基于完全信息动态博弈的国有资本收益收取研究
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摘要
以国有资本收益收取为研究对象,通过对影响国有资本收益的各类因素进行分析,选择可以体现国有资本经营状况的指标,创造性的将完全信息动态博弈模型带入资本收益收取研究,从全新的博弈角度对国有资本收益的收取问题展开研究。
回顾国有资本收益收取的演变历程,基于国内外关于国有资本收益管理研究成果,根据国内外关于国企分红的理论研究基础,本文对国有资本收益收取问题进行系统性分析,提出合理确定国有资本收益收取比例的理论方法。首先,根据国内不同行业国有资本管理现状,选择资源性行业和竞争性行业为研究范围,并根据国有资本的行业分布状况,将研究对象锁定为两类典型行业中具有代表性的国有独资企业。其次,分析国有企业现存的分红条件,不同行业中,不同的经营环境下,政府的采取分红方式不同,企业接受的分红方式不同。建立政府与国有企业之间关于国有资本收益收取的博弈格局,分析得出博弈类型为完全信息动态博弈,结合Cobb-Douglas生产函数,得出解决关于国企分红的核心问题即国有资本分红中的收益收取比例问题的模型。最后,结合模型对国有资本运营的宏观环境进行分析,并得出影响利润收取比例的两个宏观因素,分别为资本产出弹性系数和劳动力产出弹性系数。论文针对两个因素分别进行分析,并将所搜集的实际数据代入模型,结合现状分析实证结果,提出完善收益收取制度的参考建议。
In order to study the collection of State-owned net capital gains, we select the economic benefit indices that could reflect the status of State-Owned capital management through the analysis of all kinds of factors that could influence the capital benefit. Now we introduce the complete information dynamic game model to the collection research on the State-Owned capital gain creatively and could do research on the collection issue from a new angle.
Through the review of the history of the collection of the State-Owned capital gains, we learn the research results at home and abroad. Then according to domestic and foreign research on SOE dividend theory, we do system availability analysis of the collection of the State-Owned capital and get the theoretical method of determining the charge radio of the State-Owned capital gains
Firstly, according to present management situation of different industry State-Owned capital, we choose resource industry and competitive industry as the research objects. According to the state assets distribution in industry, we finally focus on representative of the State-Owned enterprises in the two typical industries as the objects. Secondly, through the analysis of the existing condition, we get that in some limited condition enterprises will accept the government's dividend policy. And we want to know in which circumstances the government will take counter measures. So we could establish the game situation about to collect the State-Owned net benefit between the Government and the State-Owned enterprises and make sure that the type of game is compete information dynamic game. Combining with Cobb-Douglas production function we get the core issue that the proportion of the State-Owned enterprise dividend policy.
Lastly, combined with the model we do analysis about the operation macro environment of the State-Owned capital. There are two macro factors that affect the charge radio which are capital output elastic coefficient and labor output elastic coefficient respectively. According to the two factors that are analyzed and put actual data into the model, we get the empirical results and put forward recommendations to improve revenue collection system
回顾国有资本收益收取的演变历程,基于国内外关于国有资本收益管理研究成果,根据国内外关于国企分红的理论研究基础,本文对国有资本收益收取问题进行系统性分析,提出合理确定国有资本收益收取比例的理论方法。首先,根据国内不同行业国有资本管理现状,选择资源性行业和竞争性行业为研究范围,并根据国有资本的行业分布状况,将研究对象锁定为两类典型行业中具有代表性的国有独资企业。其次,分析国有企业现存的分红条件,不同行业中,不同的经营环境下,政府的采取分红方式不同,企业接受的分红方式不同。建立政府与国有企业之间关于国有资本收益收取的博弈格局,分析得出博弈类型为完全信息动态博弈,结合Cobb-Douglas生产函数,得出解决关于国企分红的核心问题即国有资本分红中的收益收取比例问题的模型。最后,结合模型对国有资本运营的宏观环境进行分析,并得出影响利润收取比例的两个宏观因素,分别为资本产出弹性系数和劳动力产出弹性系数。论文针对两个因素分别进行分析,并将所搜集的实际数据代入模型,结合现状分析实证结果,提出完善收益收取制度的参考建议。
In order to study the collection of State-owned net capital gains, we select the economic benefit indices that could reflect the status of State-Owned capital management through the analysis of all kinds of factors that could influence the capital benefit. Now we introduce the complete information dynamic game model to the collection research on the State-Owned capital gain creatively and could do research on the collection issue from a new angle.
Through the review of the history of the collection of the State-Owned capital gains, we learn the research results at home and abroad. Then according to domestic and foreign research on SOE dividend theory, we do system availability analysis of the collection of the State-Owned capital and get the theoretical method of determining the charge radio of the State-Owned capital gains
Firstly, according to present management situation of different industry State-Owned capital, we choose resource industry and competitive industry as the research objects. According to the state assets distribution in industry, we finally focus on representative of the State-Owned enterprises in the two typical industries as the objects. Secondly, through the analysis of the existing condition, we get that in some limited condition enterprises will accept the government's dividend policy. And we want to know in which circumstances the government will take counter measures. So we could establish the game situation about to collect the State-Owned net benefit between the Government and the State-Owned enterprises and make sure that the type of game is compete information dynamic game. Combining with Cobb-Douglas production function we get the core issue that the proportion of the State-Owned enterprise dividend policy.
Lastly, combined with the model we do analysis about the operation macro environment of the State-Owned capital. There are two macro factors that affect the charge radio which are capital output elastic coefficient and labor output elastic coefficient respectively. According to the two factors that are analyzed and put actual data into the model, we get the empirical results and put forward recommendations to improve revenue collection system
引文
[1]Lang, larry H. Pand litzenberger, R. H. Dividend Announcements. Cash Flow Hypothesis [J]. Financial Economics,1989,(66):81-191
[2]Jensen,Michael C.Agency costs of free-cash-flow, corporate finance and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1976,(76):323-329
[3]Michael Rozeff. How companies Set Their Dividend-Payout Ratios[J].Chase Financial Quarterly.Winter 1982,(34):141-53
[4]Kumanr. M. S. Growth Beta and Agency costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios [J].The Journal of financial Research,1982,(24):249-259
[5]Vernon. Linking Managers with Ministers. Dilemmas of state-owned Enterpaise[J].Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,1984,(56):11-29
[6]Refeal Lie Porta. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanse. Andrei Shleifer. Robert w. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J].Financial Economics,2000,(58):50-67
[7]Bruce M Berton, Alasdair Lonie, David M.Power. The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Announcement:The Case of Individual Capital Expenditure Projects[J]. Business, 1999,(44):38-39
[8]Richardson scott. over-investment of free cash flow [M]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,(11):159-189
[9]Miller, M.H. and Modigliani, F.Dividend policy growth and the valuation of share [J]. Journal of Business,1961,(32):22-23
[10]Jennifer. Jones. Earnings management During Import Ralief Investigations [M] Journal of Accounting Reasearch,Vol.29,No.2(Autumn,1991):193-228
[11]高路易,高伟彦,张春霖.国企分红：分多少,分给谁?[J].中国投资,2006,(4)：47-49
[12]邓子基.建立国有资本经营预算的思考[J].中国财经,2005,(12)：19-21
[13]黄伯平.重构地方财政收入体系——对当前宏观调控的反思[J].中央财经大学学报,2007,(06)：14-18
[14]柳建华,魏明海.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资[J].管理世界,2007,(04)：88-95
[15]张春霖.国有企业分红的三个政策问题[J]产权制度与公共利益高层论坛,2005,(2)：97-104
[16]王德中.对利税分流问题的思考[J].财经科学,1991,(5)：4-6
[17]赵尔军.上海、深圳、北京、武汉、广州国有资本经营预算制度试行情况及启示[J].中国农业会计,2008,(1)：20-22
[18]李友忠.政府应享受国企红利[J].中国投资,2006,(4)：50-51
[19]郑磊,郭洪业,杨志勇等.国企红利蛋糕怎么分[J]董事会,2011,(09)：23-26
[20]郑磊.全社会福利最大化才是根本目标[J]董事会,2009,(12)：26-27
[21]张涛,耿伯涛.国有资本收益收缴与预算管理制度相关问题研究[J]会计师,2008,(10)：21-24
[22]郑焕.高新技术企业风险分析和融资策略研究[J],黑龙江对外贸易,2007,(8)：68-69
[23]张春霖.国有企业改革的新阶段：调整改革思路和政策的若干建议[J].中国经济改革,2005,(8)：32-34
[24]刘俊海.国有企业公司制改革与国家股东的分红权[J].产权制度与公共利益高层论坛,2008,(2)：30-32
[25]郭复初.国家财务投资于国有企业债务重组[J].国有资产研究,1997,(03)：33-35
[26]郭复初.国有企业财务管理体制改革的历程[J].财务与会计,2008,(21)：16-18
[27]崔建民.国有资本经营预算：创新与变革[J].中国总会计师,2007,(6)：20-21
[28]夏敏.基于合作博弈的国有企业分红问题研究[D],江苏大学,2010
[29]王庆成.我国近期财务管理若干理论观点评述[J],会计研究,2003,(6)：40-43
[30]张瑞云.国有资本经营预算实施中的难点分析[J],中国乡镇企业会计,2008,(5)：46-47
[31]贾剑非.论国有资本经营预算制度的法理基础与法价值[J],政治与法律,2009,(4)：2-7
[32]陈大雨.诌议静脉产业及对我国的政策建议[J],商场现代化,2005,(8)：80-81
[33]高海东.基于Agent建模的农户土地利用行为模拟研究[J],自然资源学报,2009,(12)：2057-2066
[34]朱亚萍.投资回报具有随机变量的风险模型[J],安徽大学学报,2007,(5)：5-8
[35]甘浩森.食品安全治理的误区及对策[J].商业时代,2007,(5)：66-67
[36]文兴普.数值分析法在VAR中的应用[J].武汉理工大学学报,2010,(12)：1015-1017
[37]张涛,王丽萍.国有资本经营预算与收益管理问题的思考[J].会计师,2009,(1)：16-20
[38]张维迎.《博弈论与信息经济学》[M].上海人民出版社,1996,(1)：30-118
[39]柴晓文.现代企业如何进行竞争决策[J].锦州师范学院学报,2009,(7)：28-30
[40]Arrel M J. "The measurement of productivity efficientcy" [J].The Royal Statiscal Society, 1957,A(3):253-290
[41]Shixia Duan, Juan pu, Xiaoli He. Multi-objective multi-execution mode resource-limited opti mization of fuzzy project scheduling[C].The 4nd International Conference on E-Business an d E-Government ICEE,2011(4):3365-3368
[42]马克思.资本论,人民出版社,1975,(3),891-900
[43]周放生.区别两种产权转让行为[J].上海国资,2007,(11)：71-72
[44]毛专.我国政府国有资本经营预算管理研究[D].中国海洋大学,2009
[45]冯瑞菊.国有资本经营预算编制中的博弈关系初探[J].经济经纬,2005,(5)：130-132
[46]李世聪,周晓蓉,唐莺.国有资本经营预算制度若干问题探讨[J].财会月刊,2007,(10)：15-17
[47]刘永泽,陈艳利.国有资本预算相关问题探究[J].国有资产管理,2005,(7)：21-22
[48]王新红,谈琳.论“国资委”的性质、权利范围与监督机制[J].湖南社会科学,2005(4)：76-78
[49]财政部国资委.中央国有资本收益收取管理办法,2007
[50]HanZhang, Wujuncao, Juan Pu, Wei Zhang. A Study on the Proportion of the Capture of Provincial State-owned Enterprises Revenue Based on Complete Information Dynamic Game[C].The 4nd International Conference on E-Business and E-Government ICEE,2011(2) :1034-1037
[51]Wujun Cao, Han Zhang.A Grey Relevancy Analysis on the Relationship between Energy Consumption and Economic Growth in Henan province[C].The 2nd International' Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce, 2011 volume 2,1034-1037
[52]赵昆.国资委的职能定位与国有资产管理体制改革[J].财经论丛,2004,(5)：22-26
[53]徐晖.中央企业国有资本收益收取相关问题研究[J].现代经济信息,2009,(1)53-54
[2]Jensen,Michael C.Agency costs of free-cash-flow, corporate finance and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1976,(76):323-329
[3]Michael Rozeff. How companies Set Their Dividend-Payout Ratios[J].Chase Financial Quarterly.Winter 1982,(34):141-53
[4]Kumanr. M. S. Growth Beta and Agency costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios [J].The Journal of financial Research,1982,(24):249-259
[5]Vernon. Linking Managers with Ministers. Dilemmas of state-owned Enterpaise[J].Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,1984,(56):11-29
[6]Refeal Lie Porta. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanse. Andrei Shleifer. Robert w. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J].Financial Economics,2000,(58):50-67
[7]Bruce M Berton, Alasdair Lonie, David M.Power. The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Announcement:The Case of Individual Capital Expenditure Projects[J]. Business, 1999,(44):38-39
[8]Richardson scott. over-investment of free cash flow [M]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,(11):159-189
[9]Miller, M.H. and Modigliani, F.Dividend policy growth and the valuation of share [J]. Journal of Business,1961,(32):22-23
[10]Jennifer. Jones. Earnings management During Import Ralief Investigations [M] Journal of Accounting Reasearch,Vol.29,No.2(Autumn,1991):193-228
[11]高路易,高伟彦,张春霖.国企分红：分多少,分给谁?[J].中国投资,2006,(4)：47-49
[12]邓子基.建立国有资本经营预算的思考[J].中国财经,2005,(12)：19-21
[13]黄伯平.重构地方财政收入体系——对当前宏观调控的反思[J].中央财经大学学报,2007,(06)：14-18
[14]柳建华,魏明海.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资[J].管理世界,2007,(04)：88-95
[15]张春霖.国有企业分红的三个政策问题[J]产权制度与公共利益高层论坛,2005,(2)：97-104
[16]王德中.对利税分流问题的思考[J].财经科学,1991,(5)：4-6
[17]赵尔军.上海、深圳、北京、武汉、广州国有资本经营预算制度试行情况及启示[J].中国农业会计,2008,(1)：20-22
[18]李友忠.政府应享受国企红利[J].中国投资,2006,(4)：50-51
[19]郑磊,郭洪业,杨志勇等.国企红利蛋糕怎么分[J]董事会,2011,(09)：23-26
[20]郑磊.全社会福利最大化才是根本目标[J]董事会,2009,(12)：26-27
[21]张涛,耿伯涛.国有资本收益收缴与预算管理制度相关问题研究[J]会计师,2008,(10)：21-24
[22]郑焕.高新技术企业风险分析和融资策略研究[J],黑龙江对外贸易,2007,(8)：68-69
[23]张春霖.国有企业改革的新阶段：调整改革思路和政策的若干建议[J].中国经济改革,2005,(8)：32-34
[24]刘俊海.国有企业公司制改革与国家股东的分红权[J].产权制度与公共利益高层论坛,2008,(2)：30-32
[25]郭复初.国家财务投资于国有企业债务重组[J].国有资产研究,1997,(03)：33-35
[26]郭复初.国有企业财务管理体制改革的历程[J].财务与会计,2008,(21)：16-18
[27]崔建民.国有资本经营预算：创新与变革[J].中国总会计师,2007,(6)：20-21
[28]夏敏.基于合作博弈的国有企业分红问题研究[D],江苏大学,2010
[29]王庆成.我国近期财务管理若干理论观点评述[J],会计研究,2003,(6)：40-43
[30]张瑞云.国有资本经营预算实施中的难点分析[J],中国乡镇企业会计,2008,(5)：46-47
[31]贾剑非.论国有资本经营预算制度的法理基础与法价值[J],政治与法律,2009,(4)：2-7
[32]陈大雨.诌议静脉产业及对我国的政策建议[J],商场现代化,2005,(8)：80-81
[33]高海东.基于Agent建模的农户土地利用行为模拟研究[J],自然资源学报,2009,(12)：2057-2066
[34]朱亚萍.投资回报具有随机变量的风险模型[J],安徽大学学报,2007,(5)：5-8
[35]甘浩森.食品安全治理的误区及对策[J].商业时代,2007,(5)：66-67
[36]文兴普.数值分析法在VAR中的应用[J].武汉理工大学学报,2010,(12)：1015-1017
[37]张涛,王丽萍.国有资本经营预算与收益管理问题的思考[J].会计师,2009,(1)：16-20
[38]张维迎.《博弈论与信息经济学》[M].上海人民出版社,1996,(1)：30-118
[39]柴晓文.现代企业如何进行竞争决策[J].锦州师范学院学报,2009,(7)：28-30
[40]Arrel M J. "The measurement of productivity efficientcy" [J].The Royal Statiscal Society, 1957,A(3):253-290
[41]Shixia Duan, Juan pu, Xiaoli He. Multi-objective multi-execution mode resource-limited opti mization of fuzzy project scheduling[C].The 4nd International Conference on E-Business an d E-Government ICEE,2011(4):3365-3368
[42]马克思.资本论,人民出版社,1975,(3),891-900
[43]周放生.区别两种产权转让行为[J].上海国资,2007,(11)：71-72
[44]毛专.我国政府国有资本经营预算管理研究[D].中国海洋大学,2009
[45]冯瑞菊.国有资本经营预算编制中的博弈关系初探[J].经济经纬,2005,(5)：130-132
[46]李世聪,周晓蓉,唐莺.国有资本经营预算制度若干问题探讨[J].财会月刊,2007,(10)：15-17
[47]刘永泽,陈艳利.国有资本预算相关问题探究[J].国有资产管理,2005,(7)：21-22
[48]王新红,谈琳.论“国资委”的性质、权利范围与监督机制[J].湖南社会科学,2005(4)：76-78
[49]财政部国资委.中央国有资本收益收取管理办法,2007
[50]HanZhang, Wujuncao, Juan Pu, Wei Zhang. A Study on the Proportion of the Capture of Provincial State-owned Enterprises Revenue Based on Complete Information Dynamic Game[C].The 4nd International Conference on E-Business and E-Government ICEE,2011(2) :1034-1037
[51]Wujun Cao, Han Zhang.A Grey Relevancy Analysis on the Relationship between Energy Consumption and Economic Growth in Henan province[C].The 2nd International' Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce, 2011 volume 2,1034-1037
[52]赵昆.国资委的职能定位与国有资产管理体制改革[J].财经论丛,2004,(5)：22-26
[53]徐晖.中央企业国有资本收益收取相关问题研究[J].现代经济信息,2009,(1)53-54