信息不对称约束下的税收行为研究
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摘要
信息不对称是存在于人类经济社会里的一种普遍现象,参加经济交易的某一方因为独占某个方面的信息优势,可以在偏离均衡价格较多的位置达成交易,从而获取更多额外的利益,优势信息能够带来信息红利已成为大众认可的客观现实。研究表明,所有可能的代理人都具备某些私人信息,但谁才是最优的潜在人选,可以通过制度设计来识别他们的真实情况,委托——代理的方式即是很好的办法,但随之又会产生逆向选择和道德风险两类伴生的问题。根据激励约束机制,设计合适的合同关系,能较好解决逆向选择和道德风险难题,但确定适当合同的博弈过程却是复杂的。实践证明,信息不对称同样影响着税收活动,实施税收行为也会因为信息不对称的存在而出现利益博弈。本文即试图以信息不对称为基本分析路径,以参与税务行动的国家机关、政府部门、税务当局、纳税人为分析对象,以委托代理和信息博弈选择理论为工具,结合行为心理学和社会行为学,对他们的税收行为进行深入剖析,以解释我国当前复杂的税收现象及趋势,进而为税务治理提出一定的理论见解和政策建议。
第一章导论：研究背景及文献综述。主要介绍本文的研究背景、基本概念、文献综述,提出文章的主题和研究思路,对分析路径和研究方法做出基本的说明,以及交代文章可能的创新和存在的不足。
第二章委托代理：信息不对称的一个理论框架。主要界定信息不对称的内涵,论述委托代理关系的形成,以及在代理关系下将产生逆向选择、隐藏信息、隐藏行动等新的问题。解决这些新问题需要设计激励机制,机制的核心是要代理人分担风险和分享产出,分成制的代理合同即符合这一要求。本章还引入了博弈的基础理论,以便与委托代理搭配使用。
第三章税收立法及税收分享中的信息不对称分析。主要以税收立法及税收收入分享为对象,重点分析国家机构中人大与政府之间,中央与地方之间在实施税收行为上的利益博弈。
在税收立法方面,虽然职权应该归属于全国人大,但因为人大所处于立法方面的信息劣势,把立法专属权部分让渡给了国务院,由国务院以税收法规的形式补充人大在税收立法上的不足；国务院同样会因为在税收操作上的信息劣势,将制定税收法规的职权部分让渡给财政部、税务总局等,后者以税收行政规章的形式弥补国务院税收法规上的缺口；在税法的具体执行时各地税务局还会出台形式不一的“税收准规则”,并对税法的效力产生更实质的影响。税法以这么多的形式出现在我国的税务实践中,是信息不对称所决定的,即层层转授订立税收制度规则,能够同时满足处于税法信息优势方和劣势方的利益,使我国税法体系在短时期内得以初步建立。但这些委托代理关系附带产生了问题：税收法律层级低、维持政府和征税机关利益倾向性强,我国现有税收法律普遍以部门规章代替,且因主要由政府或税务当局主导制定,所以造成税收规则经常出现冲突、税收公正有所损害、征税正当性不足等危害。这些危害大部分属于代理人特有的逆向选择问题,长远看,这会引发对税收立法权来源合理性的质疑,并且将影响纳税人的利益和积极性。
在税收收入分享方面,由于现实中实行的是分级财政体制,中央把各税种分别划分一定的比例作为各级财政收入,纳税人分散在全国各地,地方政府占有税源状况的详细信息,所以中央与地方政府之间会产生委托代理关系里经常存在的问题,如在税收入库时隐藏行动、在定税收基数时隐藏信息、在宏观经济政策变动前实施逆向选择,这在很大程度上损伤了中央的利益。但委托人对代理合同保有修改权,并且我国还是中央集权式管理,所以中央会利用这种便利争取额外的利益,在实施分税制、调整出口退税、出台新税种(税目)时维护自己的利益。同时,中央政府毕竟是国家管理的兜底责任人,所以在与地方政府博弈时,会表现出智猪搏弈中的大猪风范,照顾部分有难处的地方政府,达到中央与地方分享税收收入的相对平衡。
第四章税务征收过程中的信息不对称分析。主要集中研究税务机关的征税行为。税务系统的信息分布在实施征管活动和提供征税保障两个方面,并具有两个不同特点。征管时层级越向下信息占有更具优势,而税务行政管理的信息越向上信息更具优势。所以税务机关整体上向政府有夸大征税困难和虚高征税成绩的倾向,而上级税务机关对下级提供征税保障时会占有更多的额外收益,上级往往比下级的保障更充足。税务征管活动中表现出诸多隐藏行动倾向,税务人员利用信息优势谋取不正当利益,如在减免税、稽查查处、纳税资格审核、税款划缴等环节出现了利益寻租；基层税务人员还广泛表现出逆向选择,即在面对工作任务和阶段性困难时,会集体选择偷懒和避让态度。这些问题其实是他们利用信息优势的必然选择,传统上却更多地认为是道德败坏或素质低下所造成。通过博弈树来演绎形成税务腐败的博弈选择过程,可以更直观地解释信息不对称、社会行为和心理对此所产生的决定性影响。
第五章纳税过程中的信息不对称分析。主要分析纳税人的纳税行为。纳税人对各自的经济交易信息占有绝对优势,隐藏信息表现为：当面对政府或交易伙伴会吹嘘经营实力,而面对税务当局要么装穷,要么提供与税收无关的信息干扰税务人员的征管行动；逆向选择表现为筹划纳税地点、规避严格的税务管理等,即通常所谓的灰色税收遵从；隐藏行动则表现为偷税骗税、谋取非法税收利益、逃避税务管理等。通过对纳税人的非遵从行为的分析也可以察觉社会守法意识状况的无形影响,即社会心理普遍影响着具体的纳税选择。纳税人偷税成功并不缘于其偷税技术高明,只是用基本相同的手法多次向不同的税务人员尝试的结果,即只有当怀有偷税企图的企业碰巧遇上愿意犯错的税务主管人员,且该税务员有能力识别出企业偷税实情、能帮助企业掩盖偷税事实不易再被查获,偷税才会成为事实,博弈矩阵较具体地分析了偷税事件的概率和社会认知的影响作用。
这一章还对国际范围的税收行为进行了扩展式讨论。国家间税收协作困难、资本及财富转移、避税天堂的存在等,都是信息极度不对称的体现。发展中国家要融入国际,需要负担的信息成本异常沉重,无论是他们的政府还是纳税人,因为发达国家是国际税收规则的代理人。现阶段我国已出现明显的财富资本外逃现象,撇开我国对私权的保护不重视等客观背景,规避潜在的纳税义务,即未来是否会被追征税收、财富会否成为重要的课税对象等等。这些信息的不明确,带来人们社会心理预期不确定,进而成为财富外逃的重要诱因。
第六章缓解税收中信息不对称问题的政策建议。主要就文章前面分析的问题提出了具体的政策建议,也是全文的总结性意见。信息不对称是客观现象,需要理性对待。我们能做的是尽量控制其带来负面的效应,思路有两条：信号显示和声誉塑造。前者是基于社会行为的指向性,后者的目的在于利用社会心理效应,同时具体提供了五条初步的办法。首先是面对信息量的急剧增长等客观实际,需要在信息流经的所有环节提高自动化水平,使信息初始状态用电子信息的形式生成,把科技手段广泛用于信息传输、获取、分析、反馈等环节,以提高准确度和处理效率。而且这种提升信息化的办法,要在国家机关、征税过程、纳税人业务处理三个方面平行推进,配套制定三个方面法定、自动交换信息的规定,使相互间的信息占有尽量对等和共享。二是增加公众和媒体对不对称信息的披露,在法律和道德允许的前提下使私人信息公共化,从而减低代理人制造和保守私人信息的潜在收益,重整维护税收公平正义的社会基础。三是利用第三方的专业力量参与到税收行为中,以客观公正的立场维持正当的征纳局面,同时促使税收规范周密具体、经济行为健康有序。四是针对征纳双方的数量都过于庞大、信息内生繁衍严重等客观情况,提出用担保和垂直整合的方式,通过减少参与税收行为的主体数量,只让最重要的税收信息进入处理程序,从而大幅节约征税人和纳税人的人力财力资源,减少多余的二次信息的生成量和内部私人信息问题。五是税收法制化,并且重视市场机制引导经济行为的基础功能。这一点是最根本也是最重要的,经济社会的发展将使税收行为发生怎样的变化无法预测,信息本身也是没有价值判断的,只是因为人的立场和动机不同才使信息不对称有负面作用,只有通过塑造法的精神和敬畏法律的尊严,重塑社会基本道德,遵循在产权私人配置环境下,市场机制要始终引导经济行为的基本趋向,信息不对称才不致泛滥为普遍的、有重大危害的问题,因为法制和市场无形的手,将很快挤压信息不对称的获利空间。
这一章结尾部分,针对文章分析列举的现实现象和问题,还提出了四点具体的解决措施。1.针对立法,要重视税收立法的严肃性,尽快把所有合理的税收制度和规则上升为人大的法律,大幅削减转授立法的现象,同时实施税法执行情况的常态监督；对于税收分享,要规范各级政府的预算编制和确认,确保财权与事权匹配,对预算执行的监督要具体、到位。2.对征税方的管理,亟需理顺税务职能,把税务系统从行政执法型、收入任务型转变为公共服务型、事项承办型,简并机构、减少层级、精简人员,增强税务的装备能力和履职压力,适时合并国地税,归并税务及相关单位,实现税务部门一体化征管格局。3.面对纳税中的问题,首先要为纳税人减负,改变强制介入式的税务管理方式,然后积极倡导纳税人自治,由纳税人群体主动去达成税收待遇公平公正的愿景,同时还要增强纳税人对政府事务及其相关税务事项的平等参与能力和磋商机制。4.国际税收方面,一方面要增强税收主权意识,对跨国资本流动、关联交易、虚拟经济等方面的税务监管和征收要到位,调整出口退税的政策目标；另一方面要积极妥善保护国民在境外的经济活动,对“双反”调查、并购被诉等履行国家保护义务,维护国家利益,而税收就是国家强大的根本后盾。
Information asymmetry is a widespread phenomenon. One side who attends the economic transaction has information superiority. It may distract from exclusive equilibrium price, thus obtaining more additional benefit. Information superiority can bring information dividend has become the objective reality. Only A few participants really have the advantage of information resources. But many participants claim to have absolute useful information. It brings huge impact to the traditional trading rules. Research shows that the true or false of agents with private information can identify through institution design, for example, the way of the principal-agent. But it can produce adverse selection and moral risk. According to the mechanisms of the incentive and the mechanisms of the restraint, it can be resolved by designing appropriate contracts. And the game process is very complex. The taxation also exist the interest game due to information asymmetry. This article is based on the information asymmetry theory. The participants of the game include state organs, government departments, taxation department and taxpayer. It analyzed the taxation by using the principal-agent and the information game from the perspective of behavioral psychology and social behavior. Then, it explained the complex tax phenomenon and trends. At last, it put forward some suggestions for the tax governance.
Chapter one is introduction. This chapter introduced the research background, basic conception and the research status. It also put forward the subject, the research thoughts, analysis path, research methods, the possible contribution and the shortage.
Chapter two is atheoretical framework:the principal-agent.It mainly defined the connotation of the formation of agency relationship and oncoming problems of adverse selection and moral risk.To solve shese problems,it needed to design the incentive mechanism.The core of the mechanism is to share the risk and the output.And the angency contract is consistent with the requirements.In order to be with the principal-agent theory,it also introduced the game theory.
Chapter three is the information asymmetry analysis of tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. This chapter focused on the tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. And it mainly analyzed the interest game of taxation behavior of the government, especially between the central government and the local government.
On the aspect of tax legislation, the authorities should be belong to the National People's Congress. But the exclusive legislation right partially transfers to the state council due to the information inferiority of the National People's Congress. The state council perfects the tax laws and regulations. At the same, the state council has the information inferiority of tax operation. The functions of regulations partially transfers to the finance Ministry, the State Taxation Administration etc. The local taxation bureau also promulgates many tax regulations. It has the more substantial influence on the taxation behavior. Different levels of tax laws have impact on our country's taxation behavior. It determined by the information asymmetry. This way can satisfy the interests of the participants of information inferiority and build the tax system in a short period. But it also produces many problems, for example, the low level tax laws, the powerful trend of maintaining the interests of the government and tax bureau etc. Current tax laws are replaced by the departmental rules which formulated by the local government and tax bureau. So it produces confliction of tax regulations, damages the tax justice, etc. These damages mainly belong to the adverse selection problems of the agent. It can't damage the interest of the principal, but the source and reasonable of legislative power of taxation should be doubted. It affects the interest and enthusiasm of the taxpayer.
In the aspect of the tax revenue sharing, the central government divides the part of tax as local government revenue due to the classified fiscal system. The taxpayer scatters over the country. The local government occupies the details of tax status. Then, it will produce many problems, for example, hidden action in the process of tax warehousing and defining the tax base. The adverse selection should damage the interests of the central government. But the principal has the rights for modifying contracts. On one hand, the central government would obtain the additional benefit due to the centralized management. At the other hand, because the central government is the last responsible role of government management, it will act as the big pig during the process of Boxed Pigs Game and think about the difficulties of local governments. At last, it wants to attain the relative coordination in the tax revenue sharing between the central government and the local government.
Chapter four is the information asymmetry analysis of tax collection process. It primarily studied the taxation behavior of the tax bureau. The information distribution of tax information systems has the function of implementing tax activities and securing taxation. The lower government has information inferiority, the senior government has more information superiority. So, the tax bureau has the trend to exaggerate taxation difficulties and taxation performance. The upper tax bureau can get more sufficient safeguard. The tax staff obtains illegitimate interests by using information superiority, for example, profit rent during the link of tax activities. The base tax staff also shows the adverse selection. When facing tasks and difficulties, they will be lazy and avoiding. These problems are the results of using information superiority. But it is caused by the moral decay and the low quality. Though game tree, it can intuitively interpret the decisive influence caused by the information asymmetry, social behavior and psychology.
Chapter five is the information asymmetry analysis of tax payment process. It mainly analyzed the tax behavior. The taxpayer has the superiority for its transaction information. The phenomena of hiding information are that they brag about their economic capabilities. When they face the tax bureau, they always are poor and provide useless information for influencing tax activities. The phenomena of adverse selection are that they plan tax payment places and avoid strict tax management, etc. It is also called the grey tax compliance. Hiding activities have many forms, for example, tax evasion, tax fraud, seeking illegal tax benefits, escaping taxation management, etc. It also reflects that social psychology influences the specific tax selection. The success of tax evasion and tax fraud is not caused by high skills. It is the result that the taxpayer uses a same skill on different tax person. Game matrix specifically analyzes the probability of tax evasion event and the effects of social cognition.
In addition, this chapter also discussed international taxation activities. The difficulties of national tax coordination, transformation of capital and wealth, tax havens are the phenomena of information asymmetry. Because of the role of the developed country which formulates tax regulations, the developing country need afford unusually heavy information costs, including the government and the taxpayer. Now, our country has phenomena of capital flight. It is caused by uncertain information.
Chapter six is the suggestion for resolving information asymmetry problems in the tax process. It put forward many specific recommendations. Of course, the phenomenon of information asymmetry could not exterminate. The realistic choice is tolerant of these phenomena. But it needs try our best to control the negative effect. The thoughts are signal display and shaping the reputation. The former is based on the orientation of social behavior. And the key of the latter is using social and psychological effects. At the same time, it also put forward five preliminary approaches. Firstly, facing the rapid development of amount of information, it need to improve automation level of the information process, improve accuracy and processing efficiency of information transmission, obtaining, analysis and feedback by technological means. Meanwhile, the informatization should be implemented in three aspects of the government, taxation process and taxpayer business processing. And it should issue regulations to assure the equivalence of information for occupies and sharing. Secondly, it increases the disclosure of asymmetric information required by the public and the media and makes the private information be public in a legal and moral way. Thereby, it can reduce contingent profits for private information made or kept by the agent. So, it assured the tax justice. Thirdly, it is necessary to invite the third-party professional strength to participate in the tax behavior and maintains the objective and fair position. It can standard the tax law and make the economic behavior healthy and orderly. Fourthly, it should adopt the way of guarantee and vertical integration for the big amount of taxpayers and the serious endogenous breeding information. Through reducing the amount of taxpayers, it can make important tax behavior enter into processing procedures. It also can significantly save resources of the tax agent and the taxpayer, reduce the amount of second information formation, and overcome information rent. At last, it should pay attention to tax legalization and the function of market mechanism. It is the most fundamental and the most important. The effects of the development of economic society on tax behavior can not be predicted. The information is objective. The different of person's standpoint and motives can make the information asymmetry be negative. It can be resolved by tax regulations. Through these basic rules, the information asymmetry can not be common. Because the invisible market hand and the legalization can quickly squeeze the profit space of information asymmetry.
This chapter is the last section. And it also put forward four specific suggestions for the above phenomena and problems. At first, it should pay attention to the seriousness of tax legislation. The National People's Congress should formulate and promulgate all reasonable tax laws and regulations as soon as possible, reduce the phenomena of delegated legislation greatly, and regulate normally the implementation of tax laws and regulations. For the tax sharing, it needs to normalize budgeting of governments at all levels in order to ensure property rights and the power matching. It also needs to transfer the tax system mainly from turnover tax to property tax to narrow the coverage of the tax objects and reduce the economic effects of tax. Secondly, for the taxation participant, it needs to straighten out the function of taxation. And the tax system should realize the transformation from enforcing tax laws and completing tax revenue to servicing the public. Then, it needs to reduce tax bureau and the tax staff to realize the government department integration pattern. Thirdly, in order to resolve problems of taxation, it needs to change the compulsory intrusive tax management, advocate the taxpayer autonomous and make the taxpayer take part in government affairs and related tax matters. At last, in the aspect of international tax, on one hand need to strengthen tax sovereignty consciousness, regulate the tax of international capital flows, related transaction, and virtual economy, etc. In addition, it needs to adjust the export tax refund policy. On the other hand, it needs to protect economic activities in foreign and maintain economic freedom. In a word, taxation is the fundamental backing of a stronger country.
第一章导论：研究背景及文献综述。主要介绍本文的研究背景、基本概念、文献综述,提出文章的主题和研究思路,对分析路径和研究方法做出基本的说明,以及交代文章可能的创新和存在的不足。
第二章委托代理：信息不对称的一个理论框架。主要界定信息不对称的内涵,论述委托代理关系的形成,以及在代理关系下将产生逆向选择、隐藏信息、隐藏行动等新的问题。解决这些新问题需要设计激励机制,机制的核心是要代理人分担风险和分享产出,分成制的代理合同即符合这一要求。本章还引入了博弈的基础理论,以便与委托代理搭配使用。
第三章税收立法及税收分享中的信息不对称分析。主要以税收立法及税收收入分享为对象,重点分析国家机构中人大与政府之间,中央与地方之间在实施税收行为上的利益博弈。
在税收立法方面,虽然职权应该归属于全国人大,但因为人大所处于立法方面的信息劣势,把立法专属权部分让渡给了国务院,由国务院以税收法规的形式补充人大在税收立法上的不足；国务院同样会因为在税收操作上的信息劣势,将制定税收法规的职权部分让渡给财政部、税务总局等,后者以税收行政规章的形式弥补国务院税收法规上的缺口；在税法的具体执行时各地税务局还会出台形式不一的“税收准规则”,并对税法的效力产生更实质的影响。税法以这么多的形式出现在我国的税务实践中,是信息不对称所决定的,即层层转授订立税收制度规则,能够同时满足处于税法信息优势方和劣势方的利益,使我国税法体系在短时期内得以初步建立。但这些委托代理关系附带产生了问题：税收法律层级低、维持政府和征税机关利益倾向性强,我国现有税收法律普遍以部门规章代替,且因主要由政府或税务当局主导制定,所以造成税收规则经常出现冲突、税收公正有所损害、征税正当性不足等危害。这些危害大部分属于代理人特有的逆向选择问题,长远看,这会引发对税收立法权来源合理性的质疑,并且将影响纳税人的利益和积极性。
在税收收入分享方面,由于现实中实行的是分级财政体制,中央把各税种分别划分一定的比例作为各级财政收入,纳税人分散在全国各地,地方政府占有税源状况的详细信息,所以中央与地方政府之间会产生委托代理关系里经常存在的问题,如在税收入库时隐藏行动、在定税收基数时隐藏信息、在宏观经济政策变动前实施逆向选择,这在很大程度上损伤了中央的利益。但委托人对代理合同保有修改权,并且我国还是中央集权式管理,所以中央会利用这种便利争取额外的利益,在实施分税制、调整出口退税、出台新税种(税目)时维护自己的利益。同时,中央政府毕竟是国家管理的兜底责任人,所以在与地方政府博弈时,会表现出智猪搏弈中的大猪风范,照顾部分有难处的地方政府,达到中央与地方分享税收收入的相对平衡。
第四章税务征收过程中的信息不对称分析。主要集中研究税务机关的征税行为。税务系统的信息分布在实施征管活动和提供征税保障两个方面,并具有两个不同特点。征管时层级越向下信息占有更具优势,而税务行政管理的信息越向上信息更具优势。所以税务机关整体上向政府有夸大征税困难和虚高征税成绩的倾向,而上级税务机关对下级提供征税保障时会占有更多的额外收益,上级往往比下级的保障更充足。税务征管活动中表现出诸多隐藏行动倾向,税务人员利用信息优势谋取不正当利益,如在减免税、稽查查处、纳税资格审核、税款划缴等环节出现了利益寻租；基层税务人员还广泛表现出逆向选择,即在面对工作任务和阶段性困难时,会集体选择偷懒和避让态度。这些问题其实是他们利用信息优势的必然选择,传统上却更多地认为是道德败坏或素质低下所造成。通过博弈树来演绎形成税务腐败的博弈选择过程,可以更直观地解释信息不对称、社会行为和心理对此所产生的决定性影响。
第五章纳税过程中的信息不对称分析。主要分析纳税人的纳税行为。纳税人对各自的经济交易信息占有绝对优势,隐藏信息表现为：当面对政府或交易伙伴会吹嘘经营实力,而面对税务当局要么装穷,要么提供与税收无关的信息干扰税务人员的征管行动；逆向选择表现为筹划纳税地点、规避严格的税务管理等,即通常所谓的灰色税收遵从；隐藏行动则表现为偷税骗税、谋取非法税收利益、逃避税务管理等。通过对纳税人的非遵从行为的分析也可以察觉社会守法意识状况的无形影响,即社会心理普遍影响着具体的纳税选择。纳税人偷税成功并不缘于其偷税技术高明,只是用基本相同的手法多次向不同的税务人员尝试的结果,即只有当怀有偷税企图的企业碰巧遇上愿意犯错的税务主管人员,且该税务员有能力识别出企业偷税实情、能帮助企业掩盖偷税事实不易再被查获,偷税才会成为事实,博弈矩阵较具体地分析了偷税事件的概率和社会认知的影响作用。
这一章还对国际范围的税收行为进行了扩展式讨论。国家间税收协作困难、资本及财富转移、避税天堂的存在等,都是信息极度不对称的体现。发展中国家要融入国际,需要负担的信息成本异常沉重,无论是他们的政府还是纳税人,因为发达国家是国际税收规则的代理人。现阶段我国已出现明显的财富资本外逃现象,撇开我国对私权的保护不重视等客观背景,规避潜在的纳税义务,即未来是否会被追征税收、财富会否成为重要的课税对象等等。这些信息的不明确,带来人们社会心理预期不确定,进而成为财富外逃的重要诱因。
第六章缓解税收中信息不对称问题的政策建议。主要就文章前面分析的问题提出了具体的政策建议,也是全文的总结性意见。信息不对称是客观现象,需要理性对待。我们能做的是尽量控制其带来负面的效应,思路有两条：信号显示和声誉塑造。前者是基于社会行为的指向性,后者的目的在于利用社会心理效应,同时具体提供了五条初步的办法。首先是面对信息量的急剧增长等客观实际,需要在信息流经的所有环节提高自动化水平,使信息初始状态用电子信息的形式生成,把科技手段广泛用于信息传输、获取、分析、反馈等环节,以提高准确度和处理效率。而且这种提升信息化的办法,要在国家机关、征税过程、纳税人业务处理三个方面平行推进,配套制定三个方面法定、自动交换信息的规定,使相互间的信息占有尽量对等和共享。二是增加公众和媒体对不对称信息的披露,在法律和道德允许的前提下使私人信息公共化,从而减低代理人制造和保守私人信息的潜在收益,重整维护税收公平正义的社会基础。三是利用第三方的专业力量参与到税收行为中,以客观公正的立场维持正当的征纳局面,同时促使税收规范周密具体、经济行为健康有序。四是针对征纳双方的数量都过于庞大、信息内生繁衍严重等客观情况,提出用担保和垂直整合的方式,通过减少参与税收行为的主体数量,只让最重要的税收信息进入处理程序,从而大幅节约征税人和纳税人的人力财力资源,减少多余的二次信息的生成量和内部私人信息问题。五是税收法制化,并且重视市场机制引导经济行为的基础功能。这一点是最根本也是最重要的,经济社会的发展将使税收行为发生怎样的变化无法预测,信息本身也是没有价值判断的,只是因为人的立场和动机不同才使信息不对称有负面作用,只有通过塑造法的精神和敬畏法律的尊严,重塑社会基本道德,遵循在产权私人配置环境下,市场机制要始终引导经济行为的基本趋向,信息不对称才不致泛滥为普遍的、有重大危害的问题,因为法制和市场无形的手,将很快挤压信息不对称的获利空间。
这一章结尾部分,针对文章分析列举的现实现象和问题,还提出了四点具体的解决措施。1.针对立法,要重视税收立法的严肃性,尽快把所有合理的税收制度和规则上升为人大的法律,大幅削减转授立法的现象,同时实施税法执行情况的常态监督；对于税收分享,要规范各级政府的预算编制和确认,确保财权与事权匹配,对预算执行的监督要具体、到位。2.对征税方的管理,亟需理顺税务职能,把税务系统从行政执法型、收入任务型转变为公共服务型、事项承办型,简并机构、减少层级、精简人员,增强税务的装备能力和履职压力,适时合并国地税,归并税务及相关单位,实现税务部门一体化征管格局。3.面对纳税中的问题,首先要为纳税人减负,改变强制介入式的税务管理方式,然后积极倡导纳税人自治,由纳税人群体主动去达成税收待遇公平公正的愿景,同时还要增强纳税人对政府事务及其相关税务事项的平等参与能力和磋商机制。4.国际税收方面,一方面要增强税收主权意识,对跨国资本流动、关联交易、虚拟经济等方面的税务监管和征收要到位,调整出口退税的政策目标；另一方面要积极妥善保护国民在境外的经济活动,对“双反”调查、并购被诉等履行国家保护义务,维护国家利益,而税收就是国家强大的根本后盾。
Information asymmetry is a widespread phenomenon. One side who attends the economic transaction has information superiority. It may distract from exclusive equilibrium price, thus obtaining more additional benefit. Information superiority can bring information dividend has become the objective reality. Only A few participants really have the advantage of information resources. But many participants claim to have absolute useful information. It brings huge impact to the traditional trading rules. Research shows that the true or false of agents with private information can identify through institution design, for example, the way of the principal-agent. But it can produce adverse selection and moral risk. According to the mechanisms of the incentive and the mechanisms of the restraint, it can be resolved by designing appropriate contracts. And the game process is very complex. The taxation also exist the interest game due to information asymmetry. This article is based on the information asymmetry theory. The participants of the game include state organs, government departments, taxation department and taxpayer. It analyzed the taxation by using the principal-agent and the information game from the perspective of behavioral psychology and social behavior. Then, it explained the complex tax phenomenon and trends. At last, it put forward some suggestions for the tax governance.
Chapter one is introduction. This chapter introduced the research background, basic conception and the research status. It also put forward the subject, the research thoughts, analysis path, research methods, the possible contribution and the shortage.
Chapter two is atheoretical framework:the principal-agent.It mainly defined the connotation of the formation of agency relationship and oncoming problems of adverse selection and moral risk.To solve shese problems,it needed to design the incentive mechanism.The core of the mechanism is to share the risk and the output.And the angency contract is consistent with the requirements.In order to be with the principal-agent theory,it also introduced the game theory.
Chapter three is the information asymmetry analysis of tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. This chapter focused on the tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. And it mainly analyzed the interest game of taxation behavior of the government, especially between the central government and the local government.
On the aspect of tax legislation, the authorities should be belong to the National People's Congress. But the exclusive legislation right partially transfers to the state council due to the information inferiority of the National People's Congress. The state council perfects the tax laws and regulations. At the same, the state council has the information inferiority of tax operation. The functions of regulations partially transfers to the finance Ministry, the State Taxation Administration etc. The local taxation bureau also promulgates many tax regulations. It has the more substantial influence on the taxation behavior. Different levels of tax laws have impact on our country's taxation behavior. It determined by the information asymmetry. This way can satisfy the interests of the participants of information inferiority and build the tax system in a short period. But it also produces many problems, for example, the low level tax laws, the powerful trend of maintaining the interests of the government and tax bureau etc. Current tax laws are replaced by the departmental rules which formulated by the local government and tax bureau. So it produces confliction of tax regulations, damages the tax justice, etc. These damages mainly belong to the adverse selection problems of the agent. It can't damage the interest of the principal, but the source and reasonable of legislative power of taxation should be doubted. It affects the interest and enthusiasm of the taxpayer.
In the aspect of the tax revenue sharing, the central government divides the part of tax as local government revenue due to the classified fiscal system. The taxpayer scatters over the country. The local government occupies the details of tax status. Then, it will produce many problems, for example, hidden action in the process of tax warehousing and defining the tax base. The adverse selection should damage the interests of the central government. But the principal has the rights for modifying contracts. On one hand, the central government would obtain the additional benefit due to the centralized management. At the other hand, because the central government is the last responsible role of government management, it will act as the big pig during the process of Boxed Pigs Game and think about the difficulties of local governments. At last, it wants to attain the relative coordination in the tax revenue sharing between the central government and the local government.
Chapter four is the information asymmetry analysis of tax collection process. It primarily studied the taxation behavior of the tax bureau. The information distribution of tax information systems has the function of implementing tax activities and securing taxation. The lower government has information inferiority, the senior government has more information superiority. So, the tax bureau has the trend to exaggerate taxation difficulties and taxation performance. The upper tax bureau can get more sufficient safeguard. The tax staff obtains illegitimate interests by using information superiority, for example, profit rent during the link of tax activities. The base tax staff also shows the adverse selection. When facing tasks and difficulties, they will be lazy and avoiding. These problems are the results of using information superiority. But it is caused by the moral decay and the low quality. Though game tree, it can intuitively interpret the decisive influence caused by the information asymmetry, social behavior and psychology.
Chapter five is the information asymmetry analysis of tax payment process. It mainly analyzed the tax behavior. The taxpayer has the superiority for its transaction information. The phenomena of hiding information are that they brag about their economic capabilities. When they face the tax bureau, they always are poor and provide useless information for influencing tax activities. The phenomena of adverse selection are that they plan tax payment places and avoid strict tax management, etc. It is also called the grey tax compliance. Hiding activities have many forms, for example, tax evasion, tax fraud, seeking illegal tax benefits, escaping taxation management, etc. It also reflects that social psychology influences the specific tax selection. The success of tax evasion and tax fraud is not caused by high skills. It is the result that the taxpayer uses a same skill on different tax person. Game matrix specifically analyzes the probability of tax evasion event and the effects of social cognition.
In addition, this chapter also discussed international taxation activities. The difficulties of national tax coordination, transformation of capital and wealth, tax havens are the phenomena of information asymmetry. Because of the role of the developed country which formulates tax regulations, the developing country need afford unusually heavy information costs, including the government and the taxpayer. Now, our country has phenomena of capital flight. It is caused by uncertain information.
Chapter six is the suggestion for resolving information asymmetry problems in the tax process. It put forward many specific recommendations. Of course, the phenomenon of information asymmetry could not exterminate. The realistic choice is tolerant of these phenomena. But it needs try our best to control the negative effect. The thoughts are signal display and shaping the reputation. The former is based on the orientation of social behavior. And the key of the latter is using social and psychological effects. At the same time, it also put forward five preliminary approaches. Firstly, facing the rapid development of amount of information, it need to improve automation level of the information process, improve accuracy and processing efficiency of information transmission, obtaining, analysis and feedback by technological means. Meanwhile, the informatization should be implemented in three aspects of the government, taxation process and taxpayer business processing. And it should issue regulations to assure the equivalence of information for occupies and sharing. Secondly, it increases the disclosure of asymmetric information required by the public and the media and makes the private information be public in a legal and moral way. Thereby, it can reduce contingent profits for private information made or kept by the agent. So, it assured the tax justice. Thirdly, it is necessary to invite the third-party professional strength to participate in the tax behavior and maintains the objective and fair position. It can standard the tax law and make the economic behavior healthy and orderly. Fourthly, it should adopt the way of guarantee and vertical integration for the big amount of taxpayers and the serious endogenous breeding information. Through reducing the amount of taxpayers, it can make important tax behavior enter into processing procedures. It also can significantly save resources of the tax agent and the taxpayer, reduce the amount of second information formation, and overcome information rent. At last, it should pay attention to tax legalization and the function of market mechanism. It is the most fundamental and the most important. The effects of the development of economic society on tax behavior can not be predicted. The information is objective. The different of person's standpoint and motives can make the information asymmetry be negative. It can be resolved by tax regulations. Through these basic rules, the information asymmetry can not be common. Because the invisible market hand and the legalization can quickly squeeze the profit space of information asymmetry.
This chapter is the last section. And it also put forward four specific suggestions for the above phenomena and problems. At first, it should pay attention to the seriousness of tax legislation. The National People's Congress should formulate and promulgate all reasonable tax laws and regulations as soon as possible, reduce the phenomena of delegated legislation greatly, and regulate normally the implementation of tax laws and regulations. For the tax sharing, it needs to normalize budgeting of governments at all levels in order to ensure property rights and the power matching. It also needs to transfer the tax system mainly from turnover tax to property tax to narrow the coverage of the tax objects and reduce the economic effects of tax. Secondly, for the taxation participant, it needs to straighten out the function of taxation. And the tax system should realize the transformation from enforcing tax laws and completing tax revenue to servicing the public. Then, it needs to reduce tax bureau and the tax staff to realize the government department integration pattern. Thirdly, in order to resolve problems of taxation, it needs to change the compulsory intrusive tax management, advocate the taxpayer autonomous and make the taxpayer take part in government affairs and related tax matters. At last, in the aspect of international tax, on one hand need to strengthen tax sovereignty consciousness, regulate the tax of international capital flows, related transaction, and virtual economy, etc. In addition, it needs to adjust the export tax refund policy. On the other hand, it needs to protect economic activities in foreign and maintain economic freedom. In a word, taxation is the fundamental backing of a stronger country.
引文
3A-S模型可简单表示为：msx E(U)=(1-p)U(w-tX)+pu[W-tX-f(W-X)]。其中,E(U)表示纳税人的预期效用,p表示逃税被税务机关查获的概率(0 4张兵等,国税征管改革的信息经济学分析,财经科学,2004(6)
5刘军,信息不对称理论与税收务征管改革,涉外税务,1997(10)
6王劲颖,博弈论在税收征管中的应用,现代经济探讨,2000(3)
7李汉文等,税收征管新路：第三方信息利用,涉外税务,2010(9)
8李昭华,骗取出口退税罪若干问题探讨,法学评论,2003(6)
9王梅,信息不完全条件下的税收征纳博弈分析和对策,天津经济,2004(1)
10博弈理论与分税制制度的完善,工业技术经济,2000(5)
11周海灯等,基于不对称信息的企业纳税研究,湖北经济学院学报,2010(7-2)
12摘自《中华人民共和国宪法》,人民日报,2004.3.16
14赵安林,中国税务报,黔西县截留税款被查处,2003.2.21
15刘克崮,分税制改革时任财政部财税体制改革司副司长(主持工作)。
19中国经营报,2010.7.10
20经济观察报,2004.1.12
21新都区财政局长在2011年1月12日区人代会上的报告
26于洪泽,华图公务员考试研究中心研究员
27曹景行,中国之声特约观察员,曾任凤凰卫视资讯台副台长兼言论部总监。
29《人民日报》2011.05.23
30蒲政办发(2010)52号
31美林银行、国际清算银行、麦肯锡咨询公司,2005。
33新华网,2011.5.16.
34详细内容参阅“论税务行政的科学化”,《四川国税调研》(内刊)2006.3
35上海交通大学凯原法学院“涉税犯罪及其法律控制问题”,2010.12.03
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12摘自《中华人民共和国宪法》,人民日报,2004.3.16
14赵安林,中国税务报,黔西县截留税款被查处,2003.2.21
15刘克崮,分税制改革时任财政部财税体制改革司副司长(主持工作)。
19中国经营报,2010.7.10
20经济观察报,2004.1.12
21新都区财政局长在2011年1月12日区人代会上的报告
26于洪泽,华图公务员考试研究中心研究员
27曹景行,中国之声特约观察员,曾任凤凰卫视资讯台副台长兼言论部总监。
29《人民日报》2011.05.23
30蒲政办发(2010)52号
31美林银行、国际清算银行、麦肯锡咨询公司,2005。
33新华网,2011.5.16.
34详细内容参阅“论税务行政的科学化”,《四川国税调研》(内刊)2006.3
35上海交通大学凯原法学院“涉税犯罪及其法律控制问题”,2010.12.03
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