中国上市公司股权分置改革效应研究
|
摘要
本文紧密围绕股权分置改革这一中国资本市场上的历史性变革活动,以股权分置改革的对象——国内上市公司为研究目标,试图深入解析我国上市公司的股权分置改革效应影响,即上市公司在完成股权分置改革之后,其内部治理层面的各方面会产生那些新的变化,这些变化又会对上市公司的股东、债权人及外部投资者等相关利益体造成何种影响。通过对这些问题的研究,可以对我国上市公司在股权分置改革之后的走向有更清醒的认识,也会了解到在全流通市场下,上市公司会遇到哪些新的问题,以及面临哪些新的机遇与挑战,从而为今后更好的发展提前打下坚实的基础。因此,本文以2005-2008年间深、沪两市A股上市公司为样本,采取规范研究及实证研究相结合,并以实证研究为主线的研究方法,综合运用了公司治理领域中的股权结构、委托代理以及债务治理等相关理论,对我国上市公司的股权分置改革效应进行深入研究。
本文主体结构分为六部分。第一部分是绪论,简扼回顾了股权分置改革的历程,并阐述了本文研究的目的、意义、理论基础、逻辑方法及内容。第二部分对研究所涉及到的股权分置改革、代理冲突、债务治理等领域的国内外研究文献进行综述,并简要评论了这些文献,在此基础上提出了本文将要研究的问题。第三至第五部分是本文研究的核心,分别从公司业绩、股权结构与代理成本、自由现金流与债务治理等方面实证检验股权分置改革对我国上市公司内部治理结构的影响作用。其中第三部分检验了股权分置改革对上市公司业绩的影响作用；并分析了不同对价支付方式的选择会对公司业绩造成何种影响。实证结果表明股权分置改革对于我国上市公司的业绩有显著的促进作用；而在股改进行之时,采用股本调整对价支付方式的上市公司业绩有显著提高,其他的方式如现金对价和权证对价对提升公司业绩的效果并不显著。
第四部分着重考察股权分置改革以后,我国上市公司的股权结构及代理成本会的变化趋势,并检验了股权结构对代理成本的影响作用。结果表明上市公司在完成股权分置改革以后,其代理成本呈逐步下降的趋势；股权集中度呈上升趋势；股权制衡度呈下降趋势；机构持股比例呈上升趋势。而在我国特殊的制度环境下,上市公司股权集中有利于抑制代理成本的产生,股权制衡却未能起到其应有的制衡作用,机构持股者对代理成本有显著的抑制作用。以上结果表明,上市公司正是在股权分置改革的作用下,从股权集中、股权制衡以及机构持股者三方面优化了自身的股权结构。优化后的股权结构加强了控股大股东对代理人的控制,并加强了外部股东对公司行为的监管力度,缓解了股东与管理层之间的代理冲突,从而有效抑制了代理成本的产生。
第五部分探讨了股权分置改革对我国上市公司自由现金流及债务治理的影响作用；随后检验了自由现金流对上市公司债务治理结构的影响；并分析这种变化对我国上市公司债务治理结构所造成的影响。检验结果发现进行股权分置改革的公司其财务杠杆水平成下降趋势,而长期负债比例则呈上升趋势,由此表明股权分置改革的实施改善了我国上市公司自身的债务治理环境,并表现为上市公司资本结构得到优化；完成股改的上市公司其自由现金流量呈增长趋势,且股改完成时间越早的公司,其自由现金流量增加的幅度就越大；但是关于自由现金流对公司资本结构影响的实证结果却发现,自由现金流量的增加虽然降低了上市公司的总负债水平,但同时也降低了上市公司的长期负债和长期银行借款水平,由此表明自由现金流的增加反而恶化了我国上市公司的债务治理环境,因此有必要在今后经营活动中加强对自由现金流的管理。
第六部分在前文各项研究结论的基础上,从控股大股东行为约束化、董事会及监事会监管有效化、职业经理人市场完备化、公司信息披露机制透明化、资本市场融资渠道多样化、法律保障投资者权益健全化等六方面提出相关的政策建议,涵盖了公司治理、资本市场及法律制度等领域,以期中国资本市场在恢复正常的自由流通之后得到更好的完善,同时确保参与市场行为的各利益主体也能在健全的法律制度监管及保护下共谋发展。
This article focusing on the non-tradable share reform, one of the China's capital market activities in the historic changes, in order to target the domestic listed companies as an attempt to in-depth analysis of listed companies in China non-tradable share reform effect. That a listed company after the completion of share reform, the various aspects of internal governance level will have some new changes and these changes will make what effects to the public shareholders, creditors, outside investors and other relevant interest groups. Through study of these issues can be make a more clear understanding to listed companies after the split share structure reform, also will understand on the full circulation market, the listed companies will face which new problems, and facing which new opportunities and challenges, so as to advance the development of a better future and lay a solid foundation. Therefore, this article chose the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2005 and 2008 as the sample, combined standardize research and empirical studies, and empirical research as the main line of methods, comprehensive use of the relative theories of corporate governance, such as ownership structure theories, agency costs theories, and debt governance theories, in-depth research of listed companies in China non-tradable share reform effect.
This main structure is divided into six sections. The first part is an introduction; brief reviews the split share reform process, and explained the purpose of this study, significance, rationale, logic methods and content. The second part of the research related to the non-tradable share reform, agency conflicts, debt governance of domestic and foreign research literature review, And briefly comment on these documents, on this basis raised the questions will be studied of the issue. Third to the fifth part is the core of this paper, separately empirical the non-tradable share reform influence on the internal governance structure of listed companies in China from the aspects of company performance, ownership structure and agency costs, free cash flow and debt management. The third section examines the non-tradable share reform influence the performance of listed companies; with different payment options on the price performance of the company will be implications. The empirical results show that the share reform perform a significant role in promoting for the performance of listed companies; in the course of the non-tradable share reform, the performance of listed companies which use of capital adjustment payment on the price with a significant increase; other ways, such as cash on the price and the price of the warrants on the effect of enhancing company performance is not significant.
The fourth part focuses on how the equity structure of listed companies and the agency cost will be the trend after the non-tradable share reform, and examining the influence of equity structure on agency costs. The results show that the listed company after the completion of share reform, which showed a gradual decline in agency costs; ownership concentration the rise; equity degree of checks and balances decreased; upward trend in the proportion of institutional ownership. In the special system environment of China, the listed company focused on help inhibit the agency shares the cost of production, stock checks and balances has failed to play its proper checks and balances, institutional holders on the agency costs are significantly inhibited. These results show that the listed company is in the role of non-tradable share reform, and optimized their ownership structure from the three aspects of ownership concentration, shareholder equity, and institutional checks and balances. The optimized ownership structure enhance the the agent's control ofcontrolling shareholder, and strengthened the company's behavior outside shareholders supervision, ease the agency conflict between shareholders and the management, which effectively inhibit the production of agency costs.
Part V discusses the influence of non-tradable share reform on free cash flow, debt governance of China's listed companies; then test impact of free cash flow on the the debt governance structure of listed companies, and analysis the impact of such changes on debt governance structure of listed companies. Test results showed that the completion of share reform companies whose financial leverage is on a declining trend, while the long-term debt is on a upward trend. It is suggested that the implementation of non-tradable share reform of listed companies in China to improve its environment of debt governance, and performance to optimize the capital structure of listed companies. To complete share reform of listed companies in its free cash flow was increased, and the earlier completion of share reform companies, its free cash flow, the greater rate of increase. However, free cash flow on capital structure on the impact of empirical results found that, although the increase in free cash flow, reduce total debt levels of listed companies, but also reduces the long-term debt of listed companies and the level of long-term bank borrowings. It is suggested that the increase in free cash flow, but worsened the debt of listed companies'governance environment, it is necessary to strengthen business activities in the future management of the free cash flow.
Part VI based on the conclusion of the study of the previous paper, put forward related policies constraints from six proposal, such as the major shareholder of behavior, effective supervision of the Board and the Supervisory Board, professional managers of the market complete, transparent information disclosure system, capital market financing channels diversify, and improve legal protection for investors. Covering the field of corporate governance, capital markets and legal systems, expect China's capital market will be better improved after the resumption of normal flow. At the same time, ensure all of the stakeholders can be a sound legal system and common development under the better supervision and protection.
本文主体结构分为六部分。第一部分是绪论,简扼回顾了股权分置改革的历程,并阐述了本文研究的目的、意义、理论基础、逻辑方法及内容。第二部分对研究所涉及到的股权分置改革、代理冲突、债务治理等领域的国内外研究文献进行综述,并简要评论了这些文献,在此基础上提出了本文将要研究的问题。第三至第五部分是本文研究的核心,分别从公司业绩、股权结构与代理成本、自由现金流与债务治理等方面实证检验股权分置改革对我国上市公司内部治理结构的影响作用。其中第三部分检验了股权分置改革对上市公司业绩的影响作用；并分析了不同对价支付方式的选择会对公司业绩造成何种影响。实证结果表明股权分置改革对于我国上市公司的业绩有显著的促进作用；而在股改进行之时,采用股本调整对价支付方式的上市公司业绩有显著提高,其他的方式如现金对价和权证对价对提升公司业绩的效果并不显著。
第四部分着重考察股权分置改革以后,我国上市公司的股权结构及代理成本会的变化趋势,并检验了股权结构对代理成本的影响作用。结果表明上市公司在完成股权分置改革以后,其代理成本呈逐步下降的趋势；股权集中度呈上升趋势；股权制衡度呈下降趋势；机构持股比例呈上升趋势。而在我国特殊的制度环境下,上市公司股权集中有利于抑制代理成本的产生,股权制衡却未能起到其应有的制衡作用,机构持股者对代理成本有显著的抑制作用。以上结果表明,上市公司正是在股权分置改革的作用下,从股权集中、股权制衡以及机构持股者三方面优化了自身的股权结构。优化后的股权结构加强了控股大股东对代理人的控制,并加强了外部股东对公司行为的监管力度,缓解了股东与管理层之间的代理冲突,从而有效抑制了代理成本的产生。
第五部分探讨了股权分置改革对我国上市公司自由现金流及债务治理的影响作用；随后检验了自由现金流对上市公司债务治理结构的影响；并分析这种变化对我国上市公司债务治理结构所造成的影响。检验结果发现进行股权分置改革的公司其财务杠杆水平成下降趋势,而长期负债比例则呈上升趋势,由此表明股权分置改革的实施改善了我国上市公司自身的债务治理环境,并表现为上市公司资本结构得到优化；完成股改的上市公司其自由现金流量呈增长趋势,且股改完成时间越早的公司,其自由现金流量增加的幅度就越大；但是关于自由现金流对公司资本结构影响的实证结果却发现,自由现金流量的增加虽然降低了上市公司的总负债水平,但同时也降低了上市公司的长期负债和长期银行借款水平,由此表明自由现金流的增加反而恶化了我国上市公司的债务治理环境,因此有必要在今后经营活动中加强对自由现金流的管理。
第六部分在前文各项研究结论的基础上,从控股大股东行为约束化、董事会及监事会监管有效化、职业经理人市场完备化、公司信息披露机制透明化、资本市场融资渠道多样化、法律保障投资者权益健全化等六方面提出相关的政策建议,涵盖了公司治理、资本市场及法律制度等领域,以期中国资本市场在恢复正常的自由流通之后得到更好的完善,同时确保参与市场行为的各利益主体也能在健全的法律制度监管及保护下共谋发展。
This article focusing on the non-tradable share reform, one of the China's capital market activities in the historic changes, in order to target the domestic listed companies as an attempt to in-depth analysis of listed companies in China non-tradable share reform effect. That a listed company after the completion of share reform, the various aspects of internal governance level will have some new changes and these changes will make what effects to the public shareholders, creditors, outside investors and other relevant interest groups. Through study of these issues can be make a more clear understanding to listed companies after the split share structure reform, also will understand on the full circulation market, the listed companies will face which new problems, and facing which new opportunities and challenges, so as to advance the development of a better future and lay a solid foundation. Therefore, this article chose the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2005 and 2008 as the sample, combined standardize research and empirical studies, and empirical research as the main line of methods, comprehensive use of the relative theories of corporate governance, such as ownership structure theories, agency costs theories, and debt governance theories, in-depth research of listed companies in China non-tradable share reform effect.
This main structure is divided into six sections. The first part is an introduction; brief reviews the split share reform process, and explained the purpose of this study, significance, rationale, logic methods and content. The second part of the research related to the non-tradable share reform, agency conflicts, debt governance of domestic and foreign research literature review, And briefly comment on these documents, on this basis raised the questions will be studied of the issue. Third to the fifth part is the core of this paper, separately empirical the non-tradable share reform influence on the internal governance structure of listed companies in China from the aspects of company performance, ownership structure and agency costs, free cash flow and debt management. The third section examines the non-tradable share reform influence the performance of listed companies; with different payment options on the price performance of the company will be implications. The empirical results show that the share reform perform a significant role in promoting for the performance of listed companies; in the course of the non-tradable share reform, the performance of listed companies which use of capital adjustment payment on the price with a significant increase; other ways, such as cash on the price and the price of the warrants on the effect of enhancing company performance is not significant.
The fourth part focuses on how the equity structure of listed companies and the agency cost will be the trend after the non-tradable share reform, and examining the influence of equity structure on agency costs. The results show that the listed company after the completion of share reform, which showed a gradual decline in agency costs; ownership concentration the rise; equity degree of checks and balances decreased; upward trend in the proportion of institutional ownership. In the special system environment of China, the listed company focused on help inhibit the agency shares the cost of production, stock checks and balances has failed to play its proper checks and balances, institutional holders on the agency costs are significantly inhibited. These results show that the listed company is in the role of non-tradable share reform, and optimized their ownership structure from the three aspects of ownership concentration, shareholder equity, and institutional checks and balances. The optimized ownership structure enhance the the agent's control ofcontrolling shareholder, and strengthened the company's behavior outside shareholders supervision, ease the agency conflict between shareholders and the management, which effectively inhibit the production of agency costs.
Part V discusses the influence of non-tradable share reform on free cash flow, debt governance of China's listed companies; then test impact of free cash flow on the the debt governance structure of listed companies, and analysis the impact of such changes on debt governance structure of listed companies. Test results showed that the completion of share reform companies whose financial leverage is on a declining trend, while the long-term debt is on a upward trend. It is suggested that the implementation of non-tradable share reform of listed companies in China to improve its environment of debt governance, and performance to optimize the capital structure of listed companies. To complete share reform of listed companies in its free cash flow was increased, and the earlier completion of share reform companies, its free cash flow, the greater rate of increase. However, free cash flow on capital structure on the impact of empirical results found that, although the increase in free cash flow, reduce total debt levels of listed companies, but also reduces the long-term debt of listed companies and the level of long-term bank borrowings. It is suggested that the increase in free cash flow, but worsened the debt of listed companies'governance environment, it is necessary to strengthen business activities in the future management of the free cash flow.
Part VI based on the conclusion of the study of the previous paper, put forward related policies constraints from six proposal, such as the major shareholder of behavior, effective supervision of the Board and the Supervisory Board, professional managers of the market complete, transparent information disclosure system, capital market financing channels diversify, and improve legal protection for investors. Covering the field of corporate governance, capital markets and legal systems, expect China's capital market will be better improved after the resumption of normal flow. At the same time, ensure all of the stakeholders can be a sound legal system and common development under the better supervision and protection.
引文
[1]Agrawal Anup, Charles R. Knoeber,1996, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), pp:377-397.
[2]Aivazian V. A., Ge Y., Qiu J.,2005, Debt Maturity Structure and Firm Investment [J], Financial Management,34, pp:107-119.
[3]Aivazian V. A., Ge Y.,2005, The impact of leverage on firm investment:Canadian evidence [J],, Journal of Corporate Finance,11, pp:277-291.
[4]Anderson Christopher W., Anil K. Makhija,1999, Deregulation, disintermediation, and agency costs of debt:evidence from Japan [J], Journal of Financial Economics,51 (2), pp:309-339.
[5]Anderson Ronald, Sattar A. Mansi, David M. Reeb,2003, Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt [J], Journal of Financial Economics,68(2), pp:263-285.
[6]Ang James S., Rebel A. Cole, James W. Lin,2000, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Finance,55(1), pp:81-106.
[7]Antoniou A., Guney Y., Paudyal K.,2008, The Determinants of Capital Structure:Capital Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Institutions [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,43(1), PP:59-92.
[8]Antoniou A., Guney Y, Paudyal K.,2006, The determinants of debt maturity structure:evidence from France, Germany and the UK [J], European Financial Management,12, pp:161-194.
[9]Bae Kee-Hong, Jun-Koo Kang, Kim Jin-Mo,2002, Tunneling or Value-added:Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance,57(6), pp:2695-2740.
[10]Baggs Jen, Jean-Etienne De Bettignies,2007, Product Market Competition and Agency Costs [J], Journal of Industrial Economics,55(2), pp:289-323.
[11]Baker Malcolm, Jeffrey Wurgler,2002, Market Timing and Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,57(1), pp:1-32.
[12]Barclay M. J., Smith C. W.,1995, The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt [J], Journal of Finance, L, pp.609-631.
[13]Barclay, M. J., Marx L. M., Smith C. W.,2003, The Joint Determination of Leverage and Maturity [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,9, pp:149-167.
[14]Barnea A., Haugen R. A., Senbet L. W.,1980, "A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework", Journal of Finance,35, pp:1223-1234.
[15]Barnea, A., Haugen R. A., Senbet L. W.,1981, An Equilibrium Analysis of Debt Financing under Costly Tax Arbitrage and Agency Problems [J], Journal of Finance,36(3), pp:569-581.
[16]Bebchuk Lucian A., Alma Cohen,2005, The costs of entrenched boards [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,78(2), pp:409-433.
[17]Bebchuk Lucian A., Reinier Kraakman, George G. Triantis,2000, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights [J], Working Papers, Yale School of Management's Economics Research Network, pp:1-35.
[18]Berger, Philip G., Rebecca N. Hann,2007, Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure [J], Accounting Review,82(4), pp:869-906.
[19]Bergolf, Thadden,1994, Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests:Capital Structure with Multiple Investors [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,109, pp:1055-1084.
[20]Berle A., G. Means,1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York: Macmillan.
[21]Bernanke Ben, Mark Gertler,1989, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations [J], American Economic Review,79(1), pp:14-31.
[22]Bloch Francis, Ulrich Hege,2001, Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [J], papers, ssrn. com.
[23]Boardman Anthony E., Daniel M. Shapiro, Aidan R. Vining,1997, The role of agency costs in explaining the superior performance of foreign MNE subsidiaries [J], International Business Review,6(3), pp:295-317.
[24]Booth L., V Aivazian, A. Demirguc-Kunt, V. Maksimovic,2001, Capital Structures in Developing Countries [J], Journal of Finance,56, pp:87-130.
[25]Bradley, Michael, George A. Jarrell, E. Han Kim,1984, On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure:Theory and Evidence [J], Journal of Finance,39(3), pp:857-880.
[26]Brick I. E., Ravid S. A.,1985, On the relevance of debt maturity structure [J], Journal of Finance, 40, pp:1423-1437.
[27]Brick I. E., Ravid S. A.,1991, Interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure [J], Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,26, pp:63-81.
[28]Brockman Paul, Emre Unlu,2009, Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt [J], Journal of Financial Economics,92(2), pp:276-299.
[29]Bryan Stephen, Robert Nash, and Ajay Patel,2006, Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s? [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3), pp:516-535.
[30]Carlstrom Charles T., Timothy S. Fuerst,1997, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations:A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis [J], American Economic Review,87(5), pp:893-910.
[31]Chang C., Alice L. C., Cheng L. F.,2009, Determinants of capital structure choice:A structural equation modeling approach [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,49(2), PP:197-213.
[32]Chang W. N., Doina M. R.,2004, Does Debt Maturity Matter for Investment Decision? [Z], CESIFO Working Paper, No.1124.
[33]Chen J.,2004, Determinants of Capital Structure of Chinese-listed Companies [J], Journal of Business Research,57, pp:1341-1351.
[34]Chen Xiaoying (Cindy), Jasmine Yur-Austin,2007, Re-measuring agency costs:The effectiveness of blockholders [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,47(5), pp:588-601.
[35]Childsa P. D., Mauerb D. C., Ottc S. H.,2005, Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions:the Effects of Agency Conflicts [J], Journal of Financial Economics,76, pp:667-690.
[36]Claessens S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, L. H. P. Lang.2000, The Separation of Ownership and control in East Asian Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:81-112.
[37]Cleary S.,1999, The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status [J], Journal of Finance,54, pp:673-692.
[38]Chrisman James J., Jess H. Chua, Reginald A. Litz,2004, Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non-Family Firms:Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence [J], Entrepreneurship:Theory & Practice,28(4), pp:335-354.
[39]Collier Paul, Alan Gregory,1999, Audit committee activity and agency costs [J], Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,18(4/5), pp:311-332.
[40]Corbetta Guido, Carlo Salvato,2004, Self-Serving or Self-Actualizing? Models of Man and Agency Costs in Different Types of Family Firms:A Commentary on "Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non-family Firms:Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence" [J] Entrepreneurship:Theory & Practice,28(4), pp:355-362.
[41]Cronqvist Henrik, Mattias Nilsson,2003, Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,38(4), pp:695-719.
[42]Cronqvist Henrik, Peter Hogfeldt, Mattias Nilsson,2001, Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts [J], Real Estate Economics,29(1), pp:85-126.
[43]Cumming Douglas J.,2005, Agency costs, Institutions, Learning, and Taxation in Venture Capital Contracting [J], Journal of Business Venturing,20(5), pp:573-622.
[44]Delianedis G., R. Geske,1998, Credit Risk and Risk Neutral Default Probabilities:Information about Rating Migrations and Defaults [Z], UCLA, Anderson Working Paper, www. ssrn. com.
[45]Demirguc-Kunt A., Maksimovic V.,1999, Institutions, Financial Markets and firm Debt Maturity [J], Journal of Financial Economics,54, pp:295-336.
[46]Diamond D. W.,1991, Debt maturity and liquidity risk [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,106, pp:709-737.
[47]Diamond D. W.,1991, Monitoring and reputation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt [J], Journal of Political Economy,99, pp:689-721.
[48]Diamond D. W.,1993, Seniority and maturity of debt contracts [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp:341-368.
[49]Doukas John A., Christos Pantzalis,2003, Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,9(1), pp:59-92.
[50]Doukas John A., Kim Chansog, Christos Pantzalis,2000, Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and Company Characteristics [J], Financial Analysts Journal.56(6), pp:54-63.
[51]Easterbrook Frank H.,1984, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends [J], American Economic Review,74(4), pp:650-659.
[52]Elston Julie Ann, Lawrence G. Goldberg,2003, Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,27(7), pp:1391-1410.
[53]Elyasiani E., Guo L., Tang L.,2002, The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance:A System-based Model [J], Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,19, pp:351-377.
[54]Ertugrul Mine, Shantaram Hegde,2008, Board compensation practices and agency costs of debt [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5), pp:512-531.
[55]Fan P. H., Titman S., Twite J.,2003, An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices [Z], working paper from www.ssrn.com.
[56]Ferris Stephen P., Xuemin (Sterling) Yan,2009, Agency costs, governance, and organizational forms:Evidence from the mutual fund industry [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,33(4), pp: 619-626.
[57]Fischer E., Heinkel R., Zechner J.,1989, Dynamic Capital Structure Choice:Theory and Test [J], Journal of Finance,44, pp:19-40.
[58]Flannery M.,1986, Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice [J], Journal of Finance,41, pp:18-38.
[59]Flanneny M.,1994, Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage optimally financing banking firms [J], American Economic Review,84, pp:320-331.
[60]Florackis Chrisostomos, Aydin Ozkan,2009, The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs:An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data [J], European Financial Management, 15(3), pp:497-528.
[61]Francis Jennifer, Abbie Smith,1995, Agency costs and innovation some empirical evidence [J], Journal of Accounting & Economics,19(2/3), pp:383-409.
[62]Francis Jere R., Earl R. Wilson,1988, Auditor Changes:A Joint Test of Theory Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation [J], Accounting Review,63(4), pp:663-682.
[63]Friedman Eric, H. Simon Johnson, Mitton Todd,2003, Propping and Tunneling [Z], NBER Working Paper, No, W9949.
[64]Gilson Ronald J., Charles K. Whitehead,2008, Deconstructing Equity:Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets [J], Columbia Law Review,108(1), pp:231-264.
[65]Goswami G., T. H. Noe, M. J. Robello,1995, Debt financing under asymmetric information [J], Journal of Finance,50, pp:633-659.
[66]Green Richard C., Eli Talmor,1986, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,10(2/3), pp:391-399.
[67]Guedes J., T. Opler,1996, The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues [J], Journal of Finance,51, pp:1809-1833.
[68]Gupta, Keshav,1982, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 10(1), pp:115-116.
[69]Harper Joel T., John R. Wingender,2000, An empirical test of agency cost reduction using interest rate swaps [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,24(9), pp:1419-1431.
[70]Hart, Oliver, and James Moore,1995, Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management [J], American Economic Review,85, pp:567-585.
[71]Harvey Campbell R., Karl V. Lins, Andrew H. Roper,2004, The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme [J], Journal of Financial Economics,74(1), pp:3-30.
[72]Heinkel Robert, Josef Zechner,1990, The Role of Debt and Preferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,25, pp:1-24.
[73]Hennessy C.,2004, Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment [J], Journal of Finance,59, pp: 1717-1742.
[74]Holdness C., D. Sheehan,1998, The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations:An exploratory analysis [J], Journal of Financial Economics,20, pp:317-346.
[75]Jeng Vivian, C. Lai Gene,2005, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs, Specialization, and Efficiency: Analysis of Keiretsu and Independent Insurers in the Japanese Nonlife Insurance Industry [J], Journal of Risk & Insurance,72(1), pp:105-158.
[76]Jensen Michael C.,2005, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity [J], Financial Management,34(1), pp:5-19.
[77]Jensen Michael C.,2004, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance [J], European Financial Management,10(4), pp:549-565.
[78]Jensen Michael C.,1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers [J], American Economic Review,76(2), pp:323-329.
[79]Jensen Michael C., William H. Meckling,1976, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Financial Economics,3(4), pp:305-360.
[80]Joseph Kissan, Vernon J. Richardson,2002, Free Cash Flow, Agency Costs, and the Affordability Method of Advertising Budgeting [J], Journal of Marketing,66(1), pp:94-107.
[81]Johnson S., P. Boone, A. Breach, E. Friedman,2000, Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:141-186.
[82]Kale J., T. H. Noe,1990, Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential game equilibrium [J], Journal of Financial Researches,13(2), pp:155-165.
[83]Kim C. S., Marcus D. C., Stohs M. H.,1995, Corporate Debt Maturity Policy and Investor Tax Timing Options:Theory and Evidence [J], Financial Management,24(1), pp:33-46.
[84]Lang L.H.P., Stulz R.M., Walkling R. A.,1991, A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, the Case of Bidder Returns [J], Journal of Financial Economics,29(2), pp:315-335.
[85]Lang Larry, Annette Poulsen, Rene Stulz,1995, Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion [J], Journal of Financial Economics,37(1), pp:3-37.
[86]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,1999, Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance,54(2), pp:471-517.
[87]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer. and R. Vishny,2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World [J], Journal of Finance,55(1), pp:1-33.
[88]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:3-27.
[89]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J], Journal of Finance,57, pp:1147-1170.
[90]Lasfer Meziane,2002, Board Structure and Agency Costs [Z], EFMA 2002 London Meetings, Cass Business School Research Paper.
[91]Leland Hayne E., D. Pyle,1977, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial intermediation [J], Journal of Finance,32(2), pp:371-387.
[92]Leland Hayne E.,1994, Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,49(4), pp:1213-1252.
[93]Leland Hayne E., Klaus T.,1996, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads [J], Journal of Finance,51(3), pp:987-1019.
[94]Leland Hayne E.,1998, Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,53(4), pp:1213-1243.
[95]LeeSeok Hwang, Yong O. Kim,1998, Does the Ownership Structure of Debt and Equity Affect the Agency Costs of Debt? Japanese Evidence [J], Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,13(1), pp:37-66.
[96]Lubatkin Michael H., William S. Schulze,2007, An Organizational Justice-Based View of Self-Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms [J], Journal of Management Studies,44(6), pp: 955-971.
[97]Maug E.,1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is there a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control [J], Journal of Finance,53, pp:65-98.
[98]Mann S.V., N.W. Sicherman,1991, The agency cost of free cash flow:Acquisition activity and equity issues [J], Journal of Business,64(2), pp:213-227.
[99]Maksimovic Vojislav, Josef Zechner,1991, Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium [J], Journal of Finance,46(5), pp:1619-1643.
[100]McKnight Phillip J., Charlie Weir,2009, Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies:A panel data analysis [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,49(2), pp:139-158.
[101]Mello Antonio S., John E. Parsons,1992, Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt [J], Journal of Finance,47(5), pp:1887-1904.
[102]Menon Krishnagopal, Joanna D. Williams,1994, The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring [J], Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,13(2), pp:121-139.
[103]Modigliani Franco, Merton H. Miller,1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of Investment [J], American Economic Review,48(3), pp:261-298.
[104]Modigliani Franco, Merton H. Miller,1963, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital:A Correction [J], American Economic Review,53(3), pp:433-444.
[105]Morris J. R.,1976, On Corporate Debt Maturity Strategies [J], Journal of Finance,31(1), pp:29-37.
[106]Moyer R. Charles, Robert E. Chatfield, Phillip M. Sisneros,1989, Security Analyst Monitoring Activity:Agency Costs and Information Demands [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 24(4), pp:503-512.
[107]Myers Stewart C., Nicholas S. Majluf,1984, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Information that Investors do not Have [J], Journal of Financial Economics,13(2), pp:187-221.
[108]Myers S.,1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J], Journal of Financial Economics,5(2), pp:147-175.
[109]Myers S.,1984, The Capital Structure Puzzle [J], Journal of Financial,39(3), pp:575-592.
[110]Nam Jouahn, Charles Tang, John H. Thornton, Kevin Wynne,2006, The effect of agency costs on the value of single-segment and multi-segment firms [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,12(4), pp: 761-782.
[111]Noe Thomas H.,2002, Institutional Activism and Financial Market Structure [J], Review of Financial Studies,15, pp:289-319.
[112]Nohel Tom, Vefa Tarhan,1998, Share repurchases and firm performance:new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow [J], Journal of Financial Economics,49(2), pp:187-222.
[113]Pagano Marco, Ailsa Roell,1998, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to go Public [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,113(1), pp: 187-225.
[114]Pawlina Grzegorz, Luc Renneboog,2005, Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK [J], European Financial Management, 11(4), pp:483-513.
[115]Piot Charles,2001, Agency costs and audit quality:evidence from France [J], European Accounting Review,10(3), pp:461-499.
[116]Rozeff Michael S.,1982, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios [J], Journal of Financial Research,5(3), pp:249-259.
[117]Shleifer A., R. Vishny,1986, Large shareholders and corporate control [J], Journal of Political Economy,94, pp:461-488.
[118]Shin Hyun-Han, Yong H. Kim,2002, Agency costs and efficiency of business capital investment: evidence from quarterly capital expenditures [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,8(2), pp:139-158.
[119]Singh Manohar, Wallace N. Davidson Ⅲ,2003, Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,27(5), pp:793-817.
[120]Stohs M. H., Mauer D. C.,1996, The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure [J], Journal of Business,69(3), pp:279-312.
[121]Thatcher Janet S.,1985, The Choice of Call Provision Terms:Evidence of the Existence of Agency Costs of Debt [J], Journal of Finance,40(2), pp:549-561,
[122]Wall Larry D.,1989, Interest Rate Swaps in an Agency Theoretic Model with Uncertain Interest Rates [J], Journal of Banking & Finance.13(2). pp:261-270.
[123]白重恩、路江涌、陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006.08：4-13.
[124]曹廷求、孙文祥.股权结构与资本结构—中国上市公司实证分析[J].中国软科学,2004.01：32-36.
[125]陈建勇、王东静、张景青.公司债务期限结构与投资效率[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2009.04：80-92.
[126]陈明贺.股权分置改革及股权结构对公司绩效影响的实证研究—基于面板数据的分析[J].南方经济.2007.02：57-66.
[127]陈信元、汪晖.股东制衡与公司价值：模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究.2004.11：102-110.
[128]陈文浩、任娟华.企业债务期限结构的行业特征—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].上海财经大学学报,2007.08：78-84.
[129]淳伟德等.股权分置改革对我国上市公司业绩影响的实证分析[J].预测,2009.04：43-49.
[130]党红.关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究[J].会计研究.2008.06：63-71.
[131]邓莉、张宗益、李宏胜.银行债权的公司治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007.01：61-70.
[132]丁志国、苏治、杜晓宇.股权分置改革均衡对价[J]I中国工业经济.2006.02：113-119.
[133]丁守海.股权改革的三阶段托宾q效应[J].南开经济研究.2006.05：72-81.
[134]冯根福.双重委托代理理论：上市公司治理的另一种分析框架[J].经济研究,2004.12：16-25.
[135]傅勇、谭松涛.股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易[J].金融研究.2008.03：88-102.
[136]傅永昌.中国沪深权证市场实证和应用若干问题研究[D].西南交通大学博士学位论文,成都：西南交通大学,2008.
[137]高雷、宋顺林.治理环境、治理结构与代理成本—来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据[J].经济评论,2007.03：35-40.
[138]葛蓉蓉.股权结构对公司治理影响的状态依存性[J].金融研究.2006.07：151-156.
[139]“股权分置改革研究”课题组.股市公共性、股权分置改革的理论根据[J].中国工业经济.2006.04：5-13.
[140]郝臣、宫永建、孙凌霞.公司治理要素对代理成本影响的实证研究—来自我国上市公司的证据(2000-2007)[J].软科学,2009.10：123-127.
[141]何诚颖、李翔.股权分置改革、扩容预期及其市场反应的实证研究[J].金融研究.2007.04：157-170.
[142]何丹、朱建军.股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本[J].会计研究.2006,05：50-57.
[143]黄渝祥、孙艳等.股权制衡与公司治理研究[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版).2003,09：1102-1105.
[144]胡援成.中国企业资本结构与企业价值研究[J].金融研究,2002.03：110-122.
[145]胡援成、周裙、胡韬,利率风险与债务期限结构的正反馈效应分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2007.09：87-98.
[146]金雪军、张学勇.银行监管与中国上市公司代理成本研究[J].金融研究,2005.10：110-119.
[147]敬景程.股权分置问题的制度经济学思考[J].经济评论.2005.02：86-92.
[148]匡海波、李延喜、曹雨.最佳资本结构、债务期限结构与公司收益的相关性研究[J].管理评论,2007.12：55-60.
[149]雷勇、蒲勇健.裁员视角下人力资源的有效激励与代理成本分析[J].管理工程学报,2007.01：25-28.
[150]雷森、李传昭、李奔波.信号传递下的企业债务期限结构选择[J].重庆大学学报,2004.09：143-145.
[151]雷森、李传昭、李奔波.企业债务期限结构与民营中小企业融资研究[J].预测,2005.04：57-60.
[152]李明辉.股权结构、公司治理对股权代理成本的影响—基于中国上市公司2000-2006年数据的研究[J].金融研究,2009.02：149-168.
[153]李世辉、雷新途.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究—来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008.05：30-37.
[154]李维安、李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究—基于CCGI_NK_的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008.01：4-14.
[155]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007.01：102-113.
[156]李善民、王彩萍、朱滔、李珩.现代企业引进职业经理人的损失分析—代理成本的观点[J].管理工程学报,2005.02：40-45.
[157]李冻菊.股票市场发展与经济增长的关系研究—源自计量经济学的解释[J].金融研究.2006.09：75-80.
[158]李朝霞.影响中国上市公司融资结构的主要因素分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003.10：5-12.
[159]廖理、沈红波、郦金梁.股权分置改革与上市公司治理的实证研究[J].中国工业经济.2008.05：99-108.
[160]廖理、张学勇.全流通纠正终极控制者利益取向的有效性—来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2008.08：77-88.
[161]刘昌国.公司治理机制、自由现金流量与上市公司过度投资行为研究[J].经济科学,2006.04：50-58.
[162]刘孟晖.大股东治理与现金股利行为研究[D].西南交通大学博士论文,2008.
[163]刘煜辉、熊鹏.股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价[J].经济研究.2005.05：85-95.
[164]刘星、杨亦民.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响—来自沪深股市的经验证据[J].预测,2006.03：33-37.
[165]刘星、宋小保.控股股东代理对负债代理成本的影响—基于实物期权的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007.09：61-68.
[166]刘运国、高亚男.我国上市公司股权制衡与公司业绩关系研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版).2007,04：102-108.
[167]刘玉敏、任广乾.股权分置改革的效率及其影响因素[J].中国工业经济.2007.07：103-110.
[168]罗宏、黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008.09：139-147.
[169]罗琦等.融资约束抑或过度投资—中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007.09：103-110.
[170]陆正飞.企业适度负债的理论分析与实证研究[J].经济研究,1996.02：52-58.
[171]陆正飞、辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究[J].会计研究,1998.08：34-37.
[172]陆正飞、韩霞、常琦.公司长期负债与投资行为关系研究—基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2006.01：120-128.
[173]吕长江、张艳秋.企业财务状况对负债代理成本的影响[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2002.12：108-112.
[174]吕峻、李朝霞、胡洁.基于公司治理视角的上市公司经营者监督实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008.09：101-116.
[175]马曙光、黄志忠、薛云奎.股权分置—资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究.2005.09：44-50.
[176]孟焰、张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究[J].会计研究,2006.04：37-43.
[177]庞梅.股权分置改革对上市公司治理基本命题影响的分析[J].预测.2007.06：27-30.
[178]钱爱民、张淑君、程幸.基于自由现金流量的财务预警指标体系的构建与检验—来自中国机械制造业A股上市公司的经验数据[J].中国软科学,2008.09：148-155.
[179]平新乔、范瑛、郝朝艳.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析[J].经济研究,2003.11：42-53.
[180]秦彬、肖坤.我国上市公司股权结构对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2008.02：109-114.
[181]屈文洲、许年行、关家雄、吴世农.市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配[J].经济研究.2008.04：132-146.
[182]沈艺峰、许琳、黄娟娟.我国股权分置中对价水平的“群聚”现象分析[J].经济研究.2006.11：102-111.
[183]宋立、韩亮亮.大股东持股比例对代理成本影响的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2005.01：30-34.
[184]苏梅、寇纪淞、陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究[J].管理科学学报.2006.02：54-61.
[185]苏启林.代理问题、公司治理与企业价值—以民营上市公司为例[J].中国工业经济,2004.04：100-106.
[186]孙铮、刘凤委、李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构—来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005.05：52-63.
[187]汤谷良、朱蕾.自由现金流量与财务运行体系[J].会计研究,2004.04：32-37.
[188]唐国正.股权二元结构下的股利政策一一种新的代理成本理论[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006.05：94-102.
[189]唐国正、熊德华、巫和懋.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性[J].金融研究.2005.09：141-158.
[190]唐雪松、周晓苏、马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究[J].会计研究,2007.07：44-52.
[191]唐跃军、谢仍明.股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应—来自1999—2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].中国工业经济.2006.02：120-128.
[192]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005.07：123-128.
[193]田利辉.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效[J].经济学季刊,2004.10：15-26.
[194]童盼、陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005.05：75-84.
[195]王兵.独立董事监督了吗?—基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角[J].金融研究,2007.01：109-121.
[196]王东静、张祥建、张景青.公司债务期限结构与违约风险[J].管理科学学报,2009.04：77-87.
[197]王克敏、陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效[J].管理世界.2004.07：127-148.
[198]王琨、肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论.2005.02：27-33.
[199]王旻、杨朝军、廖士光.中国股票市场流通性价值研究—给予非流通股协议转让与限售股转让的证据[J].财经研究.2008.03：81-94.
[200]魏刚、肖泽忠、Nick Travlos、邹宏.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007.03：92-105.
[201]吴江、阮彤.股权分置结构与中国上市公司融资行为[J].金融研究.2004.06：56-67.
[202]吴超鹏、郑方鏕、林周勇、吴世农.对价支付影响因素的理论和实证分析[J].经济研究.2006.08：14-22.
[203]吴晓求.股权分置改革的若干理论问题—兼论全流通条件下中国资本市场的若干新变化[J].财贸经济.2006.02：26-33.
[204]吴晓求.中国资本市场：股权分裂与流动性变革[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[205]吴晓求.股权分置改革后的中国资本市场[M].中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[206]伍利娜、陆正飞.企业投资行为与融资结构的关系—基于一项实验研究的发现[J].管理世界,2005.04：99-105.
[207]肖作平.资本结构影响因素和双向效应动态模型—来自中国上市公司面板数据的证据[J].会计研究,2004.02：36-41.
[208]肖作平.中国上市公司债务期限结构特征的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2006.02：51-57.
[209]肖作平、陈德胜.公司治理结构对代理成本的影响—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸经济,2006.12：29-35.
[210]肖作平、廖理.大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007.10：99-113.
[211]肖作平.债务期限结构影响因素和双向效应动态调整模型—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理工程学报,2009.03：142-146.
[212]谢军.债务期限结构、公司治理和政府保护：基于投资者保护视角的分析[J].经济评论,2008.01：123-128.
[213]辛宇、徐莉萍.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究.2007.09：121-133.
[214]许年行、吴世农.我国上市公司股权分置改革中的锚定效应研究[J].经济研究.2007.01：114-125.
[215]徐向艺、王俊韡、巩震.高管人员报酬激励与公司治理绩效研究—一项基于深、沪A股上市 公司的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2007.02：94-100.
[216]徐向艺、李鑫.自由现金流、负债融资与企业过度投资—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].软科学,2008.07：124-127.
[2]7]徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟。股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究.2006.01：92-102.
[218]阎达五、谭劲松.我国上市公司独立董事制度：缺陷与改进一一个基于制度分析的研究框架[J].会计研究,2003.11：3-9.
[219]晏艳阳、陈共荣.我国上市公司的资本结构与代理成本问题分析[J].会计研究,2001.09：28-33.
[220]晏艳阳、赵大玮.我国股权分置改革中内幕交易的实证研究[J].金融研究.2006.04：101-108.
[221]杨德明、辛清泉.投资者关系与代理成本—基于上市公司的分析[J].经济科学,2006.03：47-60.
[222]杨善林、杨模荣、姚禄仕.股权分置改革与股票市场价值相关性研究[J].会计研究.2006.12：41-46.
[223]杨兴全、郑军.基于代理成本的企业债务融资契约安排研究[J].会计研究,2004.07：61-66.
[224]杨华军、胡亦明.制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资[J].管理世界,2007.09：99-106.
[225]姚颐、刘志远、王健.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究.2007.11：45-56.
[226]袁卫秋.我国上市公司的债务期限结构—基于权衡思想的实证研究[J].会计研究,2005.12：53-58.
[227]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效—一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003.01：87-94.
[228]曾颖、叶康涛.股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求[J].会计研究,2005.10：63-70.
[229]曾庆生、陈信元.何种内部治理机制影响了公司权益代理成本—大股东与董事会治理效率的比较[J].财经研究,2006.02：106-117.
[230]张建民、宁代兵、曹孟鸣.完善股权分置改革方案的方法论思考[J].经济学动态.2005.07：49-53.
[231]张建民.后股权分置时代中国股市与上市公司治理的问题与对策—对股权分置改革实践的反思[J].经济学研究.2006.06：43-47.
[232]张俊喜、王晓坤、夏乐.实证研究股权分置改革中的政策与策略[J].金融研究.2006.08：1-19.
[233]张维迎.中国国有企业资本结构存在的问题[J].金融研究,1996.10：27-29.
[234]张祥建、郭岚.资产注入、大股东寻租行为与资本配置效率[J].金融研究.2008.02：98-112.
[235]张宗新.内幕交易行为预测：理论模型与实证分析[J].管理世界.2008.04：24-35.
[236]张兆国.资本结构与代理成本—来自中国国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2008.01：39-47.
[237]张兆国、宋丽梦、张庆.我国上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析[J].会计研究,2005.08：44-49.
[238]张翼、李辰.股权结构、现金流与资本投资[J].经济学(季刊),2005.10：229-246.
[239]章卫东.定向增发新股、整体上市与股票价格短期市场表现的实证研究[J]会计研究.2007.12：63-68.
[240]赵景文、于增彪.股权制衡与公司经营业绩[J].会计研究.2005.12：59-64.
[241]赵俊强、廖士光、李湛.中国上市公司股权分置改革中的利益分配研究[J].经济研究.2006.11： 112-122.
[242]周勤、徐捷、程书礼.中国上市公司规模与债务融资关系的实证研究[J].金融研究,2006.08：41-55.
[243]周冬华、周红.上市公司信息披露质量度量研究评述[J].中国注册会计师,2009.10：35-39.
[244]郑振龙、王保合.股权分置改革的期权分析[J].金融研究.2006.12：116-125.
[245]郑志刚、孙艳梅、谭松涛、姜德增.股权分置改革对价确定与我国上市公司治理机制有效性的检验[J].经济研究.2007.07：96-108.
[246]郑春美、白宏磊、熊丹.股权分置改革与公司绩效研究[J].武汉理工大学学报.2007.11：150-153.
[247]支晓强、童盼.管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为—对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验[J].会计研究,2007.10：73-81.
[248]朱小平、暴冰、杨妍.股权分置改革与流动性定价问题研究[J].会计研究.2006.02：87-92.
[249]朱凯、陈信元.银行腐败与公司资本结构决策[J].金融研究,2007.01：28-40.
[2]Aivazian V. A., Ge Y., Qiu J.,2005, Debt Maturity Structure and Firm Investment [J], Financial Management,34, pp:107-119.
[3]Aivazian V. A., Ge Y.,2005, The impact of leverage on firm investment:Canadian evidence [J],, Journal of Corporate Finance,11, pp:277-291.
[4]Anderson Christopher W., Anil K. Makhija,1999, Deregulation, disintermediation, and agency costs of debt:evidence from Japan [J], Journal of Financial Economics,51 (2), pp:309-339.
[5]Anderson Ronald, Sattar A. Mansi, David M. Reeb,2003, Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt [J], Journal of Financial Economics,68(2), pp:263-285.
[6]Ang James S., Rebel A. Cole, James W. Lin,2000, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Finance,55(1), pp:81-106.
[7]Antoniou A., Guney Y., Paudyal K.,2008, The Determinants of Capital Structure:Capital Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Institutions [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,43(1), PP:59-92.
[8]Antoniou A., Guney Y, Paudyal K.,2006, The determinants of debt maturity structure:evidence from France, Germany and the UK [J], European Financial Management,12, pp:161-194.
[9]Bae Kee-Hong, Jun-Koo Kang, Kim Jin-Mo,2002, Tunneling or Value-added:Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance,57(6), pp:2695-2740.
[10]Baggs Jen, Jean-Etienne De Bettignies,2007, Product Market Competition and Agency Costs [J], Journal of Industrial Economics,55(2), pp:289-323.
[11]Baker Malcolm, Jeffrey Wurgler,2002, Market Timing and Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,57(1), pp:1-32.
[12]Barclay M. J., Smith C. W.,1995, The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt [J], Journal of Finance, L, pp.609-631.
[13]Barclay, M. J., Marx L. M., Smith C. W.,2003, The Joint Determination of Leverage and Maturity [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,9, pp:149-167.
[14]Barnea A., Haugen R. A., Senbet L. W.,1980, "A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework", Journal of Finance,35, pp:1223-1234.
[15]Barnea, A., Haugen R. A., Senbet L. W.,1981, An Equilibrium Analysis of Debt Financing under Costly Tax Arbitrage and Agency Problems [J], Journal of Finance,36(3), pp:569-581.
[16]Bebchuk Lucian A., Alma Cohen,2005, The costs of entrenched boards [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,78(2), pp:409-433.
[17]Bebchuk Lucian A., Reinier Kraakman, George G. Triantis,2000, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights [J], Working Papers, Yale School of Management's Economics Research Network, pp:1-35.
[18]Berger, Philip G., Rebecca N. Hann,2007, Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure [J], Accounting Review,82(4), pp:869-906.
[19]Bergolf, Thadden,1994, Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests:Capital Structure with Multiple Investors [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,109, pp:1055-1084.
[20]Berle A., G. Means,1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York: Macmillan.
[21]Bernanke Ben, Mark Gertler,1989, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations [J], American Economic Review,79(1), pp:14-31.
[22]Bloch Francis, Ulrich Hege,2001, Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [J], papers, ssrn. com.
[23]Boardman Anthony E., Daniel M. Shapiro, Aidan R. Vining,1997, The role of agency costs in explaining the superior performance of foreign MNE subsidiaries [J], International Business Review,6(3), pp:295-317.
[24]Booth L., V Aivazian, A. Demirguc-Kunt, V. Maksimovic,2001, Capital Structures in Developing Countries [J], Journal of Finance,56, pp:87-130.
[25]Bradley, Michael, George A. Jarrell, E. Han Kim,1984, On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure:Theory and Evidence [J], Journal of Finance,39(3), pp:857-880.
[26]Brick I. E., Ravid S. A.,1985, On the relevance of debt maturity structure [J], Journal of Finance, 40, pp:1423-1437.
[27]Brick I. E., Ravid S. A.,1991, Interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure [J], Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,26, pp:63-81.
[28]Brockman Paul, Emre Unlu,2009, Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt [J], Journal of Financial Economics,92(2), pp:276-299.
[29]Bryan Stephen, Robert Nash, and Ajay Patel,2006, Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s? [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3), pp:516-535.
[30]Carlstrom Charles T., Timothy S. Fuerst,1997, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations:A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis [J], American Economic Review,87(5), pp:893-910.
[31]Chang C., Alice L. C., Cheng L. F.,2009, Determinants of capital structure choice:A structural equation modeling approach [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,49(2), PP:197-213.
[32]Chang W. N., Doina M. R.,2004, Does Debt Maturity Matter for Investment Decision? [Z], CESIFO Working Paper, No.1124.
[33]Chen J.,2004, Determinants of Capital Structure of Chinese-listed Companies [J], Journal of Business Research,57, pp:1341-1351.
[34]Chen Xiaoying (Cindy), Jasmine Yur-Austin,2007, Re-measuring agency costs:The effectiveness of blockholders [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,47(5), pp:588-601.
[35]Childsa P. D., Mauerb D. C., Ottc S. H.,2005, Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions:the Effects of Agency Conflicts [J], Journal of Financial Economics,76, pp:667-690.
[36]Claessens S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, L. H. P. Lang.2000, The Separation of Ownership and control in East Asian Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:81-112.
[37]Cleary S.,1999, The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status [J], Journal of Finance,54, pp:673-692.
[38]Chrisman James J., Jess H. Chua, Reginald A. Litz,2004, Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non-Family Firms:Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence [J], Entrepreneurship:Theory & Practice,28(4), pp:335-354.
[39]Collier Paul, Alan Gregory,1999, Audit committee activity and agency costs [J], Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,18(4/5), pp:311-332.
[40]Corbetta Guido, Carlo Salvato,2004, Self-Serving or Self-Actualizing? Models of Man and Agency Costs in Different Types of Family Firms:A Commentary on "Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non-family Firms:Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence" [J] Entrepreneurship:Theory & Practice,28(4), pp:355-362.
[41]Cronqvist Henrik, Mattias Nilsson,2003, Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,38(4), pp:695-719.
[42]Cronqvist Henrik, Peter Hogfeldt, Mattias Nilsson,2001, Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts [J], Real Estate Economics,29(1), pp:85-126.
[43]Cumming Douglas J.,2005, Agency costs, Institutions, Learning, and Taxation in Venture Capital Contracting [J], Journal of Business Venturing,20(5), pp:573-622.
[44]Delianedis G., R. Geske,1998, Credit Risk and Risk Neutral Default Probabilities:Information about Rating Migrations and Defaults [Z], UCLA, Anderson Working Paper, www. ssrn. com.
[45]Demirguc-Kunt A., Maksimovic V.,1999, Institutions, Financial Markets and firm Debt Maturity [J], Journal of Financial Economics,54, pp:295-336.
[46]Diamond D. W.,1991, Debt maturity and liquidity risk [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,106, pp:709-737.
[47]Diamond D. W.,1991, Monitoring and reputation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt [J], Journal of Political Economy,99, pp:689-721.
[48]Diamond D. W.,1993, Seniority and maturity of debt contracts [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp:341-368.
[49]Doukas John A., Christos Pantzalis,2003, Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,9(1), pp:59-92.
[50]Doukas John A., Kim Chansog, Christos Pantzalis,2000, Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and Company Characteristics [J], Financial Analysts Journal.56(6), pp:54-63.
[51]Easterbrook Frank H.,1984, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends [J], American Economic Review,74(4), pp:650-659.
[52]Elston Julie Ann, Lawrence G. Goldberg,2003, Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,27(7), pp:1391-1410.
[53]Elyasiani E., Guo L., Tang L.,2002, The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance:A System-based Model [J], Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,19, pp:351-377.
[54]Ertugrul Mine, Shantaram Hegde,2008, Board compensation practices and agency costs of debt [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5), pp:512-531.
[55]Fan P. H., Titman S., Twite J.,2003, An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices [Z], working paper from www.ssrn.com.
[56]Ferris Stephen P., Xuemin (Sterling) Yan,2009, Agency costs, governance, and organizational forms:Evidence from the mutual fund industry [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,33(4), pp: 619-626.
[57]Fischer E., Heinkel R., Zechner J.,1989, Dynamic Capital Structure Choice:Theory and Test [J], Journal of Finance,44, pp:19-40.
[58]Flannery M.,1986, Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice [J], Journal of Finance,41, pp:18-38.
[59]Flanneny M.,1994, Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage optimally financing banking firms [J], American Economic Review,84, pp:320-331.
[60]Florackis Chrisostomos, Aydin Ozkan,2009, The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs:An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data [J], European Financial Management, 15(3), pp:497-528.
[61]Francis Jennifer, Abbie Smith,1995, Agency costs and innovation some empirical evidence [J], Journal of Accounting & Economics,19(2/3), pp:383-409.
[62]Francis Jere R., Earl R. Wilson,1988, Auditor Changes:A Joint Test of Theory Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation [J], Accounting Review,63(4), pp:663-682.
[63]Friedman Eric, H. Simon Johnson, Mitton Todd,2003, Propping and Tunneling [Z], NBER Working Paper, No, W9949.
[64]Gilson Ronald J., Charles K. Whitehead,2008, Deconstructing Equity:Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets [J], Columbia Law Review,108(1), pp:231-264.
[65]Goswami G., T. H. Noe, M. J. Robello,1995, Debt financing under asymmetric information [J], Journal of Finance,50, pp:633-659.
[66]Green Richard C., Eli Talmor,1986, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,10(2/3), pp:391-399.
[67]Guedes J., T. Opler,1996, The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues [J], Journal of Finance,51, pp:1809-1833.
[68]Gupta, Keshav,1982, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 10(1), pp:115-116.
[69]Harper Joel T., John R. Wingender,2000, An empirical test of agency cost reduction using interest rate swaps [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,24(9), pp:1419-1431.
[70]Hart, Oliver, and James Moore,1995, Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management [J], American Economic Review,85, pp:567-585.
[71]Harvey Campbell R., Karl V. Lins, Andrew H. Roper,2004, The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme [J], Journal of Financial Economics,74(1), pp:3-30.
[72]Heinkel Robert, Josef Zechner,1990, The Role of Debt and Preferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,25, pp:1-24.
[73]Hennessy C.,2004, Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment [J], Journal of Finance,59, pp: 1717-1742.
[74]Holdness C., D. Sheehan,1998, The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations:An exploratory analysis [J], Journal of Financial Economics,20, pp:317-346.
[75]Jeng Vivian, C. Lai Gene,2005, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs, Specialization, and Efficiency: Analysis of Keiretsu and Independent Insurers in the Japanese Nonlife Insurance Industry [J], Journal of Risk & Insurance,72(1), pp:105-158.
[76]Jensen Michael C.,2005, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity [J], Financial Management,34(1), pp:5-19.
[77]Jensen Michael C.,2004, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance [J], European Financial Management,10(4), pp:549-565.
[78]Jensen Michael C.,1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers [J], American Economic Review,76(2), pp:323-329.
[79]Jensen Michael C., William H. Meckling,1976, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J], Journal of Financial Economics,3(4), pp:305-360.
[80]Joseph Kissan, Vernon J. Richardson,2002, Free Cash Flow, Agency Costs, and the Affordability Method of Advertising Budgeting [J], Journal of Marketing,66(1), pp:94-107.
[81]Johnson S., P. Boone, A. Breach, E. Friedman,2000, Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:141-186.
[82]Kale J., T. H. Noe,1990, Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential game equilibrium [J], Journal of Financial Researches,13(2), pp:155-165.
[83]Kim C. S., Marcus D. C., Stohs M. H.,1995, Corporate Debt Maturity Policy and Investor Tax Timing Options:Theory and Evidence [J], Financial Management,24(1), pp:33-46.
[84]Lang L.H.P., Stulz R.M., Walkling R. A.,1991, A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, the Case of Bidder Returns [J], Journal of Financial Economics,29(2), pp:315-335.
[85]Lang Larry, Annette Poulsen, Rene Stulz,1995, Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion [J], Journal of Financial Economics,37(1), pp:3-37.
[86]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,1999, Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance,54(2), pp:471-517.
[87]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer. and R. Vishny,2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World [J], Journal of Finance,55(1), pp:1-33.
[88]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J], Journal of Financial Economics,58, pp:3-27.
[89]La Porta R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J], Journal of Finance,57, pp:1147-1170.
[90]Lasfer Meziane,2002, Board Structure and Agency Costs [Z], EFMA 2002 London Meetings, Cass Business School Research Paper.
[91]Leland Hayne E., D. Pyle,1977, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial intermediation [J], Journal of Finance,32(2), pp:371-387.
[92]Leland Hayne E.,1994, Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,49(4), pp:1213-1252.
[93]Leland Hayne E., Klaus T.,1996, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads [J], Journal of Finance,51(3), pp:987-1019.
[94]Leland Hayne E.,1998, Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure [J], Journal of Finance,53(4), pp:1213-1243.
[95]LeeSeok Hwang, Yong O. Kim,1998, Does the Ownership Structure of Debt and Equity Affect the Agency Costs of Debt? Japanese Evidence [J], Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,13(1), pp:37-66.
[96]Lubatkin Michael H., William S. Schulze,2007, An Organizational Justice-Based View of Self-Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms [J], Journal of Management Studies,44(6), pp: 955-971.
[97]Maug E.,1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is there a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control [J], Journal of Finance,53, pp:65-98.
[98]Mann S.V., N.W. Sicherman,1991, The agency cost of free cash flow:Acquisition activity and equity issues [J], Journal of Business,64(2), pp:213-227.
[99]Maksimovic Vojislav, Josef Zechner,1991, Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium [J], Journal of Finance,46(5), pp:1619-1643.
[100]McKnight Phillip J., Charlie Weir,2009, Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies:A panel data analysis [J], Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance,49(2), pp:139-158.
[101]Mello Antonio S., John E. Parsons,1992, Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt [J], Journal of Finance,47(5), pp:1887-1904.
[102]Menon Krishnagopal, Joanna D. Williams,1994, The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring [J], Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,13(2), pp:121-139.
[103]Modigliani Franco, Merton H. Miller,1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of Investment [J], American Economic Review,48(3), pp:261-298.
[104]Modigliani Franco, Merton H. Miller,1963, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital:A Correction [J], American Economic Review,53(3), pp:433-444.
[105]Morris J. R.,1976, On Corporate Debt Maturity Strategies [J], Journal of Finance,31(1), pp:29-37.
[106]Moyer R. Charles, Robert E. Chatfield, Phillip M. Sisneros,1989, Security Analyst Monitoring Activity:Agency Costs and Information Demands [J], Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 24(4), pp:503-512.
[107]Myers Stewart C., Nicholas S. Majluf,1984, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Information that Investors do not Have [J], Journal of Financial Economics,13(2), pp:187-221.
[108]Myers S.,1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J], Journal of Financial Economics,5(2), pp:147-175.
[109]Myers S.,1984, The Capital Structure Puzzle [J], Journal of Financial,39(3), pp:575-592.
[110]Nam Jouahn, Charles Tang, John H. Thornton, Kevin Wynne,2006, The effect of agency costs on the value of single-segment and multi-segment firms [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,12(4), pp: 761-782.
[111]Noe Thomas H.,2002, Institutional Activism and Financial Market Structure [J], Review of Financial Studies,15, pp:289-319.
[112]Nohel Tom, Vefa Tarhan,1998, Share repurchases and firm performance:new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow [J], Journal of Financial Economics,49(2), pp:187-222.
[113]Pagano Marco, Ailsa Roell,1998, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to go Public [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,113(1), pp: 187-225.
[114]Pawlina Grzegorz, Luc Renneboog,2005, Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK [J], European Financial Management, 11(4), pp:483-513.
[115]Piot Charles,2001, Agency costs and audit quality:evidence from France [J], European Accounting Review,10(3), pp:461-499.
[116]Rozeff Michael S.,1982, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios [J], Journal of Financial Research,5(3), pp:249-259.
[117]Shleifer A., R. Vishny,1986, Large shareholders and corporate control [J], Journal of Political Economy,94, pp:461-488.
[118]Shin Hyun-Han, Yong H. Kim,2002, Agency costs and efficiency of business capital investment: evidence from quarterly capital expenditures [J], Journal of Corporate Finance,8(2), pp:139-158.
[119]Singh Manohar, Wallace N. Davidson Ⅲ,2003, Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms [J], Journal of Banking & Finance,27(5), pp:793-817.
[120]Stohs M. H., Mauer D. C.,1996, The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure [J], Journal of Business,69(3), pp:279-312.
[121]Thatcher Janet S.,1985, The Choice of Call Provision Terms:Evidence of the Existence of Agency Costs of Debt [J], Journal of Finance,40(2), pp:549-561,
[122]Wall Larry D.,1989, Interest Rate Swaps in an Agency Theoretic Model with Uncertain Interest Rates [J], Journal of Banking & Finance.13(2). pp:261-270.
[123]白重恩、路江涌、陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006.08：4-13.
[124]曹廷求、孙文祥.股权结构与资本结构—中国上市公司实证分析[J].中国软科学,2004.01：32-36.
[125]陈建勇、王东静、张景青.公司债务期限结构与投资效率[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2009.04：80-92.
[126]陈明贺.股权分置改革及股权结构对公司绩效影响的实证研究—基于面板数据的分析[J].南方经济.2007.02：57-66.
[127]陈信元、汪晖.股东制衡与公司价值：模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究.2004.11：102-110.
[128]陈文浩、任娟华.企业债务期限结构的行业特征—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].上海财经大学学报,2007.08：78-84.
[129]淳伟德等.股权分置改革对我国上市公司业绩影响的实证分析[J].预测,2009.04：43-49.
[130]党红.关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究[J].会计研究.2008.06：63-71.
[131]邓莉、张宗益、李宏胜.银行债权的公司治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007.01：61-70.
[132]丁志国、苏治、杜晓宇.股权分置改革均衡对价[J]I中国工业经济.2006.02：113-119.
[133]丁守海.股权改革的三阶段托宾q效应[J].南开经济研究.2006.05：72-81.
[134]冯根福.双重委托代理理论：上市公司治理的另一种分析框架[J].经济研究,2004.12：16-25.
[135]傅勇、谭松涛.股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易[J].金融研究.2008.03：88-102.
[136]傅永昌.中国沪深权证市场实证和应用若干问题研究[D].西南交通大学博士学位论文,成都：西南交通大学,2008.
[137]高雷、宋顺林.治理环境、治理结构与代理成本—来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据[J].经济评论,2007.03：35-40.
[138]葛蓉蓉.股权结构对公司治理影响的状态依存性[J].金融研究.2006.07：151-156.
[139]“股权分置改革研究”课题组.股市公共性、股权分置改革的理论根据[J].中国工业经济.2006.04：5-13.
[140]郝臣、宫永建、孙凌霞.公司治理要素对代理成本影响的实证研究—来自我国上市公司的证据(2000-2007)[J].软科学,2009.10：123-127.
[141]何诚颖、李翔.股权分置改革、扩容预期及其市场反应的实证研究[J].金融研究.2007.04：157-170.
[142]何丹、朱建军.股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本[J].会计研究.2006,05：50-57.
[143]黄渝祥、孙艳等.股权制衡与公司治理研究[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版).2003,09：1102-1105.
[144]胡援成.中国企业资本结构与企业价值研究[J].金融研究,2002.03：110-122.
[145]胡援成、周裙、胡韬,利率风险与债务期限结构的正反馈效应分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2007.09：87-98.
[146]金雪军、张学勇.银行监管与中国上市公司代理成本研究[J].金融研究,2005.10：110-119.
[147]敬景程.股权分置问题的制度经济学思考[J].经济评论.2005.02：86-92.
[148]匡海波、李延喜、曹雨.最佳资本结构、债务期限结构与公司收益的相关性研究[J].管理评论,2007.12：55-60.
[149]雷勇、蒲勇健.裁员视角下人力资源的有效激励与代理成本分析[J].管理工程学报,2007.01：25-28.
[150]雷森、李传昭、李奔波.信号传递下的企业债务期限结构选择[J].重庆大学学报,2004.09：143-145.
[151]雷森、李传昭、李奔波.企业债务期限结构与民营中小企业融资研究[J].预测,2005.04：57-60.
[152]李明辉.股权结构、公司治理对股权代理成本的影响—基于中国上市公司2000-2006年数据的研究[J].金融研究,2009.02：149-168.
[153]李世辉、雷新途.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究—来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008.05：30-37.
[154]李维安、李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究—基于CCGI_NK_的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008.01：4-14.
[155]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007.01：102-113.
[156]李善民、王彩萍、朱滔、李珩.现代企业引进职业经理人的损失分析—代理成本的观点[J].管理工程学报,2005.02：40-45.
[157]李冻菊.股票市场发展与经济增长的关系研究—源自计量经济学的解释[J].金融研究.2006.09：75-80.
[158]李朝霞.影响中国上市公司融资结构的主要因素分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003.10：5-12.
[159]廖理、沈红波、郦金梁.股权分置改革与上市公司治理的实证研究[J].中国工业经济.2008.05：99-108.
[160]廖理、张学勇.全流通纠正终极控制者利益取向的有效性—来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2008.08：77-88.
[161]刘昌国.公司治理机制、自由现金流量与上市公司过度投资行为研究[J].经济科学,2006.04：50-58.
[162]刘孟晖.大股东治理与现金股利行为研究[D].西南交通大学博士论文,2008.
[163]刘煜辉、熊鹏.股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价[J].经济研究.2005.05：85-95.
[164]刘星、杨亦民.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响—来自沪深股市的经验证据[J].预测,2006.03：33-37.
[165]刘星、宋小保.控股股东代理对负债代理成本的影响—基于实物期权的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007.09：61-68.
[166]刘运国、高亚男.我国上市公司股权制衡与公司业绩关系研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版).2007,04：102-108.
[167]刘玉敏、任广乾.股权分置改革的效率及其影响因素[J].中国工业经济.2007.07：103-110.
[168]罗宏、黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008.09：139-147.
[169]罗琦等.融资约束抑或过度投资—中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007.09：103-110.
[170]陆正飞.企业适度负债的理论分析与实证研究[J].经济研究,1996.02：52-58.
[171]陆正飞、辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究[J].会计研究,1998.08：34-37.
[172]陆正飞、韩霞、常琦.公司长期负债与投资行为关系研究—基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2006.01：120-128.
[173]吕长江、张艳秋.企业财务状况对负债代理成本的影响[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2002.12：108-112.
[174]吕峻、李朝霞、胡洁.基于公司治理视角的上市公司经营者监督实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008.09：101-116.
[175]马曙光、黄志忠、薛云奎.股权分置—资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究.2005.09：44-50.
[176]孟焰、张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究[J].会计研究,2006.04：37-43.
[177]庞梅.股权分置改革对上市公司治理基本命题影响的分析[J].预测.2007.06：27-30.
[178]钱爱民、张淑君、程幸.基于自由现金流量的财务预警指标体系的构建与检验—来自中国机械制造业A股上市公司的经验数据[J].中国软科学,2008.09：148-155.
[179]平新乔、范瑛、郝朝艳.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析[J].经济研究,2003.11：42-53.
[180]秦彬、肖坤.我国上市公司股权结构对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2008.02：109-114.
[181]屈文洲、许年行、关家雄、吴世农.市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配[J].经济研究.2008.04：132-146.
[182]沈艺峰、许琳、黄娟娟.我国股权分置中对价水平的“群聚”现象分析[J].经济研究.2006.11：102-111.
[183]宋立、韩亮亮.大股东持股比例对代理成本影响的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2005.01：30-34.
[184]苏梅、寇纪淞、陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究[J].管理科学学报.2006.02：54-61.
[185]苏启林.代理问题、公司治理与企业价值—以民营上市公司为例[J].中国工业经济,2004.04：100-106.
[186]孙铮、刘凤委、李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构—来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005.05：52-63.
[187]汤谷良、朱蕾.自由现金流量与财务运行体系[J].会计研究,2004.04：32-37.
[188]唐国正.股权二元结构下的股利政策一一种新的代理成本理论[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006.05：94-102.
[189]唐国正、熊德华、巫和懋.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性[J].金融研究.2005.09：141-158.
[190]唐雪松、周晓苏、马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究[J].会计研究,2007.07：44-52.
[191]唐跃军、谢仍明.股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应—来自1999—2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].中国工业经济.2006.02：120-128.
[192]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005.07：123-128.
[193]田利辉.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效[J].经济学季刊,2004.10：15-26.
[194]童盼、陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005.05：75-84.
[195]王兵.独立董事监督了吗?—基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角[J].金融研究,2007.01：109-121.
[196]王东静、张祥建、张景青.公司债务期限结构与违约风险[J].管理科学学报,2009.04：77-87.
[197]王克敏、陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效[J].管理世界.2004.07：127-148.
[198]王琨、肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论.2005.02：27-33.
[199]王旻、杨朝军、廖士光.中国股票市场流通性价值研究—给予非流通股协议转让与限售股转让的证据[J].财经研究.2008.03：81-94.
[200]魏刚、肖泽忠、Nick Travlos、邹宏.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007.03：92-105.
[201]吴江、阮彤.股权分置结构与中国上市公司融资行为[J].金融研究.2004.06：56-67.
[202]吴超鹏、郑方鏕、林周勇、吴世农.对价支付影响因素的理论和实证分析[J].经济研究.2006.08：14-22.
[203]吴晓求.股权分置改革的若干理论问题—兼论全流通条件下中国资本市场的若干新变化[J].财贸经济.2006.02：26-33.
[204]吴晓求.中国资本市场：股权分裂与流动性变革[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[205]吴晓求.股权分置改革后的中国资本市场[M].中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[206]伍利娜、陆正飞.企业投资行为与融资结构的关系—基于一项实验研究的发现[J].管理世界,2005.04：99-105.
[207]肖作平.资本结构影响因素和双向效应动态模型—来自中国上市公司面板数据的证据[J].会计研究,2004.02：36-41.
[208]肖作平.中国上市公司债务期限结构特征的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2006.02：51-57.
[209]肖作平、陈德胜.公司治理结构对代理成本的影响—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸经济,2006.12：29-35.
[210]肖作平、廖理.大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007.10：99-113.
[211]肖作平.债务期限结构影响因素和双向效应动态调整模型—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理工程学报,2009.03：142-146.
[212]谢军.债务期限结构、公司治理和政府保护：基于投资者保护视角的分析[J].经济评论,2008.01：123-128.
[213]辛宇、徐莉萍.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究.2007.09：121-133.
[214]许年行、吴世农.我国上市公司股权分置改革中的锚定效应研究[J].经济研究.2007.01：114-125.
[215]徐向艺、王俊韡、巩震.高管人员报酬激励与公司治理绩效研究—一项基于深、沪A股上市 公司的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2007.02：94-100.
[216]徐向艺、李鑫.自由现金流、负债融资与企业过度投资—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].软科学,2008.07：124-127.
[2]7]徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟。股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究.2006.01：92-102.
[218]阎达五、谭劲松.我国上市公司独立董事制度：缺陷与改进一一个基于制度分析的研究框架[J].会计研究,2003.11：3-9.
[219]晏艳阳、陈共荣.我国上市公司的资本结构与代理成本问题分析[J].会计研究,2001.09：28-33.
[220]晏艳阳、赵大玮.我国股权分置改革中内幕交易的实证研究[J].金融研究.2006.04：101-108.
[221]杨德明、辛清泉.投资者关系与代理成本—基于上市公司的分析[J].经济科学,2006.03：47-60.
[222]杨善林、杨模荣、姚禄仕.股权分置改革与股票市场价值相关性研究[J].会计研究.2006.12：41-46.
[223]杨兴全、郑军.基于代理成本的企业债务融资契约安排研究[J].会计研究,2004.07：61-66.
[224]杨华军、胡亦明.制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资[J].管理世界,2007.09：99-106.
[225]姚颐、刘志远、王健.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究.2007.11：45-56.
[226]袁卫秋.我国上市公司的债务期限结构—基于权衡思想的实证研究[J].会计研究,2005.12：53-58.
[227]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效—一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003.01：87-94.
[228]曾颖、叶康涛.股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求[J].会计研究,2005.10：63-70.
[229]曾庆生、陈信元.何种内部治理机制影响了公司权益代理成本—大股东与董事会治理效率的比较[J].财经研究,2006.02：106-117.
[230]张建民、宁代兵、曹孟鸣.完善股权分置改革方案的方法论思考[J].经济学动态.2005.07：49-53.
[231]张建民.后股权分置时代中国股市与上市公司治理的问题与对策—对股权分置改革实践的反思[J].经济学研究.2006.06：43-47.
[232]张俊喜、王晓坤、夏乐.实证研究股权分置改革中的政策与策略[J].金融研究.2006.08：1-19.
[233]张维迎.中国国有企业资本结构存在的问题[J].金融研究,1996.10：27-29.
[234]张祥建、郭岚.资产注入、大股东寻租行为与资本配置效率[J].金融研究.2008.02：98-112.
[235]张宗新.内幕交易行为预测：理论模型与实证分析[J].管理世界.2008.04：24-35.
[236]张兆国.资本结构与代理成本—来自中国国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2008.01：39-47.
[237]张兆国、宋丽梦、张庆.我国上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析[J].会计研究,2005.08：44-49.
[238]张翼、李辰.股权结构、现金流与资本投资[J].经济学(季刊),2005.10：229-246.
[239]章卫东.定向增发新股、整体上市与股票价格短期市场表现的实证研究[J]会计研究.2007.12：63-68.
[240]赵景文、于增彪.股权制衡与公司经营业绩[J].会计研究.2005.12：59-64.
[241]赵俊强、廖士光、李湛.中国上市公司股权分置改革中的利益分配研究[J].经济研究.2006.11： 112-122.
[242]周勤、徐捷、程书礼.中国上市公司规模与债务融资关系的实证研究[J].金融研究,2006.08：41-55.
[243]周冬华、周红.上市公司信息披露质量度量研究评述[J].中国注册会计师,2009.10：35-39.
[244]郑振龙、王保合.股权分置改革的期权分析[J].金融研究.2006.12：116-125.
[245]郑志刚、孙艳梅、谭松涛、姜德增.股权分置改革对价确定与我国上市公司治理机制有效性的检验[J].经济研究.2007.07：96-108.
[246]郑春美、白宏磊、熊丹.股权分置改革与公司绩效研究[J].武汉理工大学学报.2007.11：150-153.
[247]支晓强、童盼.管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为—对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验[J].会计研究,2007.10：73-81.
[248]朱小平、暴冰、杨妍.股权分置改革与流动性定价问题研究[J].会计研究.2006.02：87-92.
[249]朱凯、陈信元.银行腐败与公司资本结构决策[J].金融研究,2007.01：28-40.