基于中央与地方政府间关系的财政支出事权划分模式研究
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摘要
财政分权,是指通过法律等规范化的形式,界定中央政府和地方政府间的财政收支范围,并赋予地方政府相应的预算管理权限。财政分权有利于公共商品和公共服务的有效提供,有利于节约决策成本和制度创新。
中央与地方政府间支出事权的合理划分是规范政府间财政关系的基础。我国历次中央与地方政府间财政关系变革的中心是财权的划分,支出事权的划分一直未受到足够关注。但是,世界上许多国家正逐步从关注收入分配转向关注支出事权的分配,支出事权的划分及其规范已经成为一种潮流。以我国中央与地方政府间财政关系制度变迁为背景,并借鉴国外经验,本论文提出了基于中央与地方政府间财政关系的支出事权划分这一重大课题。本文的目的是通过研究支出事权划分,为规范中央与地方政府间的财政关系提供比较完整的理论思路和操作对策,从而为实现中央与地方财政的三重目标即终极目标——实现社会公平正义和公共商品(公共服务)的均等化、基本目标——实现经济社会相对均衡发展、直接目标——实现各级财政事权与财权的统一提供政策制定的参考依据。
本文研究的切入点是公共商品。中央与地方政府间的支出事权划分,就是把公共商品的供给职责在中央与地方政府之间进行分配,从而确定不同类型公共商品的供给主体。按照公共商品的层次性和受益范围的大小,可以分为全国性公共商品、地方性公共商品、混合提供的公共商品。与此相对应,提供全国性的公共商品的职责可以确定为纯中央事权,提供地方性公共商品的职责可以确定为纯地方事权,混合提供的公共商品的职责可以确定为中央与地方混合型事权。
地方政府的双重代理角色奠定了地方政府与中央政府展开博弈的基础。现行财政体制使得地方政府缺少将混合型事权划分清晰的动力,而混合型事权模糊的现状给地方政府与中央政府展开博弈预留了空间。这是不利于中央与地方政府关系的协调顺畅运转和财力的合理分配的。必须构建一种恰当的支出事权划分模式,以压缩博弈空间,提高财政体制效率。
本文的研究表明,中央与地方政府间支出事权划分模式可以概述为:
①纯中央事权划归中央政府负责。即中央政府主要负责提供受益范围覆盖全国,可供全体国民无差别享用的公共商品;具有规模经济和经济外部性,或在一定程度上涉及国家整体利益的一些公共商品;跨不同行政区之间的收入再分配;涉及总量平衡、经济结构调整、经济稳定与经济发展的事项。承办纯中央事权所需经费由中央财政负责。
②纯地方事权划归地方政府负责。即地方政府负责在本辖区内各层次上能够被消费者共同且平等享用的公共商品的供给。承办纯地方事权所需经费由地方财政负责。
③混合型事权由中央政府委托地方政府负责。即对于那些能够满足消费上的公共性,但在分布上又不具备均等性的公共商品,由中央委托地方政府提供。承办混合型事权所需经费按比例由中央财政通过转移支付补助给地方。
④在明确支出事权划分模式的基础上合理划分财权。
⑤建立规范透明的转移支付制度。
支出事权划分模式要取得预期效果,必须构建一套有效的运行机制。在支出事权划分模式的运行机制中,决策机制是核心,筹资机制是保障,管理与监督机制是关键,而整体联动均衡机制是发挥合力的重要途径。本文通过剖析支出事权划分模式的运行效果评价的价值取向、指标体系和评价难点,提出了三种运行效果的评价方法:对纯社会效益的支出事权,采用公众评判法;对纯经济效益的支出事权,采用成本-收益分析法;对经济效益与社会效益兼有的支出事权项目,采用模糊综合评价法。
本论文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
①以独特的研究视角剖析了事权划分混乱的原因。从地方政府所扮演的双重角色及其与中央政府间的利益冲突出发,通过对事权划分现状进行深入分析,揭示了事权划分混乱的根本原因,为从理论上进一步探讨混合型事权的归属问题打下了基础。
②率先从理论上将事权划分为纯中央事权、纯地方事权、混合型事权。本文以公共商品为切入点,将其划分为全国性公共商品、地方性公共商品和混合型公共商品,并与此相联系和对应,将事权划分为三种类型。
③提出了事权划分的理论模型。纯中央事权由中央承担,纯地方事权由地方承担,混合型事权由中央委托地方承担,辅之以相应的财权划分和转移支付,这为规范和完善现行财政体制提供了理论依据。
④如何合理地构建事权划分模式的运行机制和评价其运行效果,是我国财政运行中一直没有得到解决的主要问题之一,本文提出了该模式运行的六个关联机制的构建方法和三类运行效果的评价方法,从而为财政政策制定奠定了重要的基础。
The fiscal decentralization is to limit central authorities and the local intergovernmental finance revenue and expenditure scope, and entrust with the local authority corresponding budget management jurisdiction through law and standardized forms.The fiscal decentralization is advantageous to the public commodity and collective services effective provision, and is advantageous to saving the policy-making cost and the institutional innovations.
The central and local governmental disbursement governance's reasonable division is the standard intergovernmental fiscal relations foundation. Our country all previous the central and local governmental fiscal relations transform the center is the property rights division, disburses the governance the division not to receive the enough attention. But, many countries in the world are changing the attention disbursement governance gradually from the attention division of income the assignment, disbursed the governance the division and the standard already became one kind of current. Taking our country central and local governmental fiscal relations system vicissitude as the background and profiting from the overseas experience, the paper divided this important issue based on the central and local governmental fiscal relations' disbursement governance. This article goal is,to provides the quite complete theory mentality and the operation countermeasure for the standard central and local intergovernmental fiscal relations through the research disbursement governance division, thus to realize the central and local finance's tertiary goal namely ultimate objective—realizes the social justice and the public commodity (collective services) the even equalization,the elementary object—to realize the economical and social relatively balanced development,the direct goal—to realize all levels of financial governance and the property rights unification provides the policy formulation the reference.
This article breakthrough point is the public commodity. The central and local governmental disbursement governance dividing,is to assign the public commodity supplies responsibility between the central and local authorities, thus to determine the different type public commodity the supplies main body. According to the public commodity's hierarchical and the profiting scope's size, the research ,may divide the nationwide public commodity, the local public commodity, the mix provide commodity. Corresponds with this, providing the nationwide public commodity the responsibility is the pure central governance, providing the local public commodity the responsibility is the pure local governance, the public commodity responsibility which the mix provides is the central and local mixed type governance.
Local authority's dual proxy role has established gambling the foundation between the local authority and the central authority. The present financial system causes the local authority to lack the mixed governance division clear power, but the mixed governance fuzzy present situation launched gambling for the local authority and the central authority to reserve the space. It does not favor the coordinated smooth revolution and the financial resource rational distribution between the central and local authorities. Must construct one kind of appropriate disbursement governance division pattern,reduce the gambling space,raises the financial system efficiency.
The research indicated that the central and local governmental disbursement governance dividing mode is possible to outline as follows.
①The central authority is responsible for the pure central governance. Namely the central authority mainly provides the profiting scope to cover the nation, which may supply all national the public commodity without the difference; having outside economies and the scale economy, or involving the national overall benefit to a certain extent public commodities; redistributing income cross different administrative area; Involving the total quantity balance, the readjustment of the economic structure, the economic stability and the economic development. Undertaking the pure central governance is responsible by the central level funds.
②The local authority is responsible for the pure local governance. Namely the local authority is responsible in this area of jurisdiction in various levels to be able by the consumer and the equality enjoys together public commodity supplies. Undertaking the pure place governance is responsible by the local finance.
③The central authority entrusts the local authority to be responsible for mixed governance. Namely that can satisfy in the expense regarding these public, but does not have the isotropism public commodity in the distribution provides by the local authority the central requested. The undertaking mixed type governance is given to the place in proportion by the central level funds through the transfer payment subsidy.
④Based on the clear disbursement governance divisionmode, dividing the property rights reasonably.
⑤Establishing standard transparent transfer payment system. If disburse the governance division mode obtains the expectation effect,, a good operational mechanism would be established. In the disbursement governance division mode operational mechanism, the decision-making mechanism is the core, the fund raising mechanism is the safeguard, the management and supervising mechanism is a key, and the overall linkage balanced mechanism is display important way with joint forces. Through the disbursement governance division mode’s effect of appraisal's value orientation, the indicator system and the appraisal difficulty's analysis, this article, proposed three effect assessment methods: to the pure social efficiency's disbursement governance, useing the public to judge the law; to the pure economic efficiency's disbursement governance, useing the cost-income analytic method; to Disbursement governance project which have the economic efficiency and the social efficiency at the same time, useing the fuzzy judgment method.
This paper's innovations are mainly in the following aspects:
①Analysing the governance division chaotic reason by the unique field of vision. The dual roles which, acts from the local authority embark with the central governmental conflicts of interest, carries on the analysis to the governance division present situation, analyzed the governance to divide the chaotic basic reason, to solve the mixed governance ownership to pave the way theoretically.
②From the theory firstly dividing the governance into the pure central governance, the pure place governance, and the mixed governance. This article takes the public commodity as a breakthrough point, divides it into the nationwide public commodity, the local public commodity and the mixed public commodity,with relating and corresponding, divides the governance into three kinds.
③Proposing the governance division theoretical model. The pure central governance by central government, the pure local governance by the local government, the mixed governance by the local,government as the central request auxiliaried by corresponding property rights division and transfer payment. It has provided the theory basis for the standard and the consummation of present finance system
④How to construct the governance division pattern operational mechanism and appraise its effect is the main problem in our country finance movement which did not have the solution. This article proposes the pattern moved six connection mechanism construction and three kinds of effect assessment methods, which ,have laid the foundation for the financial policy.
中央与地方政府间支出事权的合理划分是规范政府间财政关系的基础。我国历次中央与地方政府间财政关系变革的中心是财权的划分,支出事权的划分一直未受到足够关注。但是,世界上许多国家正逐步从关注收入分配转向关注支出事权的分配,支出事权的划分及其规范已经成为一种潮流。以我国中央与地方政府间财政关系制度变迁为背景,并借鉴国外经验,本论文提出了基于中央与地方政府间财政关系的支出事权划分这一重大课题。本文的目的是通过研究支出事权划分,为规范中央与地方政府间的财政关系提供比较完整的理论思路和操作对策,从而为实现中央与地方财政的三重目标即终极目标——实现社会公平正义和公共商品(公共服务)的均等化、基本目标——实现经济社会相对均衡发展、直接目标——实现各级财政事权与财权的统一提供政策制定的参考依据。
本文研究的切入点是公共商品。中央与地方政府间的支出事权划分,就是把公共商品的供给职责在中央与地方政府之间进行分配,从而确定不同类型公共商品的供给主体。按照公共商品的层次性和受益范围的大小,可以分为全国性公共商品、地方性公共商品、混合提供的公共商品。与此相对应,提供全国性的公共商品的职责可以确定为纯中央事权,提供地方性公共商品的职责可以确定为纯地方事权,混合提供的公共商品的职责可以确定为中央与地方混合型事权。
地方政府的双重代理角色奠定了地方政府与中央政府展开博弈的基础。现行财政体制使得地方政府缺少将混合型事权划分清晰的动力,而混合型事权模糊的现状给地方政府与中央政府展开博弈预留了空间。这是不利于中央与地方政府关系的协调顺畅运转和财力的合理分配的。必须构建一种恰当的支出事权划分模式,以压缩博弈空间,提高财政体制效率。
本文的研究表明,中央与地方政府间支出事权划分模式可以概述为:
①纯中央事权划归中央政府负责。即中央政府主要负责提供受益范围覆盖全国,可供全体国民无差别享用的公共商品;具有规模经济和经济外部性,或在一定程度上涉及国家整体利益的一些公共商品;跨不同行政区之间的收入再分配;涉及总量平衡、经济结构调整、经济稳定与经济发展的事项。承办纯中央事权所需经费由中央财政负责。
②纯地方事权划归地方政府负责。即地方政府负责在本辖区内各层次上能够被消费者共同且平等享用的公共商品的供给。承办纯地方事权所需经费由地方财政负责。
③混合型事权由中央政府委托地方政府负责。即对于那些能够满足消费上的公共性,但在分布上又不具备均等性的公共商品,由中央委托地方政府提供。承办混合型事权所需经费按比例由中央财政通过转移支付补助给地方。
④在明确支出事权划分模式的基础上合理划分财权。
⑤建立规范透明的转移支付制度。
支出事权划分模式要取得预期效果,必须构建一套有效的运行机制。在支出事权划分模式的运行机制中,决策机制是核心,筹资机制是保障,管理与监督机制是关键,而整体联动均衡机制是发挥合力的重要途径。本文通过剖析支出事权划分模式的运行效果评价的价值取向、指标体系和评价难点,提出了三种运行效果的评价方法:对纯社会效益的支出事权,采用公众评判法;对纯经济效益的支出事权,采用成本-收益分析法;对经济效益与社会效益兼有的支出事权项目,采用模糊综合评价法。
本论文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
①以独特的研究视角剖析了事权划分混乱的原因。从地方政府所扮演的双重角色及其与中央政府间的利益冲突出发,通过对事权划分现状进行深入分析,揭示了事权划分混乱的根本原因,为从理论上进一步探讨混合型事权的归属问题打下了基础。
②率先从理论上将事权划分为纯中央事权、纯地方事权、混合型事权。本文以公共商品为切入点,将其划分为全国性公共商品、地方性公共商品和混合型公共商品,并与此相联系和对应,将事权划分为三种类型。
③提出了事权划分的理论模型。纯中央事权由中央承担,纯地方事权由地方承担,混合型事权由中央委托地方承担,辅之以相应的财权划分和转移支付,这为规范和完善现行财政体制提供了理论依据。
④如何合理地构建事权划分模式的运行机制和评价其运行效果,是我国财政运行中一直没有得到解决的主要问题之一,本文提出了该模式运行的六个关联机制的构建方法和三类运行效果的评价方法,从而为财政政策制定奠定了重要的基础。
The fiscal decentralization is to limit central authorities and the local intergovernmental finance revenue and expenditure scope, and entrust with the local authority corresponding budget management jurisdiction through law and standardized forms.The fiscal decentralization is advantageous to the public commodity and collective services effective provision, and is advantageous to saving the policy-making cost and the institutional innovations.
The central and local governmental disbursement governance's reasonable division is the standard intergovernmental fiscal relations foundation. Our country all previous the central and local governmental fiscal relations transform the center is the property rights division, disburses the governance the division not to receive the enough attention. But, many countries in the world are changing the attention disbursement governance gradually from the attention division of income the assignment, disbursed the governance the division and the standard already became one kind of current. Taking our country central and local governmental fiscal relations system vicissitude as the background and profiting from the overseas experience, the paper divided this important issue based on the central and local governmental fiscal relations' disbursement governance. This article goal is,to provides the quite complete theory mentality and the operation countermeasure for the standard central and local intergovernmental fiscal relations through the research disbursement governance division, thus to realize the central and local finance's tertiary goal namely ultimate objective—realizes the social justice and the public commodity (collective services) the even equalization,the elementary object—to realize the economical and social relatively balanced development,the direct goal—to realize all levels of financial governance and the property rights unification provides the policy formulation the reference.
This article breakthrough point is the public commodity. The central and local governmental disbursement governance dividing,is to assign the public commodity supplies responsibility between the central and local authorities, thus to determine the different type public commodity the supplies main body. According to the public commodity's hierarchical and the profiting scope's size, the research ,may divide the nationwide public commodity, the local public commodity, the mix provide commodity. Corresponds with this, providing the nationwide public commodity the responsibility is the pure central governance, providing the local public commodity the responsibility is the pure local governance, the public commodity responsibility which the mix provides is the central and local mixed type governance.
Local authority's dual proxy role has established gambling the foundation between the local authority and the central authority. The present financial system causes the local authority to lack the mixed governance division clear power, but the mixed governance fuzzy present situation launched gambling for the local authority and the central authority to reserve the space. It does not favor the coordinated smooth revolution and the financial resource rational distribution between the central and local authorities. Must construct one kind of appropriate disbursement governance division pattern,reduce the gambling space,raises the financial system efficiency.
The research indicated that the central and local governmental disbursement governance dividing mode is possible to outline as follows.
①The central authority is responsible for the pure central governance. Namely the central authority mainly provides the profiting scope to cover the nation, which may supply all national the public commodity without the difference; having outside economies and the scale economy, or involving the national overall benefit to a certain extent public commodities; redistributing income cross different administrative area; Involving the total quantity balance, the readjustment of the economic structure, the economic stability and the economic development. Undertaking the pure central governance is responsible by the central level funds.
②The local authority is responsible for the pure local governance. Namely the local authority is responsible in this area of jurisdiction in various levels to be able by the consumer and the equality enjoys together public commodity supplies. Undertaking the pure place governance is responsible by the local finance.
③The central authority entrusts the local authority to be responsible for mixed governance. Namely that can satisfy in the expense regarding these public, but does not have the isotropism public commodity in the distribution provides by the local authority the central requested. The undertaking mixed type governance is given to the place in proportion by the central level funds through the transfer payment subsidy.
④Based on the clear disbursement governance divisionmode, dividing the property rights reasonably.
⑤Establishing standard transparent transfer payment system. If disburse the governance division mode obtains the expectation effect,, a good operational mechanism would be established. In the disbursement governance division mode operational mechanism, the decision-making mechanism is the core, the fund raising mechanism is the safeguard, the management and supervising mechanism is a key, and the overall linkage balanced mechanism is display important way with joint forces. Through the disbursement governance division mode’s effect of appraisal's value orientation, the indicator system and the appraisal difficulty's analysis, this article, proposed three effect assessment methods: to the pure social efficiency's disbursement governance, useing the public to judge the law; to the pure economic efficiency's disbursement governance, useing the cost-income analytic method; to Disbursement governance project which have the economic efficiency and the social efficiency at the same time, useing the fuzzy judgment method.
This paper's innovations are mainly in the following aspects:
①Analysing the governance division chaotic reason by the unique field of vision. The dual roles which, acts from the local authority embark with the central governmental conflicts of interest, carries on the analysis to the governance division present situation, analyzed the governance to divide the chaotic basic reason, to solve the mixed governance ownership to pave the way theoretically.
②From the theory firstly dividing the governance into the pure central governance, the pure place governance, and the mixed governance. This article takes the public commodity as a breakthrough point, divides it into the nationwide public commodity, the local public commodity and the mixed public commodity,with relating and corresponding, divides the governance into three kinds.
③Proposing the governance division theoretical model. The pure central governance by central government, the pure local governance by the local government, the mixed governance by the local,government as the central request auxiliaried by corresponding property rights division and transfer payment. It has provided the theory basis for the standard and the consummation of present finance system
④How to construct the governance division pattern operational mechanism and appraise its effect is the main problem in our country finance movement which did not have the solution. This article proposes the pattern moved six connection mechanism construction and three kinds of effect assessment methods, which ,have laid the foundation for the financial policy.
引文
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