基于环境责任分配的企业资本结构决策研究
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摘要
节能减排的经济发展战略不仅对企业经营和财务行为设计形成约束,而且为企业的价值创造和持续业绩改进提供了新的机会。政府部门为了缓解经济发展与环境保护之间的矛盾,不断制定和完善有利于环境保护的金融政策。在环境金融政策的作用下,企业、银行、政府三者之间存在不同的环境责任分配制度。本文通过分析不同环境责任制度下企业资本结构选择的差异,提出我国在制定环保金融政策时应注重有效地激励企业行为,使企业决策朝有利于环境保护的方向发展等若干建议。
虽然我国学术界对企业资本结构决定因素的研究已有数十年的时间,但是针对环境责任制度对资本结构决策影响的研究很少,一些主要观点都是国外学者的研究成果。本文通过借鉴已有的国外关于环境责任与资本结构关系的研究,结合我国环境经济政策和融资体系的特殊性,对我国环境经济政策与企业资本结构之间的关系进行了简单分析,分别讨论了以下三种环境责任制度下企业的资本结构选择行为,即企业承担完全责任,银行承担连带责任,强制财务担保,并结合我国地方政府常常考虑局部利益而与污染企业串谋的实际情况演化出了串谋模型。分析认为,企业承担完全责任和银行承担连带责任都会使企业的资本结构不同程度的偏离最优；强制财务担保制度总能使资本结构达到最优；串谋模型中指出企业与环境规制机构之间合谋最终会导致资本结构离最优水平越来越远。在随后的分析中,本文采用1998年至2008年61家上市公司的财务数据(面板数据),用虚拟变量表示环境责任制度,对61家上市公司环境责任与资本结构的关系进行了实证分析。实证结果表明：无论是银行承担连带责任还是企业承担完全责任,企业资本结构均未达到最优。
通过探讨我国环境经济政策体系下企业资本结构的变动方向,为政府部门对污染企业进行最有效的规制提供理论基础,对于完善我国环保金融政策具有一定的借鉴意义。
Energy saving and emission reduction strategy for economic development not only restrict operation and financial behavior design of an enterprise, but also provide new opportunities to enterprise value creation and sustainable performance improvement. To ease the contradiction between economic development and environmental protection, government departments constantly establish and improve monetary policies for environmental protection which would be conducive to environmental protection. With influence of the monetary policies for environmental protection, enterprises, banks and government have different distribution system of environmental responsibility. By analyzing capital structure decision differences under different environmental liability regime, this paper proposed that the monetary policies for environmental protection of China should focus on whether our policy could encourage corporate behavior effectively, make the decisions of enterprises benefit environmental protection.
Although our academic circles have studied determinant of enterprise capital structure for decades, but the system in response to environmental responsibility impact on the capital structure decision is rare, some main point is research results of foreign scholars. In this paper, we absorbed the existing foreign research on relationship between environmental responsibility and capital structure, combining environmental economic policies and specificity of our financing system, simply analyze the relationship between capital structure and environmental economic policies, we discussed enterprise capital structure choice behavior under the following three kinds of environmental responsibility, that strict liability, lender liability, financial responsibility, combined with the actual situation that our local governments often consider local interests and conspire with polluting enterprises, so our paper evolved an conspiracy model. Analysis show that financial responsibility can achieve the optimal capital structure,lender liability and strict liability both make capital structure deviate from the optimal; conspiracy model pointed out that the conspiracy between firm and environmental regulation agencies will eventually induce capital structure far away from the optimal level. In the ensuing analysis, this paper use financial data of sixty-one listed companies from 1998 to 2008(panel data), with a dummy variable to indicate environmental responsibility system, conducted empirical analysis on the relationship between environmental responsibility and capital structure of the sixty-one companies. The empirical results show that:both strict liability and lender liability did not reach the optimal capital structure.
By discussing the change direction of enterprise capital structure under the environmental economic policy system, this research could provide theoretical background to government who aim at the most effective regulation to the polluting enterprises, in addition, for improving monetary policies for environmental protection, our paper could supply some reference.
虽然我国学术界对企业资本结构决定因素的研究已有数十年的时间,但是针对环境责任制度对资本结构决策影响的研究很少,一些主要观点都是国外学者的研究成果。本文通过借鉴已有的国外关于环境责任与资本结构关系的研究,结合我国环境经济政策和融资体系的特殊性,对我国环境经济政策与企业资本结构之间的关系进行了简单分析,分别讨论了以下三种环境责任制度下企业的资本结构选择行为,即企业承担完全责任,银行承担连带责任,强制财务担保,并结合我国地方政府常常考虑局部利益而与污染企业串谋的实际情况演化出了串谋模型。分析认为,企业承担完全责任和银行承担连带责任都会使企业的资本结构不同程度的偏离最优；强制财务担保制度总能使资本结构达到最优；串谋模型中指出企业与环境规制机构之间合谋最终会导致资本结构离最优水平越来越远。在随后的分析中,本文采用1998年至2008年61家上市公司的财务数据(面板数据),用虚拟变量表示环境责任制度,对61家上市公司环境责任与资本结构的关系进行了实证分析。实证结果表明：无论是银行承担连带责任还是企业承担完全责任,企业资本结构均未达到最优。
通过探讨我国环境经济政策体系下企业资本结构的变动方向,为政府部门对污染企业进行最有效的规制提供理论基础,对于完善我国环保金融政策具有一定的借鉴意义。
Energy saving and emission reduction strategy for economic development not only restrict operation and financial behavior design of an enterprise, but also provide new opportunities to enterprise value creation and sustainable performance improvement. To ease the contradiction between economic development and environmental protection, government departments constantly establish and improve monetary policies for environmental protection which would be conducive to environmental protection. With influence of the monetary policies for environmental protection, enterprises, banks and government have different distribution system of environmental responsibility. By analyzing capital structure decision differences under different environmental liability regime, this paper proposed that the monetary policies for environmental protection of China should focus on whether our policy could encourage corporate behavior effectively, make the decisions of enterprises benefit environmental protection.
Although our academic circles have studied determinant of enterprise capital structure for decades, but the system in response to environmental responsibility impact on the capital structure decision is rare, some main point is research results of foreign scholars. In this paper, we absorbed the existing foreign research on relationship between environmental responsibility and capital structure, combining environmental economic policies and specificity of our financing system, simply analyze the relationship between capital structure and environmental economic policies, we discussed enterprise capital structure choice behavior under the following three kinds of environmental responsibility, that strict liability, lender liability, financial responsibility, combined with the actual situation that our local governments often consider local interests and conspire with polluting enterprises, so our paper evolved an conspiracy model. Analysis show that financial responsibility can achieve the optimal capital structure,lender liability and strict liability both make capital structure deviate from the optimal; conspiracy model pointed out that the conspiracy between firm and environmental regulation agencies will eventually induce capital structure far away from the optimal level. In the ensuing analysis, this paper use financial data of sixty-one listed companies from 1998 to 2008(panel data), with a dummy variable to indicate environmental responsibility system, conducted empirical analysis on the relationship between environmental responsibility and capital structure of the sixty-one companies. The empirical results show that:both strict liability and lender liability did not reach the optimal capital structure.
By discussing the change direction of enterprise capital structure under the environmental economic policy system, this research could provide theoretical background to government who aim at the most effective regulation to the polluting enterprises, in addition, for improving monetary policies for environmental protection, our paper could supply some reference.
引文
[1]Shavell S. The judgment-proof problem [J]. International Review of Law and Economics,1986,6:45-58
[2]Summers J. The case of disappearing defendant:An Economic Analysis [J] Univ-ersity of Pennsylvania Law Review,1983,132:145-185
[3]Feess E, Hege U. Lender liability, capital structure and mandatory coverage.[J]. Unpublished working paper, University of Frankfurt,1997,20:37-49
[4]Alistair Ulph, Laura Valentini. Environmental Liability and the Capital Structure [J] Resource and Energy Economics,2004,26:393-410
[5]Beard T. Bankruptcy and care choice [J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1990,21: 626-634
[6]Segerson K. Liability transfers:an economics assessment of buyer and lender
liability [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1993,25:46-63
[7]Thompson H. Contaminated land:the implications for property transactions and the property development industry [J]. National Westminster Bank Quarterly Re-view,1992,11:20-30
[8]Garber S, Hammitt J.K. Risk premiums for environmental liability:does superfu-ud increase the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Ma-nagement,1998,36:267-294
[9]Heyes A. Lender penalty for environmental damage and equilibrium cost of capi-tal [J]. Economica,1996,63:311-323
[10]Feess E, Hege U. Safety monitoring, capital structure and financial responsibi-lity [J], International Review of Law and Economics,2003,23:323-339
[11]Hutchison E, Vanl'tVeld K. Extended liability for environmental accidents:wh-at you see is what you get [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manag-ement,2005,49:157-173
[12]Dionne G, Spaeter S. Environmental risk and extended liability:The case of green technologies [J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,87 (5-6):1025-1060
[13]Boyd J.H, Ingberman D.E. The search for deep pockets:Is extended liability expensive liability? [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1997, 13:232-258
[14]Balkenborg D. How liable should a lender be? The case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk:Comment [J]. American Economic Review,2001,91: 731-738
[15]Lewis T, Sappington D. How liable should a lender be? The case of judgmentp-roof firms and environmental risk:Comment [J]. American Economic Review, 2001,15:724-730
[16]Feess E, Hege U. Safety monitoring, capital structure and financial responsibil-ity [J]. International Review of Law and Economics,2003,23:323-339
[17]Feess E, Hege U. Environmental harm and financial responsibility [J]. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance,2000,25(2):220-234
[18]Kambia-Chopin B. Environmental Risks, the Judgment-Proof Problem and fina-ncial Responsibility[J]. European Journal of Law and Economics,2007,12: 1-21
[19]Lewis T.R, Sappington D.E.M. Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems [J]. International Review of Law and Economics, 1999,19:275-293
[20]Boyd J. H. Banking on green money:Are environmental financial responsibility rules fulfilling their promise? [J]. Washington:Resources for the future, Work-ing paper,1997,26-95
[21]Che Y, E Spier K. Strategic Judgment Proofing [J]. National Bureau of Econo-mic Research, Working Paper,2008,1-38
[22]陈银飞,茅宁.社会损害赔偿责任的财务保障机制[J].财贸研究,2007(5)：118-125
[23]李华友,冯东方.我国推行环境保护金融政策的障碍与改进途径[J].经济政策,2007(6)：38-42
[24]彭海珍,任荣明.所有制结构与环境业绩[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(3)：136-140
[25]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果—基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008(7)：7-11
[26]陈元.融资体系必须改变.http://finance.sina.com.cn,2006-02-17
[27]蔡肪,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究2008(6)：4-6
[28]Marcel Boyer, Jean-Jacques Laffont. Environmental Risks and Bank Liability [J]. European Economic Review,1997(41):1427-1459
[29]Jost P. Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance [J].Internatio-nal Review of Law and Economics,1996,16:259-276
[30]苏明,傅志华,刘军民等.中国环境经济政策的回顾与展望[J].经济研究参考,2007,27：4-10
[32]拉丰,梯若尔.政府采购与规制中的激励理论[M].石磊,王永钦译.上海：上海人民出版社,2004：405-407
[33]Dasgupt, Susmita, Mainul Huq, et al. Bending the Rules:Discretionary Pollution Control in China [J].Policy Research Working paper,1997:1761
[34]古德尔.中国的污染征税制度：理论能力和现实挑战[J].胡凯等译.比较,2005(12)：57
[35]杨恺钧,黄坡.法律规制实施中合谋的经济分析[J].中国法经济学论坛论文集,2005：124
[36]蓝庆新.腐败问题的经济学分析[J].资料通讯,2003(6)：12-16
[37]曲振涛,杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005：43
[38]中国人民银行.关于贯彻信贷政策与加强环境保护工作有关问题的通知.http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/gwyfg/1995/239151199502.html,1995-02-07
[39]李慧.我国环境经济政策的绩效分析[J].生态经济(学术版),2008(2)：4
[40]姚晓明.财务管理学[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008：14
[41]张晓峒.计量经济学基础[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2007：314
[42]张晓峒.Eviews使用指南与案例[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2007：268
①数据来源于中华人民共和国环境保护部网站(http://www.zhb.gov.cn/) o
②赤道原则(the Equator Principles,简称EPs)是2002年10月世界银行下属的国际金融公司和荷兰银行,在伦敦召开的国际知名商业银行会议上,提出的一项企业贷款准则。这项准则要求金融机构在向一个项目投资时,要对该项目可能对环境和社会的影响进行综合评估,并且利用金融杠杆促进该项目在环境保护以及周围社会和谐发展方面发挥积极作用。
①以上信息均来自于新浪财经网站(http://finance.sina.com.cn)
①假设企业所有者的自有资金w能够满足最优资本结构所需的股权投入,即对任何财务决策决定的ID,均有I-ID ①上标S表示的环境责任制度为企业承担完全责任。
①上标L表示的环境责任制度为银行承担连带责任。
①上标F表示的环境责任制度为强制财务担保。
①本文的串谋模型借鉴并改进了曲振涛,杨恺钧在《规制经济学》一书中的模型,模型中重点分析了企业资本结构的变化。
①本表是根据国家环保总局于2008年2月25日发布的公告所整理的。
[2]Summers J. The case of disappearing defendant:An Economic Analysis [J] Univ-ersity of Pennsylvania Law Review,1983,132:145-185
[3]Feess E, Hege U. Lender liability, capital structure and mandatory coverage.[J]. Unpublished working paper, University of Frankfurt,1997,20:37-49
[4]Alistair Ulph, Laura Valentini. Environmental Liability and the Capital Structure [J] Resource and Energy Economics,2004,26:393-410
[5]Beard T. Bankruptcy and care choice [J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1990,21: 626-634
[6]Segerson K. Liability transfers:an economics assessment of buyer and lender
liability [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1993,25:46-63
[7]Thompson H. Contaminated land:the implications for property transactions and the property development industry [J]. National Westminster Bank Quarterly Re-view,1992,11:20-30
[8]Garber S, Hammitt J.K. Risk premiums for environmental liability:does superfu-ud increase the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Ma-nagement,1998,36:267-294
[9]Heyes A. Lender penalty for environmental damage and equilibrium cost of capi-tal [J]. Economica,1996,63:311-323
[10]Feess E, Hege U. Safety monitoring, capital structure and financial responsibi-lity [J], International Review of Law and Economics,2003,23:323-339
[11]Hutchison E, Vanl'tVeld K. Extended liability for environmental accidents:wh-at you see is what you get [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manag-ement,2005,49:157-173
[12]Dionne G, Spaeter S. Environmental risk and extended liability:The case of green technologies [J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,87 (5-6):1025-1060
[13]Boyd J.H, Ingberman D.E. The search for deep pockets:Is extended liability expensive liability? [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1997, 13:232-258
[14]Balkenborg D. How liable should a lender be? The case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk:Comment [J]. American Economic Review,2001,91: 731-738
[15]Lewis T, Sappington D. How liable should a lender be? The case of judgmentp-roof firms and environmental risk:Comment [J]. American Economic Review, 2001,15:724-730
[16]Feess E, Hege U. Safety monitoring, capital structure and financial responsibil-ity [J]. International Review of Law and Economics,2003,23:323-339
[17]Feess E, Hege U. Environmental harm and financial responsibility [J]. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance,2000,25(2):220-234
[18]Kambia-Chopin B. Environmental Risks, the Judgment-Proof Problem and fina-ncial Responsibility[J]. European Journal of Law and Economics,2007,12: 1-21
[19]Lewis T.R, Sappington D.E.M. Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems [J]. International Review of Law and Economics, 1999,19:275-293
[20]Boyd J. H. Banking on green money:Are environmental financial responsibility rules fulfilling their promise? [J]. Washington:Resources for the future, Work-ing paper,1997,26-95
[21]Che Y, E Spier K. Strategic Judgment Proofing [J]. National Bureau of Econo-mic Research, Working Paper,2008,1-38
[22]陈银飞,茅宁.社会损害赔偿责任的财务保障机制[J].财贸研究,2007(5)：118-125
[23]李华友,冯东方.我国推行环境保护金融政策的障碍与改进途径[J].经济政策,2007(6)：38-42
[24]彭海珍,任荣明.所有制结构与环境业绩[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(3)：136-140
[25]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果—基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008(7)：7-11
[26]陈元.融资体系必须改变.http://finance.sina.com.cn,2006-02-17
[27]蔡肪,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究2008(6)：4-6
[28]Marcel Boyer, Jean-Jacques Laffont. Environmental Risks and Bank Liability [J]. European Economic Review,1997(41):1427-1459
[29]Jost P. Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance [J].Internatio-nal Review of Law and Economics,1996,16:259-276
[30]苏明,傅志华,刘军民等.中国环境经济政策的回顾与展望[J].经济研究参考,2007,27：4-10
[32]拉丰,梯若尔.政府采购与规制中的激励理论[M].石磊,王永钦译.上海：上海人民出版社,2004：405-407
[33]Dasgupt, Susmita, Mainul Huq, et al. Bending the Rules:Discretionary Pollution Control in China [J].Policy Research Working paper,1997:1761
[34]古德尔.中国的污染征税制度：理论能力和现实挑战[J].胡凯等译.比较,2005(12)：57
[35]杨恺钧,黄坡.法律规制实施中合谋的经济分析[J].中国法经济学论坛论文集,2005：124
[36]蓝庆新.腐败问题的经济学分析[J].资料通讯,2003(6)：12-16
[37]曲振涛,杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005：43
[38]中国人民银行.关于贯彻信贷政策与加强环境保护工作有关问题的通知.http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/gwyfg/1995/239151199502.html,1995-02-07
[39]李慧.我国环境经济政策的绩效分析[J].生态经济(学术版),2008(2)：4
[40]姚晓明.财务管理学[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008：14
[41]张晓峒.计量经济学基础[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2007：314
[42]张晓峒.Eviews使用指南与案例[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2007：268
①数据来源于中华人民共和国环境保护部网站(http://www.zhb.gov.cn/) o
②赤道原则(the Equator Principles,简称EPs)是2002年10月世界银行下属的国际金融公司和荷兰银行,在伦敦召开的国际知名商业银行会议上,提出的一项企业贷款准则。这项准则要求金融机构在向一个项目投资时,要对该项目可能对环境和社会的影响进行综合评估,并且利用金融杠杆促进该项目在环境保护以及周围社会和谐发展方面发挥积极作用。
①以上信息均来自于新浪财经网站(http://finance.sina.com.cn)
①假设企业所有者的自有资金w能够满足最优资本结构所需的股权投入,即对任何财务决策决定的ID,均有I-ID
①上标L表示的环境责任制度为银行承担连带责任。
①上标F表示的环境责任制度为强制财务担保。
①本文的串谋模型借鉴并改进了曲振涛,杨恺钧在《规制经济学》一书中的模型,模型中重点分析了企业资本结构的变化。
①本表是根据国家环保总局于2008年2月25日发布的公告所整理的。