摘要
会计政策选择研究一直以来是会计研究领域的重要内容之一。企业会计政策选择研究虽然不是一个新话题,但是在企业越来越关注利益相关者利益的现实状况下,以及利益相关者会计理论的提出和不断发展的理论背景下,从利益相关者角度研究企业会计政策选择,具有一定的理论价值和现实意义。
本文在对国内外企业会计政策选择研究文献进行系统的回顾后,发现整个企业会计政策选择研究领域呈现重实证研究,轻规范研究的局面。实证研究方法的采用虽然极大的丰富了企业会计政策选择研究领域,但是也面临着自身仍然无法很好解决的问题,例如多种选择、多种动机问题。大部分研究成果缺乏一个统一的理论作为研究的支撑,很少有研究试图从综合的视角构建一套完整的企业会计政策选择理论体系。因此,本文主要采用规范研究方法,同时采用案例研究、问卷调查的实证研究方法作为研究补充,试图从利益相关者理论出发构建企业会计政策选择理论框架。
企业会计政策选择研究依托于企业理论的发展。企业本质上是利益相关者集体选择的结果,而会计本质上是一种以货币计量为主的对经济活动的价值形态进行反映和控制,进而维护和协调各个利益相关者的经济利益的管理系统。从企业的经营边界、资源边界、主体边界到会计的对象边界、资产边界、权益边界的转换器就是企业的会计政策选择。企业会计政策选择是一种行为,是行为主体采用一定的行为方式对会计政策选择客体所开展的活动过程,它依存于会计政策选择的目标,并受制于会计政策选择的内部动因和外部环境。因此,企业会计政策选择理论框架至少应该包括客体、主体、外部环境、目标、内部动因、行为偏好。
①企业会计政策选择的客体是会计政策,而会计政策应是会计领域的规则,包括以会计准则为核心的正式会计规则和以会计惯例为核心的非正式会计规则两部分。宏观会计政策和微观会计政策的关系更适合用交集的关系而不是子集的关系来诠释。企业对于会计政策的最初选择其实发生在内部利益相关者通过集体选择达成组织契约之时,组织契约的具体内容间接地决定了企业可以选择的正式会计规则的空间范围。而对于企业会计政策选择客体的具体范围的界定,一方面不能盲目的向外扩展,另一方面也不能仅仅局限在“硬的”会计选择中。
②控制权可以进一步分解为最终控制权、经营控制权和作业控制权。内部利益相关者享有源于剩余分享权和最终控制权的企业会计政策选择权,管理者享有源于经营控制权的企业会计政策选择权,会计人员享有源于作业控制权的企业会计政策选择权。这三类主体以外的其他利益相关者,即政府、债权人、供应商、顾客、非会计类普通员工、审计人员构成了企业会计政策选择的外部环境。
③企业会计政策选择目标是企业作为会计政策选择主体时期望达到的境地或者结果,其有基本目标和具体目标两个层次。基本目标应该定位于“权益保护观”,具体目标应定位为追求企业会计政策选择外部性的最小化,其“外部性的最小化”应该是外部性承受者集合中每一类利益相关者承受的外部性的绝对值之和的最小化。
④作为企业会计政策选择主体的内部利益相关者、管理者、会计人员,在追逐个人利益最大化动因驱动下会产生不同的会计政策选择行为偏好,甚至在同一类利益相关者内部也会出现不同的会计政策选择行为偏好。例如投入资源种类、分享剩余收益形式、最终控制权大小存在差异的内部利益相关者之间以及CFO和以CEO为主的其他高管之间的会计政策选择行为偏好并不完全相同。企业除了受内部动因驱动会产生一定的会计政策选择行为偏好外,在政府、债权人、供应商、顾客、非会计类普通员工、审计人员构成的外部环境的影响下,也会产生特定的行为偏好。
在从利益相关者角度出发构建了企业会计政策选择的理论框架后,本文利用问卷调查的方法获得了部分结论的证据支持。
The research on accounting policy choice has been one of the important fields inaccounting researches. Although research on accounting policy choice is not a newtopic, but the study from the perspective of stakeholders has some theoretical valueand practical significance, especially in the reality that companies are increasinglyconcerned about the interests of stakeholders, and in the theoretical background thatstakeholders accounting theory is proposed and developed.
After conducting the systematic review of the domestic and foreign researchliteratures on the accounting policy choices, it is found that the entire research fieldattaches importance to empirical research and underrates normative research.Empirical research method greatly enriches the research area of corporate accountingpolicy choices, but it also faces the problem that itself still can not resolve, such as avariety of options and motivations. Most of the researches are lack of a unified theory,and few studies have tried to build a set of theoretical system of enterprise accountingpolicy choices from an integrated perspective. Therefore, this paper tries to build thetheoretical framework of enterprise accounting policy choices based on stakeholdertheory, mainly using normative research method as well as adding case studies andquestionnaire survey.
Research on the firm accounting policy choice relies on the development of thefirm theory. The nature of the firm is the result of the stakeholders’ collective choice,and the nature of accounting is the management system that reflects and controls thevalue form of economic activities mainly by means of monetary measurement, andthat protects and coordinates the economic interests of stakeholders. Firm accountingpolicy choice is a converter that can change operating boundary, resources boundaryand subject boundary of the firm into the object boundary, asset boundary and equityboundary of the accounting. Enterprise accounting policy choice is the behavior thatthe behavior subject carries out the activities process to the object. It is dependent onthe aim of accounting policy choice, and it is subjected to the internal motivation andexternal environment of accounting policy choice. Therefore, the theoreticalframework of firm accounting policy choice should at least include the object, subject,external environment, aim, internal motivation and behavior preference.
①The object of the enterprise accounting policy choice is the accountingpolicies that are the rules in the field of accounting, including formal accounting rulessuch as accounting standards, and informal accounting rules such as accountingconventions. The relationship between macro accounting policies and microaccounting policies is more suitable for intersection relationship rather than subset relationship. The first choice of the accounting policies has taken place when internalstakeholders achieve the organizational contract through collective choice. Thespecific content of organizational contract indirectly determines the scope in whichthe enterprise must comply with formal accounting rules. On the one hand, the objectscope of enterprise accounting policy choice can not be blindly expanded; on theother hand, it is not confined to the "hard" accounting choice.
②Control rights can be further broken down into the ultimate control, operatingcontrol and craft control. The internal stakeholders owe the right of firm accountingpolicy choice deriving from the residual claims and the ultimate control, managersowe the right of firm accounting policy choice deriving from the operating control,and accountants owe the right of firm accounting policy choice deriving from the craftcontrol. In addition to internal stakeholders, managers and accountants, otherstakeholders constitute the external environment of the enterprise accounting policychoice, such as government, creditors, suppliers, customers, non-accountingemployees and auditors.
③The aim of enterprise accounting policy choice is the condition or results thatthe subjects expect to achieve, and it can be divided into basic objective and specificobjective. The basic objective is the equity protection, and specific objective is tominimize the externality of enterprise accounting policy choice, which means that thesum of the absolute values of externalities that each category of stakeholders bearsshould be minimized.
④As the subject of the enterprise accounting policy choice,the internalstakeholders,managers and accountants produce different behavior preferences onaccounting policy choice in the pursuit of personal interests maximization. Even thereare different behavior preferences among the same type of stakeholders. For example,the internal stakeholders have different behavior preferences when they input differentresources, have different sharing forms of residual income, or owe different ultimatecontrol, as well as the CFO and other executives, such as CEO, have differentbehavior preferences. In addition to the internal motivation to drive certain behaviorpreferences of accounting policy choice, the firm can have the specific preferencesunder the influence of external environment, such as government, reditors, suppliers,customers, non-accounting employees and auditors.
After building the theoretical framework of the corporate accounting policychoices from the the perspective of stakeholders, this paper obtains some evidence tosupport some conclusions by means of questionnaire survey.
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