立管制机构在形态上表现各异。不同形态的独立管制机构可以被用于不同的环境,实现不同的管制任务。所有这些管制机构形态,为正在开展第六次行政机构改革的中国提供了有意义的经验与教训。
The transformation from traditional common law regulation to modern administrative state regulation has been a gradual process. The creation of independent regulatory agencies began by asking the question: How can big business be made to serve the public interest in a modern democratic society?
This is the question that led to the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887. As the first Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), the ICC became the model for future independent regulatory agencies. When a new kind of agency was entrusted with the government’s responsibility to regulate, there arose a unique institution-the IRA. With the development and subsequent modification of the IRA, the responsibility of regulation came to be realized by setting up IRA’s marking a change from traditional common law regulation to modern administrative state regulation to implement the law in the United States. In a word, the watchdog for common law regulation is the court, and the watchdog for modern administrative state regulation are administrative agencies, especially the IRA’s.
Beginning in the 1960s, regulation reformers started to attack the IRA’s. The idea of regulatory reform and deregulation dominated government policy. During this period, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) were created as new kinds of IRA’s drawing upon the ideas of the reformers. The new model involving changes in structure as well as a change from the traditional Control-Command model to a Market-Oriented model. This challenged the idea of regulation by IRAs. It is an open question whether IRA’s will do a better job meeting the challenges of deregulation and re-regulation in the future. The history and experience of IRA regulations in the United States, especially the introduction of reforms based on a Market-Oriented model, provide a valuable lesson for other countries in their efforts to build modern governmental agencies. The IRA is created to meet the new social and economic problems. It is clear that the unique structure, including the committee, the staggered term, the restrict removal provisions, the respect paid to expertise, and different regulatory models, helps the IRA’s become useful law enforcement tools. At the same time, by studying the process of reform based on deregulation, we should recognize that merely modifying the structure cannot easily guarantee the success of administrative commissions or goals set by law. The effectiveness of the IRA depends both on the structure of the agency and the people who are appointed in the changing political environments.
It can be concluded that there are several variations in the form of the IRA. The form of the IRA can be varied for different situations and to achieve different goals. All of these forms of regulatory agencies will be valuable to consider with respect to the sixth executive branch reform recently begun in China.
从20世纪60年代开始,管制改革对独立管制机构进行了激烈的攻击。管制改革和降低管制思维成为此后政府决策的主导。联邦能源管制委员会和环境保护局正是在这一背景下组建的新型独立管制机构。除了组织机构的微调,管制模式也在发生变革。这种变化向传统的独立管制机制提出了挑战。独立管制机构是否能够适应新的变化,在降低管制和再管制中作出应有的贡献,这仍是一个留待未来回答的问题。美国独立管制的历史和经验,以及管制改革引介的市场化模式,为世界其他国家建设现代政府机构的努力提供了颇具价值的经验与教训。
独立管制机构是在应对新的社会经济问题时产生的。独立管制机构独特的组织机构,包括委员会制,交错任期制,严格的免职条款,对专家的尊重,以及不同形态的管制模型,使得独立管制机构成为十分有效的法律实施工具。降低管制以来的管制实践,为加深对独立管制机制的认识提供了新的视角。作为一种组织形态,其效用的发挥与组织环境密切相关,组织成员与整体政治环境都在影响着组织效用的正常发挥。独立管制机构的有效性,不仅立足于机构的组织,也取决于在变化的政治环境中任命的组织成员。独立管制机构在形态上表现各异。不同形态的独立管制机构可以被用于不同的环境,实现不同的管制任务。所有这些管制机构形态,为正在开展第六次行政机构改革的中国提供了有意义的经验与教训。
The transformation from traditional common law regulation to modern administrative state regulation has been a gradual process. The creation of independent regulatory agencies began by asking the question: How can big business be made to serve the public interest in a modern democratic society?
This is the question that led to the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887. As the first Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), the ICC became the model for future independent regulatory agencies. When a new kind of agency was entrusted with the government’s responsibility to regulate, there arose a unique institution-the IRA. With the development and subsequent modification of the IRA, the responsibility of regulation came to be realized by setting up IRA’s marking a change from traditional common law regulation to modern administrative state regulation to implement the law in the United States. In a word, the watchdog for common law regulation is the court, and the watchdog for modern administrative state regulation are administrative agencies, especially the IRA’s.
Beginning in the 1960s, regulation reformers started to attack the IRA’s. The idea of regulatory reform and deregulation dominated government policy. During this period, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) were created as new kinds of IRA’s drawing upon the ideas of the reformers. The new model involving changes in structure as well as a change from the traditional Control-Command model to a Market-Oriented model. This challenged the idea of regulation by IRAs. It is an open question whether IRA’s will do a better job meeting the challenges of deregulation and re-regulation in the future. The history and experience of IRA regulations in the United States, especially the introduction of reforms based on a Market-Oriented model, provide a valuable lesson for other countries in their efforts to build modern governmental agencies. The IRA is created to meet the new social and economic problems. It is clear that the unique structure, including the committee, the staggered term, the restrict removal provisions, the respect paid to expertise, and different regulatory models, helps the IRA’s become useful law enforcement tools. At the same time, by studying the process of reform based on deregulation, we should recognize that merely modifying the structure cannot easily guarantee the success of administrative commissions or goals set by law. The effectiveness of the IRA depends both on the structure of the agency and the people who are appointed in the changing political environments.
It can be concluded that there are several variations in the form of the IRA. The form of the IRA can be varied for different situations and to achieve different goals. All of these forms of regulatory agencies will be valuable to consider with respect to the sixth executive branch reform recently begun in China.
引文
①Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189.
②See1988 Duke Law Journal Nineteenth Annual Administrative Law Issue, Symposium, the Independence of Independent Agencies, 238,257.
③Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke Law Journal, 257.
④S.E.C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforcement,http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/sec-chief-pursues-reversal-of-years-of-lax-enforcement/?scp=1&sq=SEC%20CHIEF&st=cse。
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Aspen Publishers; 3 Sup edition 1993,Vol. 1, p66.
②Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises,Vol.1, p65.
③Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth Edition, p94.
①参见王名扬:《美国行政法》(上),中国法制出版社1995年版,第172页。
②http :/ / www. chinapublaw. com/ zfgz/ 2005103170349. htm,以及郝建臻先生的《美国的独立管制机构》载《党政论坛》2003年12月号。
③应松年、薛刚凌:《行政组织法研究》,法律出版社,2002年版,第33页。
④马英娟:《监管机构与行政组织法的发展—关于监管机构设立根据及建制理念的思考》,浙江学刊,2007年第2期。
①参见马英娟:《政府监管机构研究》,北京大学出版社2007年版,第38、44页。
②比如美国学者Kenneth J. Meier和Christoper G. Reddick将美国的管制机构分为从属性的管制机构(the Dependent Regulatory Agencies, DRA)和独立管制委员会(the Independent Regulatory Commission, IRC)。Kenneth J. Meier, The Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs or DRAs?; Christoper G. Reddick, IRCs versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 2003, pp3-7.
③Mariana Mota Prado,The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil,41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 435。
④http://www.is-law.com/%E5%8F%8B%E6%83%85%E8%B4%8A%E5%8A%A9%E5%8D%80/%E8%AB%87%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E3%80%8C%E7%8D%A8%E7%AB%8B%E3%80%8D%E7%AE%A1%E5%88%B6%E5%A7%94%E5%93%A1%E6%9C%83%E7%9A%84%E5%90%88%E6%86%B2%E6%80%A7%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C.htm。
①兰戴斯(Landis)的解读是,较之于1887年ICA授权给ICC的权限,更为重要的是ICC这种委员会形式的创造。转引自,Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, a Legislative History of U.S. Regulatory Agencies, Chelsea House Publishers, 1973, Vol. 1, p18.
①Curtis J. Milhaupt Katharina Pistor,Law & Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World,University of Chicago Press,2008。
①Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth edition, Foundation Press, 2004, p64.
②Cass Sunstein, The Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407,427.
③独立管制机构在组织上多是委员会制,很多学者直接将这些机构称为独立管制委员会。这也正是这一机制没有统一概念的标志之一。
④Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Oxford University Press, 1941, p1.
①Christoper G. Reddick :IRCs versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, Public Budgeting & Finance, Volume 23 Issue 4.
②Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies under Attack: a Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate,1988 Duke Law Journal 223。
③Stephen Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, Sixth edition, Aspen Publishers,2006, p100。
④Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, Third Edition, Thomson West, 2004, p8.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p64。
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1,p64.
②FEC V. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, D.C. Cir. 1993,D.C巡回法院判决议会限制总统任命选举委员会成员的立法违反了三权分立的宪法原则。
①Alan B. Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies? 1988 Duke Law Journal 252.
②Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, pp6-7.
③Jones, Multitude of Counselors, Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision Making, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 541(1979).
④Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, p8.
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,260.
②Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, p9
③5 U.S.C.at 552b (b)。
④Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law and Process, p500.
⑤Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law and Process, p500.
①Mariana Mota Prado, the Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: a Cautionary Tale from Brazil, 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.435.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p83.
②U.S Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald Told To Relax, He Will Keep His Job By Obama Administration,http://guntotingliberal.com/?p=4741。
③Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke Law Journal 257, p260.
①Richard Pierce: Administrative Law and Process, p94.
①这里并不是说所有的委员会主席都具有雇用委员会工作人员的权力。比如FPC,委员会工作人员的雇用则需要经过全体委员会通过。
②David M. Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, University of Tennessee Press, 1977, p132.
③Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1950, 15 Fed Reg 3175(May 24, 1950).
④David Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, p133.
⑤David Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, p141.
①Breyer, Adiministrative Law and Regulatory Policy, p98.
②参见Shapiro & McGarity, Rethinking OSHA,Rulemaking Reforms and Legislative Changes, 6 Yale J. Reg. 1, pp59-62,1989.
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,p263.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, New York, Knopf, 1959,p49.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, p49.
②Mariana Mota Prado,The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil,41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 435,脚注189.
①No state nor shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
②Owen M. Fiss. Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910. New York: Macmillan Reference, 1993,转引自:Jonathan Boyarin, Review Section Symposium: the Legacy of Lochner,Law, Literature, and the Resurrection of Contract,24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195。
③Jonathan Boyarin, Law, Literature and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195, p200.
①Grant Gilmore, the Death of Contract, Ohio State University Press, 1995, p105.
②Jonathan Boyarin, Law, Literature and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195, 196.
③Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s legacy, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No.5 ,873.
④198 U.S. 45,547。
①198 U.S. 45,75。
②C. Montesquieu, the Spirit of the Laws, D. Carrithers ed, 1977, T. Nugent trans. 2d ed. 1748, p211,
③这也说明了传统行政法受案范围狭窄,以及行政不作为长期不能接受司法审查的原因。约在20世纪60、70年代,随着管制受益人(Beneficiaries of Regulatory Programs)也可以挑战行政机关不作为的合法性,这一现象才得到实质性改观。
④孙斯坦的解释是,法院非法介入原属政府政治部门的领地。
①Robert B. Reich, Supercapitalism: the Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, First Vintage edition, 2008, p7.
②这些大企业主的名字至今仍是人们谈论的话题,金融家J.P.摩根,Andrew Carnegie(Carnegie Steel),John D.Rockefeller,洛克菲勒标准石油公司(Standard Oil Company)。
①Herbert Croly, the Promise of American Life, Northeastern, 1989, Px.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p18。
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, pp22-23.
①Richard Hofstadter,“What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?”来自the Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952)转引自Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p 23.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p26.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p22.
①Barrington Moore, Jr., the Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston:Beacon,1966)转引自Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p23.
②Herbert Croly, the Promise of American Life,pp362,379.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, pp24-25.
①Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No.5 , 893.
②Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press, 1982, p4.
①第二个权利法案由罗斯福总统在1944年提出。参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Bill_of_Rights。
②Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev., 421.
③转引自,Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal,脚注53.
④Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, p 434.
⑤Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism afte New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421.
①Alan Jones: Thomas M. Cooley and the Interstate Commerce Commission: Continuity and Change in the Doctrine of Equal Rights,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1966), p610.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1,p19
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p83.
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,pp45-53。
①Progressive Democracy, 364-369,转引自James E. Anderson, the Emergence of Modern Regulatory State, Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C.,1962,p149.因为这段话的重要性,特将原文摘录如下:It legislates, but without being or dispensing with a legislature. It administers, but without being or dispensing with an executive. It adjudicates, but without any power of attaching final construction to the law. It is simply a convenient means of consolidating the divided activities of government for certain practical social purpose…it does not involve the same danger of usurpation as would result from the grant of legislative power to the executive, or executive power to the legislature, or of either or both to the courts.
①参见A New Regulatory Framework:Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies,Washington,1971, p32.
②1920交通法(Transportation Act)。
①Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,p62.
②Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, Six edition, Aspen Publishers, p16.
①Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on the ICC.
②1910年的实验性立法虽然失败了。但是,仿效法国设立行政法院一直在美国行政法学者的梦想。20世纪60年代,Ash报告对独立管制机构大肆批判,建议之一就是设立行政法庭专门负责行政案件。
③Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.2, p1008.
①ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Texas Pacific Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 494,505, 506(1897).
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p77.
③Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p76.
①Bernard Schwartz Roberto L. Corrada Robert Brown, Administrative Law a Case Book, Aspen, Six edition, 2006,p35.
①转引自Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p18.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, P19.
③布朗罗委员会(The Brownlow Committee)早在20世纪30年代就无头的第四部门进行了激烈的争论。
④Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p20.
⑤Richard Pierce Sidney A. Shapiro Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process, Jr., Fourth edition, p94.
①Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p45.
②See Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p450.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p84。
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p84.
③Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,p101.
①这个问题,在总统政治影响力不断扩大之后成为,总统可以在多大程度上介入行政机关依法执行的行政过程?本文将在后续章节分析。
②Morrison, Presidential Intervention in Informal Rulemaking: Striking the Proper Balance, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 879,892(1982).
③Bruff, President Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 1979.
①议会授权的原则与议会(主流社会倾向)对专家的看重,决定了一旦议会认为授权给专家并不能确保行政决策更具科学性,那么,独立管制机构的内在机理也因此松动。
②参见,Lloyd N. Cutler,Symposium:Presidential Intervention In Administrative Rulemaking: the Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch,56 Tul. L. Rev. 830, 833.
③Lloyd N. Cutler,56 Tul. L. Rev. 830, 833.
①James E. Anderson, The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State, p96.
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p64.
③Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, p24。
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.3, p1821.
②转引自,Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry ,Vol.3, p1821.
③这种观点也受到其他一些议员的支持。议员Norris在对联席会议报告提出反对意见的时候已经指出,应当设立一个独立的委员会,而不是由内阁官员组成的委员会。内阁官员的地位随政治形势而变革,每有总统换届,内阁成员随之改变,而且政党内部的派系斗争也会导致内阁成员的变迁。Senate-66th Congress, 2nd Session, May 27-28,1920. Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry ,Vol.3, p2036.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p1861.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p1821.
③Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p2054。
①Kelemen R. Daniel, the Rules of Federalism:Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and BeyondHarvard University Press, p165.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry,Vol.1, p1396.
①Susan Bartlett Foote, Nineteenth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Symposium: the Indpendence of Independent Agencies: Independnet Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debat, 1988 Duke L.J. 223.
②Chrisropher McCrudden, Regulation and Deregulation, Clarebdib Press Oxford, 1999, p15.
①Paul W. MacAvoy, editor, Unsettled Questions on Regulatory Reform, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p17.
①Richard Stewart, the Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1682(1975). APA之后的立法反映了以议会为首的公民社会对行政系统整体信心的不断降低。
②增加行政行为透明度,扩大公民参与和降低起诉门槛,成为这个时期行政法的研究重点。例如,为了确保独立管制机构决策的透明度,增加民主监督,不至于完全被来自白宫的政治压力扭曲,议会出台了阳光下的政府法。新政之后,独立管制机构被俘获的思想占据了主流。除了总统加强对独立管制机构的控制,议会不仅失去了创设新的独立管制机构的冲动,对已有的独立管制机构也加强了控制。阳光下的政府法(the Government in the Sunshine Act,1976)就是在这样的背景下出台的。该法是通过程序控制的方式,让公众参与到委员会制合议性行政机构的审议过程,监督和确保行政决策不要偏离公众利益。
③Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, p352.
①David A. Dana ,Review Essay: Setting Environmental Priorities: the Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution: Breaking theVicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 74 B.U.L. Rev. 365, 376.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p133.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitlism, p139。
①Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1980, 956.
②Graham & Kramer, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: Federal Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission (1949-1974), pp 385-86(1976).
①Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, pp46-47.
②Morrison v. Olson, 487 US 654(1988), Mistretta v. United States, 109 S Ct 647(1989).
③Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p68.
④Peter Strauss, the Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, pp 639-650(1984).
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257, 264. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc, 412 U.S. 609(1973)(FDA), Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747(1968)(FPC)
②Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,435 U.S. 519, 1978。
③Peter M.Strauss, the Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 599-602, (1984).关于统一行政的必要性,可参见Cass Sunstein, the Contitutionalim after the New Deal,脚注42.
①David M. Welborn, Regulation in the White House, the Johnson Presidency, University of Texas Press, 1993, pp17-18.
②David M. Welborn, Regulation in the White House, p22.
③Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2085。参见Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies, Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 1980, 963.
①Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: an Evaluation of the Ash Council Proposals, Brookings Institution 1971, p89.
②3 C.F.R.152(1979)。
③Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943(1980)。
④Barry D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan–Bush Era, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, p92。以上数据为1995年之前的情况。有些组织的地位已经发生了变化,如FEMA在国土安全部组建中被吸纳为部内机构,丧失了独立地位。
①Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: the Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1070,1071.
②Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking:Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849.
①参见Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059,
②Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1070,1071.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849,853.
①参见Dudley F. Pegrum, Should the I.C.C. be Abolished? Transportation Journal, fall 71, Vol.11,Issue,1, p5.
②Motor Carrier Act of 1935。
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p67.
①Kalter Vogely, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell University Press, 1976, p307.
②Matthew Bender & Company, Administrative Law, 4.04.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849.
④Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,263.
⑤王名扬:《美国行政法》,第172页。
①88 Stat. 1233 (1974).
②5 USCS 901 et seq.
①Kelemen R. Daniel, the Rules of Federalism, p59.
②王名扬《美国行政法》对总统重组权(改组计划)有较详细的介绍,但没有强调国会授权总统进行行政改组往往有时间限制这个重要特征。参见王名扬《美国行政法》,第154-155页。
③参见Richard Pierce Shapiro Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth edition, 2004, Foundation Press, p84.
①Paul. C. Light, Restoring the President's Reorganization Authority,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2003/0403governance_light.aspx?rssid=civil+service.
①Ash Council Memo,subject: Federal Organization for Environmental Protection, http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/ash.htm。
②参见Jack Lewis,The Birth of EPA,http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm。
③President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, a New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies , 1971,以后简称“Ash Report”p13。
①Ash Report, p14.
②Ash Report, pp4-20.
③Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo: the Unitary Executive in the Modern Era 1945-2004, 90. Iowa L. Rev. 601, 659.
①Terry L. Anderson, Breaking the Environmental Policy Gridlock, Hoover Institution Press, 1997, pp141-145.
②Terry L. Anderson, Breaking the Environmental Policy Gridlock, p145.
①A new initiative that would allow companies to demonstrate“eXcellence and Leadership”,XL计划。
①Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure: an Analysis of the EPA’s Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129,140。
②参见Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure: an Analysis of the EPA’s Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129,以及Amoco Corp.& U.S. EPA, Amoco/USEPA Pollution Prevention Project, Executive Summary (revised May 1992).
①Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129.
①http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11212008/watch.html。
②1980年,卡特总统匆匆下台,许多原定的施政方案尚未来得及实施。卡特政府利用最后的几周时间以前所未有的速度出台行政规章。规章不仅数量大,长达一万多页,而且牵涉的面很广,“午夜规章”一词,继“午夜法官”之后,成为总统弄权的新法宝。至此之后,一个奇怪的现象出现了。每一位新上任的总统都会批评上一届总统不负责任的出台午夜规章,但是每隔四年或者八年,每一位总统又会习惯性的出台自己的午夜规章,从老布什,到克林顿,到小布什,无一例外。
③The New Yorker, theTale of the Town, Elizabeth Kolbert on Bush’s Midnight Rules, November 24, 2008, p39 .
④The New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert on Bush’s Midnight Rules, p39 .
①有关内容参见President George W. Bush, Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (13 Mar. 2001) available at http://whitehouse.gov.
②Senators Introduce Bill to Direct EPA to Grant California Waiver,http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/01/senators-introd.html。
①Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle : Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Harvard University Press, 1993, p9。
②Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle,pp30, 50.
③Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, p11.
④Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, p19.
⑤Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, pp21-22.
①29 U.S.C.§§651-678,1982。
②30 U.S.C.§823, 1982。
①http://www.energy.gov/about/index.htm .
②http://www.energy.gov/media/DOECHART-NONAMES-012209.pdf。
③http://www.ferc.gov/about/offices.asp#orgchart.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises,Vol. 1, p83,FEC v. NRA Political Victors Fund, 513 U.S. 88(1994)。
②H.R.Rep. No. 95-539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1977),§406, 20。
①§405 at 25. and Department of Energy Organization Act, P.L. No. 95-91,§502(a), 91 Stat 565 (1977)。
①Robert J. Kalter William A. Vogely, Federal Government Energy Organization, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell Uni. Press, 1976, p307.
①James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President- Elect,Dec. 1960.
②James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, p54.
①James M. Landis, Report On The Regulatory Agencies to The President-Elect, 1960,pp54-58.
②William F. Fox Jr.,Federal Regulation of Energy, Colorado Springs, Colo. : Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 1983, p757.
③A New Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1971.
①参见A New Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1971, pp31-43.
②参见A New Regulatory Framework, p47.
①Stephen G. Breyer Paul W. Macavoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974, p15.
②I bid, p128.
③I bid, p132.
②42 USC§§7101-7375, 42 USC§§7134,7151,7171,7172.
①Clark Byse, the Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 Administrative Law Review 193, 1978,193.
②唯一的一个例外是,如果法律规定的能源配置和定价过程要求进行公听,并且需要依据公听记录决定,那么,这一特殊配置和定价需要由一个独立的,由总统任命的由三名成员组成的,设置在能源部内的公听和申诉委员会完成。
③由环境保护局(EPA)和核能管制委员会(Nuclear Regulatory Commission)负责的健康,安全和环保管制。
④Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1978, at 1, Col. 3.
⑤参见President’s Energy Reorganization Message to Congress, March 1, 1977,35 Cong. Q. 404(1977).
①Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§§403, 405(c)at 100, 102(1977).
②Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§404(b) at 101.
③能源部长享有的权力,比如管理能源信息,划分能源区域,电力出口管制和天然气的进出口管制,以及处理紧急事宜的权力(Emergency Interconnections)。参见Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§301(b)of the House Bill, 123 Cong. Rec. H5,408.
④众议院讨论和投票报告参见123 Cong. Rec. H5, 309-17(daily ed. June 2, 1977)。
①众议院辩论和投票结果详见123 Cong. Rec. H5, 309-17(daily ed. June 2, 1977).
②H.R.Rep. No95-539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1977)。
③Robert J. Kalter William A. Vogely, Federal Government Energy Organization, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell uni. Press, 1976, p323.
④Clark Byse, the Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 Administrative Law Review
①James E. Hickey Jr., Energy Law and Policy for the 21st Century, the Energy Law Group (2000), Denver, Colo.: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 2000, 12-6。
②James E. Hickey Jr., Energy Law and Policy for the 21st Century, the Energy Law Group (2000) 12-6。
③Dudley F. Pegrum, Should the I.C.C. be Abolished?, Transportation Journal, Fall 71, Vol.11,Issue,1, 11.
①尽管联邦政府的政策是支持自然垄断,但是,这并非表明电力领域没有自由竞争的空间。Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973)一案判决表明,联邦能源法鼓励在自然垄断范围内的有限竞争,这些竞争行为受到反垄断法的保护。
②Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 724, 106 Stat. 2776, 2920 (1992)。
③Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,550-52 (1996)。
①362 U.S. App. D.C. 314, 318.
②Summary of FERC Order 888, http://www.converger.com/fercnopr/888_889.htm。
①Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, p320。
②Electricity Market Reform, an International Perspective, edited by Fereidoon P. Sioshansi and Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, Amsterdam, Boston, Elsevier, 2006, p320。
③Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, 2008, pp323-324.市政公用事业的定价由委任的或者选举的市政组织决定,这就使其定价脱离州内管制。由于受平衡预算的原则指导,经过数年的经营,可以发现,市政公用事业的定价也基本遵循了由生产成本决定的模式。
①Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, 2008, p325。
②California Public Utilities Commission:CPUC Proposes Competition for Electric Utilities and Open Electric Supply Market for Consumers. 20 April 1994. News Release。
③Richard Munson, From Edison to Enron: the Business of Power and What it Means for the Future of Electricity, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005, p123。
①Richard Munson, Fom Edison to Enron, p124。
②兆瓦时。
①John Woolfolk and Steve Johnson, California Tallies Cost of Power Deregulation Fiasco, San Jose Mercury News, July 10, 2001.转引自,Richard Munson,From Edison to Enron, p125。
②Order Proposing Remedies for California Wholesale Electric Markets, 93 FERC 61,121(November 1, 2000),mimeo。
③通常来说,Order是指裁决决定。但是,FERC使用ORDER一词,通常是指行政规章。参见http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg.asp。
①San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX, 93 FERC 61,294(December 15, 2000), mimeo, p53。
②San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX,95 FERC 61,115(April 26, 2001), mimeo,p5。
③San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX, 93 FERC 61,294(December 15, 2000), mimeo, p15。
④Staff Report Price Manipulation in Western Markets, Docket No. PA 02-2-000,3-26-03。
①Section316A。
②Federal Power Act§316, 16 U.S. Code§8250(2000)。
③378U.S. App.D.C.1,12。
④Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371, 1998。
①Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 224, 1991。
②Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F. 2d 998, 1004, D.C. CIR. 1990。
③Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 ,1984。
④La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).当市场不处于竞争状态时,委员会不得授权市场定价。
⑤Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC。
⑥Senator Feinstein Calls on FERC Chairman to Act Aggressively Against Energy Profiteers,http://feinstein.senate.gov/04Releases/r-ferc-enron-ltr.htm。
①Bruce Doern, Monica Gattinger, Power Switch: Energy Regulatory Governance in the Twenty First Ccentury, Uni. of Toronto Press, 2003,p40。
②Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, Oxford University Press, 2008, p53.
③Pelosi, Western Democrats Urge Bush to Repudiate FERC, Supply Refunds to Energy Consumers in California, Other Western States,http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/Oct04/EnergyRefundsLetters101804.html。
①Enron’s Many Strands: the Administration: Bush's California Energy Stance Faulted,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E3D61530F93BA35756C0A9649C8B63。
②Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph T. Kelliher,http://www.ferc.gov/news/statements-speeches/kelliher/2009/01-15-09.pdf。
③FERC前任主席Kelliher的新任期开始于去年,即奥巴马上任前一年,刚刚获得参议会确认,法定任期5年。但是,该主席曾对参议院明确表示,如果下一届总统是民主党,他将辞去FERC职务。
④http://www.ferc.gov/about/com-mem/prev-comm.asp。
①FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III Announces Resignation,http://tdworld.com/news/FERC-chairman-resignation/。
①FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III Announces Resignation,http://tdworld.com/news/FERC-chairman-resignation/。
①Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 509.
①Max Weber: Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp 335,337.
①A New Regulatory Framework, p32.
①Eric Patridge, Origins: a Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, Macmillan Company, p562.
②Robert W. Hahn& Robert N. Stavins , Incentive–Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea? 18 Ecology L. Q. 1, 20 (1991)。
①Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo: the Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 720.
①Fixing FEMA, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/opinion/24mon3.html.
①http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-01/14/content_7415075.htm。
①《国务院机构改革“大部制”方案接近征求意见尾声》,http://gov.people.com.cn/GB/6768669.html。
①http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-13/104415140114.shtml。
②参见美国1920年能源管制委员会的评析。
1. A New Regulatory Framework:Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies,Washington,1971。
2. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press, 1982。
3. Stephen Breyer, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, Sixth edition Aspen Publishers,2006。
4. Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle : Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Harvard University Press, 1993。
5. Stephen G. Breyer Paul W. Macavoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974。
6. Herbert Croly, the Promise of American Life, Northeastern ,1989。
7. Robert E. Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, Oxford University Press, 1941。
8. Bruce Doern, Monica Gattinger, Power Switch: Energy Regulatory Governance in the Twenty First Century, Uni. of Toronto Press, 2003。
9. Kelemen R. Daniel, the Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond,Harvard University Press,2004。
10. William F. Fox Jr.,Federal Regulation of Energy, Colorado Springs, Colo. : Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 1983。
11. Grant Gilmore, the Death of Contract, Columbus : Ohio State University Press,1995, 2nd ed.。
12. James E. Hickey Jr., Energy Law and Policy for the 21st Century, the Energy Law Group (2000), Denver, Colo.: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 2000.
13. James Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President- Elect,1960。
14. Curtis J. Milhaupt Katharina Pistor,Law & Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World,University of Chicago Press,2008。
15. C. Montesquieu, the Spirit of the Laws, 211, D. Carrithers ed, 1977, T. Nugent Trans. 2d ed. 1748。
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17. Chrisropher McCrudden, Regulation and Deregulation, Clarebdib Press Oxford, 1999。
18. Richard Munson, From Edison to Enron: the Business of Power and What it Means for the Future of Electricity, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005.
19. Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: an Evaluation of the Ash Council Proposals, Brookings Institution , 1971。
20. Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Aspen Publishers; 3 Sup edition 2002。
21. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process, Fourth edition, Foundation Press,2004。
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23. Bernard Schwartz Roberto L. Corrada Robert Brown, Administrative Law a Case Book, Aspen, Six edition, 2006。
24. Electricity Market Reform, an International Perspective, edited by Fereidoon P. Sioshansi and Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, Amsterdam; Boston, Elsevier, 2006.
25. Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, Oxford University Press, 2008。
26. Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, a Legislative History of U.S. Regulatory Agencies, Chelsea House Publishers, 1973, Vol. 1,2,3。
27. Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, New York, Knopf, 1959。
28. Kalter Vogely, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell University Press, 1976。
29. David M. Welborn, Regulation in the White House, the Johnson Presidency, University of Texas Press, 1993。
30. Max Weber,translated by A.M. Henderson Talcott Parsons, the Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford University Press, 1947。
31. David M. Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, University of Tennessee Press, 1977。
32.马英娟,《政府监管机构研究》,北京大学出版社2007年版。
33.王名扬,《美国行政法》,法制出版社,1994。
34.应松年薛刚凌,《行政组织法研究》,法律出版社,2002年版。
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2. Bruff, President Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 1979。
3. Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking:Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849。
4. Lloyd N. Cutler , Symposium: Presidential Intervention In Administrative Rulemaking: the Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 830。
5. David A. Dana, Review Essay: Setting Environmental Priorities: the Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution: Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 74 B.U.L. Rev. 365, 1994。
6. Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies under Attack: a Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate,1988 Duke Law Journal 223。
7. Alan Jones: Thomas M. Cooley and the Interstate Commerce Commission: Continuity and Change in the Doctrine of Equal Rights,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 4,1966。
8. Jones, Multitude of Counselors, Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision Making , 54 Tul. L. Rev. 541,1979。
9. Kenneth J. Meier, the Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs or DRAs?
10. Alan B. Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies? 1988 Duke Law Journal 252。
11. Mariana Mota Prado , The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil,41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 435, 2008。
12. Alan Morrison, Presidential Intervention in Informal Rulemaking: Striking the Proper Balance, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 879。
13. Dudley F. Pegrum, Should the I.C.C. be Abolished? Transportation Journal, Fall 71, Vol.11,Issue,1, 11.。
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Lgacy, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No.5 873,1987。
15. Cass Sunstein, the Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407。
16. Peter L. Strauss, the Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573。
17. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1980。
18. Christoper G. Reddick, IRCs versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 2003。
19. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189。
20. Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke Law Journal, 257。
21. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo: the Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601。
22.马英娟,《监管机构与行政组织法的发展—关于监管机构设立根据及建制理念的思考》,浙江学刊,2007年第2期。
23.郝建臻,《美国的独立管制机构》,《党政论坛》2003年12月号。
24.张来明,《美国独立管制机构研究》,硕士论文(1984年)。
25.周林军,《美国独立管制机构探析》,http://www.law-star.com/cac/5195.htm。
1. Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 ,1984。
2. Lochner v. New York,198 U.S. 45, 1905。
3. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371, 1998。
4. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 1991。
5. Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F. 2d 998, 1004, D.C. CIR. 1990。
6. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,435 U.S. 519, 1978。
②See1988 Duke Law Journal Nineteenth Annual Administrative Law Issue, Symposium, the Independence of Independent Agencies, 238,257.
③Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke Law Journal, 257.
④S.E.C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforcement,http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/sec-chief-pursues-reversal-of-years-of-lax-enforcement/?scp=1&sq=SEC%20CHIEF&st=cse。
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Aspen Publishers; 3 Sup edition 1993,Vol. 1, p66.
②Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises,Vol.1, p65.
③Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth Edition, p94.
①参见王名扬:《美国行政法》(上),中国法制出版社1995年版,第172页。
②http :/ / www. chinapublaw. com/ zfgz/ 2005103170349. htm,以及郝建臻先生的《美国的独立管制机构》载《党政论坛》2003年12月号。
③应松年、薛刚凌:《行政组织法研究》,法律出版社,2002年版,第33页。
④马英娟:《监管机构与行政组织法的发展—关于监管机构设立根据及建制理念的思考》,浙江学刊,2007年第2期。
①参见马英娟:《政府监管机构研究》,北京大学出版社2007年版,第38、44页。
②比如美国学者Kenneth J. Meier和Christoper G. Reddick将美国的管制机构分为从属性的管制机构(the Dependent Regulatory Agencies, DRA)和独立管制委员会(the Independent Regulatory Commission, IRC)。Kenneth J. Meier, The Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs or DRAs?; Christoper G. Reddick, IRCs versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter 2003, pp3-7.
③Mariana Mota Prado,The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil,41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 435。
④http://www.is-law.com/%E5%8F%8B%E6%83%85%E8%B4%8A%E5%8A%A9%E5%8D%80/%E8%AB%87%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E3%80%8C%E7%8D%A8%E7%AB%8B%E3%80%8D%E7%AE%A1%E5%88%B6%E5%A7%94%E5%93%A1%E6%9C%83%E7%9A%84%E5%90%88%E6%86%B2%E6%80%A7%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C.htm。
①兰戴斯(Landis)的解读是,较之于1887年ICA授权给ICC的权限,更为重要的是ICC这种委员会形式的创造。转引自,Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, a Legislative History of U.S. Regulatory Agencies, Chelsea House Publishers, 1973, Vol. 1, p18.
①Curtis J. Milhaupt Katharina Pistor,Law & Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World,University of Chicago Press,2008。
①Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth edition, Foundation Press, 2004, p64.
②Cass Sunstein, The Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407,427.
③独立管制机构在组织上多是委员会制,很多学者直接将这些机构称为独立管制委员会。这也正是这一机制没有统一概念的标志之一。
④Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Oxford University Press, 1941, p1.
①Christoper G. Reddick :IRCs versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, Public Budgeting & Finance, Volume 23 Issue 4.
②Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies under Attack: a Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate,1988 Duke Law Journal 223。
③Stephen Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, Sixth edition, Aspen Publishers,2006, p100。
④Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, Third Edition, Thomson West, 2004, p8.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p64。
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1,p64.
②FEC V. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, D.C. Cir. 1993,D.C巡回法院判决议会限制总统任命选举委员会成员的立法违反了三权分立的宪法原则。
①Alan B. Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies? 1988 Duke Law Journal 252.
②Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, pp6-7.
③Jones, Multitude of Counselors, Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision Making, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 541(1979).
④Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, p8.
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,260.
②Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, p9
③5 U.S.C.at 552b (b)。
④Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law and Process, p500.
⑤Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law and Process, p500.
①Mariana Mota Prado, the Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: a Cautionary Tale from Brazil, 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.435.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p83.
②U.S Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald Told To Relax, He Will Keep His Job By Obama Administration,http://guntotingliberal.com/?p=4741。
③Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke Law Journal 257, p260.
①Richard Pierce: Administrative Law and Process, p94.
①这里并不是说所有的委员会主席都具有雇用委员会工作人员的权力。比如FPC,委员会工作人员的雇用则需要经过全体委员会通过。
②David M. Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, University of Tennessee Press, 1977, p132.
③Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1950, 15 Fed Reg 3175(May 24, 1950).
④David Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, p133.
⑤David Welborn, Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, p141.
①Breyer, Adiministrative Law and Regulatory Policy, p98.
②参见Shapiro & McGarity, Rethinking OSHA,Rulemaking Reforms and Legislative Changes, 6 Yale J. Reg. 1, pp59-62,1989.
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,p263.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, New York, Knopf, 1959,p49.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, p49.
②Mariana Mota Prado,The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil,41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 435,脚注189.
①No state nor shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
②Owen M. Fiss. Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910. New York: Macmillan Reference, 1993,转引自:Jonathan Boyarin, Review Section Symposium: the Legacy of Lochner,Law, Literature, and the Resurrection of Contract,24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195。
③Jonathan Boyarin, Law, Literature and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195, p200.
①Grant Gilmore, the Death of Contract, Ohio State University Press, 1995, p105.
②Jonathan Boyarin, Law, Literature and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 195, 196.
③Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s legacy, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No.5 ,873.
④198 U.S. 45,547。
①198 U.S. 45,75。
②C. Montesquieu, the Spirit of the Laws, D. Carrithers ed, 1977, T. Nugent trans. 2d ed. 1748, p211,
③这也说明了传统行政法受案范围狭窄,以及行政不作为长期不能接受司法审查的原因。约在20世纪60、70年代,随着管制受益人(Beneficiaries of Regulatory Programs)也可以挑战行政机关不作为的合法性,这一现象才得到实质性改观。
④孙斯坦的解释是,法院非法介入原属政府政治部门的领地。
①Robert B. Reich, Supercapitalism: the Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, First Vintage edition, 2008, p7.
②这些大企业主的名字至今仍是人们谈论的话题,金融家J.P.摩根,Andrew Carnegie(Carnegie Steel),John D.Rockefeller,洛克菲勒标准石油公司(Standard Oil Company)。
①Herbert Croly, the Promise of American Life, Northeastern, 1989, Px.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p18。
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, pp22-23.
①Richard Hofstadter,“What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?”来自the Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952)转引自Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p 23.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p26.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p22.
①Barrington Moore, Jr., the Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston:Beacon,1966)转引自Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p23.
②Herbert Croly, the Promise of American Life,pp362,379.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, pp24-25.
①Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No.5 , 893.
②Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press, 1982, p4.
①第二个权利法案由罗斯福总统在1944年提出。参见http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Bill_of_Rights。
②Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev., 421.
③转引自,Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal,脚注53.
④Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, p 434.
⑤Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism afte New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421.
①Alan Jones: Thomas M. Cooley and the Interstate Commerce Commission: Continuity and Change in the Doctrine of Equal Rights,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1966), p610.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1,p19
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p83.
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,pp45-53。
①Progressive Democracy, 364-369,转引自James E. Anderson, the Emergence of Modern Regulatory State, Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C.,1962,p149.因为这段话的重要性,特将原文摘录如下:It legislates, but without being or dispensing with a legislature. It administers, but without being or dispensing with an executive. It adjudicates, but without any power of attaching final construction to the law. It is simply a convenient means of consolidating the divided activities of government for certain practical social purpose…it does not involve the same danger of usurpation as would result from the grant of legislative power to the executive, or executive power to the legislature, or of either or both to the courts.
①参见A New Regulatory Framework:Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies,Washington,1971, p32.
②1920交通法(Transportation Act)。
①Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,p62.
②Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, Six edition, Aspen Publishers, p16.
①Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on the ICC.
②1910年的实验性立法虽然失败了。但是,仿效法国设立行政法院一直在美国行政法学者的梦想。20世纪60年代,Ash报告对独立管制机构大肆批判,建议之一就是设立行政法庭专门负责行政案件。
③Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.2, p1008.
①ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Texas Pacific Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 494,505, 506(1897).
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p77.
③Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p76.
①Bernard Schwartz Roberto L. Corrada Robert Brown, Administrative Law a Case Book, Aspen, Six edition, 2006,p35.
①转引自Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p18.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, P19.
③布朗罗委员会(The Brownlow Committee)早在20世纪30年代就无头的第四部门进行了激烈的争论。
④Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p20.
⑤Richard Pierce Sidney A. Shapiro Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process, Jr., Fourth edition, p94.
①Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p45.
②See Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p450.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p84。
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.1, p84.
③Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions,p101.
①这个问题,在总统政治影响力不断扩大之后成为,总统可以在多大程度上介入行政机关依法执行的行政过程?本文将在后续章节分析。
②Morrison, Presidential Intervention in Informal Rulemaking: Striking the Proper Balance, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 879,892(1982).
③Bruff, President Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 1979.
①议会授权的原则与议会(主流社会倾向)对专家的看重,决定了一旦议会认为授权给专家并不能确保行政决策更具科学性,那么,独立管制机构的内在机理也因此松动。
②参见,Lloyd N. Cutler,Symposium:Presidential Intervention In Administrative Rulemaking: the Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch,56 Tul. L. Rev. 830, 833.
③Lloyd N. Cutler,56 Tul. L. Rev. 830, 833.
①James E. Anderson, The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State, p96.
②Cushman, the Independent Regulatory Commissions, p64.
③Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, p24。
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry, Vol.3, p1821.
②转引自,Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry ,Vol.3, p1821.
③这种观点也受到其他一些议员的支持。议员Norris在对联席会议报告提出反对意见的时候已经指出,应当设立一个独立的委员会,而不是由内阁官员组成的委员会。内阁官员的地位随政治形势而变革,每有总统换届,内阁成员随之改变,而且政党内部的派系斗争也会导致内阁成员的变迁。Senate-66th Congress, 2nd Session, May 27-28,1920. Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry ,Vol.3, p2036.
①Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p1861.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p1821.
③Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry Vol.3, p2054。
①Kelemen R. Daniel, the Rules of Federalism:Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and BeyondHarvard University Press, p165.
②Bernard Schwartz, the Economic Regulation of Business and Industry,Vol.1, p1396.
①Susan Bartlett Foote, Nineteenth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Symposium: the Indpendence of Independent Agencies: Independnet Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debat, 1988 Duke L.J. 223.
②Chrisropher McCrudden, Regulation and Deregulation, Clarebdib Press Oxford, 1999, p15.
①Paul W. MacAvoy, editor, Unsettled Questions on Regulatory Reform, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p17.
①Richard Stewart, the Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1682(1975). APA之后的立法反映了以议会为首的公民社会对行政系统整体信心的不断降低。
②增加行政行为透明度,扩大公民参与和降低起诉门槛,成为这个时期行政法的研究重点。例如,为了确保独立管制机构决策的透明度,增加民主监督,不至于完全被来自白宫的政治压力扭曲,议会出台了阳光下的政府法。新政之后,独立管制机构被俘获的思想占据了主流。除了总统加强对独立管制机构的控制,议会不仅失去了创设新的独立管制机构的冲动,对已有的独立管制机构也加强了控制。阳光下的政府法(the Government in the Sunshine Act,1976)就是在这样的背景下出台的。该法是通过程序控制的方式,让公众参与到委员会制合议性行政机构的审议过程,监督和确保行政决策不要偏离公众利益。
③Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, p352.
①David A. Dana ,Review Essay: Setting Environmental Priorities: the Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution: Breaking theVicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 74 B.U.L. Rev. 365, 376.
②Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p133.
③Robert Reich, Supercapitlism, p139。
①Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1980, 956.
②Graham & Kramer, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: Federal Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission (1949-1974), pp 385-86(1976).
①Bernard Schwartz, the Professor and the Commissions, pp46-47.
②Morrison v. Olson, 487 US 654(1988), Mistretta v. United States, 109 S Ct 647(1989).
③Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises, Vol. 1, p68.
④Peter Strauss, the Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, pp 639-650(1984).
①Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257, 264. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc, 412 U.S. 609(1973)(FDA), Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747(1968)(FPC)
②Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,435 U.S. 519, 1978。
③Peter M.Strauss, the Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 599-602, (1984).关于统一行政的必要性,可参见Cass Sunstein, the Contitutionalim after the New Deal,脚注42.
①David M. Welborn, Regulation in the White House, the Johnson Presidency, University of Texas Press, 1993, pp17-18.
②David M. Welborn, Regulation in the White House, p22.
③Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2085。参见Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies, Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 1980, 963.
①Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: an Evaluation of the Ash Council Proposals, Brookings Institution 1971, p89.
②3 C.F.R.152(1979)。
③Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943(1980)。
④Barry D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan–Bush Era, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, p92。以上数据为1995年之前的情况。有些组织的地位已经发生了变化,如FEMA在国土安全部组建中被吸纳为部内机构,丧失了独立地位。
①Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: the Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1070,1071.
②Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking:Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849.
①参见Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059,
②Alan B. Morrison, Commentary: OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1070,1071.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849,853.
①参见Dudley F. Pegrum, Should the I.C.C. be Abolished? Transportation Journal, fall 71, Vol.11,Issue,1, p5.
②Motor Carrier Act of 1935。
③Robert Reich, Supercapitalism, p67.
①Kalter Vogely, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell University Press, 1976, p307.
②Matthew Bender & Company, Administrative Law, 4.04.
③Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 849.
④Paul R. Verkuil, the Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257,263.
⑤王名扬:《美国行政法》,第172页。
①88 Stat. 1233 (1974).
②5 USCS 901 et seq.
①Kelemen R. Daniel, the Rules of Federalism, p59.
②王名扬《美国行政法》对总统重组权(改组计划)有较详细的介绍,但没有强调国会授权总统进行行政改组往往有时间限制这个重要特征。参见王名扬《美国行政法》,第154-155页。
③参见Richard Pierce Shapiro Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process,Fourth edition, 2004, Foundation Press, p84.
①Paul. C. Light, Restoring the President's Reorganization Authority,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2003/0403governance_light.aspx?rssid=civil+service.
①Ash Council Memo,subject: Federal Organization for Environmental Protection, http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/ash.htm。
②参见Jack Lewis,The Birth of EPA,http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm。
③President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, a New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies , 1971,以后简称“Ash Report”p13。
①Ash Report, p14.
②Ash Report, pp4-20.
③Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo: the Unitary Executive in the Modern Era 1945-2004, 90. Iowa L. Rev. 601, 659.
①Terry L. Anderson, Breaking the Environmental Policy Gridlock, Hoover Institution Press, 1997, pp141-145.
②Terry L. Anderson, Breaking the Environmental Policy Gridlock, p145.
①A new initiative that would allow companies to demonstrate“eXcellence and Leadership”,XL计划。
①Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure: an Analysis of the EPA’s Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129,140。
②参见Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure: an Analysis of the EPA’s Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129,以及Amoco Corp.& U.S. EPA, Amoco/USEPA Pollution Prevention Project, Executive Summary (revised May 1992).
①Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and AL’s XL-ENT Adventure, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129.
①http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11212008/watch.html。
②1980年,卡特总统匆匆下台,许多原定的施政方案尚未来得及实施。卡特政府利用最后的几周时间以前所未有的速度出台行政规章。规章不仅数量大,长达一万多页,而且牵涉的面很广,“午夜规章”一词,继“午夜法官”之后,成为总统弄权的新法宝。至此之后,一个奇怪的现象出现了。每一位新上任的总统都会批评上一届总统不负责任的出台午夜规章,但是每隔四年或者八年,每一位总统又会习惯性的出台自己的午夜规章,从老布什,到克林顿,到小布什,无一例外。
③The New Yorker, theTale of the Town, Elizabeth Kolbert on Bush’s Midnight Rules, November 24, 2008, p39 .
④The New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert on Bush’s Midnight Rules, p39 .
①有关内容参见President George W. Bush, Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (13 Mar. 2001) available at http://whitehouse.gov.
②Senators Introduce Bill to Direct EPA to Grant California Waiver,http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/01/senators-introd.html。
①Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle : Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Harvard University Press, 1993, p9。
②Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle,pp30, 50.
③Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, p11.
④Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, p19.
⑤Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle, pp21-22.
①29 U.S.C.§§651-678,1982。
②30 U.S.C.§823, 1982。
①http://www.energy.gov/about/index.htm .
②http://www.energy.gov/media/DOECHART-NONAMES-012209.pdf。
③http://www.ferc.gov/about/offices.asp#orgchart.
①Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatises,Vol. 1, p83,FEC v. NRA Political Victors Fund, 513 U.S. 88(1994)。
②H.R.Rep. No. 95-539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1977),§406, 20。
①§405 at 25. and Department of Energy Organization Act, P.L. No. 95-91,§502(a), 91 Stat 565 (1977)。
①Robert J. Kalter William A. Vogely, Federal Government Energy Organization, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell Uni. Press, 1976, p307.
①James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President- Elect,Dec. 1960.
②James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, p54.
①James M. Landis, Report On The Regulatory Agencies to The President-Elect, 1960,pp54-58.
②William F. Fox Jr.,Federal Regulation of Energy, Colorado Springs, Colo. : Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 1983, p757.
③A New Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1971.
①参见A New Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1971, pp31-43.
②参见A New Regulatory Framework, p47.
①Stephen G. Breyer Paul W. Macavoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974, p15.
②I bid, p128.
③I bid, p132.
②42 USC§§7101-7375, 42 USC§§7134,7151,7171,7172.
①Clark Byse, the Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 Administrative Law Review 193, 1978,193.
②唯一的一个例外是,如果法律规定的能源配置和定价过程要求进行公听,并且需要依据公听记录决定,那么,这一特殊配置和定价需要由一个独立的,由总统任命的由三名成员组成的,设置在能源部内的公听和申诉委员会完成。
③由环境保护局(EPA)和核能管制委员会(Nuclear Regulatory Commission)负责的健康,安全和环保管制。
④Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1978, at 1, Col. 3.
⑤参见President’s Energy Reorganization Message to Congress, March 1, 1977,35 Cong. Q. 404(1977).
①Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§§403, 405(c)at 100, 102(1977).
②Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§404(b) at 101.
③能源部长享有的权力,比如管理能源信息,划分能源区域,电力出口管制和天然气的进出口管制,以及处理紧急事宜的权力(Emergency Interconnections)。参见Sen. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1ST Sess. 99§301(b)of the House Bill, 123 Cong. Rec. H5,408.
④众议院讨论和投票报告参见123 Cong. Rec. H5, 309-17(daily ed. June 2, 1977)。
①众议院辩论和投票结果详见123 Cong. Rec. H5, 309-17(daily ed. June 2, 1977).
②H.R.Rep. No95-539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1977)。
③Robert J. Kalter William A. Vogely, Federal Government Energy Organization, Energy Supply and Government Policy, Cornell uni. Press, 1976, p323.
④Clark Byse, the Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 Administrative Law Review
①James E. Hickey Jr., Energy Law and Policy for the 21st Century, the Energy Law Group (2000), Denver, Colo.: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 2000, 12-6。
②James E. Hickey Jr., Energy Law and Policy for the 21st Century, the Energy Law Group (2000) 12-6。
③Dudley F. Pegrum, Should the I.C.C. be Abolished?, Transportation Journal, Fall 71, Vol.11,Issue,1, 11.
①尽管联邦政府的政策是支持自然垄断,但是,这并非表明电力领域没有自由竞争的空间。Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973)一案判决表明,联邦能源法鼓励在自然垄断范围内的有限竞争,这些竞争行为受到反垄断法的保护。
②Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 724, 106 Stat. 2776, 2920 (1992)。
③Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,550-52 (1996)。
①362 U.S. App. D.C. 314, 318.
②Summary of FERC Order 888, http://www.converger.com/fercnopr/888_889.htm。
①Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, p320。
②Electricity Market Reform, an International Perspective, edited by Fereidoon P. Sioshansi and Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, Amsterdam, Boston, Elsevier, 2006, p320。
③Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, 2008, pp323-324.市政公用事业的定价由委任的或者选举的市政组织决定,这就使其定价脱离州内管制。由于受平衡预算的原则指导,经过数年的经营,可以发现,市政公用事业的定价也基本遵循了由生产成本决定的模式。
①Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, 2008, p325。
②California Public Utilities Commission:CPUC Proposes Competition for Electric Utilities and Open Electric Supply Market for Consumers. 20 April 1994. News Release。
③Richard Munson, From Edison to Enron: the Business of Power and What it Means for the Future of Electricity, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005, p123。
①Richard Munson, Fom Edison to Enron, p124。
②兆瓦时。
①John Woolfolk and Steve Johnson, California Tallies Cost of Power Deregulation Fiasco, San Jose Mercury News, July 10, 2001.转引自,Richard Munson,From Edison to Enron, p125。
②Order Proposing Remedies for California Wholesale Electric Markets, 93 FERC 61,121(November 1, 2000),mimeo。
③通常来说,Order是指裁决决定。但是,FERC使用ORDER一词,通常是指行政规章。参见http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg.asp。
①San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX, 93 FERC 61,294(December 15, 2000), mimeo, p53。
②San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX,95 FERC 61,115(April 26, 2001), mimeo,p5。
③San Diego & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services intro Markets Operated by CAISO and CalPX, 93 FERC 61,294(December 15, 2000), mimeo, p15。
④Staff Report Price Manipulation in Western Markets, Docket No. PA 02-2-000,3-26-03。
①Section316A。
②Federal Power Act§316, 16 U.S. Code§8250(2000)。
③378U.S. App.D.C.1,12。
④Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371, 1998。
①Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 224, 1991。
②Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F. 2d 998, 1004, D.C. CIR. 1990。
③Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 ,1984。
④La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).当市场不处于竞争状态时,委员会不得授权市场定价。
⑤Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC。
⑥Senator Feinstein Calls on FERC Chairman to Act Aggressively Against Energy Profiteers,http://feinstein.senate.gov/04Releases/r-ferc-enron-ltr.htm。
①Bruce Doern, Monica Gattinger, Power Switch: Energy Regulatory Governance in the Twenty First Ccentury, Uni. of Toronto Press, 2003,p40。
②Zillman Redgwell, Omorogbe, Barrera-Hernandez, Beyond the Carbon Economy, Oxford University Press, 2008, p53.
③Pelosi, Western Democrats Urge Bush to Repudiate FERC, Supply Refunds to Energy Consumers in California, Other Western States,http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/Oct04/EnergyRefundsLetters101804.html。
①Enron’s Many Strands: the Administration: Bush's California Energy Stance Faulted,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E3D61530F93BA35756C0A9649C8B63。
②Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph T. Kelliher,http://www.ferc.gov/news/statements-speeches/kelliher/2009/01-15-09.pdf。
③FERC前任主席Kelliher的新任期开始于去年,即奥巴马上任前一年,刚刚获得参议会确认,法定任期5年。但是,该主席曾对参议院明确表示,如果下一届总统是民主党,他将辞去FERC职务。
④http://www.ferc.gov/about/com-mem/prev-comm.asp。
①FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III Announces Resignation,http://tdworld.com/news/FERC-chairman-resignation/。
①FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III Announces Resignation,http://tdworld.com/news/FERC-chairman-resignation/。
①Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 509.
①Max Weber: Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp 335,337.
①A New Regulatory Framework, p32.
①Eric Patridge, Origins: a Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, Macmillan Company, p562.
②Robert W. Hahn& Robert N. Stavins , Incentive–Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea? 18 Ecology L. Q. 1, 20 (1991)。
①Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo: the Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 720.
①Fixing FEMA, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/opinion/24mon3.html.
①http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-01/14/content_7415075.htm。
①《国务院机构改革“大部制”方案接近征求意见尾声》,http://gov.people.com.cn/GB/6768669.html。
①http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-13/104415140114.shtml。
②参见美国1920年能源管制委员会的评析。
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1. Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 ,1984。
2. Lochner v. New York,198 U.S. 45, 1905。
3. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371, 1998。
4. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 1991。
5. Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F. 2d 998, 1004, D.C. CIR. 1990。
6. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,435 U.S. 519, 1978。