发达经济体政府债务问题研究
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摘要
始于2008年的金融危机重创了世界经济，这场危机使经济前景变得扑朔迷离，也严重损伤了发达经济体的公共财政状况，金融危机之后发达经济体在债务的泥潭中越陷越深，美国面临着不可持续的债务负担以及持续的政治瘫痪，欧洲一直承受着主权债务危机和各国政治不合的重压；欧美财政整顿的失利正将世界拖入一个延续多年的低增长期，政府债务问题日益成为全球经济不能承受之重。如今在主权债务的风暴中，欧美发达经济体正艰难地寻找着债务问题的解药，在可预见的未来削减债务仍将是发达经济体政策讨论的优先议题。但对于如何寻找政府债务的长期可持续之路，发达经济体至今仍然缺乏清晰的思路。在这一背景之下，本文主要关心的问题如下：发达国家的政府债务如何演变至今？政府债务积累会对经济产生何种影响？对于在发达国家实现成功的债务削减，历史提供了哪些经验与启示？危机后各国普遍出现的“金融抑制”政策能否有效化解当前的债务僵局？长期视角下如何抑制政府债务倾向？
本文首先在第二章回顾了发达国家政府债务诞生的历史，对比分析了不同时期政府债务的差异，同时也介绍了政府债务相关研究的若干理论基础。接着第三章中以1980-2009年期间61个国家（其中包括25个典型发达国家和36个发展中国家）组成的面板数据，采用系统GMM方法对政府债务与经济增长之间的非线性关系进行了实证分析，较好的克服了变量内生性问题，结果显示政府债务与经济增长之间存在着非线性(倒U型)关系，这种关系普遍存在于发达国家和发展中国家；证明了债务阈值的存在性，且两组国家中政府债务阈值的大小存在显著差异。但是，政府债务阈值并不具有唯一性和确定性，它随利率、通货膨胀、经常账户和金融发展的变化而显示出动态性特征，同时上述变量对两组国家的影响存在显著的区别。
基于“政府债务的过度积累不利于长期经济增长”这一基本判断，本文第四章试图在长期历史中总结政府债务削减的经验。首先，定义何为成功的债务削减周期，在1880-2012年长达百余年的发达国家政府债务数据中，按照定义筛选出195次成功的政府债务削减周期；其次，实证检验了通货膨胀、名义利率、基础预算平衡、长期增长等变量在实现成功债务削减过程中所扮演的角色。结果显示：当基础财政赤字的下降主要由紧缩支出所推动时，能够使得债务削减成功的概率大大增加，而通过增加财政收入的方式所进行的财政巩固政策对于遏制政府债务的膨胀并无太多帮助，甚至会使形势进一步恶化；长期经济增长率在政府债务削减过程中发挥着重要作用；利用通货膨胀稀释债务存量的方式似乎并不像人们所认为的那么效果显著；政府债务削减成功与否同样对于名义利率的变动极为敏感；出人意料的是沉重的债务负担往往成为债务削减的动力之一。最后，基于不同时间段的考察发现，政府债务削减对于各个变量的敏感程度会发生变化。
第五章的研究发现，在当前背景下，被人们所忽略的金融抑制因其在化解政府债务方面的独特优势正在成为发达国家应对政府债务问题的政策工具。二战之后，发达国家的政府债务规模达到历史最高点，在解决债务问题的过程中，金融抑制发挥了重要作用。然而结合第四章的实证结果，本文发现面对迥异的外部条件，如今金融抑制的效果已大打折扣，它并不能成为政府债务问题的最终化解之道，同时也必将对全球经济带来新的挑战，比如会使发达国家货币政策面临巨大压力、社会福利损失、新兴经济体宏观经济政策面临更多制约及全球金融行业与金融中心的多极化格局日渐显现等。
本文第六章试图寻找长期视角下的政府债务化解之道，通过考察本文发现当前的政府债务周期起点可追溯至1970年代。早期发达国家政府债务积累往往与战争相联系，然而1970年代以来，在无战争与冲突的背景下发达国家债务水平却持续增长，成为历史上的独特现象。分析发现，新政治经济学领域中选民的“不完备知识”和政治进程中的“策略性互动”对此给出了有力的解释，政府债务内生性出现。长期以来发达国家试图利用财政规则抑制政府债务的不断膨胀，但本文的实证检验显示财政规则实施的效果并不显著，这一结果源于它不能消除债务的内生性问题。受到独立央行的启发，危机之后独立的财政委员会开始受到更多人的关注。分析表明理论上这一制度安排能够成为内生性政府债务的解，并通过考察历史上成功的实践，本文归纳出关于财政委员会的若干原则，希望为当前正处于全球债务迷雾中的政策制定者带来些许启示。第七章对前文中的主要结论进行总结，依据本文的研究对当前发达国家政府债务问题及若干争论进行评述；同时对全文进行反思，在此基础上对未来的研究方向进行展望。
The severe financial crisis that hit the world economy in2008not only caused alarge decline in output and brought about an uncertain economic outlook, it also harmedmany countries’ public finances. After the financial crisis, Developed economies arebogged down in the mire of debt, the US faced an unsustainable debt burden alongsidesustained political paralysis, and the European Union have been buckling under theweight of sovereign debt and political discord. The failure of fiscal adjustment in theadvanced economies has damaged long-term growth prospects of the world. Thisproblem has become unbearable for the world economy. Now debt reduction has becomeone of the main policy issues in most of the advanced economies. Advanced economiesare struggling for the antidotes in the sovereign debt storm. They still do not find the wayto achieve a balanced budget and reduce government debt. Against this background，thepaper will research on these important issues: How has government debt evolved? Whatthe impact of government debt on the economy? What factors help to reduce governmentdebt? Can "financial repression" policy successfully resolve the debt impasse? How tosuppress the tendency of government debt in the long run?
Firstly, the paper reviewed the evolution government debt, compared the differenceof government debt in different periods, and found that since the1970s government debtbecomed endogenous in advanced countries. Then the paper explored the nonlinearrelationship between government debt and economic growth. The analysis based on apanel of61advanced and emerging market economies. The system GMM method wasused in the study to deal with the reverse causality and endogeneity. The empirical resultssuggest the relationship between government debt and economic growth can be describedby an inverted U-shaped pattern, and threshold effects exist both in advanced andemerging market economies. But the turning point between public debt and GDP growthvaries significantly by country and macroeconomic variable(such as interest rates、inflation、current account and financial development).
Against this background this paper analyzed past episodes of reductions in thehistory to provide insights on policy options for successful debt reductions in the future.The first step is defining a successful debt reduction period, using data for the period 1985-2009this paper found195successful public debt reduction periods. Then I estimatewhich factors determine the probability of a successful debt reduction. The findingssuggest that: major debt reductions are mainly driven by decisive and lasting fiscalconsolidation efforts focused on reducing government expenditure, while tax increasesare less likely to contribute to a large and persistent debt reduction. Robust real GDPgrowth increases the likelihood of a major debt reduction because it helps countries togrow their way out of indebtedness. The effect of inflation is relatively small；Thesuccess of government debt reduction also extremely sensitive to the change of nominalinterest rates; Finally It is also worth noting that major debt reductions mainly occurredin times of higher interest burden or debt servicing cost. But there is a huge differencebetween various periods for the conclusion.
In recent years, along with large increases in government debt in advancedeconomies, financial repression has reemerged because of its unique advantage inresolving the debt problem. After World War II, the scale of government debt reached arecord vertex. To solving the problem, financial repression played an important role.However, because of the different external conditions, the effect of financial repressionhas been greatly reduced. At the same time it will brought new challenges to the globaleconomy.
The starting point of the current government debt cycle can be traced back to the1970s. Earlier accumulation of government debt in developed countries is often linkedwith the war. Since the1970s, however, debt levels continued to grow without war andconflict has become a unique phenomenon. In new political economics research field,“incomplete knowledge” of the voter and “strategic interaction” in the political processmade a strong explanation, so that government debt becomes endogenous. Developedcountries are trying to use the fiscal rules inhibit the expansion of government debt for along time, But our empirical testing found that the rules are not successful; it can noteliminate the problem the endogeneity of debt. The success of independent central bankinspired the institutional arrangement of the independent Fiscal councils in the aftermathof the crisis, and it is beginning to receive the attention of more people. Our analysisshows that the institutional arrangements could be the solution of the endogenousgovernment debt theoretically. Historical experience suggests there are some principles for the Independent Fiscal councils to dealing with high debt burdens, and offers both
instructive lessons and cautionary tales for the policy makers in the cloud of governmentdebt. In Chapter7, the final conclusions are summarized after the whole study and somecomments are made on the government debt problems. Finally, on the basis of theseresearch conclusions, the issues need to be further studied are also discussed.
本文首先在第二章回顾了发达国家政府债务诞生的历史，对比分析了不同时期政府债务的差异，同时也介绍了政府债务相关研究的若干理论基础。接着第三章中以1980-2009年期间61个国家（其中包括25个典型发达国家和36个发展中国家）组成的面板数据，采用系统GMM方法对政府债务与经济增长之间的非线性关系进行了实证分析，较好的克服了变量内生性问题，结果显示政府债务与经济增长之间存在着非线性(倒U型)关系，这种关系普遍存在于发达国家和发展中国家；证明了债务阈值的存在性，且两组国家中政府债务阈值的大小存在显著差异。但是，政府债务阈值并不具有唯一性和确定性，它随利率、通货膨胀、经常账户和金融发展的变化而显示出动态性特征，同时上述变量对两组国家的影响存在显著的区别。
基于“政府债务的过度积累不利于长期经济增长”这一基本判断，本文第四章试图在长期历史中总结政府债务削减的经验。首先，定义何为成功的债务削减周期，在1880-2012年长达百余年的发达国家政府债务数据中，按照定义筛选出195次成功的政府债务削减周期；其次，实证检验了通货膨胀、名义利率、基础预算平衡、长期增长等变量在实现成功债务削减过程中所扮演的角色。结果显示：当基础财政赤字的下降主要由紧缩支出所推动时，能够使得债务削减成功的概率大大增加，而通过增加财政收入的方式所进行的财政巩固政策对于遏制政府债务的膨胀并无太多帮助，甚至会使形势进一步恶化；长期经济增长率在政府债务削减过程中发挥着重要作用；利用通货膨胀稀释债务存量的方式似乎并不像人们所认为的那么效果显著；政府债务削减成功与否同样对于名义利率的变动极为敏感；出人意料的是沉重的债务负担往往成为债务削减的动力之一。最后，基于不同时间段的考察发现，政府债务削减对于各个变量的敏感程度会发生变化。
第五章的研究发现，在当前背景下，被人们所忽略的金融抑制因其在化解政府债务方面的独特优势正在成为发达国家应对政府债务问题的政策工具。二战之后，发达国家的政府债务规模达到历史最高点，在解决债务问题的过程中，金融抑制发挥了重要作用。然而结合第四章的实证结果，本文发现面对迥异的外部条件，如今金融抑制的效果已大打折扣，它并不能成为政府债务问题的最终化解之道，同时也必将对全球经济带来新的挑战，比如会使发达国家货币政策面临巨大压力、社会福利损失、新兴经济体宏观经济政策面临更多制约及全球金融行业与金融中心的多极化格局日渐显现等。
本文第六章试图寻找长期视角下的政府债务化解之道，通过考察本文发现当前的政府债务周期起点可追溯至1970年代。早期发达国家政府债务积累往往与战争相联系，然而1970年代以来，在无战争与冲突的背景下发达国家债务水平却持续增长，成为历史上的独特现象。分析发现，新政治经济学领域中选民的“不完备知识”和政治进程中的“策略性互动”对此给出了有力的解释，政府债务内生性出现。长期以来发达国家试图利用财政规则抑制政府债务的不断膨胀，但本文的实证检验显示财政规则实施的效果并不显著，这一结果源于它不能消除债务的内生性问题。受到独立央行的启发，危机之后独立的财政委员会开始受到更多人的关注。分析表明理论上这一制度安排能够成为内生性政府债务的解，并通过考察历史上成功的实践，本文归纳出关于财政委员会的若干原则，希望为当前正处于全球债务迷雾中的政策制定者带来些许启示。第七章对前文中的主要结论进行总结，依据本文的研究对当前发达国家政府债务问题及若干争论进行评述；同时对全文进行反思，在此基础上对未来的研究方向进行展望。
The severe financial crisis that hit the world economy in2008not only caused alarge decline in output and brought about an uncertain economic outlook, it also harmedmany countries’ public finances. After the financial crisis, Developed economies arebogged down in the mire of debt, the US faced an unsustainable debt burden alongsidesustained political paralysis, and the European Union have been buckling under theweight of sovereign debt and political discord. The failure of fiscal adjustment in theadvanced economies has damaged long-term growth prospects of the world. Thisproblem has become unbearable for the world economy. Now debt reduction has becomeone of the main policy issues in most of the advanced economies. Advanced economiesare struggling for the antidotes in the sovereign debt storm. They still do not find the wayto achieve a balanced budget and reduce government debt. Against this background，thepaper will research on these important issues: How has government debt evolved? Whatthe impact of government debt on the economy? What factors help to reduce governmentdebt? Can "financial repression" policy successfully resolve the debt impasse? How tosuppress the tendency of government debt in the long run?
Firstly, the paper reviewed the evolution government debt, compared the differenceof government debt in different periods, and found that since the1970s government debtbecomed endogenous in advanced countries. Then the paper explored the nonlinearrelationship between government debt and economic growth. The analysis based on apanel of61advanced and emerging market economies. The system GMM method wasused in the study to deal with the reverse causality and endogeneity. The empirical resultssuggest the relationship between government debt and economic growth can be describedby an inverted U-shaped pattern, and threshold effects exist both in advanced andemerging market economies. But the turning point between public debt and GDP growthvaries significantly by country and macroeconomic variable(such as interest rates、inflation、current account and financial development).
Against this background this paper analyzed past episodes of reductions in thehistory to provide insights on policy options for successful debt reductions in the future.The first step is defining a successful debt reduction period, using data for the period 1985-2009this paper found195successful public debt reduction periods. Then I estimatewhich factors determine the probability of a successful debt reduction. The findingssuggest that: major debt reductions are mainly driven by decisive and lasting fiscalconsolidation efforts focused on reducing government expenditure, while tax increasesare less likely to contribute to a large and persistent debt reduction. Robust real GDPgrowth increases the likelihood of a major debt reduction because it helps countries togrow their way out of indebtedness. The effect of inflation is relatively small；Thesuccess of government debt reduction also extremely sensitive to the change of nominalinterest rates; Finally It is also worth noting that major debt reductions mainly occurredin times of higher interest burden or debt servicing cost. But there is a huge differencebetween various periods for the conclusion.
In recent years, along with large increases in government debt in advancedeconomies, financial repression has reemerged because of its unique advantage inresolving the debt problem. After World War II, the scale of government debt reached arecord vertex. To solving the problem, financial repression played an important role.However, because of the different external conditions, the effect of financial repressionhas been greatly reduced. At the same time it will brought new challenges to the globaleconomy.
The starting point of the current government debt cycle can be traced back to the1970s. Earlier accumulation of government debt in developed countries is often linkedwith the war. Since the1970s, however, debt levels continued to grow without war andconflict has become a unique phenomenon. In new political economics research field,“incomplete knowledge” of the voter and “strategic interaction” in the political processmade a strong explanation, so that government debt becomes endogenous. Developedcountries are trying to use the fiscal rules inhibit the expansion of government debt for along time, But our empirical testing found that the rules are not successful; it can noteliminate the problem the endogeneity of debt. The success of independent central bankinspired the institutional arrangement of the independent Fiscal councils in the aftermathof the crisis, and it is beginning to receive the attention of more people. Our analysisshows that the institutional arrangements could be the solution of the endogenousgovernment debt theoretically. Historical experience suggests there are some principles for the Independent Fiscal councils to dealing with high debt burdens, and offers both
instructive lessons and cautionary tales for the policy makers in the cloud of governmentdebt. In Chapter7, the final conclusions are summarized after the whole study and somecomments are made on the government debt problems. Finally, on the basis of theseresearch conclusions, the issues need to be further studied are also discussed.
引文
②这一表述最先出现在1781年5月30日亚历山大·汉密尔顿写给莫里斯的信中，在美国财政部公共债务办公室网站亦有提及。详见http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/history/1700.htm。
①数据来源：IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS)数据库.
①数据来源：美国财政部，http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/debtlimit.aspx.
②如Calmfors (2005), Wyplosz (2005), Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010), Wren-Lewis (2010a)及Hagen (2010)等人均使用这一称呼。
①资料来源：加拿大国会预算办公室，http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/en/
②资料来源：瑞典财政政策委员会，http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/english/swedishfiscalpolicycouncil.4.6f04e222115f0dd09ea80001437.html
①资料来源：英国预算责任办公室，http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/
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①数据来源：IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS)数据库.
①数据来源：美国财政部，http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/debtlimit.aspx.
②如Calmfors (2005), Wyplosz (2005), Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010), Wren-Lewis (2010a)及Hagen (2010)等人均使用这一称呼。
①资料来源：加拿大国会预算办公室，http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/en/
②资料来源：瑞典财政政策委员会，http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/english/swedishfiscalpolicycouncil.4.6f04e222115f0dd09ea80001437.html
①资料来源：英国预算责任办公室，http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/
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