中国企业海外并购定价研究
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摘要
随着全球经济一体化的发展，海外并购已经成为各国企业实施海外战略的主要手段。而我国企业海外并购起步较晚，相对于西方国家，无论在理论还是实践方面都存有很多问题，其中并购定价问题关系到海外并购成功与否，显得尤其重要。本文主要是对中国企业海外并购定价问题展开研究，把定价问题分为海外目标企业定价和并购交易定价两部分，其中目标企业定价是对海外目标企业价值的评估，是静态定价过程；并购交易定价是确定最终的并购交易价格，是动态定价过程。
本文首先基于跨国并购理论，从跨国并购理论和并购定价两方面对现有研究现状进行总结。结果发现现有的研究主要存在以下不足点：国内对跨国并购理论的研究往往从单一角度来分析并购动因，并且对并购动因具体所起的作用的研究很少；现有的研究更多的关注企业定价这一过程中的动机和影响因素，而对于定价模型及定价方法的具体实证研究较少；对并购定价博弈的研究，往往会忽略博弈过程中的交易费用、外部环境的变化对其产生的影响等，这会使得最终结果与事实偏离。
其次从企业并购价值理论、期望效用理论和信号博弈理论三方面对企业跨国并购定价进行了理论分析。首先以成熟的企业价值理论为基础，以企业并购活动的价值动因作为研究视角，在分析一般的跨国并购活动价值动因的基础上提出了中国企业跨国并购的特殊动因；然后从期望效用理论的角度对企业并购定价进行分析，运用讨价还价模型对并购双方讨价还价能力对并购的影响进行的详细阐述，说明了不同风险偏好条件下所不同的并购选择和结果；最后，从并购信号博弈的角度，说明了目标公司定价的动态博弈过程。
再次对中国企业海外并购定价的四个主要影响因素——目标企业价值、协同效应、制度视角、私募基金进行了定性分析。其中目标企业价值是并购定价的基础，是影响跨国并购定价的核心因素；从制度视角展开两国制度因素对并购定价的影响是本文的创新点；此外本文还就中国经济发展现状，考虑到私募基金参与海外并购所产生的协同效应及协同溢价不同于传统跨国并购定价方式，私募基金的参与会对海外并购定价产生影响。
最后本文探讨了现有的定价理论和方法，并对其优点和不足点进行分析，结果发现只有实物期权定价方法比较全面的考虑了外部环境的不确定性和企业并购的战略价值。本文以实物期权理论为基础对目标企业价值进行静态定价分析，结合中国海外并购的谈判交易现状，引入汇率的影响，并借用博弈论中的讨价还价理论对并购交易价格进行动态分析，建立起相应的中国企业海外并购定价模型。通过对联想并购IBM PC业务的案例分析，发现该模型可以较好的为中国企业海外并购的定价提供可靠的依据。
With the development of global economic integration, overseas mergers andacquisitions have become the primary overseas strategy. Compared to Western countries,Chinese enterprises overseas mergers and acquisitions started later, there are a lot ofproblems both in theory and in practice. In particular, M&A pricing issues is critical to thesuccess of overseas mergers and acquisitions. In this paper we will study Chineseenterprises' overseas M&A pricing issue. M&A pricing includes the overseas targetcompany pricing and M&A transaction pricing, overseas target company pricing is willingto assess of the value of overseas target company, which is a static pricing process; M&Atransaction pricing is to determine the final price of M&A transactions, which is a processof dynamic pricing
First, based on cross-border M&A theory, we summarized the existing research ofcross-border M&A theory and M&A pricing theory, and found that there are threeinsufficient points: domestic cross-border M&A research often from a single point of viewto analyze the M&A, and few studies on M&A motives’ influences; existing research paymore attention to enterprise motivation and influencing factors, while less research onempirical research pricing models and pricing methods; research on M&A pricing gametend to ignore the transaction costs and the external environment changes’ impaction, itmay lead the deviate from the final results with the facts.
Second, from the M&A value theory, expected utility theory and the signaling gametheory, we analysis the cross-border mergers and acquisitions of enterprises pricing in aneconomic point of view. First based on the mature enterprise value theory, from theperspective of corporations merger and acquisition’ value motivations, we proposed of thespecial motivations of Chinese enterprises cross-border M&A; and then from theexpectations of utility theory perspective we analysis M&A pricing, we use the bargainingmodel of mergers and acquisitions to describe the impact of the ability on mergers andacquisitions, and illustrates the different risk preferences lead to different M&A optionsand results; Finally, from the perspective of M&A signaling game, we show the dynamic game process of target pricing.
Then we qualitative analyze the four main factors of the Chinese enterprises overseasmergers and acquisitions pricing-the value of the target company, synergies, institutionalperspective, private equity. The value of the target company is the base of M&A pricing，which is the core factors affecting cross-border M&A pricing; Research on the twocountries institutional factors and private equity funds participation impaction on M&Apricing from the perspective of New Institutional Economics is the innovation of thispaper; private equity funds participating in overseas mergers and acquisitions brings thedifferent synergies and collaborative premium pricing from the traditional cross-bordermergers and acquisitions, therefore, private equity funds participating in overseas M&Awill impact the M&A pricing.
Finally, we analyze the existing pricing theories and methods, and summarize theirstrengths and weaknesses, then we found that the only real option pricing method is amore comprehensive consideration of the uncertainty of the external environment and thestrategic value of mergers and acquisitions. We use the real options theory to analyze thestatic pricing progress of the value of the target company, combined with game theorybargaining theory for dynamic analysis of the M&A transaction price, and we build up theChinese enterprises' overseas M&A pricing model. The model can be a reliable tool toresolve the pricing issue of Chinese enterprises overseas mergers and acquisitions.
本文首先基于跨国并购理论，从跨国并购理论和并购定价两方面对现有研究现状进行总结。结果发现现有的研究主要存在以下不足点：国内对跨国并购理论的研究往往从单一角度来分析并购动因，并且对并购动因具体所起的作用的研究很少；现有的研究更多的关注企业定价这一过程中的动机和影响因素，而对于定价模型及定价方法的具体实证研究较少；对并购定价博弈的研究，往往会忽略博弈过程中的交易费用、外部环境的变化对其产生的影响等，这会使得最终结果与事实偏离。
其次从企业并购价值理论、期望效用理论和信号博弈理论三方面对企业跨国并购定价进行了理论分析。首先以成熟的企业价值理论为基础，以企业并购活动的价值动因作为研究视角，在分析一般的跨国并购活动价值动因的基础上提出了中国企业跨国并购的特殊动因；然后从期望效用理论的角度对企业并购定价进行分析，运用讨价还价模型对并购双方讨价还价能力对并购的影响进行的详细阐述，说明了不同风险偏好条件下所不同的并购选择和结果；最后，从并购信号博弈的角度，说明了目标公司定价的动态博弈过程。
再次对中国企业海外并购定价的四个主要影响因素——目标企业价值、协同效应、制度视角、私募基金进行了定性分析。其中目标企业价值是并购定价的基础，是影响跨国并购定价的核心因素；从制度视角展开两国制度因素对并购定价的影响是本文的创新点；此外本文还就中国经济发展现状，考虑到私募基金参与海外并购所产生的协同效应及协同溢价不同于传统跨国并购定价方式，私募基金的参与会对海外并购定价产生影响。
最后本文探讨了现有的定价理论和方法，并对其优点和不足点进行分析，结果发现只有实物期权定价方法比较全面的考虑了外部环境的不确定性和企业并购的战略价值。本文以实物期权理论为基础对目标企业价值进行静态定价分析，结合中国海外并购的谈判交易现状，引入汇率的影响，并借用博弈论中的讨价还价理论对并购交易价格进行动态分析，建立起相应的中国企业海外并购定价模型。通过对联想并购IBM PC业务的案例分析，发现该模型可以较好的为中国企业海外并购的定价提供可靠的依据。
With the development of global economic integration, overseas mergers andacquisitions have become the primary overseas strategy. Compared to Western countries,Chinese enterprises overseas mergers and acquisitions started later, there are a lot ofproblems both in theory and in practice. In particular, M&A pricing issues is critical to thesuccess of overseas mergers and acquisitions. In this paper we will study Chineseenterprises' overseas M&A pricing issue. M&A pricing includes the overseas targetcompany pricing and M&A transaction pricing, overseas target company pricing is willingto assess of the value of overseas target company, which is a static pricing process; M&Atransaction pricing is to determine the final price of M&A transactions, which is a processof dynamic pricing
First, based on cross-border M&A theory, we summarized the existing research ofcross-border M&A theory and M&A pricing theory, and found that there are threeinsufficient points: domestic cross-border M&A research often from a single point of viewto analyze the M&A, and few studies on M&A motives’ influences; existing research paymore attention to enterprise motivation and influencing factors, while less research onempirical research pricing models and pricing methods; research on M&A pricing gametend to ignore the transaction costs and the external environment changes’ impaction, itmay lead the deviate from the final results with the facts.
Second, from the M&A value theory, expected utility theory and the signaling gametheory, we analysis the cross-border mergers and acquisitions of enterprises pricing in aneconomic point of view. First based on the mature enterprise value theory, from theperspective of corporations merger and acquisition’ value motivations, we proposed of thespecial motivations of Chinese enterprises cross-border M&A; and then from theexpectations of utility theory perspective we analysis M&A pricing, we use the bargainingmodel of mergers and acquisitions to describe the impact of the ability on mergers andacquisitions, and illustrates the different risk preferences lead to different M&A optionsand results; Finally, from the perspective of M&A signaling game, we show the dynamic game process of target pricing.
Then we qualitative analyze the four main factors of the Chinese enterprises overseasmergers and acquisitions pricing-the value of the target company, synergies, institutionalperspective, private equity. The value of the target company is the base of M&A pricing，which is the core factors affecting cross-border M&A pricing; Research on the twocountries institutional factors and private equity funds participation impaction on M&Apricing from the perspective of New Institutional Economics is the innovation of thispaper; private equity funds participating in overseas mergers and acquisitions brings thedifferent synergies and collaborative premium pricing from the traditional cross-bordermergers and acquisitions, therefore, private equity funds participating in overseas M&Awill impact the M&A pricing.
Finally, we analyze the existing pricing theories and methods, and summarize theirstrengths and weaknesses, then we found that the only real option pricing method is amore comprehensive consideration of the uncertainty of the external environment and thestrategic value of mergers and acquisitions. We use the real options theory to analyze thestatic pricing progress of the value of the target company, combined with game theorybargaining theory for dynamic analysis of the M&A transaction price, and we build up theChinese enterprises' overseas M&A pricing model. The model can be a reliable tool toresolve the pricing issue of Chinese enterprises overseas mergers and acquisitions.
引文
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