母子公司关系法律规制研究
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摘要
母子公司的出现是时代发展的产物。自上世纪中期以来,整个世界范围内的市场竞争日趋激烈,许多公司为了在竞争中立于不败之地,不断扩大公司规模,公司集团化的趋势势不可挡。采用设立分公司的形式容易扩大本公司经营风险,毕竟分公司不是具有独立法人资格的实体,如果分公司出现问题本公司需要承担责任;但子公司就不一样,具有独立的法人资格,如果子公司破产,母公司仅以投资额为限承担责任。这样,母公司不但聚集资本扩大了规模,增强了企业的竞争力,还可以改善企业外部的经营环境,同时子公司也可以通过母公司获得更多的商业信息及资本支持。因而,大的企业集团大都采用母子公司的结构。但是,母子公司关系是一把“双刃剑”,伴随着经济效益的同时,也给传统的公司法理论带来了很大的挑战:其一,母公司对子公司有必要控制权,母公司往往会为了公司集团的利益对子公司操纵过度,使子公司失去了自主权,造成对子公司及少数股东利益的损害;其二,母公司和子公司都具有独立的法人资格,经营活动中母公司过度控制子公司其利益受到损害的同时,母公司又会利用股东的有限责任原则规避义务,这对子公司债权人的利益十分不利;其三,母子公司相互持股往往会使公司资本的反复计算,虚伪扩张,助长内幕交易行为,造成公司经营和监管的失控。要解决上述问题就必须对母公司的强势地位予以限制,通过立法保护子公司少数股东及债权人的利益。值得欣慰的是西方国家早已对此以积极的态度做出了回应,制定了相关的措施,如通过控制股东的诚信义务及派生诉讼来保护子公司及少数股东的利益;通过“揭开公司面纱”原则或“公司人格否认”来保障债权人的合法权益;通过限制母子公司相互持股或已持股份的表决权,来避免交叉持股所带来的不利影响,等等。
在我国,母子公司关系同样具有重要的意义。我国处于社会主义的初级阶段,经济改革及发展刚刚起步,但企业集团中母子公司结构也越来越显现出不可比拟的优势。对于这一经济现象,我国法律也有所涉及,如《公司法》第13条规定:“公司可以设立子公司,子公司具有企业法人资格,依法独立承担民事责任”。这一规定为我国公司结构中母子公司关系的存在及子公司的法律地位的确立提供了基本依据。但公司法未对母子公司的权利义务关系做出进一步积极有效的规定,使得母子公司权利义务关系的法律规制在立法上形成了真空。本文即以此立足点,重点讨论了西方国家对母子公司关系的法律规制,并对我国立法如何完善母子公司关系的立法提出一点粗浅的看法:对子公司
The occurrence of parents-subsidiary companies is a trend of economic development. Since the middle of last century, the competition of the markets becoming much tenser, for the sake of becoming the winner in the competition, many companies enlarged their scales, and Bloc Company became an inevitable trend. Since the sub-branches are not an independence entity, if the branch have some problems, the main company will bear the burden; on the contrary, the mode of parents-subsidiary is different, the subsidiary company has corporation qualification, if it bankrupt, the parent company is only responsible for the investment, because the subsidiary company is independent from the bloc. So, the parent company not only enlarged it's scale, toned up it's ability of competition, improved the outer environment of management ,but also the subsidiary company can get more capital and business information. Therefore, most of the blocs adapt the mode of parent-subsidiary companies. But the mode of parent-subsidiary companies is a two-edged sword ,with the economic benefit ,the traditional law theory of firm was challenged: first, commonly the parent company have the necessary power of controlling the subsidiary company, but in many case the parent company abused this power, so the subsidiary company lost it's independence and the power of self-management .It is harmful to the interest of subsidiary company and it's few shareholders ; secondly, since the parent company and the subsidiary company are independent from each other ,if the parent company makes the subsidiary company lost it's independence , the subsidiary company will become the tool of the parent company, it is harmful to the creditor; thirdly, if both the parent-subsidiary companies owned the stocks of each others, the harm is obvious, it will make the capital of the company accounted repeatedly, help the inner exchange, makes the company's management lost control. For resolving these questions, we must restrict the power of parent company; protect the benefit of the subsidiary company and its few shareholders also the creditors by legislation.Being gratified, the western countries were responded for this question with a high attitude, making the related regulations, such as: by using the doctrine of enforcing shareholder's duty of being honest and the "derive lawsuit" to protect the subsidiary company
and its few shareholders; by using the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil'" or "Disregard of the Corporate Entity" to protect the interest of the creditors of subsidiaries; by restricting the stocks' across owning or the already owned stocks' voting right to avoid the bad effect etc.'In our country, the mode of parent-subsidiary companies also has a deep meaning. We are in the primary step of socialism; the development of the economy is just in the beginning, but this mode has already showed us its advantage. For this economic phenomenon, we have a little legislation, such as no. 13: "Companies can set the subsidiary company, the subsidiary company has the corporation qualification, can take on the civil duty independently". This legislation set a regulation for the parent-subsidiary companies in our country, but lack of detailed rules about how to protect the interest of the subsidiary company and its few shareholders, and also can't protect the interest of the creditors.The above mentioned are main content of this thesis, the stress is discussing the legislation for the relationship between parents-subsidiary companies, and also have some suggestions of the related legislation in our country: In the aspect of protecting the interest of the subsidiary company and its few shareholders, we should make more special legislations, such as giving the shareholders the right of suing the parent company, and add the legislation of the dominating shareholder's duty of being honest; introducing the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil" to protect the interest of the creditors of subsidiaries: Consummating the parents-subsidiary companies" share across holding by the principle of forbidden with exception.
在我国,母子公司关系同样具有重要的意义。我国处于社会主义的初级阶段,经济改革及发展刚刚起步,但企业集团中母子公司结构也越来越显现出不可比拟的优势。对于这一经济现象,我国法律也有所涉及,如《公司法》第13条规定:“公司可以设立子公司,子公司具有企业法人资格,依法独立承担民事责任”。这一规定为我国公司结构中母子公司关系的存在及子公司的法律地位的确立提供了基本依据。但公司法未对母子公司的权利义务关系做出进一步积极有效的规定,使得母子公司权利义务关系的法律规制在立法上形成了真空。本文即以此立足点,重点讨论了西方国家对母子公司关系的法律规制,并对我国立法如何完善母子公司关系的立法提出一点粗浅的看法:对子公司
The occurrence of parents-subsidiary companies is a trend of economic development. Since the middle of last century, the competition of the markets becoming much tenser, for the sake of becoming the winner in the competition, many companies enlarged their scales, and Bloc Company became an inevitable trend. Since the sub-branches are not an independence entity, if the branch have some problems, the main company will bear the burden; on the contrary, the mode of parents-subsidiary is different, the subsidiary company has corporation qualification, if it bankrupt, the parent company is only responsible for the investment, because the subsidiary company is independent from the bloc. So, the parent company not only enlarged it's scale, toned up it's ability of competition, improved the outer environment of management ,but also the subsidiary company can get more capital and business information. Therefore, most of the blocs adapt the mode of parent-subsidiary companies. But the mode of parent-subsidiary companies is a two-edged sword ,with the economic benefit ,the traditional law theory of firm was challenged: first, commonly the parent company have the necessary power of controlling the subsidiary company, but in many case the parent company abused this power, so the subsidiary company lost it's independence and the power of self-management .It is harmful to the interest of subsidiary company and it's few shareholders ; secondly, since the parent company and the subsidiary company are independent from each other ,if the parent company makes the subsidiary company lost it's independence , the subsidiary company will become the tool of the parent company, it is harmful to the creditor; thirdly, if both the parent-subsidiary companies owned the stocks of each others, the harm is obvious, it will make the capital of the company accounted repeatedly, help the inner exchange, makes the company's management lost control. For resolving these questions, we must restrict the power of parent company; protect the benefit of the subsidiary company and its few shareholders also the creditors by legislation.Being gratified, the western countries were responded for this question with a high attitude, making the related regulations, such as: by using the doctrine of enforcing shareholder's duty of being honest and the "derive lawsuit" to protect the subsidiary company
and its few shareholders; by using the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil'" or "Disregard of the Corporate Entity" to protect the interest of the creditors of subsidiaries; by restricting the stocks' across owning or the already owned stocks' voting right to avoid the bad effect etc.'In our country, the mode of parent-subsidiary companies also has a deep meaning. We are in the primary step of socialism; the development of the economy is just in the beginning, but this mode has already showed us its advantage. For this economic phenomenon, we have a little legislation, such as
引文
1.郭富青:《论现代企业集团组织运行的法律机制》,载《甘肃政法学院学报》2000年第2期。
2.廖崇宏:《德国企业集团法研究》,载《万国法律》(台北)1997年第8期。
3.朱慈蕴:《公司法人格否认法理在母子公司中的运用》,载《法律科学》1998年第5期。
4.王志诚:《关系企业之法律规范》,载《比较法研究》1999年第3、4期。
5.张士元、朱苏人:《国有控股公司理论与实践》,载徐学鹿主编《商法研究》第四辑,人民法院出版社2001年版。
6.王有文:《企业集团中母子公司关系探析》,载《上海企业》1998年03期。
7.朱留虎:《浅析母子公司的相互关系》,载《池州师专学报》1998年01期。
8.辜明安、刘兴旺:《母子公司及其价值初论》,载《重庆师院学报》(哲学社会科学版)1999年04期。
9.辜明安、蔡维力:《母子公司关系的法律分析》,载《重庆大学学报》(社会科学版)2000年02期。
10.郭富青、王喆:《公司集团化对公司法的挑战》,载《人文杂志》1999年06期。
11.胡庆春:《母子公司经济关系和法律责任探讨》,载《冶金管理》2001年01期。
12.马新福:《论公司集团中母子公司关系的法律规制》,载《经济师》2002年08期。
13.沈乐平:《企业集团母子公司关系的法律透析》,载《时代法学》2003年02期。
14.陈继梅:《论母子公司结构中有限责任滥用的救济》,载《河北法学》2000年06期。
15.张永志、袁仕棠:《企业集团内部母子公司关系的法律规制》,载《理论学刊》1998年01期。
16.孙北南:《母公司对其子公司债务承担的法律思考》,载《扬州大学商学院学报》1996年05期。
17.陈现杰:《公司人格否认法理评述》,载《外国法译评》1996年03期。
18.龙英峰:《“揭开公司面纱”理论之探悉及借鉴》,载《现代法学》1995年01期。
19.张民安:《公司少数股东的法律救济》,载《法制与社会发展》,1995年第3期。
20.许陈生:《论公司相互持股及其立法完善》,载《兰州学刊》2004年04期。
1.叶林著:《中国公司法》,中国审计出版社1999年版。
2.卞耀武主编:《当代外国公司法》,法律出版社,1995年版。
3.朱慈蕴著:《公司法人格否认法理研究》,法律出版社,1998年版,第251页。
4.吴越著:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社,2003年版。
5.施天涛著:《关联企业法律问题研究》,法律出版社,1998年版。
6.赖英超著:《公司法论文集》,台湾证券发展基金会编印,1988年增订再版。
7.[美]罗伯特.C.克拉克著,胡平等译:《公司法则》工商出版社1999年第1版。
8.卞耀武主编:《德国股份公司法》法律出版社1998年版。
9.罗伯特·霍恩:《德国民商法导论》,中国大百科全书出版社1997年版。王书江、殿建平译:《日本商法》,煤炭工业出版社,1994年版。
10.甘培忠著:《企业与公司法学》北京大学出版社2004年版。
11.[英]迈恩哈特著:《欧洲九国公司法》,赵旭东等译,中国政法大学出版社出版,1988年版。
12.徐学鹿主编:《商法研究》第四辑,人民法院出版社,2001年版。
13.蒋一苇主编:《企业集团概论》,中国劳动出版社,1991年版。
14.黄文忠、顾宝孚、颜旭若主编:《企业集团的理论与实践》,贵州人民出版社,1991年版。
15.范健、蒋大兴:《公司法论》,南京大学出版社1997年版。
16.王长斌著:《企业集团法律比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2004年版。
17. Robert W. Hamilton, the Law of Corporations, West Group 1996.
18. P. I. Blumberg, the Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Law, 1987.
19. P. I. Blumberg, the Multinational Challenge to Corporate Law, Oxford University Press 1993.
2.廖崇宏:《德国企业集团法研究》,载《万国法律》(台北)1997年第8期。
3.朱慈蕴:《公司法人格否认法理在母子公司中的运用》,载《法律科学》1998年第5期。
4.王志诚:《关系企业之法律规范》,载《比较法研究》1999年第3、4期。
5.张士元、朱苏人:《国有控股公司理论与实践》,载徐学鹿主编《商法研究》第四辑,人民法院出版社2001年版。
6.王有文:《企业集团中母子公司关系探析》,载《上海企业》1998年03期。
7.朱留虎:《浅析母子公司的相互关系》,载《池州师专学报》1998年01期。
8.辜明安、刘兴旺:《母子公司及其价值初论》,载《重庆师院学报》(哲学社会科学版)1999年04期。
9.辜明安、蔡维力:《母子公司关系的法律分析》,载《重庆大学学报》(社会科学版)2000年02期。
10.郭富青、王喆:《公司集团化对公司法的挑战》,载《人文杂志》1999年06期。
11.胡庆春:《母子公司经济关系和法律责任探讨》,载《冶金管理》2001年01期。
12.马新福:《论公司集团中母子公司关系的法律规制》,载《经济师》2002年08期。
13.沈乐平:《企业集团母子公司关系的法律透析》,载《时代法学》2003年02期。
14.陈继梅:《论母子公司结构中有限责任滥用的救济》,载《河北法学》2000年06期。
15.张永志、袁仕棠:《企业集团内部母子公司关系的法律规制》,载《理论学刊》1998年01期。
16.孙北南:《母公司对其子公司债务承担的法律思考》,载《扬州大学商学院学报》1996年05期。
17.陈现杰:《公司人格否认法理评述》,载《外国法译评》1996年03期。
18.龙英峰:《“揭开公司面纱”理论之探悉及借鉴》,载《现代法学》1995年01期。
19.张民安:《公司少数股东的法律救济》,载《法制与社会发展》,1995年第3期。
20.许陈生:《论公司相互持股及其立法完善》,载《兰州学刊》2004年04期。
1.叶林著:《中国公司法》,中国审计出版社1999年版。
2.卞耀武主编:《当代外国公司法》,法律出版社,1995年版。
3.朱慈蕴著:《公司法人格否认法理研究》,法律出版社,1998年版,第251页。
4.吴越著:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社,2003年版。
5.施天涛著:《关联企业法律问题研究》,法律出版社,1998年版。
6.赖英超著:《公司法论文集》,台湾证券发展基金会编印,1988年增订再版。
7.[美]罗伯特.C.克拉克著,胡平等译:《公司法则》工商出版社1999年第1版。
8.卞耀武主编:《德国股份公司法》法律出版社1998年版。
9.罗伯特·霍恩:《德国民商法导论》,中国大百科全书出版社1997年版。王书江、殿建平译:《日本商法》,煤炭工业出版社,1994年版。
10.甘培忠著:《企业与公司法学》北京大学出版社2004年版。
11.[英]迈恩哈特著:《欧洲九国公司法》,赵旭东等译,中国政法大学出版社出版,1988年版。
12.徐学鹿主编:《商法研究》第四辑,人民法院出版社,2001年版。
13.蒋一苇主编:《企业集团概论》,中国劳动出版社,1991年版。
14.黄文忠、顾宝孚、颜旭若主编:《企业集团的理论与实践》,贵州人民出版社,1991年版。
15.范健、蒋大兴:《公司法论》,南京大学出版社1997年版。
16.王长斌著:《企业集团法律比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2004年版。
17. Robert W. Hamilton, the Law of Corporations, West Group 1996.
18. P. I. Blumberg, the Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Law, 1987.
19. P. I. Blumberg, the Multinational Challenge to Corporate Law, Oxford University Press 1993.