经理人市场对企业经营者的隐性激励研究
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摘要
目前,在企业经营者激励问题的研究上,我国理论界对于国企经营者的年薪、奖金、期权、期股等显性激励手段已有较为充分的探讨,而针对激励机制的另一重要方面——基于经理人市场隐性激励的系统研究却显相对不足。同时,在数量有限的关于经理人市场隐性激励的研究文献中,其研究范畴也未能涵盖民营企业、三资企业等“体制外”经理人市场,忽视了经理人市场的充分竞争性和统一开放性。
本文所研究的经理人市场对企业经营者的隐性激励,是指通过经理人市场竞争与声誉机制,而形成的一种内生于企业经营者的自我驱动性激励。本文在综合评述国内外关于经理人市场隐性激励研究文献,对隐性激励的基本原理和基本模型进行梳理的基础上,结合从“北京市企业经营者激励与约束问题调查研究”课题调研中所获取的实证材料,对我国经理人市场(包括“体制外”和“体制内”经理人市场)隐性激励现状和隐性激励低效原因进行深入分析,并基于以上研究提出一些希望能对职业经理人市场建设以至我国国有企业改革有意义的对策建议。
本文在研究过程中作了以下创新性的探索:
(1)以经营者人力资本价值为线索,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性及其作用机理,搭建了经理人市场隐性激励的理论模型架构。本文在考虑经营者未来人力资本价值及其动态贴现因素的基础上,通过模型改进量化地证明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性。然后通过对两阶段声誉模型、无限期限声誉模型和引入触发战略均衡的声誉模型的分析,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的作用机理。
(2)以国有企业经营者的多任务特征为主线,构建了国有企业经营者隐性激励问题的分析框架。本文将袁江天的国企经营者多任务假说引入严建苗的国企经营者效用函数之中,推导出国企经营者的效用最大化的两个条件,并据此阐明了国企经营者遴选问题上引入经理人市场的意义所在。之后,将王珺“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈”的观点模型化,借鉴多任务委托代理模型分析框架,对我国国企经营者的激励现状进行分析。
(3)以经理人市场整体发展为视角,贯穿经典模型分析,构建了基于统一竞争的经理人市场隐性激励的系统分析框架。本文以经理人市场隐性激励中的经典模型为分析工具来研究我国经理人市场的隐性激励状况。在研究角度上,本文把包括国有企业、民营企业、外资企业经营者在内的整个经理人阶层作为一个群体,研究如何构建一个统一、开放、竞争、有序的经理人市场以实现对该群体的隐性激励。
本文通过理论研究和现状分析,得出了如下主要结论:
(1)经理人市场的引入能节约委托人对代理人的激励成本,实现对经营者的隐性激励。隐性激励作用发挥在很大程度上依赖于经理人市场的公平竞争以及经营者与经理人市场之间的重复博弈。
(2)我国国企经营者与国企和政府关系的特殊性,导致“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈并存”,使经营者将更多本应该付诸企业经营的努力转移到满足上级偏好上来,由此产生的多任务委托代理关系使我国国企经营者的行为发生行政化扭曲。
(3)体制化和地域性分割降低了我国经理人市场的竞争水平,中介组织功能不健全导致我国经理人市场的信息传导机制失灵,这些都使隐性激励机制难以发挥作用。
(4)在转型经济中要提高我国经营者隐性激励效率需从三个方面着手:使经营者具有长远预期、营造经营者与所有者之间的重复博弈环境以及完善经营者市场的竞争与配套机制。
我国企业改革过程中的大部分问题都与管理层激励有关,解决这一问题有助于巩固中国经济长期稳定发展的微观基础。本文对经理人市场隐性激励的研究,希望能为国有企业改革探寻内外治理结构共同完善以及中国职业经理人市场建设的实践作出贡献。
In the past two decades and more, great changes have taken place in the management system of the state-owned enterprises in China. But the reformation in the property structure and the corporate governance structure still needs to be improved. Thus people have paid more and more attention to the peifection of the incentive mechanism of the managers. For the moment, the research on the incentive problems of the manager of the state-owned enterprises focuses on such explicit incentives as annual pay ,bonuses, options and so on, but lacking the research of the other part of the incentive mechanism-systimatic research on the implicit incentives which based on Managerial Labor Market.
The classical explanation of our theorists about the short-term gains of the managers in the state-owned enterprises is that: it is lack of explicit incentives which causes the mismatch of payment and merit that leads to the short-term gains. The shortcoming of this view lies in the omition of the important fact: the low efficiency of the explicit contract, such as options, partly because there are some drawbacks in the designation and operation of explicit incentive mechanisms. On the other hand, more important, it is because of the ineffective of the explicit incentive mechanisms, which makes the explicit incentive mechanisms inefficient.
During the economic transiton period, because of the imperfection of the outside macket system, the managers of the state-owned enterprises need not to face the menance or strain which comes from the marcket. In the mean time, the cost of pure explicit incentives is rather high. So only explicit incentives it is not enough to make the managers work hard. If we only pay attention to inner incentives of the enterprises with out pay any attention to managerial market and its influence on the behavior of the managers, This "disease" of the distortion of incentives could not easily be rooted out. So the status of implicit incentives become more and more important and necessary to explicit incentives.
General corporate governance structure includes inner governance structure and outer governance structure. The former means to indirectly control the behavior of the manager through the managerial labor market, while the latter means to stir up and also control the managerial behavior by the owner of some specific enterprises, also the designation of payment systerm. Inner governance structure based on outer governance structure, and it can be efficient only under the condtion of matching the outer market competition. With out the pefection of outer market, any method borrowed from other countries can not bring out ideal result. Incentives with high efficiency must be the organic combination of both explicit incentives and implicit incentives.
With consideration of the recent condition of China, and aim at pefection the environment of market and building up the competitive managerial labor market, use market methods to carry out effective implicit incentives become more and more important. We can find enough resources about explicit incentives, but find that, the research on implicit incentives streams from the early 80s—the researchers in the name of Fama,Holmstorm, based on market competition, built up the reputation model to make some research on implicit incentives. In the author's sphere, we can find many articles focus on implicit incentives, but with out any systematic research on the problems of implicit incentives. Pay sufficient attention to implicit incentives can help to thereticly solve the problem of managerial market development. The development of managerial market is critical to the reformation of our state-owned enterprises, without which can leads to the failure of MBO,ESO and so on. So attach importance to the research of implicit incentives which based on the managerial market can be a hot topic of the reformation of our state-owned enterprises.
As already stated in our previous letter, to build up the reputation machanism should based on perfect managerial labor market, which is the premise of wasetrn researcher's theory achievement. In our country, the managerial labor market needs further perfection to support the operation of reputation machanism. What's more, managerial labor market is a huge system, the paticipant in which not only includes state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. Domestic researchers payed more and more attention to the affection of reputation machanism on state-owned enterprises, but neglect the private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. But the performance of reputation machanism Depends on a united, open, competitive and ordly managerial labor market. So the research sphere of this paper includes not only state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. How can we neglect the development and perfection of the whole managerial labor market which includes state-owned enterprises, private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment?
This paper focuses on the implicit incentives of managerial labor market. Based on a panorama of the theory achievement of wasetrn researchers and domestic researchers, to elucidate the machanism of the implicit incentives which comes from the managerial labor market. The author has taken part in the project of "Drive and Control of the managers of the enterprises of Beijing", and hold responsible for the relative research of a sub-project. The sub-project began at January,2006, with 300 questionaires(173 valid) and face to face interview. Valid questionaires include 23 state-owned enterprises, 129 private enterprises and 21 enterprises of foreign investment. In this paper, the author will combine the resource of questionaire and interview with reputation theory and model, deeply analyse the implicit incentives in China managerial labor market. And hope to draw some constructive conclusions which is useful to the perfection of our profetional manegerial labor market.
本文所研究的经理人市场对企业经营者的隐性激励,是指通过经理人市场竞争与声誉机制,而形成的一种内生于企业经营者的自我驱动性激励。本文在综合评述国内外关于经理人市场隐性激励研究文献,对隐性激励的基本原理和基本模型进行梳理的基础上,结合从“北京市企业经营者激励与约束问题调查研究”课题调研中所获取的实证材料,对我国经理人市场(包括“体制外”和“体制内”经理人市场)隐性激励现状和隐性激励低效原因进行深入分析,并基于以上研究提出一些希望能对职业经理人市场建设以至我国国有企业改革有意义的对策建议。
本文在研究过程中作了以下创新性的探索:
(1)以经营者人力资本价值为线索,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性及其作用机理,搭建了经理人市场隐性激励的理论模型架构。本文在考虑经营者未来人力资本价值及其动态贴现因素的基础上,通过模型改进量化地证明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性。然后通过对两阶段声誉模型、无限期限声誉模型和引入触发战略均衡的声誉模型的分析,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的作用机理。
(2)以国有企业经营者的多任务特征为主线,构建了国有企业经营者隐性激励问题的分析框架。本文将袁江天的国企经营者多任务假说引入严建苗的国企经营者效用函数之中,推导出国企经营者的效用最大化的两个条件,并据此阐明了国企经营者遴选问题上引入经理人市场的意义所在。之后,将王珺“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈”的观点模型化,借鉴多任务委托代理模型分析框架,对我国国企经营者的激励现状进行分析。
(3)以经理人市场整体发展为视角,贯穿经典模型分析,构建了基于统一竞争的经理人市场隐性激励的系统分析框架。本文以经理人市场隐性激励中的经典模型为分析工具来研究我国经理人市场的隐性激励状况。在研究角度上,本文把包括国有企业、民营企业、外资企业经营者在内的整个经理人阶层作为一个群体,研究如何构建一个统一、开放、竞争、有序的经理人市场以实现对该群体的隐性激励。
本文通过理论研究和现状分析,得出了如下主要结论:
(1)经理人市场的引入能节约委托人对代理人的激励成本,实现对经营者的隐性激励。隐性激励作用发挥在很大程度上依赖于经理人市场的公平竞争以及经营者与经理人市场之间的重复博弈。
(2)我国国企经营者与国企和政府关系的特殊性,导致“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈并存”,使经营者将更多本应该付诸企业经营的努力转移到满足上级偏好上来,由此产生的多任务委托代理关系使我国国企经营者的行为发生行政化扭曲。
(3)体制化和地域性分割降低了我国经理人市场的竞争水平,中介组织功能不健全导致我国经理人市场的信息传导机制失灵,这些都使隐性激励机制难以发挥作用。
(4)在转型经济中要提高我国经营者隐性激励效率需从三个方面着手:使经营者具有长远预期、营造经营者与所有者之间的重复博弈环境以及完善经营者市场的竞争与配套机制。
我国企业改革过程中的大部分问题都与管理层激励有关,解决这一问题有助于巩固中国经济长期稳定发展的微观基础。本文对经理人市场隐性激励的研究,希望能为国有企业改革探寻内外治理结构共同完善以及中国职业经理人市场建设的实践作出贡献。
In the past two decades and more, great changes have taken place in the management system of the state-owned enterprises in China. But the reformation in the property structure and the corporate governance structure still needs to be improved. Thus people have paid more and more attention to the peifection of the incentive mechanism of the managers. For the moment, the research on the incentive problems of the manager of the state-owned enterprises focuses on such explicit incentives as annual pay ,bonuses, options and so on, but lacking the research of the other part of the incentive mechanism-systimatic research on the implicit incentives which based on Managerial Labor Market.
The classical explanation of our theorists about the short-term gains of the managers in the state-owned enterprises is that: it is lack of explicit incentives which causes the mismatch of payment and merit that leads to the short-term gains. The shortcoming of this view lies in the omition of the important fact: the low efficiency of the explicit contract, such as options, partly because there are some drawbacks in the designation and operation of explicit incentive mechanisms. On the other hand, more important, it is because of the ineffective of the explicit incentive mechanisms, which makes the explicit incentive mechanisms inefficient.
During the economic transiton period, because of the imperfection of the outside macket system, the managers of the state-owned enterprises need not to face the menance or strain which comes from the marcket. In the mean time, the cost of pure explicit incentives is rather high. So only explicit incentives it is not enough to make the managers work hard. If we only pay attention to inner incentives of the enterprises with out pay any attention to managerial market and its influence on the behavior of the managers, This "disease" of the distortion of incentives could not easily be rooted out. So the status of implicit incentives become more and more important and necessary to explicit incentives.
General corporate governance structure includes inner governance structure and outer governance structure. The former means to indirectly control the behavior of the manager through the managerial labor market, while the latter means to stir up and also control the managerial behavior by the owner of some specific enterprises, also the designation of payment systerm. Inner governance structure based on outer governance structure, and it can be efficient only under the condtion of matching the outer market competition. With out the pefection of outer market, any method borrowed from other countries can not bring out ideal result. Incentives with high efficiency must be the organic combination of both explicit incentives and implicit incentives.
With consideration of the recent condition of China, and aim at pefection the environment of market and building up the competitive managerial labor market, use market methods to carry out effective implicit incentives become more and more important. We can find enough resources about explicit incentives, but find that, the research on implicit incentives streams from the early 80s—the researchers in the name of Fama,Holmstorm, based on market competition, built up the reputation model to make some research on implicit incentives. In the author's sphere, we can find many articles focus on implicit incentives, but with out any systematic research on the problems of implicit incentives. Pay sufficient attention to implicit incentives can help to thereticly solve the problem of managerial market development. The development of managerial market is critical to the reformation of our state-owned enterprises, without which can leads to the failure of MBO,ESO and so on. So attach importance to the research of implicit incentives which based on the managerial market can be a hot topic of the reformation of our state-owned enterprises.
As already stated in our previous letter, to build up the reputation machanism should based on perfect managerial labor market, which is the premise of wasetrn researcher's theory achievement. In our country, the managerial labor market needs further perfection to support the operation of reputation machanism. What's more, managerial labor market is a huge system, the paticipant in which not only includes state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. Domestic researchers payed more and more attention to the affection of reputation machanism on state-owned enterprises, but neglect the private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. But the performance of reputation machanism Depends on a united, open, competitive and ordly managerial labor market. So the research sphere of this paper includes not only state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. How can we neglect the development and perfection of the whole managerial labor market which includes state-owned enterprises, private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment?
This paper focuses on the implicit incentives of managerial labor market. Based on a panorama of the theory achievement of wasetrn researchers and domestic researchers, to elucidate the machanism of the implicit incentives which comes from the managerial labor market. The author has taken part in the project of "Drive and Control of the managers of the enterprises of Beijing", and hold responsible for the relative research of a sub-project. The sub-project began at January,2006, with 300 questionaires(173 valid) and face to face interview. Valid questionaires include 23 state-owned enterprises, 129 private enterprises and 21 enterprises of foreign investment. In this paper, the author will combine the resource of questionaire and interview with reputation theory and model, deeply analyse the implicit incentives in China managerial labor market. And hope to draw some constructive conclusions which is useful to the perfection of our profetional manegerial labor market.
引文
1 林毅夫等,充分信息与国有企业改革,[M]上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1997
2 广义的法人治理结构包括外部治理和内部治理结构,二者在逻辑层次上是不同的,内部治理结构是以外部治理,即市场竞争机制的激励和约束为基础的:内部治理结构只有在适应外部市场竞争机制的条件下才能有效率。在外部市场条件不具备的情况下,任何试图机械套用他国的内部治理结构模式的努力,都难以获得理想的效果。高效的激励必须是市场合约的隐性激励与企业合约的显性激励的有机结合。参见林毅夫等,充分信息与国有企业改革,[M]上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1997。
3 魏杰,职业经理人制度建设中的一个重要问题[J]。财贸经济,2001.6
4 邱显平,构建经理市场体系的思考,江西社会科学,2001.1
5 李蓉.职业经理人能界定——上海出台职业经理人职业标准.解放日报2001-05-25
6 杨河清,唐军著,企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究,中国劳动与社会保障出版社,2004年8月版,P6。
7 关培兰,影响企业家人力资本市场有效性的理论评介,武汉大学学报(社会科学版),第54卷第2期,2001.3
8 内部劳动力市场的理论渊源可以追溯到上个世纪60年代末,70年代初。一批制度主义经济学家对传统的劳动力市场范式提出了挑战,创立了分层劳动力市场理论模型(segmented labour market SLM理论),内部劳动力市场的概念被提出。
10 威廉姆森,资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约,北京:商务印书馆,2002年版。
11 机会主义和道德风险的存在将可能导致类似于克莱因所描述的通用汽车公司和费舍公司之间的“敲竹杠”行为的发生(参见克莱因,契约经济学,经济科学出版社,1999年中译本)。
12 Alchian,A.and H.Demsetz,(1972),"Production,Information Cost,and Economic Organization",American Economic Association,62(50):777-795
13 Wilson,R,(1969),"The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty",La,Decision,No.171.
14 Ross,S.,(1973),"The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Problem," TheAmerican Economic Review,63:134-139
15 Mirrlees,J.A.,(1974),"Note on Welfare Economics,Information and Uncertainty," in Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty,Balch,McFadden and Wu,eds.Amsterdam:North Holland.
16[1]Holmstrom,B.,(1979),"Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics,10:74-91.
[2]Holmstrom,B.,(1982a),"Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics,13(2):324-340
17 Grossman,S.and O.Hart,(1980),"Takeover Bids,the Free-Rider Problem,and the Theory of the Corporation,"Bell Journal of Economics,2(1):42-64
18 当然,职位消费中的漏税行为,是公众买单:此外,还有短期利益集中化行为,做假帐行为等。这些暂不属于本文涉及的研究范围。
19[1]Kreps David M.,Wilson Robert,Sequential Equilibria[J].Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-895.
[2]Kreps David M·,Milgrom Paul,Roberts John,Wilson Robert.Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Pris-oners' Dilemma[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):245-253.
[3]Milgrom Paul,Roberts John.Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information:An Equilibrium Analysis[J].Econometrica,1982,50(2):443-461.后来人们关于声誉形成的大量文献都起源于上述三篇论文。
20 早在50年代就为博弈论专家所共知但无人曾发表,后由Fudenberg and Maskin(1986)等扩展和完善的无名氏定理(Folk theorem)说明了,在无限次重复博弈中,如果参与人有足够的耐心(认为未来的收益与现在的收益几乎无差别),那么,任何满足个人理性的可行的支付向量都可以通过一个特定的子博弈精炼纳什均衡来得到。换句话说,只要参与人的交易具有长期性,并且交易双方对朱来收益的贴现足够高,则双方将从长期利益出发来维持相互的合作。这就避免了在单阶段的博弈中,自利的当事人沉迷于机会主义行为而无法合作的情况出现。
21 黄群慧,企业家激励约束与国有企业改革,北京.中国人民大学出版社,2000年版.
22 Holmstrom,B.,(1982b),"Managerial incentive problems—a dynamic perspective," in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars,Wahlbeck Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics
23 转引自张正堂,企业家报酬的决定:理论与实证研究。北京:经济管理出版社,2003年3月版。
24 Martin,D.and L.Michael,(2001),"Social Norms and Moral Hazard",the Economic Journal,Ⅲ(7):506-525
25 Kang,J.and A.Shivdasani,(1995),"Firm Performance,Corporate Governance,and Top Executive Turnover in Japan",Journal ofFinancial Economics,38:29-58
26 Sappington,D.,(1991),"Incentive in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives,5:45-66
27 Bikhchandani,S.,Hirshleifer D.and I.Welch,(1992),"A Theory of fads,Fashion,Changes as Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy,100(5):P992-1026
28 凯恩斯(1936):就业、货币和利息通论,北京:商务印书馆,1983年版,Custom and Cultural,P135
29[1]Dewatripont,M.,L,Jewitt,and J.Tirole,(1999a),"The Economics of Career Concerns,PartⅠ:"Comparing Information Structures",Review of Economic Studies,66:183-198.
[2]Dewatripont,M.,L,Jewitt,and J.Tirole,(1999b),"The Economics of Career Concerns,PartⅡ;"Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies",Review of EconomicStudies,66:199-217
30 参见如下2篇文章:[1]郑江淮,信息追随、管理者从众行为与报酬合约,中国工业经济,2002,3。
[2]郑江淮,企业家行为的制度分析,北京:人民出版社,2004年版。
31 Bilchchandani,Sushil,D.,Hirshleifer and I.Welch,(1992),"A Theory of Fads,Fashion,Custom,and Cultural Changes in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy,100(5):992-1026
32 姚伟、黄卓、郭磊,公司智力理论前言综述。经济研究,2003。5.
33 另一方面,补偿风险的增加也会诱使经理人的从众行为,他们可能放弃高额补偿而不愿企业去冒风险(Mishra,McConaughy and Gobeli,2000)。
34 Narayanan,M.P,(1985),"Managerial incentives for short-term results," Journal of Finance,40(5):1469-1484
35 Narayanan,M.P,(1985),"Managerial incentives for short-term results," Journal of Finance,40(5):1469-1484
36 Palley,T.L,(1997),"Managerial Turnover and Theory of Short-termism,"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi32:547-557
37 Jensen,M.and K.Murphy,(1988),"Compensation and Incentives:Practice vs.Theory",Journal of Finance,pp593-616
38 Khanna,N.and A.Poulsen,(1995),"Managers of Financially Distressed Firms:Villainy of Scapegoats?"Journal of Finance,50:919-940
39 早在50年代就为博弈论专家所共知但无人曾发表,后由Fudenberg and Maskin(1986)等扩展和完善的无名氏定理(Folk theorem)说明了,在无限次重复博弈中,如果参与人有足够的耐心(认为朱来的收益与现在的收益几乎无差别),那么,任何满足个人理性的可行的支付向量都可以通过一个特定的子博弈精炼纳什均衡来得到。换句话说,只要参与人的交易具有长期性,并且交易双方对朱来收益的贴现足够高,则双方将从长期利益出发来维持相互的合作.这就避免了在单阶段的博弈中,自利的当事人沉迷于机会主义行为而无法合作的情况出现。
40 参见Fama,E,Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.笔者整理。
41 Holmstrom,B.,(1982a),"Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics,13(2):324-340,Holmstrom,B,Managerial Incentive Problem-A Dynamic Perspective[C].in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck·Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics,1982.
42 Holmstrom,B.Managerial Incentive Problems:A Dynamic Perspective[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:169-182.
43 Zabojnik,J.,2001.On the efficiency of markets for managers.Ecomomic Theory,18,701-710.
44 Meyer,M·and Vickers,J·,Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(3):547-581.
45[美]克莱因,契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用,载[美]科斯、哈特、斯蒂格利茨等著,拉斯·沃因、汉斯·韦坎德编,契约经济学,北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版.
46 Hart,O.,(1995),Firms,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford,Clarendon Press
47 Abreu,D.and F.Gul,(2000),"Bargaining and Reputation," Eeonometrica,68:85-117
48 Abreu,D.and D.Pearee,(2002),"Bargaining,Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games,"working paper
49 祖克尔(Zucker,1986)曾将信任的产生机制划分为三种,一是基于过程的信任模式;二是基于特征的信任模式:三是基于制度的信任模式。第一种模式依赖于过去的交易和经验,这表明可根据一个人过去的行为和声誉而决定是否给予信任。如果市场有“记忆”功能,这种模式的信任原则就会对职业经理人的行为产生约束作用。Yongmin,Chen(2000)也认为信任可以降低契约成本,并有助于提高企业绩效。
50 Tadelis,S.,(1999),"What's in Name?Reputation as a Tradable Asset,"American Economic Review,89(3):548-563
51 Mailath,G.J.and L.Samuelson,(2001),"Who Wants a Good Reputation?" Review of Economic Studies,Blackwell Publishing,68(2):415-441
52 对于生产者而言,丧失了声誉,财富就要减少,减少的幅度为所失去的未来收入的资本化现值。所以,声誉是一件资产,也就是说关于预期绩效的可靠信息是一件高成本、有价值的商品。
53 Breton,Michele,P Gibbons Behavior,"Working Paper,and K.Murphy,(2001),"Dynamic Production Teams with Hautes Etudes Commerciales
54 Grundfest,J.A,,(1990),"subordination of American Capital," Journal of Financial Economics,27,September
55[1]Kreps David M·,Wilson Robert,Sequential Equilibria[J].Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-895.
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[3]Milgrom Paul,Roberts John.Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information:An Equilibrium Analysis[J].Econometrica,1982,50(2):443-461.后来人们关于声誉形成的大量文献都起源于这三篇论文。
56 Tadelis,S·,The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism[J].Journal of Political Economy,2002,110(4):854-882.
57 Milbourn,T·,CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68:233-262.
58 Barro,R·,Reputation in a model of monetary policy within complete information[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1986,17:3-17.
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61 肖条军,盛昭翰,两阶段基于信号博弈的声誉模型,[J],管理科学学报,2003,6(1):27-31。
62 蒲勇健,赵国强,内在动机与外在激励[J],中国管理科学,2003,11(5):95-100。
63 Hou Guangming,JinJun,GanRenchu.The reputation model of multi-stage dynamic game[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology,1999,8(1):1-6
64 刘惠萍、张世英,基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究,中国管理科学,2005,8.Vol.13,No.4
65 严建苗、万建军,国有企业间经理人市场的声誉机制分析,数量经济技术经济研究,2002,3
66 欧阳润平、余鑫.从声誉理论看“59岁现象”,中国民营科技与经济,2002,8
67 余鑫、蔡江川、李菊容,从声誉理论透视“59岁现象”,南昌航空工业学院学报(社会科学版),2005,7。
68 肖艳、石磊,隐性激励与国有企业经营者激励机制重构,当代财经,2002,3
69 刘琳,基于经理人市场的隐性激励分析,辽宁经济,2006,4
70 杨伟文、刘梦雨,经理市场的隐性激励约束效应分析及对策,中南工业大学学报(社会科学版),2001,11.Vol.7,No.4
71 Kreps,D.and R.Wilson,1982.Sequential equilibrium.Econometrica 50,863-94.
72 颜剑英,职业晋升机制与国有企业经理行为的激励问题,科学·经济·社会,2003,1。
73 KMRW两阶段声誉模型只一般性地证明了声誉对人的行为的影响,其最初的研究着眼点并不在经理人市场,而是源于关于消费者重复购买与垄断厂商提供产品或服务质量之间关系的讨论。他们的研究结果表明,只要消费者充分经常地重复购买垄断厂商的产品或服务(重复次数足够多),即使垄断厂商有很小的可能性是非利润最大化的,还是会导致利润最大化类型的垄断厂商树立高质量的声誉。本文在这个声誉模型的基础上构建了一个经理人市场两阶段声誉模型。
74 Holmstrom,B.,1982.Managerial incentive problems:A dynamic perspective.In:Essays in economics and manage ment in honor of Lars Wahlbeck,pp.209-230.Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration.
75 Zabojnik,J.,2001.On the efficiency of markets for managers.Ecomomic Theory,18,701-710.
77 Hart,O.,and B.,Holmstrom,1987.Theory of contracts,in Advances in economic theory:fifth world congress,edited by T.Bewley.Cambridge University Press.
78 张进,李文,王海燕,公司股权结构、经理人市场与管理层激励,东南大学学报(哲社版),2001,2:62-64.
79 张进,李文,王海燕,公司股权结构、经理人市场与管理层激励,东南大学学报(哲社版),2001,2:62-64.
81 Axelrod,R,1984.The evolution of cooperation.Basic Books,New York.
84 Medoffand Abraham,1981.Are Those Paid More Really MoreProductive? The case of experience.Journal of Labor Resources 16(Spring),186-216.
86 Jensen,M.C.,Murphy,K.J.,1990.Performance pay and top-management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,98,225-264.
96 参见王珺,双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释,经济研究,2001,8:71-78。
97 同上。
98 参见王珺,双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释,经济研究,2001,8:71-78。及袁江天,要素市场化与经理人市场的隐性激励,天津大学博士学位论文,2004
99 在国企经营者与所任职企业间的一次性博弈关系中,国企经营者自己也不知道白己会在这个企业干多久,即使想干出成绩,也是会急功近利,他没有积极性为企业的长远发展而谋.
100 对于国企经营者的努力成本,在前文中,我们作了经营性努力与非经营性努力的分辨。而在这里博弈论的分析框架下。为了分析方便又不失分析的意义,我们将国企经营者的努力成本(负效用)改为只作努力水平高低的分辨。
101 侯光明,甘仞初,隐蔽行为的约束机制研究,北京理工大学学报,1999,2:122-126。
119 李春琦,石磊.国外企业激励理论述评[J],经济学动态,2001(6),61-66。
120 行政性任命制度也使得企业经营者的行为政治化,企业经营者官员化.但经营者与官员又有着不同的价值取向,主要表现为官员的基本特征是尽可能地追求个人或集团的升迁,对政治斗争特别敏感,在官僚体制内强调服从与纪律,其行为是政治权力驱动的。而经营者的主要目标是企业利润最优化,强调独立的市场判断能力和创新精神,是利润驱动型的。
121 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海人民出版社,2000:454
122 中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[R].管理世界,2000(4)
123 黄群慧、李春琦.报酬、声誉与经营者长期化行为的激励[J],中国工业经济,2001(1):58-63
124 黄群慧、李春琦.报酬、声誉与经营者长期化行为的激励[J],中国工业经济,2001(1):58-63
125 周小亮.市场配置资源的制度修正[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
126 谢茂拾.论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
127 陈柳钦,进一步发展和完善我国民营经济,特区经济,2004年1期,P25-29
128 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
129 吴炯、胡培、耿剑锋,人力资本定价的逆向选择问题研究,中国工业经济,2002(4)
133 按照Nolson的定义,所谓“经验商品”,是与“search good”相对应的一个概念,后者指其特征很容易在购买前就鉴别清楚的产品或服务,而“经验商品”则是指其特征和质量很难在购买前鉴别清楚的产品或服务,包括非耐用品中的酒,耐用品中的电器、汽车,以及大多数专业服务如律师、会计师和航空公司等,都可以看成为经验商品.这样,经验商品市场的特点自然就是消费者对商品的实际使用经验非常宝贵。在Nelson(1970)首次提出这一概念之后,随后在产业组织学、市场学、管理学以及劳动经济学等学科中都得到了广泛的运用.
134 周立群,陈晓东,我国企业经营者的演变轨迹与职业企业家队伍的培育,南开学报,2000,3:10-15.
135 周立群,陈晓东,我国企业经营者的演变轨迹与职业企业家队伍的培育,南开学报,2000,3:10-15。
137 观点摘自杨河清,唐军著,企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究,中国劳动与社会保障出版社,2004年8月版,P156。
138 Vancil,R.F.,1987.Passing the baton:managing the process of CEO succession.Boston:Harvard Business School Press.
139 Brickley,J.A.,Coles,J.L.,Linck,J.S.,,1999.What happens to ceos after retire?Newevidence on career concerns,horizon problems,and CEO incentives.Journal of Financial Economics,52,341-377.
140 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
141 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
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2 广义的法人治理结构包括外部治理和内部治理结构,二者在逻辑层次上是不同的,内部治理结构是以外部治理,即市场竞争机制的激励和约束为基础的:内部治理结构只有在适应外部市场竞争机制的条件下才能有效率。在外部市场条件不具备的情况下,任何试图机械套用他国的内部治理结构模式的努力,都难以获得理想的效果。高效的激励必须是市场合约的隐性激励与企业合约的显性激励的有机结合。参见林毅夫等,充分信息与国有企业改革,[M]上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1997。
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8 内部劳动力市场的理论渊源可以追溯到上个世纪60年代末,70年代初。一批制度主义经济学家对传统的劳动力市场范式提出了挑战,创立了分层劳动力市场理论模型(segmented labour market SLM理论),内部劳动力市场的概念被提出。
10 威廉姆森,资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约,北京:商务印书馆,2002年版。
11 机会主义和道德风险的存在将可能导致类似于克莱因所描述的通用汽车公司和费舍公司之间的“敲竹杠”行为的发生(参见克莱因,契约经济学,经济科学出版社,1999年中译本)。
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18 当然,职位消费中的漏税行为,是公众买单:此外,还有短期利益集中化行为,做假帐行为等。这些暂不属于本文涉及的研究范围。
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20 早在50年代就为博弈论专家所共知但无人曾发表,后由Fudenberg and Maskin(1986)等扩展和完善的无名氏定理(Folk theorem)说明了,在无限次重复博弈中,如果参与人有足够的耐心(认为未来的收益与现在的收益几乎无差别),那么,任何满足个人理性的可行的支付向量都可以通过一个特定的子博弈精炼纳什均衡来得到。换句话说,只要参与人的交易具有长期性,并且交易双方对朱来收益的贴现足够高,则双方将从长期利益出发来维持相互的合作。这就避免了在单阶段的博弈中,自利的当事人沉迷于机会主义行为而无法合作的情况出现。
21 黄群慧,企业家激励约束与国有企业改革,北京.中国人民大学出版社,2000年版.
22 Holmstrom,B.,(1982b),"Managerial incentive problems—a dynamic perspective," in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars,Wahlbeck Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics
23 转引自张正堂,企业家报酬的决定:理论与实证研究。北京:经济管理出版社,2003年3月版。
24 Martin,D.and L.Michael,(2001),"Social Norms and Moral Hazard",the Economic Journal,Ⅲ(7):506-525
25 Kang,J.and A.Shivdasani,(1995),"Firm Performance,Corporate Governance,and Top Executive Turnover in Japan",Journal ofFinancial Economics,38:29-58
26 Sappington,D.,(1991),"Incentive in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives,5:45-66
27 Bikhchandani,S.,Hirshleifer D.and I.Welch,(1992),"A Theory of fads,Fashion,Changes as Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy,100(5):P992-1026
28 凯恩斯(1936):就业、货币和利息通论,北京:商务印书馆,1983年版,Custom and Cultural,P135
29[1]Dewatripont,M.,L,Jewitt,and J.Tirole,(1999a),"The Economics of Career Concerns,PartⅠ:"Comparing Information Structures",Review of Economic Studies,66:183-198.
[2]Dewatripont,M.,L,Jewitt,and J.Tirole,(1999b),"The Economics of Career Concerns,PartⅡ;"Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies",Review of EconomicStudies,66:199-217
30 参见如下2篇文章:[1]郑江淮,信息追随、管理者从众行为与报酬合约,中国工业经济,2002,3。
[2]郑江淮,企业家行为的制度分析,北京:人民出版社,2004年版。
31 Bilchchandani,Sushil,D.,Hirshleifer and I.Welch,(1992),"A Theory of Fads,Fashion,Custom,and Cultural Changes in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy,100(5):992-1026
32 姚伟、黄卓、郭磊,公司智力理论前言综述。经济研究,2003。5.
33 另一方面,补偿风险的增加也会诱使经理人的从众行为,他们可能放弃高额补偿而不愿企业去冒风险(Mishra,McConaughy and Gobeli,2000)。
34 Narayanan,M.P,(1985),"Managerial incentives for short-term results," Journal of Finance,40(5):1469-1484
35 Narayanan,M.P,(1985),"Managerial incentives for short-term results," Journal of Finance,40(5):1469-1484
36 Palley,T.L,(1997),"Managerial Turnover and Theory of Short-termism,"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi32:547-557
37 Jensen,M.and K.Murphy,(1988),"Compensation and Incentives:Practice vs.Theory",Journal of Finance,pp593-616
38 Khanna,N.and A.Poulsen,(1995),"Managers of Financially Distressed Firms:Villainy of Scapegoats?"Journal of Finance,50:919-940
39 早在50年代就为博弈论专家所共知但无人曾发表,后由Fudenberg and Maskin(1986)等扩展和完善的无名氏定理(Folk theorem)说明了,在无限次重复博弈中,如果参与人有足够的耐心(认为朱来的收益与现在的收益几乎无差别),那么,任何满足个人理性的可行的支付向量都可以通过一个特定的子博弈精炼纳什均衡来得到。换句话说,只要参与人的交易具有长期性,并且交易双方对朱来收益的贴现足够高,则双方将从长期利益出发来维持相互的合作.这就避免了在单阶段的博弈中,自利的当事人沉迷于机会主义行为而无法合作的情况出现。
40 参见Fama,E,Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.笔者整理。
41 Holmstrom,B.,(1982a),"Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics,13(2):324-340,Holmstrom,B,Managerial Incentive Problem-A Dynamic Perspective[C].in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck·Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics,1982.
42 Holmstrom,B.Managerial Incentive Problems:A Dynamic Perspective[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:169-182.
43 Zabojnik,J.,2001.On the efficiency of markets for managers.Ecomomic Theory,18,701-710.
44 Meyer,M·and Vickers,J·,Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(3):547-581.
45[美]克莱因,契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用,载[美]科斯、哈特、斯蒂格利茨等著,拉斯·沃因、汉斯·韦坎德编,契约经济学,北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版.
46 Hart,O.,(1995),Firms,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford,Clarendon Press
47 Abreu,D.and F.Gul,(2000),"Bargaining and Reputation," Eeonometrica,68:85-117
48 Abreu,D.and D.Pearee,(2002),"Bargaining,Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games,"working paper
49 祖克尔(Zucker,1986)曾将信任的产生机制划分为三种,一是基于过程的信任模式;二是基于特征的信任模式:三是基于制度的信任模式。第一种模式依赖于过去的交易和经验,这表明可根据一个人过去的行为和声誉而决定是否给予信任。如果市场有“记忆”功能,这种模式的信任原则就会对职业经理人的行为产生约束作用。Yongmin,Chen(2000)也认为信任可以降低契约成本,并有助于提高企业绩效。
50 Tadelis,S.,(1999),"What's in Name?Reputation as a Tradable Asset,"American Economic Review,89(3):548-563
51 Mailath,G.J.and L.Samuelson,(2001),"Who Wants a Good Reputation?" Review of Economic Studies,Blackwell Publishing,68(2):415-441
52 对于生产者而言,丧失了声誉,财富就要减少,减少的幅度为所失去的未来收入的资本化现值。所以,声誉是一件资产,也就是说关于预期绩效的可靠信息是一件高成本、有价值的商品。
53 Breton,Michele,P Gibbons Behavior,"Working Paper,and K.Murphy,(2001),"Dynamic Production Teams with Hautes Etudes Commerciales
54 Grundfest,J.A,,(1990),"subordination of American Capital," Journal of Financial Economics,27,September
55[1]Kreps David M·,Wilson Robert,Sequential Equilibria[J].Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-895.
[2]Kreps David M·,Milgrom Paul,Roberts John,Wilson Robert.Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Pris-oners' Dilemma[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):245-253.
[3]Milgrom Paul,Roberts John.Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information:An Equilibrium Analysis[J].Econometrica,1982,50(2):443-461.后来人们关于声誉形成的大量文献都起源于这三篇论文。
56 Tadelis,S·,The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism[J].Journal of Political Economy,2002,110(4):854-882.
57 Milbourn,T·,CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68:233-262.
58 Barro,R·,Reputation in a model of monetary policy within complete information[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1986,17:3-17.
59 Vickers,·,Signaling in a model of monetary policy within complete information[C].Oxford Economic Papers,1986,38:443-498.
60 李军林,声誉、控制权与博弈均衡——一个关于国有企业经营绩效的博弈分析[J],上海财经大学学报,2002,4(4):38-45。
61 肖条军,盛昭翰,两阶段基于信号博弈的声誉模型,[J],管理科学学报,2003,6(1):27-31。
62 蒲勇健,赵国强,内在动机与外在激励[J],中国管理科学,2003,11(5):95-100。
63 Hou Guangming,JinJun,GanRenchu.The reputation model of multi-stage dynamic game[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology,1999,8(1):1-6
64 刘惠萍、张世英,基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究,中国管理科学,2005,8.Vol.13,No.4
65 严建苗、万建军,国有企业间经理人市场的声誉机制分析,数量经济技术经济研究,2002,3
66 欧阳润平、余鑫.从声誉理论看“59岁现象”,中国民营科技与经济,2002,8
67 余鑫、蔡江川、李菊容,从声誉理论透视“59岁现象”,南昌航空工业学院学报(社会科学版),2005,7。
68 肖艳、石磊,隐性激励与国有企业经营者激励机制重构,当代财经,2002,3
69 刘琳,基于经理人市场的隐性激励分析,辽宁经济,2006,4
70 杨伟文、刘梦雨,经理市场的隐性激励约束效应分析及对策,中南工业大学学报(社会科学版),2001,11.Vol.7,No.4
71 Kreps,D.and R.Wilson,1982.Sequential equilibrium.Econometrica 50,863-94.
72 颜剑英,职业晋升机制与国有企业经理行为的激励问题,科学·经济·社会,2003,1。
73 KMRW两阶段声誉模型只一般性地证明了声誉对人的行为的影响,其最初的研究着眼点并不在经理人市场,而是源于关于消费者重复购买与垄断厂商提供产品或服务质量之间关系的讨论。他们的研究结果表明,只要消费者充分经常地重复购买垄断厂商的产品或服务(重复次数足够多),即使垄断厂商有很小的可能性是非利润最大化的,还是会导致利润最大化类型的垄断厂商树立高质量的声誉。本文在这个声誉模型的基础上构建了一个经理人市场两阶段声誉模型。
74 Holmstrom,B.,1982.Managerial incentive problems:A dynamic perspective.In:Essays in economics and manage ment in honor of Lars Wahlbeck,pp.209-230.Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration.
75 Zabojnik,J.,2001.On the efficiency of markets for managers.Ecomomic Theory,18,701-710.
77 Hart,O.,and B.,Holmstrom,1987.Theory of contracts,in Advances in economic theory:fifth world congress,edited by T.Bewley.Cambridge University Press.
78 张进,李文,王海燕,公司股权结构、经理人市场与管理层激励,东南大学学报(哲社版),2001,2:62-64.
79 张进,李文,王海燕,公司股权结构、经理人市场与管理层激励,东南大学学报(哲社版),2001,2:62-64.
81 Axelrod,R,1984.The evolution of cooperation.Basic Books,New York.
84 Medoffand Abraham,1981.Are Those Paid More Really MoreProductive? The case of experience.Journal of Labor Resources 16(Spring),186-216.
86 Jensen,M.C.,Murphy,K.J.,1990.Performance pay and top-management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,98,225-264.
96 参见王珺,双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释,经济研究,2001,8:71-78。
97 同上。
98 参见王珺,双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释,经济研究,2001,8:71-78。及袁江天,要素市场化与经理人市场的隐性激励,天津大学博士学位论文,2004
99 在国企经营者与所任职企业间的一次性博弈关系中,国企经营者自己也不知道白己会在这个企业干多久,即使想干出成绩,也是会急功近利,他没有积极性为企业的长远发展而谋.
100 对于国企经营者的努力成本,在前文中,我们作了经营性努力与非经营性努力的分辨。而在这里博弈论的分析框架下。为了分析方便又不失分析的意义,我们将国企经营者的努力成本(负效用)改为只作努力水平高低的分辨。
101 侯光明,甘仞初,隐蔽行为的约束机制研究,北京理工大学学报,1999,2:122-126。
119 李春琦,石磊.国外企业激励理论述评[J],经济学动态,2001(6),61-66。
120 行政性任命制度也使得企业经营者的行为政治化,企业经营者官员化.但经营者与官员又有着不同的价值取向,主要表现为官员的基本特征是尽可能地追求个人或集团的升迁,对政治斗争特别敏感,在官僚体制内强调服从与纪律,其行为是政治权力驱动的。而经营者的主要目标是企业利润最优化,强调独立的市场判断能力和创新精神,是利润驱动型的。
121 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海人民出版社,2000:454
122 中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[R].管理世界,2000(4)
123 黄群慧、李春琦.报酬、声誉与经营者长期化行为的激励[J],中国工业经济,2001(1):58-63
124 黄群慧、李春琦.报酬、声誉与经营者长期化行为的激励[J],中国工业经济,2001(1):58-63
125 周小亮.市场配置资源的制度修正[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
126 谢茂拾.论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
127 陈柳钦,进一步发展和完善我国民营经济,特区经济,2004年1期,P25-29
128 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
129 吴炯、胡培、耿剑锋,人力资本定价的逆向选择问题研究,中国工业经济,2002(4)
133 按照Nolson的定义,所谓“经验商品”,是与“search good”相对应的一个概念,后者指其特征很容易在购买前就鉴别清楚的产品或服务,而“经验商品”则是指其特征和质量很难在购买前鉴别清楚的产品或服务,包括非耐用品中的酒,耐用品中的电器、汽车,以及大多数专业服务如律师、会计师和航空公司等,都可以看成为经验商品.这样,经验商品市场的特点自然就是消费者对商品的实际使用经验非常宝贵。在Nelson(1970)首次提出这一概念之后,随后在产业组织学、市场学、管理学以及劳动经济学等学科中都得到了广泛的运用.
134 周立群,陈晓东,我国企业经营者的演变轨迹与职业企业家队伍的培育,南开学报,2000,3:10-15.
135 周立群,陈晓东,我国企业经营者的演变轨迹与职业企业家队伍的培育,南开学报,2000,3:10-15。
137 观点摘自杨河清,唐军著,企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究,中国劳动与社会保障出版社,2004年8月版,P156。
138 Vancil,R.F.,1987.Passing the baton:managing the process of CEO succession.Boston:Harvard Business School Press.
139 Brickley,J.A.,Coles,J.L.,Linck,J.S.,,1999.What happens to ceos after retire?Newevidence on career concerns,horizon problems,and CEO incentives.Journal of Financial Economics,52,341-377.
140 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
141 谢茂拾,论建立经营者人力资本的识别评估机制问题,广东商学院学报,2002,5
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