上市公司债务融资中的盈余管理实证研究
|
摘要
改革开放三十多年，债务融资在我国社会融资中已占有越来越重要的地位。在间接债务融资方面，我国企业始终对银行信贷有很强的依赖性，而在直接债务融资方面，从2008年起，无论是绝对规模还是社会融资的相对占比，企业的债券市场一直都在超越股票市场。①因此，提高直接融资比例已成为了社会各界的广泛共识，作为直接融资重要渠道的债券市场也必然会得到空前的发展。盈余管理一直是公司财务和公司治理所关注的重要课题之一。经典的委托代理等理论认为，债务融资具有治理作用，能够约束企业管理者的盈余管理行为，但债务融资本身又可能诱发管理者的盈余管理动机。由于企业债务融资的获得、债务契约的签订、融资的定价及债券的信用评级等在很大程度上都依赖于企业提供的财务会计信息及其所报告的企业盈利能力，因此企业的债务融资与盈余管理必然地联系在一起。本文围绕着债务融资中的盈余管理问题，研究了我国资本市场中上市公司的债务融资特征对管理者盈余管理行为产生怎样的影响，以及管理者盈余管理行为又如何影响了债务融资。对上述问题的探讨，是对我国资本市场盈余管理问题研究的丰富和补充，对保障债权人利益，提高公司治理水平，加强债务资本市场的监管等方面都具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文沿着“提出问题→理论分析→实证分析→结论及政策建议”的基本思路开展研究，以我国上市公司为研究对象，采用理论分析和实证分析相结合、定性分析和定量分析相结合的研究方法。在理论分析方面，本文运用资本结构、委托代理、信号传递、控制权及债权人治理等理论，解释债务融资对盈余管理产生的影响；运用会计信息的经济后果和有效资本市场理论解释盈余管理对债务融资产生的影响；利用博弈论分析融资约束条件下债权人监督与管理者盈余管理的博弈及其结果。在实证分析中，采用相关性分析、异方差性和序列相关检验、均值差异性分析等统计分析方法对数据进行初步检验，进而采用混合截面回归模型、面板数据固定效应模型等对本文所提出的研究假设进行实证检验。同时本文还通过分组回归、扩大样本容量、寻找替代变量和使用工具变量等方法，对实证分析得到的结论进行了稳健性检验。
本文共分为8章，各章内容如下：
第1章绪论。主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究问题与意义、研究思路与方法、研究内容及全文研究的框架结构。
第2章文献综述。首先阐述了盈余管理的相关研究，并根据盈余管理的手段，描述了盈余管理的计量模型；其次阐述了债务融资治理作用的相关研究；然后对债务融资与盈余管理相互影响的有关研究进行梳理；最后对已有文献进行了评述，并指出了现有研究的不足。
第3章债务融资与盈余管理相互影响的理论分析。首先就债务融资与盈余管理之间的单向影响进行理论分析。债务融资对盈余管理的影响具有双重性，它对盈余管理有治理作用，但也可能成为盈余管理的动机。而由于盈余管理信息会产生一定的经济后果，因此在不同效率的有效市场中，盈余管理对债务契约双方的利益会产生不同的影响。本章进一步对融资约束条件下，债权人监督与管理者盈余管理进行了博弈分析，最后对债务融资与盈余管理的相互作用进行了概述。
第4章实证研究设计。就债务融资规模、方式和结构对盈余管理的影响及盈余管理对债务融资成本的影响分别提出了研究假设。以2007-2011年沪深A股主板上市公司作为研究样本，针对不同的研究问题，选择了盈余管理和其它研究变量。本章还对面板数据进行了异方差性和序列相关检验，最终确定对面板数据使用固定效应模型；对非面板结构的数据，则使用混合截面回归模型。
第5章债务融资对盈余管理影响的实证分析。本章从实证角度分别分析了债务融资规模、方式和结构对盈余管理产生的影响。（1）关于债务融资规模对盈余管理的影响，研究发现上市公司的应计和真实盈余管理程度，都随着资产负债率的增加而呈现出先下降后提高的现象。实证分析结果表明债务融资对盈余管理具有双重影响。（2）关于债务融资方式对盈余管理的影响，研究发现在控制了行业特征和盈利性影响后，获得银行贷款的公司应计盈余管理水平要显著高出没有获得贷款的公司；发行公司债的公司应计和真实盈余管理水平都要显著高出没有发行公司债的公司。实证分析结果表明新债的产生诱发了上市公司的盈余管理行为，也验证了债务融资中盈余管理的资本市场动机。（3）关于债务融资结构对盈余管理的影响，研究发现长期债务融资比例、银行借款比例和债券融资比例都与上市公司向上调整盈余的行为显著正相关。商业信用比例与盈余管理行为之间存在不确定的关系。实证分析结果表明某一项债务资金的增加也会导致企业进行盈余管理，验证了盈余管理的债务契约动机。
第6章盈余管理对债务融资影响的实证分析。本章从实证角度分别分析了盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响和对公司债定价的影响。（1）关于盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响，研究发现上市公司在会计周期期间调增盈利的行为与公司整体债务融资成本显著负相关。实证分析结果表明债权人不能及时识别上市公司的盈余管理行为，因此不能针对盈余管理要求更高的风险回报。（2）关于盈余管理对公司债定价的影响，研究发现公司债发行主体的盈余管理水平在公司债发行前一年和发行当年都显著大于零；公司债发行主体在发行前一年的盈余管理水平与公司债的实际发行利率显著负相关。实证分析结果表明公司债市场中的债权人也不能够及时识别企业管理盈余的行为。
第7章稳健性检验。本章从不同角度对第5、6章中的实证分析结果进行了稳健性检验。检验结果能够支持研究假设。（1）关于债务融资规模对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验进行了分组回归。研究发现，在低负债率样本中，二者之间显著负相关；在高负债率样本中，二者之间显著正相关。（2）关于债务融资方式对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验放松了对行业和盈利性的控制。研究发现，直接债务融资方式比间接债务融资方式，对企业通过真实活动向上调整盈利的影响更大。（3）关于债务融资结构对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验将几种债务融资结构变量放入同一个模型。研究发现，长期债务、商业信用、银行借款和债券融资的比例都与企业的盈余管理水平显著正相关。（4）关于盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响，稳健性检验替换了原有的解释变量。研究发现，上市公司在会计周期的当期调增盈利与债务融资成本显著负相关。（5）关于盈余管理对公司债定价的影响，稳健性检验采用了工具变量法。研究发现，公司债发行主体在发行前一年调增盈余与公司债的实际发行利率显著负相关。
第8章研究结论和建议。通过实证检验，本文得到了一些有意义的研究结论。主要结论有：（1）债务融资对盈余管理具有双重影响。公司负债水平较低时，债务融资的治理效应占主导地位；而公司负债水平较高时，盈余管理动机占主导地位。（2）就债务融资方式而言，无论是直接债务融资方式还是间接债务融资方式，新债的产生都能诱发上市公司向上调整盈利，且直接债务融资方式对盈余管理影响的程度更大。（3）就债务融资结构而言，长期债务融资比例、银行借款比例或者债券融资的比例增加时，上市公司都将显著调增盈利；在其他债务结构的共同作用下，商业信用比例增加，也会使上市公司显著调增盈利。（4）就盈余管理对债务融资的影响而言，无论是考察一般债务资本市场还是考察公司债市场，上市公司调增盈利的盈余管理行为都能够显著降低公司债务融资成本和公司债实际发行利率，表明债权人不能及时识别企业的盈余管理行为。
本文的创新之处体现在：（1）在研究内容上，以往关于债务融资对盈余管理影响的研究，多是研究单方面的影响，且实证分析主要从“债务的增加”这个角度进行。本文则就债务融资对盈余管理产生的双重影响进行了理论和实证分析；就“债务的增加”所产生的影响，也从广义和狭义两个角度进行了检验。（2）在研究视角上，以往研究盈余管理产生的影响大多是关注盈余管理对股票市场产生的影响，或检验股票市场对盈余管理的反应。本文则重点关注了盈余管理对债务资本市场产生的影响，并检验了债权人对盈余管理的反应。（3）在研究方法上，国内以往的研究一般是运用事件研究法和采用一般的线性回归分析模型，并没有对面板数据进行深入的挖掘与分析。本文的实证分析则强调了对上市公司面板数据的分析，并对为何采用固定效应模型，以及面板数据中的异方差性和序列相关等问题进行了详细的统计检验和计量经济学分析，从而使实证分析结论更令人信服。
本文提出的政策性建议包括：（1）对债权人：不要单纯依赖盈利信息来评估企业；签订契约前，要对企业的盈余管理进行事前考量。（2）对公司管理者：增强债权人利益保护意识；完善内部控制制度和发挥内部审计职能。（3）对监管部门：以法律制度安排债权人适当介入公司治理；尽早解决债务资本市场的多头监管问题。
本文的研究不足和进一步的研究方向：由于受到数据、资料及研究能力的限制，本文对债券市场研究对象的细化、盈余管理对债务融资其他方面的影响及债务融资与盈余管理的相互作用机理等问题研究的还不够深入，因此有待未来对此进行更进一步的探讨和挖掘。
Over the past three decades of reform and opening-up, debt financing has played anincreasingly important role in China's social financing. In terms of private debt,companies in China have always relied heavily on the bank loans, while in terms ofpublic debt, regardless of the absolute scale or the relative proportion in social financing,the corporate bond market has been overtaking the stock market ever since2008.Therefore, increasing the proportion of direct financing has become the consensus. As animportant direct financing channel, the bond market is bound to be an unprecedenteddevelopment. Earnings management has been one of the important issues studied incorporate finance and corporate governance. Classical principal-agent theory believesthat debt financing has a governance role, which can restrain managers’ earningsmanagement behavior, but debt financing itself may also induce managers’ earningsmanagement motives. As debt financing acquirement, debt contract signing, debt pricingand bonds credit rating etc. would all have to rely on the financial accountinginformation provided by the company and the earnings ability reported by the company,company’s debt financing are necessarily connected to earings management. Focussingon the earnings management issues in debt financing, this paper studies how debtfinancing in listed companies affect managers’ earnings management behavior in China'scapital market, and how managers’ earnings management behavior affect debt financing.Discussion on these issues will be an enrichment and supplement to the research onearnings management in China's capital market and will have important theoretical andpractical meanings in protecting creditors’ interests, improving corporate governance andstrengthening the bond market supervision.
Research in this paper will follow the basic way of "putting forward questions→theoretical analysis→empirical analysis→conclusions and policy recommendations"，take the listed companies as the study objects and adopt the theoretical and empiricalanalysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis methods. In theoretical analysis, theories ofcapital structure, principal-agent, signalling, corporate control, creditor governance areused to explain the impact of debt financing on earnings management; theories ofaccounting economic consequences and effective capital market are used to explain the effect of earnings management on debt financing；game theory is used to analyze theequilibrium results between creditors’ supervision and managers’ earnings managementbehavior under financing constraint. In empirical analysis, correlation analysis,heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation test, t test with equal variances are carried out for apreliminary inspection of the data. Pooled cross-section regression model and fixed effectpanel data model are adopted to test the hypothesises. This paper also performsrobustness tests in way of regressing by groups, expanding the sample size, using theproxy variables and instrumental variables to further prove the conclusions drawn fromthe empirical analysis.
This paper embraces8chapters. Each chapter is as follows.
Chapter1Introduction. It introduces the background, research issues and thesignificance, research routes and methods, research contents and the framework of thispaper.
Chapter2Literature review. Firstly, it introduces the related studies on earningsmanagement, and describes different earngings management measurement modelsaccording to different means. Secondly, it elaborates the studies on the governance roleof debt financing. Then it sorts out the mutual effect studies between debt financing andearnings management. Finally comments are given to extant literature and the weakareas of current studies are pointed out.
Chapter3Theorectical analysis of the mutual influence of debt financing andearnings management. First it analyzes the one-way influence between debt financingand earnings management theoretically. Debt financing has dual impacts on earningsmanagement. It has governance effect on earnings management, but may also become themotive for earnings management. However, as earnings management information willproduce certain economic consequences, earnings management has different impacts onthe interests of both sides of the debt contract in different effective markets. This chapterthen conducts a game analysis between creditors’ supervision and managers’ earningsmanagement behavior. At last, it summarizes the interaction effect between debtfinancing and earnings management.
Chapter4Empirical research design. Research hypothesises are proposed withrespect to the impact of the debt financing scale, debt financing mode and debt financing structure on earnings management and the impact of earnings management on cost ofdebt. Taking the2007-2011A-share major board listed companies as study samples,according to different problems, it chooses earnings management and other researchvariables. This chapter also carries out heteroskedastisity and autocorrelation tests forpanel data, and finally determines the fixed effect regression models for panel data. Fornon-panel stuctured data, pooled regression models will be used.
Chapter5Empirical analysis of the impact of debt financing on earningsmanagement. This chapter empirically analyzed the impact of debt financing scale, modeand structure on earnings management respectively.(1) Regarding the impact of debtfinancing scale on earnings management，it finds that, the accruals-based and realearnings management degrees in listed companies, all decrease first and then increasefollowing the debt level increases. These results show that debt financing has a dualeffect on earnings management.(2) Regarding the impact of debt financing mode onearnings management, it finds that, after controlling the industry characteristics andprofitability impact, the accruals-based earnings management level of companies whoobtained bank loans is significantly higher than that of companies who didn’t acquireloans; both of the accruals-based and real earnings management levels of companies whoissued corporate bonds are significantly higher than those of companies who didn’t issuebonds. The results show that the new debt emergence induced earnings managementbehavior of listed companies, and also verify the capital market motive of earningsmanagement in debt financing.(3) Regarding the impact of debt financing structure onearnings management, it finds that, the proportion of long-term debt, the proportion ofbank borrowing and the proportion of bonds financing are all significantly positivecorrelated to listed companies’ upward earnings adjustment behavior. The relationshipbetween the proportion of commercial credits and earnings management behavior isuncertain. The results show that increasing any kind of debt capital would leadcompanies to manage earnings, and also verify the debt contract motive of earningsmanagement.
Chapter6Empirical analysis of the impact of earnings management on debtfinancing. This chapter empirically analyzed the impact of earnings management oncorporate cost of debt and on corporate bonds pricing respectively.(1) Regarding the impact of earnings management on corporate cost of debt, it finds that listed companies’upward earnings adjustment between accounting periods is significantly negativecorrelated with companies’ cost of debt. The results indicate that creditors cannot seethrough listed companies’ earnings management behavior timely, therefore were not ableto claim higher risk returns for earnings management.(2) Regarding the impact ofearnings management on corporate bonds pricing, it finds that, prior to and in the year ofcorporate bonds issuance, earnings management level of the issuers are significantlygreater than zero; and earnings management level prior to the year of issuance issignificantly negative correlated with corporate bonds real insuing rate. The results showthat creditors in corporate bonds market were neither able to identify companies’earnings management behavior timely.
Chapter7Robustness test. This chapter carries out robustness tests from differentangles for conclusions obtained in Chapter5and6. Testing results can support thehypotheses.(1) Regarding the impact of debt financing scale on earnings management,robustness test runs regressions by groups. It finds that, in the sample of low debt ratio,they are significantly negative correlated; in a sample of high debt ratio, they aresignificantly positive correlated.(2) Regarding the impact of debt financing mode onearnings management, robustness test releases the control on industry and profitabilitycharacteristics. It finds that, compared to private debt financing, public debt financinghas greater impact on companies’ upward earnins adjustment through real activities.(3)Regarding the impact of debt financing structure on earnings management, robustnessputs all debt structure variables into one model. It finds that, the proportion of long-termdebt ratio, commercial credits, bank borrowings and bonds financing are all significantlypositive correlated with earnings management.(4) Regarding the impact of earningsmanagement on corporate cost of debt, robustness test replaces the original explanatoryvariable. It finds that, listed companies’ upward earnings adjustment in currentaccounting period is significantly negative correlated with cost of debt.(5) Regarding theimpact of earnings management on corporate bonds pricing, robustness test adoptsinstrumental variable method. It finds that, upward earnings adjustment prior to the yearof issuance is significantly negative correlated with corporate bonds real insuing rate.
Chapter8Conclusion and suggestions. This pater obtained some meaningful conclusions after empirical analysis. Main conclusions are:(1) Debt financing has a dualeffect on earnings management. When debt ratio is low, the governance effects of debtfinancing play a dominant role. When debt ratio is high, motives of earningsmanagement dominate.(2) In terms of debt financing mode, whether public or privatedebt, new debt issuance has indeed induced companies’ upward earnings adjustmentbehavior, and public financing has a greater impact on earnings management.(3) Interms of debt structure, the larger the long-term debt ratio, the bank borrowings ratio orthe bonds financing ratio, the more likely that listed companies manage earningsupwardly; under the common effect of other debt components, increasing the proportionof commercial credits also can significantly lead to upward earnings management.(4) Interms of the impact of earnings management on debt financing, whether examingcorporate general cost of debt or examing corporate bonds’ issuing rate, listed companies’upward earning adjustment can significantly reduce corporate cost of debt and bondsinterest rate at issuance， which means debt market can’t see through earningsmanagement behavior timely.
The innovations of this paper are:(1) On the research contents, the previous studiesconcerning the effect of debt financing on earnings management, mainly focus on theone-way influence, and empirical analysis is mainly carried out from the view of “debtlevel increases”. The innovation of this paper is that it analyzes the dual impact of debtfinancing on earnings management both theoretically and empirically; in terms of theeffect of “debt level increases”, it also conducts the tests from both the broad and narrowsense.(2) On the research perspective, the previous studies concerning the effect ofearnings management produced, are mainly concerning the impact of earningsmanagement on the stock market, or testing the stock market reaction to earningsmanagement. The innovation of this paper is that it concerns the impact of earningsmanagement on debt market, and tests the creditors’ reaction to earnings management.(3)On the research methods, current domestic empirical analysis often applies event studymethod and adopts general linear regression models, which doesn’t perform in-depthexcavation and analysis for panel data. The empirical analysis in this paper underlines theanalysis of listed company’s panel data and performs detailed statistical tests andeconometric analysis for why to use fixed effect models, as well as for the heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems in panel data. Thereby, making theempirical analysis conclusions more convincing.
This paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:(1) To creditors: do notrely solely on earnings information to evaluate company; perform an ex-anteinvestigation for companies’ earnings management before signing the contract.(2) Tomanagers: strengthen the consciousness to protect creditors’ interests; improve internalcontrol system and bring internal audit to function.(3) To regulators: allow creditors toinvolve in corporate governance system by law; solve the problem of various regulatorybodies in the debt market as soon as possible.
Limitations and future research directions are as follows: As restricted by the data,information and research ability, the issues of the refinement of the study objects in bondmarket, the influence of earnings management on other aspects in debt financing, and themechanism of the interaction of debt financing and earnings management are not studiedintensively. For this reason, these areas are needed to be futher explorated and excavatedin the future.
本文沿着“提出问题→理论分析→实证分析→结论及政策建议”的基本思路开展研究，以我国上市公司为研究对象，采用理论分析和实证分析相结合、定性分析和定量分析相结合的研究方法。在理论分析方面，本文运用资本结构、委托代理、信号传递、控制权及债权人治理等理论，解释债务融资对盈余管理产生的影响；运用会计信息的经济后果和有效资本市场理论解释盈余管理对债务融资产生的影响；利用博弈论分析融资约束条件下债权人监督与管理者盈余管理的博弈及其结果。在实证分析中，采用相关性分析、异方差性和序列相关检验、均值差异性分析等统计分析方法对数据进行初步检验，进而采用混合截面回归模型、面板数据固定效应模型等对本文所提出的研究假设进行实证检验。同时本文还通过分组回归、扩大样本容量、寻找替代变量和使用工具变量等方法，对实证分析得到的结论进行了稳健性检验。
本文共分为8章，各章内容如下：
第1章绪论。主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究问题与意义、研究思路与方法、研究内容及全文研究的框架结构。
第2章文献综述。首先阐述了盈余管理的相关研究，并根据盈余管理的手段，描述了盈余管理的计量模型；其次阐述了债务融资治理作用的相关研究；然后对债务融资与盈余管理相互影响的有关研究进行梳理；最后对已有文献进行了评述，并指出了现有研究的不足。
第3章债务融资与盈余管理相互影响的理论分析。首先就债务融资与盈余管理之间的单向影响进行理论分析。债务融资对盈余管理的影响具有双重性，它对盈余管理有治理作用，但也可能成为盈余管理的动机。而由于盈余管理信息会产生一定的经济后果，因此在不同效率的有效市场中，盈余管理对债务契约双方的利益会产生不同的影响。本章进一步对融资约束条件下，债权人监督与管理者盈余管理进行了博弈分析，最后对债务融资与盈余管理的相互作用进行了概述。
第4章实证研究设计。就债务融资规模、方式和结构对盈余管理的影响及盈余管理对债务融资成本的影响分别提出了研究假设。以2007-2011年沪深A股主板上市公司作为研究样本，针对不同的研究问题，选择了盈余管理和其它研究变量。本章还对面板数据进行了异方差性和序列相关检验，最终确定对面板数据使用固定效应模型；对非面板结构的数据，则使用混合截面回归模型。
第5章债务融资对盈余管理影响的实证分析。本章从实证角度分别分析了债务融资规模、方式和结构对盈余管理产生的影响。（1）关于债务融资规模对盈余管理的影响，研究发现上市公司的应计和真实盈余管理程度，都随着资产负债率的增加而呈现出先下降后提高的现象。实证分析结果表明债务融资对盈余管理具有双重影响。（2）关于债务融资方式对盈余管理的影响，研究发现在控制了行业特征和盈利性影响后，获得银行贷款的公司应计盈余管理水平要显著高出没有获得贷款的公司；发行公司债的公司应计和真实盈余管理水平都要显著高出没有发行公司债的公司。实证分析结果表明新债的产生诱发了上市公司的盈余管理行为，也验证了债务融资中盈余管理的资本市场动机。（3）关于债务融资结构对盈余管理的影响，研究发现长期债务融资比例、银行借款比例和债券融资比例都与上市公司向上调整盈余的行为显著正相关。商业信用比例与盈余管理行为之间存在不确定的关系。实证分析结果表明某一项债务资金的增加也会导致企业进行盈余管理，验证了盈余管理的债务契约动机。
第6章盈余管理对债务融资影响的实证分析。本章从实证角度分别分析了盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响和对公司债定价的影响。（1）关于盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响，研究发现上市公司在会计周期期间调增盈利的行为与公司整体债务融资成本显著负相关。实证分析结果表明债权人不能及时识别上市公司的盈余管理行为，因此不能针对盈余管理要求更高的风险回报。（2）关于盈余管理对公司债定价的影响，研究发现公司债发行主体的盈余管理水平在公司债发行前一年和发行当年都显著大于零；公司债发行主体在发行前一年的盈余管理水平与公司债的实际发行利率显著负相关。实证分析结果表明公司债市场中的债权人也不能够及时识别企业管理盈余的行为。
第7章稳健性检验。本章从不同角度对第5、6章中的实证分析结果进行了稳健性检验。检验结果能够支持研究假设。（1）关于债务融资规模对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验进行了分组回归。研究发现，在低负债率样本中，二者之间显著负相关；在高负债率样本中，二者之间显著正相关。（2）关于债务融资方式对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验放松了对行业和盈利性的控制。研究发现，直接债务融资方式比间接债务融资方式，对企业通过真实活动向上调整盈利的影响更大。（3）关于债务融资结构对盈余管理的影响，稳健性检验将几种债务融资结构变量放入同一个模型。研究发现，长期债务、商业信用、银行借款和债券融资的比例都与企业的盈余管理水平显著正相关。（4）关于盈余管理对公司债务融资成本的影响，稳健性检验替换了原有的解释变量。研究发现，上市公司在会计周期的当期调增盈利与债务融资成本显著负相关。（5）关于盈余管理对公司债定价的影响，稳健性检验采用了工具变量法。研究发现，公司债发行主体在发行前一年调增盈余与公司债的实际发行利率显著负相关。
第8章研究结论和建议。通过实证检验，本文得到了一些有意义的研究结论。主要结论有：（1）债务融资对盈余管理具有双重影响。公司负债水平较低时，债务融资的治理效应占主导地位；而公司负债水平较高时，盈余管理动机占主导地位。（2）就债务融资方式而言，无论是直接债务融资方式还是间接债务融资方式，新债的产生都能诱发上市公司向上调整盈利，且直接债务融资方式对盈余管理影响的程度更大。（3）就债务融资结构而言，长期债务融资比例、银行借款比例或者债券融资的比例增加时，上市公司都将显著调增盈利；在其他债务结构的共同作用下，商业信用比例增加，也会使上市公司显著调增盈利。（4）就盈余管理对债务融资的影响而言，无论是考察一般债务资本市场还是考察公司债市场，上市公司调增盈利的盈余管理行为都能够显著降低公司债务融资成本和公司债实际发行利率，表明债权人不能及时识别企业的盈余管理行为。
本文的创新之处体现在：（1）在研究内容上，以往关于债务融资对盈余管理影响的研究，多是研究单方面的影响，且实证分析主要从“债务的增加”这个角度进行。本文则就债务融资对盈余管理产生的双重影响进行了理论和实证分析；就“债务的增加”所产生的影响，也从广义和狭义两个角度进行了检验。（2）在研究视角上，以往研究盈余管理产生的影响大多是关注盈余管理对股票市场产生的影响，或检验股票市场对盈余管理的反应。本文则重点关注了盈余管理对债务资本市场产生的影响，并检验了债权人对盈余管理的反应。（3）在研究方法上，国内以往的研究一般是运用事件研究法和采用一般的线性回归分析模型，并没有对面板数据进行深入的挖掘与分析。本文的实证分析则强调了对上市公司面板数据的分析，并对为何采用固定效应模型，以及面板数据中的异方差性和序列相关等问题进行了详细的统计检验和计量经济学分析，从而使实证分析结论更令人信服。
本文提出的政策性建议包括：（1）对债权人：不要单纯依赖盈利信息来评估企业；签订契约前，要对企业的盈余管理进行事前考量。（2）对公司管理者：增强债权人利益保护意识；完善内部控制制度和发挥内部审计职能。（3）对监管部门：以法律制度安排债权人适当介入公司治理；尽早解决债务资本市场的多头监管问题。
本文的研究不足和进一步的研究方向：由于受到数据、资料及研究能力的限制，本文对债券市场研究对象的细化、盈余管理对债务融资其他方面的影响及债务融资与盈余管理的相互作用机理等问题研究的还不够深入，因此有待未来对此进行更进一步的探讨和挖掘。
Over the past three decades of reform and opening-up, debt financing has played anincreasingly important role in China's social financing. In terms of private debt,companies in China have always relied heavily on the bank loans, while in terms ofpublic debt, regardless of the absolute scale or the relative proportion in social financing,the corporate bond market has been overtaking the stock market ever since2008.Therefore, increasing the proportion of direct financing has become the consensus. As animportant direct financing channel, the bond market is bound to be an unprecedenteddevelopment. Earnings management has been one of the important issues studied incorporate finance and corporate governance. Classical principal-agent theory believesthat debt financing has a governance role, which can restrain managers’ earningsmanagement behavior, but debt financing itself may also induce managers’ earningsmanagement motives. As debt financing acquirement, debt contract signing, debt pricingand bonds credit rating etc. would all have to rely on the financial accountinginformation provided by the company and the earnings ability reported by the company,company’s debt financing are necessarily connected to earings management. Focussingon the earnings management issues in debt financing, this paper studies how debtfinancing in listed companies affect managers’ earnings management behavior in China'scapital market, and how managers’ earnings management behavior affect debt financing.Discussion on these issues will be an enrichment and supplement to the research onearnings management in China's capital market and will have important theoretical andpractical meanings in protecting creditors’ interests, improving corporate governance andstrengthening the bond market supervision.
Research in this paper will follow the basic way of "putting forward questions→theoretical analysis→empirical analysis→conclusions and policy recommendations"，take the listed companies as the study objects and adopt the theoretical and empiricalanalysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis methods. In theoretical analysis, theories ofcapital structure, principal-agent, signalling, corporate control, creditor governance areused to explain the impact of debt financing on earnings management; theories ofaccounting economic consequences and effective capital market are used to explain the effect of earnings management on debt financing；game theory is used to analyze theequilibrium results between creditors’ supervision and managers’ earnings managementbehavior under financing constraint. In empirical analysis, correlation analysis,heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation test, t test with equal variances are carried out for apreliminary inspection of the data. Pooled cross-section regression model and fixed effectpanel data model are adopted to test the hypothesises. This paper also performsrobustness tests in way of regressing by groups, expanding the sample size, using theproxy variables and instrumental variables to further prove the conclusions drawn fromthe empirical analysis.
This paper embraces8chapters. Each chapter is as follows.
Chapter1Introduction. It introduces the background, research issues and thesignificance, research routes and methods, research contents and the framework of thispaper.
Chapter2Literature review. Firstly, it introduces the related studies on earningsmanagement, and describes different earngings management measurement modelsaccording to different means. Secondly, it elaborates the studies on the governance roleof debt financing. Then it sorts out the mutual effect studies between debt financing andearnings management. Finally comments are given to extant literature and the weakareas of current studies are pointed out.
Chapter3Theorectical analysis of the mutual influence of debt financing andearnings management. First it analyzes the one-way influence between debt financingand earnings management theoretically. Debt financing has dual impacts on earningsmanagement. It has governance effect on earnings management, but may also become themotive for earnings management. However, as earnings management information willproduce certain economic consequences, earnings management has different impacts onthe interests of both sides of the debt contract in different effective markets. This chapterthen conducts a game analysis between creditors’ supervision and managers’ earningsmanagement behavior. At last, it summarizes the interaction effect between debtfinancing and earnings management.
Chapter4Empirical research design. Research hypothesises are proposed withrespect to the impact of the debt financing scale, debt financing mode and debt financing structure on earnings management and the impact of earnings management on cost ofdebt. Taking the2007-2011A-share major board listed companies as study samples,according to different problems, it chooses earnings management and other researchvariables. This chapter also carries out heteroskedastisity and autocorrelation tests forpanel data, and finally determines the fixed effect regression models for panel data. Fornon-panel stuctured data, pooled regression models will be used.
Chapter5Empirical analysis of the impact of debt financing on earningsmanagement. This chapter empirically analyzed the impact of debt financing scale, modeand structure on earnings management respectively.(1) Regarding the impact of debtfinancing scale on earnings management，it finds that, the accruals-based and realearnings management degrees in listed companies, all decrease first and then increasefollowing the debt level increases. These results show that debt financing has a dualeffect on earnings management.(2) Regarding the impact of debt financing mode onearnings management, it finds that, after controlling the industry characteristics andprofitability impact, the accruals-based earnings management level of companies whoobtained bank loans is significantly higher than that of companies who didn’t acquireloans; both of the accruals-based and real earnings management levels of companies whoissued corporate bonds are significantly higher than those of companies who didn’t issuebonds. The results show that the new debt emergence induced earnings managementbehavior of listed companies, and also verify the capital market motive of earningsmanagement in debt financing.(3) Regarding the impact of debt financing structure onearnings management, it finds that, the proportion of long-term debt, the proportion ofbank borrowing and the proportion of bonds financing are all significantly positivecorrelated to listed companies’ upward earnings adjustment behavior. The relationshipbetween the proportion of commercial credits and earnings management behavior isuncertain. The results show that increasing any kind of debt capital would leadcompanies to manage earnings, and also verify the debt contract motive of earningsmanagement.
Chapter6Empirical analysis of the impact of earnings management on debtfinancing. This chapter empirically analyzed the impact of earnings management oncorporate cost of debt and on corporate bonds pricing respectively.(1) Regarding the impact of earnings management on corporate cost of debt, it finds that listed companies’upward earnings adjustment between accounting periods is significantly negativecorrelated with companies’ cost of debt. The results indicate that creditors cannot seethrough listed companies’ earnings management behavior timely, therefore were not ableto claim higher risk returns for earnings management.(2) Regarding the impact ofearnings management on corporate bonds pricing, it finds that, prior to and in the year ofcorporate bonds issuance, earnings management level of the issuers are significantlygreater than zero; and earnings management level prior to the year of issuance issignificantly negative correlated with corporate bonds real insuing rate. The results showthat creditors in corporate bonds market were neither able to identify companies’earnings management behavior timely.
Chapter7Robustness test. This chapter carries out robustness tests from differentangles for conclusions obtained in Chapter5and6. Testing results can support thehypotheses.(1) Regarding the impact of debt financing scale on earnings management,robustness test runs regressions by groups. It finds that, in the sample of low debt ratio,they are significantly negative correlated; in a sample of high debt ratio, they aresignificantly positive correlated.(2) Regarding the impact of debt financing mode onearnings management, robustness test releases the control on industry and profitabilitycharacteristics. It finds that, compared to private debt financing, public debt financinghas greater impact on companies’ upward earnins adjustment through real activities.(3)Regarding the impact of debt financing structure on earnings management, robustnessputs all debt structure variables into one model. It finds that, the proportion of long-termdebt ratio, commercial credits, bank borrowings and bonds financing are all significantlypositive correlated with earnings management.(4) Regarding the impact of earningsmanagement on corporate cost of debt, robustness test replaces the original explanatoryvariable. It finds that, listed companies’ upward earnings adjustment in currentaccounting period is significantly negative correlated with cost of debt.(5) Regarding theimpact of earnings management on corporate bonds pricing, robustness test adoptsinstrumental variable method. It finds that, upward earnings adjustment prior to the yearof issuance is significantly negative correlated with corporate bonds real insuing rate.
Chapter8Conclusion and suggestions. This pater obtained some meaningful conclusions after empirical analysis. Main conclusions are:(1) Debt financing has a dualeffect on earnings management. When debt ratio is low, the governance effects of debtfinancing play a dominant role. When debt ratio is high, motives of earningsmanagement dominate.(2) In terms of debt financing mode, whether public or privatedebt, new debt issuance has indeed induced companies’ upward earnings adjustmentbehavior, and public financing has a greater impact on earnings management.(3) Interms of debt structure, the larger the long-term debt ratio, the bank borrowings ratio orthe bonds financing ratio, the more likely that listed companies manage earningsupwardly; under the common effect of other debt components, increasing the proportionof commercial credits also can significantly lead to upward earnings management.(4) Interms of the impact of earnings management on debt financing, whether examingcorporate general cost of debt or examing corporate bonds’ issuing rate, listed companies’upward earning adjustment can significantly reduce corporate cost of debt and bondsinterest rate at issuance， which means debt market can’t see through earningsmanagement behavior timely.
The innovations of this paper are:(1) On the research contents, the previous studiesconcerning the effect of debt financing on earnings management, mainly focus on theone-way influence, and empirical analysis is mainly carried out from the view of “debtlevel increases”. The innovation of this paper is that it analyzes the dual impact of debtfinancing on earnings management both theoretically and empirically; in terms of theeffect of “debt level increases”, it also conducts the tests from both the broad and narrowsense.(2) On the research perspective, the previous studies concerning the effect ofearnings management produced, are mainly concerning the impact of earningsmanagement on the stock market, or testing the stock market reaction to earningsmanagement. The innovation of this paper is that it concerns the impact of earningsmanagement on debt market, and tests the creditors’ reaction to earnings management.(3)On the research methods, current domestic empirical analysis often applies event studymethod and adopts general linear regression models, which doesn’t perform in-depthexcavation and analysis for panel data. The empirical analysis in this paper underlines theanalysis of listed company’s panel data and performs detailed statistical tests andeconometric analysis for why to use fixed effect models, as well as for the heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems in panel data. Thereby, making theempirical analysis conclusions more convincing.
This paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:(1) To creditors: do notrely solely on earnings information to evaluate company; perform an ex-anteinvestigation for companies’ earnings management before signing the contract.(2) Tomanagers: strengthen the consciousness to protect creditors’ interests; improve internalcontrol system and bring internal audit to function.(3) To regulators: allow creditors toinvolve in corporate governance system by law; solve the problem of various regulatorybodies in the debt market as soon as possible.
Limitations and future research directions are as follows: As restricted by the data,information and research ability, the issues of the refinement of the study objects in bondmarket, the influence of earnings management on other aspects in debt financing, and themechanism of the interaction of debt financing and earnings management are not studiedintensively. For this reason, these areas are needed to be futher explorated and excavatedin the future.
引文
[1]Aflatooni, A.&Nikbakht, Z. Income Smoothing, Real Earnings Management and Long-Run Stock Returns [J]. Business Intelligence Journal,2010,3(1):15-46
[2]Aghion, P.&Bolton, P. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(3):473-494
[3]Agrawal, A.&Knoeber, C. R. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):377-397
[4]Ahadiat, N.&Hefzi, H. An investigation of earnings management practices: examining generally accepted accounting principles [J]. International Journal of Business and Social Science,2012,3(14):245-251
[5]Akerlof, G. A. The market for'lemons':quality uncertainty and the market mechanism [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500
[6]Altman, E. I. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy [J]. Journal of Finance,1968,23(4):589-609
[7]Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A.&Reeb, D. M. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity and the cost of debt [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(3):315-342
[8]Ayers, B. C, Laplante, S. K.&McGuire, S. T. Credit ratings and taxes:the effect of book-tax differences on ratings changes [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,27(2):359-402
[9]Ayers, B. C., Lefanowicz, C.&Robinson, J. Do firms purchase the pooling method?[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7(1):5-32
[10]Beatty, A., Chamberlain, S.&Magliolo, J. Managing financial reports of commercial banks:the influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33(2):231-261
[11]Beaver, W. H. Financial ratios as predictors of failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1966,4:71-111
[12]Berger, P., Ofek, E.&Yermack, D. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions [J]. Journal of Finance,1997,52(4):1411-1438
[13]Berlin, M.&Loyes, J. Bond covenants and delegated monitoring [J]. Journal of Finance,1998,43(2):397-412
[14]Bharath, S. T., Sunder, J.&Sunder, S. V. Do sophisticated investors understand accounting quality? Evidence from bank loans [Z], Working Paper, University of Michigan,2004.
[15]Bharath, S. T., Sunder, J.&Sunder, S. V. Accounting quality and debt contracting [J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(1):1-28
[16]Bhojraj, S.,&Sengupata, P. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields:The role of institutional investors and the outside directors [J]. The Journal of Business,2003,76(3):455-475
[17]Carter, M., Lynch, L.&Tuna, I. The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation [Z]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania and University of Virginia,2006
[18]Caton, G. L., Chiyachantana, C. N.&Chua, C. et al. Earnings management surrounding seasoned bond offerings:do managers mislead ratings agencies and the bond market?[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2011.46(3):687-708
[19]Chapman, C. J. The effects of real earnings management on the firm, its competitors and subsequent reporting periods [Z]. Working paper, Northwestern University,2011
[20]Chemmanur, T.&Fulghieri, P. Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt [J]. Review of Financial Studies,1994,7(3):475-506
[21]Chi, W., Lisic, L. L.&Pevzner, M. Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management?[J]. Accounting Horizons,2011,25(2):315-335
[22]Chin, C. L., Lin, T. T.&Lee, C. C. Convertible bonds issuance terms, management forecasts, and earnings management:evidence from Taiwan market [J]. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies,2005,8(3):543-571
[23]Chung, R., Firth, M.&Kim, J. Earnings management, surplus-free cash flow, and external monitoring [J]. Journal of Business Research,2005,58(6):766-776
[24]Chung, H., Sheu, H. J.&Wang J. L. Do firms' earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?[J]. Finance Research Letters,2009,6(3):152-158
[25]Coase, R. H. The nature of the firm [J]. Economica,1937,4(16):386-405
[26]Cohen, D. A., Dey, A.&Lys, T. Z. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods [J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(3):757-787
[27]Cohen, D. A.&Zarowin, P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19
[28]Comiskey, E.&Mulford, C. W. Investment decisions and the equity accounting standards [J]. The Accounting Review,1986,61(3):519-525
[29]Dechow, P. M.&Dichev, I. D. The quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77:35-59
[30]Dechow, P. M., Hutton, A. P.&Kim, J. H. et al. Detecting earnings management:a new approach [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(2):275-334
[31]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G.&Sweeney, A. P. Detecting earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225
[32]Dechow, P. M, Sloan, R. G.&Sweeney, A. P. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(1):1-36
[33]DeFond, M.&Jiambalvo, J. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting Economics,1994,18(2):145-176
[34]Demers, E.&Wang, C. The impact of CEO career concerns on accruals based and real earnings management [Z]. Working paper, Naval Postgraduate School,2010
[35]Diamond, D. J. Monitoring and reputation:the choice between bank loans and directly placed debt [J]. Journal of political economy,1991,99(4):689-721
[36]Dichev, I. D.&Skinner, D. J. Large-sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1091-1123
[37]Driscoll, J. C.&Kraay, A. C. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent panel data [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1998,80(4):549-560
[38]DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H.&Sefcik, S. E. Earnings management:IPO valuation and subsequent performance [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,2001,16(4):369-396
[39]Dye, R. A. Classifications manipulation and Nash accounting standards [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1125-1162
[40]Eldenburg, L. G, Gunny, K. A.&Hee, K. W. et al. Earnings management using real activities:evidence from nonprofit hospitals [J]. The Accounting Review,2011.86(5):1605-1630
[41]Ewert, R.&Wagenhofer, A. Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review.2005,80(4):1101-1124
[42]Fama, E. F. The behavior of stock market prices [J]. The Journal of Business,1965,38(1):34-105
[43]Fama, E. F. Efficient capital markets:a review of theory and empirical work [J], Journal of Finance,1970,25(2):383-417
[44]Fama, E. F. What's different about banks?[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1985,15(1):29-39
[45]Fathi, S., Hashemi, S. A.&Firuzkuhi, Z. The effect of earnings management on stock liquidity of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange [J]. Interdisciplinary journal of contemporary research in business,2011,3(8):424-430
[46]Francis, J., LaFond, R.&Olsson, P. M. et al. Cost of equity and earnings attributes [J]. The accounting review,2004,79(4):967-1010
[47]Francis, J., LaFond, R.&Olsson, P. M. et al. The market pricing of accruals quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005.39(2):295-327
[48]Ghosh, A.&Moon, D. Corporate debt financing and earnings quality [J]. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2010,37(5-6):538-559
[49]Goodwin, J., Gul, F. A.&Fung, S. Short-Term debt maturity, monitoring and accruals-based earnings management [EB/OL].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505797,2009.11.14
[50]Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R.&Rajgopal, S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1-3):3-73
[51]Grossman, S. J.&Hart, O. D. Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives, in John McCall, National Bureau of Economic Research [M]. Cambridge: NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, with number mcca82-1, 1982:107-137
[52]Gunny, K. A. What are the consequences of real earnings management?[Z]. Working paper, University of Colorado at Boulder,2005
[53]Gunny, K. A. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance:Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,27(3):855-888
[54]Gupta, M.&Fields, L. P. Debt maturity structure and earnings management [Z]. Workding paper, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville and Texas A&M University,2006
[55]Harris, M.&Raviv, A. Capital structure and the informational role of debt [J]. The Journal of Finance,1990,45(2):321-349
[56]Hart, O.&Moore, J. Property rights and the nature of the firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158
[57]Harvey, C. R., Lins, K. V.&Roper, A. H. The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,74(1):3-30
[58]Healy, P. M.&Wahlen, J. M. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standards setting [J]. Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383
[59]Jensen, M. C.&Meckling, W. H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[60]Jensen, M. C. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers [J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329
[61]Jones, J. J. Earnings management during import relief investigations [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228
[62]Key, K. G. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,23(3):309-337
[63]Kothari, S., Leone, A.&Wasley, C. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163-197
[64]Kwan, S.&Carleton, W. financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds [Z]. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,2004
[65]Lee, K.W., Lev, B.&Yeo, G. Organizational structure and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,2007,22(2):293-331
[66]Leland, H. E.&Pyle, D. H. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation [J]. The Journal of Finance,32(2):371-387
[67]Lenard, M. J.&Yu, B. Do earnings management and audit quality influence over-investment by Chinese companies?[J]. International Journal of Economics and Finance,2012,4(2):21-30
[68]Liu, Y. X., Ning, Y. X.&Davidson Ⅲ, W. N. Earnings management surrounding new debt issues [J]. The Financial Review,2010,45:659-681
[69]Makar, S. D., Alam, P.&Pearson, M. A. When does juggling the numbers become fraud?[N]. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners World Headquarters, January/February,2010
[70]Mamedova, I. Z. The effect of leverage increases on real earnings management [D]. Thesis of Erasmus University,2008
[71]Mansi, S., Maxwell, W.&Miller, D. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors? Evidence from the bond market [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(4):755-793
[72]Marquardt, C.&Wiedman, C. Earnings management through transaction structuring: contingent convertible debt and diluted earnings per share [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2005,43(2):205-243
[73]McNichols, M. F.&Stubben, S. R. Does earnings management affect firms' investment decisions?[J]. The Accounting Review,2008.83(6):1571-1603
[74]McNichols, M. F, Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77:61-69
[75]Mizik, N.&Jacobson, R. Earnings inflation through accruals and real activity manipulation:its prevalence at the time of an SEO and the financial market consequences [Z]. Working paper, Columbia University,2007
[76]Modigliani, F.&Miller, M. H. The Cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment [J]. The American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297
[77]ModigIiani, F.&Miller, M. H. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital:A correction [J]. The American Economic Review,1963,53(3):433-443
[78]Moreira, J. A. Are financing needs a constraint to earnings management? Evidence for private Portuguese firms [Z]. CEF.UP Working Papers from University of Porto,2006
[79]Nagata, K.&Hachiya, T. Earnings management and the pricing of initial public offerings [J]. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies,2007,10(4):541-559
[80]National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Report of National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting [R]. New York,1987
[81]Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P.&Skousen, C. Z. Earnings management and the cost of debt [Z]. Working paper, Ohio University,2008
[82]Rodriguez-Perez, G.&Hemmen, S. V. Debt, diversification and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2010,29(2):138-159
[83]Ross, S. A. The determination of financial structure:the incentive signaling approach [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40
[84]Rothschild, M.&Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:an essay on the economics of imperfect information [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(4):629-649
[85]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370
[86]Schipper, K. Commentary on earnings management [J]. Accounting Horizons,1989,3:91-102
[87]Sengupta, P. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt [J]. The Accoutning Review,1998,73(4):459-474
[88]Sercu, P., Bauwhede, V. H.&Willekens, M. Earnings management and debt [Z]. Working paper, KU Leuven,2006
[89]Seybert, N. R&D capitalization and reputation-driven real earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review,2010,85(2):671-693
[90]Shleifer, A.&Vishny, R. W. A survey of corporate governance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783
[91]Sloan, R. G. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?[J] The Accounting Review,1996,71(3):289-315
[92]Spence, M. Job market signaling [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973,87(3):355-374
[93]Stulz, R. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27
[94]Sweeney, A. P. Debt-covenant violations and managers accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17(3):281-308
[95]Teoh,S.H.,Welch,I.&Wong, T. J. Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,50(1):63-99
[96]Teoh, S. H., Welch, I.&Wong, T. J. Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings [J]. The Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1935-1974
[97]Tian, L. Bank lending, corporate governance and government ownership in China [Z]. Working Paper, Peking University,2005
[98]Urcan, O.&Kieschnik, R. Earnings management and convertible debt issuance [EB/OL]. http://ssrn.com/abstract=817164,2006.09.18
[99]Valipour, H.&Moradbeygi, M. Corporate debt financing and earnings quality [J]. Journal of Applied Finance&Banking,2011,1(3):139-157
[100]Watts, R. L.&Zimmerman, J. L. Positive accounting theory [M]. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,1986
[101]Williamson, O. E. Corporate finance and corporate governance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):567-591
[102]Zang, A. Y. Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation [Z]. Working paper, Duke University,2007
[103]Zhang, W. Real activity manipulation to meet analyst cash flow forecast [Z]. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas,2008
[104]Zeff, S. A. The rise of "economic consequences"[J]. Journal of Accountancy,1978(12):56-63
[105]奥利弗.E.威廉姆森和西德尼.G.温特(编),姚海鑫和邢源源(译).企业的性质[M].北京：商务印书馆,2008
[106]薄澜,姚海鑫和王书林等.债务融资与盈余管理的关系及其控制人性质差异分析——基于非平衡面板数据的经验研究[J].财政研究,2013,4：73-76
[107]薄澜,姚海鑫.上市公司财务舞弊与外部审计的博弈分析——基于不完全信息动态博弈模型[J].审计与经济研究,2013,3：43-49
[108]蔡昌.盈余管理[M].西安：西安交通大学出版社,2005
[109]蔡春,朱荣和和辉等.盈余管理方式选择、行为隐性化与濒死企业状况改善——来自A股特别处理公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,9：31-39
[110]蔡春,朱荣和谢柳芳.真实盈余管理研究述评[J].经济学动态,2011,12:125-130
[111]陈骏.基于债务契约的银行监督有效吗?——来自盈余管理视角的经验证据[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,12：84-90
[112]邓莉,张宗益和李宏胜.银行债权的公司治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,1：61-70
[113]胡咏梅.计量经济学基础与STATA应用[M].北京：北京师范大学出版社,2010
[114]葛家澍,杜兴强.会计理论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005
[115]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009,5：136-143
[116]黄文青.我国上市公司债权融资的治理效应研究[J].财经问题研究,2010,8：69-72
[117]姜英兵,王清莹.上市公司股权结构与真实活动盈余管理[J].财经问题研究,2011,5：73-80
[118]杰弗里.M.伍德里奇(著),费剑平和林相森(译).计量经济学导论：现代观点[M].中国人民大学出版社,2003
[119]杰弗里.A.杰里和菲利普.J.瑞尼.高级微观经济理论[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008
[120]雷光勇,刘金文和柳木华.经济后果、会计管制和会计寻租[J].会计研究,2001,9：50-53
[121]雷强.银行监督与上市公司盈余管理关系的实证研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2010,6：91-98
[122]李吉栋.上市公司盈余管理分析[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2006
[123]李增福,董志强和连玉君.应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理?——基于我国2007年所得税改革的研究[J].管理世界,2011,1：121-134
[124]李增福,郑友环和连玉君.股权再融资、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控方式下的研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,4：49-56
[125]李增福,曾庆意和魏下海.债务契约、控制人性质与盈余管理[J].经济评论,2011,6：88-96
[126]刘汉民.企业理论、公司治理与制度分析[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2007
[127]刘颖.真实和应计盈余管理水平及其价值相关性的实证研究[D].博士学位论文,财政部财政科学研究所,2011
[128]陆正飞,魏涛.配股和业绩下降：盈余管理后果与真实业绩滑坡[J].会计研究,2006,8：52-57
[129]陆正飞,祝继高和孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,3：152-158
[130]罗进辉,万迪昉和蔡地.大股东终极现金流量权与债务融资的关系研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2009,2：84-88
[131]雒敏.国家控制、债务融资与大股东利益侵占——基于沪深两市上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2011,3：107-115
[132]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2006
[133]让.梯诺尔(著),王永钦(译).公司金融理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2007
[134]斯蒂芬.A.罗斯,伦道夫.W.威斯特菲尔德和杰弗利.F.杰富(著),吴世农和王世强(译).公司理财[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2011
[135]万红波,阮铭华和王蓓蓓.负债融资、债务契约与盈余信息质量关系研究——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2010,5：53-60
[136]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,2003,8：28-35
[137]王生年.盈余管理影响因素研究：公司治理视角[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2009
[138]威廉.R.斯科特(著),陈汉文(译).财务会计理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2012
[139]吴联生,薄仙慧和王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较[J].会计研究,2007,2：44-51
[140]吴联生和王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据：一个综述[J].经济研究,2007,8：143-152
[141]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2008
[142]杨全兴,陈旭东.负债融资契约的治理效用分析[J].财政研究,2004,8：53-56
[143]姚海鑫.经济政策的博奕论分析[M].北京：北京经济管理出版社,2001
[144]叶志锋,胡玉明和纳超洪.基于银行借款融资动机的盈余管理研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,1：118-124
[145]于忠泊,叶琼燕和田高良.外部监督与盈余管理——针对媒体关注、机构投资者与分析师的考察[J].山西财经大学,2011,9：90-99
[146]袁淳,刘思淼和薛蔚等.公司债券对代理成本影响的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2011,5：37-40
[147]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004
[148]钟海燕,冉茂盛.制度环境、所有权性质与负债的治理效应[J].技术经济,2010,7：110-116
[2]Aghion, P.&Bolton, P. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(3):473-494
[3]Agrawal, A.&Knoeber, C. R. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):377-397
[4]Ahadiat, N.&Hefzi, H. An investigation of earnings management practices: examining generally accepted accounting principles [J]. International Journal of Business and Social Science,2012,3(14):245-251
[5]Akerlof, G. A. The market for'lemons':quality uncertainty and the market mechanism [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500
[6]Altman, E. I. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy [J]. Journal of Finance,1968,23(4):589-609
[7]Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A.&Reeb, D. M. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity and the cost of debt [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(3):315-342
[8]Ayers, B. C, Laplante, S. K.&McGuire, S. T. Credit ratings and taxes:the effect of book-tax differences on ratings changes [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,27(2):359-402
[9]Ayers, B. C., Lefanowicz, C.&Robinson, J. Do firms purchase the pooling method?[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7(1):5-32
[10]Beatty, A., Chamberlain, S.&Magliolo, J. Managing financial reports of commercial banks:the influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33(2):231-261
[11]Beaver, W. H. Financial ratios as predictors of failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1966,4:71-111
[12]Berger, P., Ofek, E.&Yermack, D. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions [J]. Journal of Finance,1997,52(4):1411-1438
[13]Berlin, M.&Loyes, J. Bond covenants and delegated monitoring [J]. Journal of Finance,1998,43(2):397-412
[14]Bharath, S. T., Sunder, J.&Sunder, S. V. Do sophisticated investors understand accounting quality? Evidence from bank loans [Z], Working Paper, University of Michigan,2004.
[15]Bharath, S. T., Sunder, J.&Sunder, S. V. Accounting quality and debt contracting [J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(1):1-28
[16]Bhojraj, S.,&Sengupata, P. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields:The role of institutional investors and the outside directors [J]. The Journal of Business,2003,76(3):455-475
[17]Carter, M., Lynch, L.&Tuna, I. The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation [Z]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania and University of Virginia,2006
[18]Caton, G. L., Chiyachantana, C. N.&Chua, C. et al. Earnings management surrounding seasoned bond offerings:do managers mislead ratings agencies and the bond market?[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2011.46(3):687-708
[19]Chapman, C. J. The effects of real earnings management on the firm, its competitors and subsequent reporting periods [Z]. Working paper, Northwestern University,2011
[20]Chemmanur, T.&Fulghieri, P. Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt [J]. Review of Financial Studies,1994,7(3):475-506
[21]Chi, W., Lisic, L. L.&Pevzner, M. Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management?[J]. Accounting Horizons,2011,25(2):315-335
[22]Chin, C. L., Lin, T. T.&Lee, C. C. Convertible bonds issuance terms, management forecasts, and earnings management:evidence from Taiwan market [J]. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies,2005,8(3):543-571
[23]Chung, R., Firth, M.&Kim, J. Earnings management, surplus-free cash flow, and external monitoring [J]. Journal of Business Research,2005,58(6):766-776
[24]Chung, H., Sheu, H. J.&Wang J. L. Do firms' earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?[J]. Finance Research Letters,2009,6(3):152-158
[25]Coase, R. H. The nature of the firm [J]. Economica,1937,4(16):386-405
[26]Cohen, D. A., Dey, A.&Lys, T. Z. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods [J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(3):757-787
[27]Cohen, D. A.&Zarowin, P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19
[28]Comiskey, E.&Mulford, C. W. Investment decisions and the equity accounting standards [J]. The Accounting Review,1986,61(3):519-525
[29]Dechow, P. M.&Dichev, I. D. The quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77:35-59
[30]Dechow, P. M., Hutton, A. P.&Kim, J. H. et al. Detecting earnings management:a new approach [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(2):275-334
[31]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G.&Sweeney, A. P. Detecting earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225
[32]Dechow, P. M, Sloan, R. G.&Sweeney, A. P. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(1):1-36
[33]DeFond, M.&Jiambalvo, J. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting Economics,1994,18(2):145-176
[34]Demers, E.&Wang, C. The impact of CEO career concerns on accruals based and real earnings management [Z]. Working paper, Naval Postgraduate School,2010
[35]Diamond, D. J. Monitoring and reputation:the choice between bank loans and directly placed debt [J]. Journal of political economy,1991,99(4):689-721
[36]Dichev, I. D.&Skinner, D. J. Large-sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1091-1123
[37]Driscoll, J. C.&Kraay, A. C. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent panel data [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1998,80(4):549-560
[38]DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H.&Sefcik, S. E. Earnings management:IPO valuation and subsequent performance [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,2001,16(4):369-396
[39]Dye, R. A. Classifications manipulation and Nash accounting standards [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1125-1162
[40]Eldenburg, L. G, Gunny, K. A.&Hee, K. W. et al. Earnings management using real activities:evidence from nonprofit hospitals [J]. The Accounting Review,2011.86(5):1605-1630
[41]Ewert, R.&Wagenhofer, A. Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review.2005,80(4):1101-1124
[42]Fama, E. F. The behavior of stock market prices [J]. The Journal of Business,1965,38(1):34-105
[43]Fama, E. F. Efficient capital markets:a review of theory and empirical work [J], Journal of Finance,1970,25(2):383-417
[44]Fama, E. F. What's different about banks?[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1985,15(1):29-39
[45]Fathi, S., Hashemi, S. A.&Firuzkuhi, Z. The effect of earnings management on stock liquidity of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange [J]. Interdisciplinary journal of contemporary research in business,2011,3(8):424-430
[46]Francis, J., LaFond, R.&Olsson, P. M. et al. Cost of equity and earnings attributes [J]. The accounting review,2004,79(4):967-1010
[47]Francis, J., LaFond, R.&Olsson, P. M. et al. The market pricing of accruals quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005.39(2):295-327
[48]Ghosh, A.&Moon, D. Corporate debt financing and earnings quality [J]. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2010,37(5-6):538-559
[49]Goodwin, J., Gul, F. A.&Fung, S. Short-Term debt maturity, monitoring and accruals-based earnings management [EB/OL].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505797,2009.11.14
[50]Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R.&Rajgopal, S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1-3):3-73
[51]Grossman, S. J.&Hart, O. D. Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives, in John McCall, National Bureau of Economic Research [M]. Cambridge: NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, with number mcca82-1, 1982:107-137
[52]Gunny, K. A. What are the consequences of real earnings management?[Z]. Working paper, University of Colorado at Boulder,2005
[53]Gunny, K. A. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance:Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,27(3):855-888
[54]Gupta, M.&Fields, L. P. Debt maturity structure and earnings management [Z]. Workding paper, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville and Texas A&M University,2006
[55]Harris, M.&Raviv, A. Capital structure and the informational role of debt [J]. The Journal of Finance,1990,45(2):321-349
[56]Hart, O.&Moore, J. Property rights and the nature of the firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158
[57]Harvey, C. R., Lins, K. V.&Roper, A. H. The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,74(1):3-30
[58]Healy, P. M.&Wahlen, J. M. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standards setting [J]. Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383
[59]Jensen, M. C.&Meckling, W. H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[60]Jensen, M. C. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers [J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329
[61]Jones, J. J. Earnings management during import relief investigations [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228
[62]Key, K. G. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,23(3):309-337
[63]Kothari, S., Leone, A.&Wasley, C. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163-197
[64]Kwan, S.&Carleton, W. financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds [Z]. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,2004
[65]Lee, K.W., Lev, B.&Yeo, G. Organizational structure and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,2007,22(2):293-331
[66]Leland, H. E.&Pyle, D. H. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation [J]. The Journal of Finance,32(2):371-387
[67]Lenard, M. J.&Yu, B. Do earnings management and audit quality influence over-investment by Chinese companies?[J]. International Journal of Economics and Finance,2012,4(2):21-30
[68]Liu, Y. X., Ning, Y. X.&Davidson Ⅲ, W. N. Earnings management surrounding new debt issues [J]. The Financial Review,2010,45:659-681
[69]Makar, S. D., Alam, P.&Pearson, M. A. When does juggling the numbers become fraud?[N]. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners World Headquarters, January/February,2010
[70]Mamedova, I. Z. The effect of leverage increases on real earnings management [D]. Thesis of Erasmus University,2008
[71]Mansi, S., Maxwell, W.&Miller, D. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors? Evidence from the bond market [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(4):755-793
[72]Marquardt, C.&Wiedman, C. Earnings management through transaction structuring: contingent convertible debt and diluted earnings per share [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2005,43(2):205-243
[73]McNichols, M. F.&Stubben, S. R. Does earnings management affect firms' investment decisions?[J]. The Accounting Review,2008.83(6):1571-1603
[74]McNichols, M. F, Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77:61-69
[75]Mizik, N.&Jacobson, R. Earnings inflation through accruals and real activity manipulation:its prevalence at the time of an SEO and the financial market consequences [Z]. Working paper, Columbia University,2007
[76]Modigliani, F.&Miller, M. H. The Cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment [J]. The American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297
[77]ModigIiani, F.&Miller, M. H. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital:A correction [J]. The American Economic Review,1963,53(3):433-443
[78]Moreira, J. A. Are financing needs a constraint to earnings management? Evidence for private Portuguese firms [Z]. CEF.UP Working Papers from University of Porto,2006
[79]Nagata, K.&Hachiya, T. Earnings management and the pricing of initial public offerings [J]. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies,2007,10(4):541-559
[80]National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Report of National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting [R]. New York,1987
[81]Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P.&Skousen, C. Z. Earnings management and the cost of debt [Z]. Working paper, Ohio University,2008
[82]Rodriguez-Perez, G.&Hemmen, S. V. Debt, diversification and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2010,29(2):138-159
[83]Ross, S. A. The determination of financial structure:the incentive signaling approach [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40
[84]Rothschild, M.&Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:an essay on the economics of imperfect information [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(4):629-649
[85]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370
[86]Schipper, K. Commentary on earnings management [J]. Accounting Horizons,1989,3:91-102
[87]Sengupta, P. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt [J]. The Accoutning Review,1998,73(4):459-474
[88]Sercu, P., Bauwhede, V. H.&Willekens, M. Earnings management and debt [Z]. Working paper, KU Leuven,2006
[89]Seybert, N. R&D capitalization and reputation-driven real earnings management [J]. The Accounting Review,2010,85(2):671-693
[90]Shleifer, A.&Vishny, R. W. A survey of corporate governance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783
[91]Sloan, R. G. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?[J] The Accounting Review,1996,71(3):289-315
[92]Spence, M. Job market signaling [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973,87(3):355-374
[93]Stulz, R. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27
[94]Sweeney, A. P. Debt-covenant violations and managers accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17(3):281-308
[95]Teoh,S.H.,Welch,I.&Wong, T. J. Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,50(1):63-99
[96]Teoh, S. H., Welch, I.&Wong, T. J. Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings [J]. The Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1935-1974
[97]Tian, L. Bank lending, corporate governance and government ownership in China [Z]. Working Paper, Peking University,2005
[98]Urcan, O.&Kieschnik, R. Earnings management and convertible debt issuance [EB/OL]. http://ssrn.com/abstract=817164,2006.09.18
[99]Valipour, H.&Moradbeygi, M. Corporate debt financing and earnings quality [J]. Journal of Applied Finance&Banking,2011,1(3):139-157
[100]Watts, R. L.&Zimmerman, J. L. Positive accounting theory [M]. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,1986
[101]Williamson, O. E. Corporate finance and corporate governance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):567-591
[102]Zang, A. Y. Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation [Z]. Working paper, Duke University,2007
[103]Zhang, W. Real activity manipulation to meet analyst cash flow forecast [Z]. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas,2008
[104]Zeff, S. A. The rise of "economic consequences"[J]. Journal of Accountancy,1978(12):56-63
[105]奥利弗.E.威廉姆森和西德尼.G.温特(编),姚海鑫和邢源源(译).企业的性质[M].北京：商务印书馆,2008
[106]薄澜,姚海鑫和王书林等.债务融资与盈余管理的关系及其控制人性质差异分析——基于非平衡面板数据的经验研究[J].财政研究,2013,4：73-76
[107]薄澜,姚海鑫.上市公司财务舞弊与外部审计的博弈分析——基于不完全信息动态博弈模型[J].审计与经济研究,2013,3：43-49
[108]蔡昌.盈余管理[M].西安：西安交通大学出版社,2005
[109]蔡春,朱荣和和辉等.盈余管理方式选择、行为隐性化与濒死企业状况改善——来自A股特别处理公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,9：31-39
[110]蔡春,朱荣和谢柳芳.真实盈余管理研究述评[J].经济学动态,2011,12:125-130
[111]陈骏.基于债务契约的银行监督有效吗?——来自盈余管理视角的经验证据[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,12：84-90
[112]邓莉,张宗益和李宏胜.银行债权的公司治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,1：61-70
[113]胡咏梅.计量经济学基础与STATA应用[M].北京：北京师范大学出版社,2010
[114]葛家澍,杜兴强.会计理论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005
[115]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009,5：136-143
[116]黄文青.我国上市公司债权融资的治理效应研究[J].财经问题研究,2010,8：69-72
[117]姜英兵,王清莹.上市公司股权结构与真实活动盈余管理[J].财经问题研究,2011,5：73-80
[118]杰弗里.M.伍德里奇(著),费剑平和林相森(译).计量经济学导论：现代观点[M].中国人民大学出版社,2003
[119]杰弗里.A.杰里和菲利普.J.瑞尼.高级微观经济理论[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008
[120]雷光勇,刘金文和柳木华.经济后果、会计管制和会计寻租[J].会计研究,2001,9：50-53
[121]雷强.银行监督与上市公司盈余管理关系的实证研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2010,6：91-98
[122]李吉栋.上市公司盈余管理分析[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2006
[123]李增福,董志强和连玉君.应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理?——基于我国2007年所得税改革的研究[J].管理世界,2011,1：121-134
[124]李增福,郑友环和连玉君.股权再融资、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控方式下的研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,4：49-56
[125]李增福,曾庆意和魏下海.债务契约、控制人性质与盈余管理[J].经济评论,2011,6：88-96
[126]刘汉民.企业理论、公司治理与制度分析[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2007
[127]刘颖.真实和应计盈余管理水平及其价值相关性的实证研究[D].博士学位论文,财政部财政科学研究所,2011
[128]陆正飞,魏涛.配股和业绩下降：盈余管理后果与真实业绩滑坡[J].会计研究,2006,8：52-57
[129]陆正飞,祝继高和孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,3：152-158
[130]罗进辉,万迪昉和蔡地.大股东终极现金流量权与债务融资的关系研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2009,2：84-88
[131]雒敏.国家控制、债务融资与大股东利益侵占——基于沪深两市上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2011,3：107-115
[132]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2006
[133]让.梯诺尔(著),王永钦(译).公司金融理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2007
[134]斯蒂芬.A.罗斯,伦道夫.W.威斯特菲尔德和杰弗利.F.杰富(著),吴世农和王世强(译).公司理财[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2011
[135]万红波,阮铭华和王蓓蓓.负债融资、债务契约与盈余信息质量关系研究——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2010,5：53-60
[136]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,2003,8：28-35
[137]王生年.盈余管理影响因素研究：公司治理视角[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2009
[138]威廉.R.斯科特(著),陈汉文(译).财务会计理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2012
[139]吴联生,薄仙慧和王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较[J].会计研究,2007,2：44-51
[140]吴联生和王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据：一个综述[J].经济研究,2007,8：143-152
[141]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2008
[142]杨全兴,陈旭东.负债融资契约的治理效用分析[J].财政研究,2004,8：53-56
[143]姚海鑫.经济政策的博奕论分析[M].北京：北京经济管理出版社,2001
[144]叶志锋,胡玉明和纳超洪.基于银行借款融资动机的盈余管理研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,1：118-124
[145]于忠泊,叶琼燕和田高良.外部监督与盈余管理——针对媒体关注、机构投资者与分析师的考察[J].山西财经大学,2011,9：90-99
[146]袁淳,刘思淼和薛蔚等.公司债券对代理成本影响的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2011,5：37-40
[147]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004
[148]钟海燕,冉茂盛.制度环境、所有权性质与负债的治理效应[J].技术经济,2010,7：110-116