我国商业银行信贷决策行为研究
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摘要
银行信贷是我国商业银行资产中最重要的组成部分,银行信贷决策行为对其经营绩效有着重要的影响。自2003年以来,我国商业银行沿着注资、股份重组、引入战略投资者、公开上市的改革路径,进行了一系列股份制改革,初步建立起现代银行制度。但与欧美国家相比,我国商业银行的运行效率和盈利能力较低,传统的银行信贷业务依旧是银行的主要盈利来源,商业银行信贷决策质量和管理技术等尚未得到本质改善,且在商业银行改革发展过程中,人们更多地关注商业银行的资产结构、经营业务和管理技术等,而忽略了银行信贷决策行为与银行贷款质量和银行营运的内在联系。因此我国商业银行在一系列改革发展中,尽管取得了不少成绩,但一直受到信贷决策行为的束缚,未能获得实质的发展。商业银行惜贷和信贷歧视行为等造成了信贷规模的萎缩,不仅使得信贷资金闲置,还造成企业(尤其是中小企业)资金紧缺,限制了生产规模的扩大。在此背景下,对银行信贷决策行为的研究有利于提高银行信贷决策效率和信贷决策水平,对改善
银行经营效率、完善我国现代银行信贷决策体系有着重要意义。国外对银行资产行为研究的文献很多,但由于我国商业银行市场化的道路不长,建立我国商业银行的资产管理模型并进行检验时缺少足够的样本数据,使得国内对银行信贷决策行为的研究相对缺乏,且大多数研究限于定性讨论,如何利用现有的数据通过适当的统计和数学技术,从定量的角度分析我国商业银行信贷决策行为特征及一般规律,寻求优化银行信贷机制的路径、方法是本文所要解决的核心问题。
本文在信息经济学、交易成本理论、信贷配给理论以及现代商业银行管理等理论的基础上,引入信息因素、交易成本因素等构建银行信贷决策行为模型,系统研究商业银行信贷决策行为。最近20多年来,信息经济学的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就。信息经济学在解释资源配置的微观基础时有别于传统经济学,认为存在不完全信息的情况下,价格机制的作用有限,价格并不必然传递所有稀缺性信号,非价格机制在很大程度上决定经济资源配置。价格的变化不仅受到市场供求因素的影响,还受到信息和交易成本等因素的影响。同时,交易成本的存在,致使商业银行为了控制成本而采取降低交易成本的行为方式。此外,信贷配给也是商业银行信贷决策研究的重要内容,在考察信贷决策行为时必须纳入。综上所述,本文将从信息环境、交易成本和信贷配给三个方面对理论进行梳理,结合我国商业银行改革的发展现状,从多个角度研究了我国商业银行信贷决策行为特征。论文的核心内容可以归纳为五个方面:
一是完善了商业银行信贷决策理论模型。首先,随着金融业的全面开放和我国银行业不断改革发展,银行业竞争态势已经逐步形成。与此同时,伴随着外部环境的逐步改善,信息真实性增大,获取成本变小。本文构建在信息对称条件下商业银行信贷决策模型,分析贷款价格和其余各个要素之间的关系,顺应了银行业发展趋势,为理顺商业银行信贷要素之间的关系奠定了基础。其次,从宏观角度分析了信贷市场均衡过程。最后,从市场竞争和潜在进入者的威胁两个角度分析了从微观均衡到宏观均衡的实现机制。
二是从银行业本身分析了信贷决策行为的基础,主要是从公司治理水平、贷款质量、盈利能力、典型银行分析四个层次进行。公司治理水平是银行有效运行的基础,也是商业银行信贷决策行为的硬性约束;贷款和不良贷款的分析是商业银行信贷决策行为结果的具体表现;盈利能力是商业银行的目标,也是信贷决策行为的目标;典型银行的分析可以更加清晰的看到商业银行信贷决策行为形成的影响。论文首先按照LLSV(1998,2000)模型的分析框架,从外部治理和内部治理两个方面分析了我国商业银行治理结构;其次,分析了我国商业银行现有的贷款规模、结构和不良贷款状况以及盈利能力和盈利水平的发展变化;最后,通过对三家典型银行特定指标的分析,讨论了信贷决策行为对商业银行具体影响。
三是从企业的角度分析银行信贷决策行为。首先通过理论推导分析银行在信息不对称条件下的信贷决策行为。银行在信贷决策过程中,信贷双方存在信息不对称,银行对于企业的质量、风险等信息不如其自身了解得透彻。正因为如此,银行偏好使用抵押担保机制降低信贷决策过程中的逆向选择、道德风险和交易成本。文章从逆向选择、道德风险和交易成本三个视角分析了担保贷款和非担保贷款还款能力的强弱,并利用因子分析法采用实际数据分析我国商业银行是否存在抵押担保偏好。研究结果表明,短期贷款不存在抵押担保偏好,但是长期贷款存在抵押担保偏好。其次,由于非国有企业信息取得成本较高,同时总体实力不强,企业性质的选择也成了我国商业银行信贷决策行为的表现形式之一。文章利用理论模型分析了商业银行的信贷决策企业性质选择行为,并进一步采取Logistic模型对我国商业银行是否存在企业性质选择行为进行了实证研究。结果表明商业银行总体上不存在对企业性质的偏好,按照贷款性质进一步细分后发现,长期信用贷款和长期担保贷款也没有企业性质偏好,但短期信用贷款和短期担保贷款存在一定程度的企业性质偏好。
四是文章使用面板数据模型分析了上市公司相关指标对银行贷款数量、期限和利率的影响,结果说明财务状况影响银行的长期贷款数量与贷款期限,但对短期贷款数量和期限的影响不显著,同时得到了商业银行贷款利率对企业财务指标的敏感度不显著,银行自主决策能力有较大提升,以及在决策时对非财务指标的关注度较高等结论。
五是提出了优化我国商业银行信贷决策的路径:仔细分析企业第一还款源,合理评估企业的第二还款源,适度关注企业的非财务因素,尽快完善商业银行信用评级体系。
The bank credit is an indispensable part of the assets of china’s commercial bank, the behavior of credit decision-making plays a singnificant role in operation performance.The commercial banks have carried out a series of shareholding system reform and preliminarily established the modern bank system through the way of injecting capital,restructuring the shares,introducting the strategic investors and making it be listed since 2003.comparing with European and American countries,however, China’s commercial banks exist a lot of problems and the major ones are as follows:to begin with,there exists low efficiency in operation and profit ability and the source of profit is single,which still comes the traditional credit business;secondly,there is still much room for improvement in the way of credit decision making and management technology;what’s more,the commercial banks pay more attention to the asset structure,operational business and management technology and focus litter attention on the inherent relationship between credit quality and bank operation.Although china’s commercial banks make a great progress after a serise of reforms,they,restrainted by the behavior of credit decision making, achieve little progress.Credit stinting and credit discrimination have greatly reduced the scale of credit,which will leave unused capital,give rise to the capital shortage of enterprises(particularly SME) and thus refrain the production from increasing.On this background,studying on the behavior of china’s commercial bank’s credit decision making will do a great benefit to the improvement of the efficence in credit decicion making and the level of decicion making,and will play a significant role in the improvement of bank operation and the credit decision making system of china’s bank.
There are many papers studying on the behaviors of credit decision-making in foreign.However, because of the marketization of china’s commercial bank proceed short and thus lack of efficent sample data,domestic studies on this are not enough and most of these studies analyzed in a qualitative view.So how to use the current data,proper statistical and mathematical technique,and analyzes the behavior of china’s credit decision-making in a quantitative view,and then seek the optimal way of bank credit mechanism and methods are the key problems this paper trys to solve.
Based on the imformation economics,transaction cost theory,credit rationing and the theory of modern commercial bank management,this paper comprehensively analyzes the behavior of commercial bank credit decision-making through constructing the model of bank credit decision making.Over the past twenty years,the imformation economics have gained a great achievement.Differentiating from the traditional economics in the way of resource allocation,Information economics advocates that the price sometimes can’t represent the signal of resource’s scarcity and the non-price mechanism, to a great degree, determines the resource allocation.they believe that the change of price relies on the supply and demand as well as other factors such as imformation and transaction cost.as a result of transaction cost, commercial bank’s behavior likes to lower transaction cost in order to reduce the cost. In additon,credit rationing is an another important factor that we need to focus on when we study on the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank.In a word,based on the analysis of imformation environment,transaction cost and credit rationing,and in combination with the present development of commercial bank of china ,this paper studies on the behavior of china’s commercial bank’s credit decision making from multiple perspectives.The key contents of this paper can come down to five aspects:
Firstly,improve the theoretical model of credit decision making of commercial bank.For one thing,with the full open of financial industry and the development of bank industry,the bank industry is in a competition situation.meanwhile,with the improvement of external environment,the authenticity of gaining imformation is increasing and its cost is growingly reduced.This paper constructs the model of credit decision making under the situation of information symmetry,the article analyzes the relationship between loan price and other factors,which are in line with the tides of the bank industry’s development and make a solid foundation for the analysis on the relationship of credit factors;For another thing,this paper analyzes the process of equilibrium of credit market in a macro perspective;In addition,analyzing from the angles of the market competition and potential entrants,this article studies on the relization mechanism that transits from micro equilibrium to macro equilibrium.
Secondly,analyze the basis of behavior of credit decision making of bank industry and this paper makes it from the level of corperate governance,the quality of credit,the profit ability and analysis of typical bank.The level of corperate govenance is the basis of bank’s efficient operation as well as a hard constraint of the behavior of credit decision making;the analysis of loan and bad loan represent the behavior of credit decision making of commercial banks;the profit ability is the goal of commercial banks as well as the target of the behavior of credit decision making;the analysis of typical bank can help us gain a better understanding about effects that the behavior of credit decision making may cause.In the first place,based on the analysis of LLSV model(1998,2000),this paper analyzes the governance structure from the aspects of external governance and internal governance;In the second place,this paper discussed the development and change of loan scale,structure,bad loan,profit ability and profit level.In addition,this article analyzes the effects the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank may cause through the analysis of specific indicators of three typical banks.
Thirdly,discuss the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank from the angle of enterprise.To begin with, based on theoretical deduction,this paper studies on the behavior of credit decision making of banks on the condition of asymmtry imformation.In the process of credit decision making,due to asymmetry information,bank gains less information of enterprise than enterprise itself,as a result,bank will have a preferance to the mortgage guarantee in order to reduce adverse selection,moral hazard and transaction cost.Analyzing the ability of repayment under the situation of mortgage loan and non-mortgage loan from perspectives of adverse selection,moral hazard and transaction cost,this paper ,adopting factor analysis method and using pratical data,discusses whether there exists preferance to mortgage loan.The results show that:there is no preferance to mortgage loan in the short run,however, it exists in the long run.Besides,since the cost of gaining information of non-stated-owned enterprise is usually high ,the overall strengh of non-stated-owned enterprise,however, is not that powerful,so the of the nature of enterprise is also a factor that affect the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank.Using theoretical model,This paper analyzes the behavior of credit decision making when considering the nature of enterprise, and further makes a empirical study using the Logistic model.Results display that:on the whole,there is no preferance to nature of enterprise.through concrete separation of credit,It also finds that there still exists no preferance to the nature of enterprise both credit loan and mortgage loan in the long term,hoever,there, to a degreee,exists perferance to the nature of enterprise both credit loan and mortgage loan in the short run.
Fourthly,using the panel data model to analyze how some concerning indexes of listed enterprises affect the loan size,term and interests.findings show that:financial situation will affect the long-term loan size and loan term,which will,however,make no significant influence to the short-term loan size and loan term,the loan interest rate of commercial bank is not sensitive to the financial indicators of enterprise,the bank’s ability of self-decision-making has greatly improved, and the banks focus great attention to the non-financial indicators when making decision.
Finally,advance the optimal path of credit decision making of china’s commercial bank:carefully analyze the first repayment source of enterprise,reasonablely assess the second repayment source of enterprise,moderately focus on the non-financial factor of enterprise and rapidly improve the enterprise credit assessing system.
银行经营效率、完善我国现代银行信贷决策体系有着重要意义。国外对银行资产行为研究的文献很多,但由于我国商业银行市场化的道路不长,建立我国商业银行的资产管理模型并进行检验时缺少足够的样本数据,使得国内对银行信贷决策行为的研究相对缺乏,且大多数研究限于定性讨论,如何利用现有的数据通过适当的统计和数学技术,从定量的角度分析我国商业银行信贷决策行为特征及一般规律,寻求优化银行信贷机制的路径、方法是本文所要解决的核心问题。
本文在信息经济学、交易成本理论、信贷配给理论以及现代商业银行管理等理论的基础上,引入信息因素、交易成本因素等构建银行信贷决策行为模型,系统研究商业银行信贷决策行为。最近20多年来,信息经济学的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就。信息经济学在解释资源配置的微观基础时有别于传统经济学,认为存在不完全信息的情况下,价格机制的作用有限,价格并不必然传递所有稀缺性信号,非价格机制在很大程度上决定经济资源配置。价格的变化不仅受到市场供求因素的影响,还受到信息和交易成本等因素的影响。同时,交易成本的存在,致使商业银行为了控制成本而采取降低交易成本的行为方式。此外,信贷配给也是商业银行信贷决策研究的重要内容,在考察信贷决策行为时必须纳入。综上所述,本文将从信息环境、交易成本和信贷配给三个方面对理论进行梳理,结合我国商业银行改革的发展现状,从多个角度研究了我国商业银行信贷决策行为特征。论文的核心内容可以归纳为五个方面:
一是完善了商业银行信贷决策理论模型。首先,随着金融业的全面开放和我国银行业不断改革发展,银行业竞争态势已经逐步形成。与此同时,伴随着外部环境的逐步改善,信息真实性增大,获取成本变小。本文构建在信息对称条件下商业银行信贷决策模型,分析贷款价格和其余各个要素之间的关系,顺应了银行业发展趋势,为理顺商业银行信贷要素之间的关系奠定了基础。其次,从宏观角度分析了信贷市场均衡过程。最后,从市场竞争和潜在进入者的威胁两个角度分析了从微观均衡到宏观均衡的实现机制。
二是从银行业本身分析了信贷决策行为的基础,主要是从公司治理水平、贷款质量、盈利能力、典型银行分析四个层次进行。公司治理水平是银行有效运行的基础,也是商业银行信贷决策行为的硬性约束;贷款和不良贷款的分析是商业银行信贷决策行为结果的具体表现;盈利能力是商业银行的目标,也是信贷决策行为的目标;典型银行的分析可以更加清晰的看到商业银行信贷决策行为形成的影响。论文首先按照LLSV(1998,2000)模型的分析框架,从外部治理和内部治理两个方面分析了我国商业银行治理结构;其次,分析了我国商业银行现有的贷款规模、结构和不良贷款状况以及盈利能力和盈利水平的发展变化;最后,通过对三家典型银行特定指标的分析,讨论了信贷决策行为对商业银行具体影响。
三是从企业的角度分析银行信贷决策行为。首先通过理论推导分析银行在信息不对称条件下的信贷决策行为。银行在信贷决策过程中,信贷双方存在信息不对称,银行对于企业的质量、风险等信息不如其自身了解得透彻。正因为如此,银行偏好使用抵押担保机制降低信贷决策过程中的逆向选择、道德风险和交易成本。文章从逆向选择、道德风险和交易成本三个视角分析了担保贷款和非担保贷款还款能力的强弱,并利用因子分析法采用实际数据分析我国商业银行是否存在抵押担保偏好。研究结果表明,短期贷款不存在抵押担保偏好,但是长期贷款存在抵押担保偏好。其次,由于非国有企业信息取得成本较高,同时总体实力不强,企业性质的选择也成了我国商业银行信贷决策行为的表现形式之一。文章利用理论模型分析了商业银行的信贷决策企业性质选择行为,并进一步采取Logistic模型对我国商业银行是否存在企业性质选择行为进行了实证研究。结果表明商业银行总体上不存在对企业性质的偏好,按照贷款性质进一步细分后发现,长期信用贷款和长期担保贷款也没有企业性质偏好,但短期信用贷款和短期担保贷款存在一定程度的企业性质偏好。
四是文章使用面板数据模型分析了上市公司相关指标对银行贷款数量、期限和利率的影响,结果说明财务状况影响银行的长期贷款数量与贷款期限,但对短期贷款数量和期限的影响不显著,同时得到了商业银行贷款利率对企业财务指标的敏感度不显著,银行自主决策能力有较大提升,以及在决策时对非财务指标的关注度较高等结论。
五是提出了优化我国商业银行信贷决策的路径:仔细分析企业第一还款源,合理评估企业的第二还款源,适度关注企业的非财务因素,尽快完善商业银行信用评级体系。
The bank credit is an indispensable part of the assets of china’s commercial bank, the behavior of credit decision-making plays a singnificant role in operation performance.The commercial banks have carried out a series of shareholding system reform and preliminarily established the modern bank system through the way of injecting capital,restructuring the shares,introducting the strategic investors and making it be listed since 2003.comparing with European and American countries,however, China’s commercial banks exist a lot of problems and the major ones are as follows:to begin with,there exists low efficiency in operation and profit ability and the source of profit is single,which still comes the traditional credit business;secondly,there is still much room for improvement in the way of credit decision making and management technology;what’s more,the commercial banks pay more attention to the asset structure,operational business and management technology and focus litter attention on the inherent relationship between credit quality and bank operation.Although china’s commercial banks make a great progress after a serise of reforms,they,restrainted by the behavior of credit decision making, achieve little progress.Credit stinting and credit discrimination have greatly reduced the scale of credit,which will leave unused capital,give rise to the capital shortage of enterprises(particularly SME) and thus refrain the production from increasing.On this background,studying on the behavior of china’s commercial bank’s credit decision making will do a great benefit to the improvement of the efficence in credit decicion making and the level of decicion making,and will play a significant role in the improvement of bank operation and the credit decision making system of china’s bank.
There are many papers studying on the behaviors of credit decision-making in foreign.However, because of the marketization of china’s commercial bank proceed short and thus lack of efficent sample data,domestic studies on this are not enough and most of these studies analyzed in a qualitative view.So how to use the current data,proper statistical and mathematical technique,and analyzes the behavior of china’s credit decision-making in a quantitative view,and then seek the optimal way of bank credit mechanism and methods are the key problems this paper trys to solve.
Based on the imformation economics,transaction cost theory,credit rationing and the theory of modern commercial bank management,this paper comprehensively analyzes the behavior of commercial bank credit decision-making through constructing the model of bank credit decision making.Over the past twenty years,the imformation economics have gained a great achievement.Differentiating from the traditional economics in the way of resource allocation,Information economics advocates that the price sometimes can’t represent the signal of resource’s scarcity and the non-price mechanism, to a great degree, determines the resource allocation.they believe that the change of price relies on the supply and demand as well as other factors such as imformation and transaction cost.as a result of transaction cost, commercial bank’s behavior likes to lower transaction cost in order to reduce the cost. In additon,credit rationing is an another important factor that we need to focus on when we study on the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank.In a word,based on the analysis of imformation environment,transaction cost and credit rationing,and in combination with the present development of commercial bank of china ,this paper studies on the behavior of china’s commercial bank’s credit decision making from multiple perspectives.The key contents of this paper can come down to five aspects:
Firstly,improve the theoretical model of credit decision making of commercial bank.For one thing,with the full open of financial industry and the development of bank industry,the bank industry is in a competition situation.meanwhile,with the improvement of external environment,the authenticity of gaining imformation is increasing and its cost is growingly reduced.This paper constructs the model of credit decision making under the situation of information symmetry,the article analyzes the relationship between loan price and other factors,which are in line with the tides of the bank industry’s development and make a solid foundation for the analysis on the relationship of credit factors;For another thing,this paper analyzes the process of equilibrium of credit market in a macro perspective;In addition,analyzing from the angles of the market competition and potential entrants,this article studies on the relization mechanism that transits from micro equilibrium to macro equilibrium.
Secondly,analyze the basis of behavior of credit decision making of bank industry and this paper makes it from the level of corperate governance,the quality of credit,the profit ability and analysis of typical bank.The level of corperate govenance is the basis of bank’s efficient operation as well as a hard constraint of the behavior of credit decision making;the analysis of loan and bad loan represent the behavior of credit decision making of commercial banks;the profit ability is the goal of commercial banks as well as the target of the behavior of credit decision making;the analysis of typical bank can help us gain a better understanding about effects that the behavior of credit decision making may cause.In the first place,based on the analysis of LLSV model(1998,2000),this paper analyzes the governance structure from the aspects of external governance and internal governance;In the second place,this paper discussed the development and change of loan scale,structure,bad loan,profit ability and profit level.In addition,this article analyzes the effects the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank may cause through the analysis of specific indicators of three typical banks.
Thirdly,discuss the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank from the angle of enterprise.To begin with, based on theoretical deduction,this paper studies on the behavior of credit decision making of banks on the condition of asymmtry imformation.In the process of credit decision making,due to asymmetry information,bank gains less information of enterprise than enterprise itself,as a result,bank will have a preferance to the mortgage guarantee in order to reduce adverse selection,moral hazard and transaction cost.Analyzing the ability of repayment under the situation of mortgage loan and non-mortgage loan from perspectives of adverse selection,moral hazard and transaction cost,this paper ,adopting factor analysis method and using pratical data,discusses whether there exists preferance to mortgage loan.The results show that:there is no preferance to mortgage loan in the short run,however, it exists in the long run.Besides,since the cost of gaining information of non-stated-owned enterprise is usually high ,the overall strengh of non-stated-owned enterprise,however, is not that powerful,so the of the nature of enterprise is also a factor that affect the behavior of credit decision making of commercial bank.Using theoretical model,This paper analyzes the behavior of credit decision making when considering the nature of enterprise, and further makes a empirical study using the Logistic model.Results display that:on the whole,there is no preferance to nature of enterprise.through concrete separation of credit,It also finds that there still exists no preferance to the nature of enterprise both credit loan and mortgage loan in the long term,hoever,there, to a degreee,exists perferance to the nature of enterprise both credit loan and mortgage loan in the short run.
Fourthly,using the panel data model to analyze how some concerning indexes of listed enterprises affect the loan size,term and interests.findings show that:financial situation will affect the long-term loan size and loan term,which will,however,make no significant influence to the short-term loan size and loan term,the loan interest rate of commercial bank is not sensitive to the financial indicators of enterprise,the bank’s ability of self-decision-making has greatly improved, and the banks focus great attention to the non-financial indicators when making decision.
Finally,advance the optimal path of credit decision making of china’s commercial bank:carefully analyze the first repayment source of enterprise,reasonablely assess the second repayment source of enterprise,moderately focus on the non-financial factor of enterprise and rapidly improve the enterprise credit assessing system.
引文
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