国家审计质量与效果的研究
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摘要
本文以国家审计对社会审计质量进行检查并延伸上市公司为线索,通过对国家审计监管质量和国家审计监管效果的分析,力图能够有效地为资本市场的投资者正确判断上市公司财务质量传递高质量的监管信息。首先对国内外相关研究文献进行梳理,然后分析国家审计监管质量,并通过分析证监会处理处罚、社会审计质量和上市公司信息披露的变化,进一步研究国家审计监管的效果,从而对国家审计监管的体制和机制进行探讨。
本文收集了2002-2005年审计署检查的60家左右具有证券业务从业资格的会计师事务所和延伸审计的121家上市公司作为审计样本,并按照同年度、同行业、同规模的标准选取了相应的对照样本,采用描述性统计、回归分析和累计异常回报模型,做了以下研究:(1)将上市公司的审计样本与对照样本相比较,研究了国家审计抽样的效率;(2)将审计移交样本与未移交样本相比较,研究了国家审计监管的效率;(3)将证监会处罚样本与未处罚样本相比较,研究了证监会监管的偏好;(4)将被处罚的事务所处罚前后年度市场占有率、审计收费和审计独立性变化情况进行比较,研究了政府对事务所的监管效果;(5)将被处罚的上市公司处罚前后年度信息披露质量变化情况进行比较,研究了政府延伸上市公司的监管效果;(6)将处罚日前后短期和长期的平均异常回报和累计异常回报进行比较,研究了处罚事件的市场反应。
本文通过对国家审计监管质量和国家审计监管效果的研究,证明了国家审计具有较高的审计抽样质量和审计结果质量,国家审计监管取得了较好的效果,但受体制、机制等因素的制约,审计监督作用的发挥受到了一定程度的影响。因此本文提出了改革监管体制、完善监管机制等的政策建议。
In the effective capital markets, the social auditing and information disclosure quality of listed companies are extremely concerned by the public. After experiencing 1970s-1980s“lawsuit explosion”, American accounting professional sector began the research on audit quality and information disclosure. In 2001 the Enron case caused the "century-old store" Arthur Andersen to withdraw from listed company auditing market. Furthermore, the Shitong company issue, which happened immediately after the Enron case, made Bimawei blamed. Then the listed companies and accounting offices’auditing quality, information disclosure and management once again absorbed attentions of countries all over the world. In recent years in China, along with breach of Accounting firms and listed companies being disclosed and strengthening of democracy, law and risk awareness, not only information disclosure of listed companies and quality of social auditing absorbed public attentions, but also the quality of government supervision was put forward.“Who will supervise the surveillant”, the public has sent out such question.
In recent years,“the audit storm”of the economic field blew more and more fiercely. The state audit has bring his function into full play, then how about the qulity and how much can people use the result in capital market? Reseach will be done on the qulity and efficenicy of government audit .
Because some capital market developed country's state audit has no supervision function on capital and related market, as to the research of state audit on capital and related markets, there are only a few related researches in our country. Furthermore, subject to materials and data, positive researches are fewer. As to the existing researches, they are only indirect normative analysts, which are carried out from some aspects of supervision and quality.
This paper uses data which were obtained from Auditing Administration when it carried out inspection on quality of audit of securities qualified accounting firms which simultaneously extended to more than 120 listed companies from 2002 to 2005 to inspect quality of government audit supervision. Also, it uses these data to carry out deep researches on our country’s capital market and auditing market supervision and quality. Based on these, we can test the effect of government audit. Then I give some suggestions on how to strength and advance goverment audit supervision and advance quality of social audit and listed companies’information disclosure.
The content of this paper
Social audit and listed company supervision carried out by state audit deals with government supervision economics, enterprise theory, audit, financial management, etc. Until now, there is no one agreed theoretical and positive research framework. The research design of this paper use all subjects’merit for reference and use ways of normative analyst cooperated with positive analyst. The aim is to try to construct an analytical framework that goverment audit can supervise on social audit and listed corporations. This paper surrounds the national inspection on social audit, then, it extends audit to listed corporations, carrying out six important positive researches. These researches include: first, using the comparison between listed corporations’audit sample and comparison sample, study the quality of goverment audit sample; second, using the comparison between handover sample and non handover sample, study the quality of goverment audit consequence; third, using the comparison between China securities regulatory commission’s penalty sample and non penalty sample and from the state that China securities regulatory commission use the production of goverment audit, study the effect of goverment audit supervision and the preference of China securities regulatory commission’s supervision; forth, using the comparison between the audit quality changes of punished audit firm before punishment and after punishment and the comparison between the audit quality changes of punished audit firm and comparison audit firm, study the effect of government supervision on audit firm; fifth, using the comparison of the punished audit firm’s quality changes of information disclosure before and after punishment, study the effect of government supervision extended to listed companies; sixth, using the comparison between long-term and short-term average abnormal return and accumulative abnormal return, study the market feedback of punishment issue. During the process of research, some econometrics ways such as description statistic analysis, multiple regression analysis and event analysis etc were used.
Characteristic and innovation
Firstly, as to the aspect of data, I collect the whole sample of audit quality inspection, which was obtained through goverment audit extending to securities qualified audit firm. Then I classified and analyzed the whole sample and classified the whole sample into audit supervision problem-group and non-problem-group. Finally, in order to check the supervision quality, I carried out induction, analysis and positive research on two group data of listed companies.
Secondly, as to the ways of research, I carried out the research on goverment audit supervision quality. Because the function of government audit is different from country to country, there is little research about the supervision that goverment audit put on capital and related markets in foreign countries. In recent two years, along with the goverment audit absorbed more and more public attention, the researches of goverment audit quality emerged in and out of China. But, most of the existing researches are normative analysis. This paper, for the first time, used positive analysis to study the goverment audit supervision on capital and audit markets.
Thirdly, as to the research content, most of the foreign researches on the effect of goverment audit pay great attention to performance audit and the corn of the study is the state that government carry out its fiduciary duty to use public fund. As to our country, most of researches pay great attention to audit consequence settlement and audit public report and carry out positive study. This paper, for the first time, used the state that China securities regulatory commission take advantage of the consequence of goverment audit to study the effect of goverment audit supervision and from the angle of goverment audit supervision, used the related changes before and after the penalty of audit firm to carry out positive study on the effect of government audit supervision and from the angle of government audit supervision, used the related changes before and after the penalty of listed companies to carry out positive study on the effect of government audit supervision.
Finally, as to the suggestions, based on positive study, this paper used accurate and informative data and got the believable conclusion. Also, the above gave strong support to the advancement of social audit quality and listed corporations’information disclosure quality and the suggestions on reform on supervision mechanism and the perfection of the supervision system.
Main production and conclusion of this paper
Through the positive research on the quality and the effect of the government audit supervision, this paper proved that government audit has high quality of audit sample and audit consequence. But the audit supervision function was affected somehow subject to system and mechanism and other factors.
1. The main conclusion of the positive research on government audit extending to listed corporations
First, comparing the audit extending to listed corporations with the degree of the listed companies’financial quality; we find that government audit has higher audit sample quality. That is to say, when the government audit selected listed companies, it intentionally selected listed corporations that have lower financial quality and have higher social audit risk as the objects. Furthermore, as to the listed companies’financial quality, government audit pay more attention to their short term repaying and payoff ability and getting profit ability.
Second, comparing listed companies handed over to China securities regulatory commission with those not hand over to China securities regulatory commission , we find that government audit has higher audit consequence quality. That is to say, through extended audit, audit organ handed listed companies that have lower financial quality and higher financial risk to China securities regulatory commission. Furthermore, as to the listed companies’financial quality, government audit pay more attention to listed companies’short term repaying ability and getting profit ability.
Third, the consequence that administering indicator in all samples including audit extending to listed companies and the whole listed corporations and listed companies handed to China securities regulatory commission and those not handed’test is not obvious reflected such a question that neither as to the audit sample nor as to the audit settlement, government audit never regards companies’governance as the main indicator. So, from the angle of share governance, government audit treats listed companies all the same and government audit supervision is self-governed.
2. The main conclusion of the positive research that government audit affected the settlement of China securities regulatory commission
First, comparing samples’financial quality that got China securities regulatory commission’s penalty with those not get penalty, we find that when China securities regulatory commission deals with punishment, it pays no more attention to listed companies’financial quality.
Second, comparing samples’administration structure that got China securities regulatory commission’s penalty with those not get penalty, we accidentally find that the settlement is different to listed companies that have different share character. That is to say, the settlements of China securities regulatory commission are not absolutely fair and they need advanced amendment.
Third, from the settlements of China securities regulatory commission, we find that government audit consequences are not used fully. On one side, the standard of China securities regulatory commission’s settlement is different from that of the government audits. As the self-governed outside supervision department, government audit hands listed companies that got out of line, have lower financial quality and have more long term repaying risk to China securities regulatory commission. But when China securities regulatory commission deals with them, it pays no more attention to their financial quality. That is to say, if the listed companies have no big problem on sustaining operation, they seldom get China securities regulatory commission’s penalty. On the other side, as one government department, China securities regulatory commission has the burden to carry out macroeconomic regulation, so as to the nation absolutely and relatively controlled listed corporations, he is more and more careful.
3. The positive research of the government audit’s influence on accounting firm
First, comparing related indicators before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that their self audit quality is not obvious different. But from the angle of the whole market, comparing related indicators before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that the handover firms are obvious different to those comparison accounting firms and the audit quality increased evidently.
Second, better effect resulted from government audit’s quality inspection on social audit and self governing and audit quality enhanced obviously. Meanwhile, we find that punishments have little effect on accounting firms’market share and fees that reflected that there are some problems on our audit market. That is to say, there is less need for high quality audit service. The phenomenon of bad eliminating good is existing.
4. The positive research of the government audit’s influence on listed companies’information disclosure quality and market reaction.
First, through related and regression analysis on information disclosure management level before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that it is very important to audit supervision effect whether punishment information is public or not. When the punished samples in the related analysis include the samples that have non public information, surplus management level of information disclosure is not obviously related to penalty year. But, if the samples that have non public information are picked out, surplus management level of listed companies is evidently different. From the angle of surplus management, the quality of information disclosure enhanced obviously after punishment. The government audit handover is positive for higher information disclosure quality of listed corporations and the effect is better.
Second, through the research on short-term (five, ten, thirty days) and long-term (about six months) market reaction before and after the day when the punishment report is public, we find that the phenomenon of information disclosure beforehand is existing. The punishment information has been digested two months before the punishment report is public. So the short-term market reaction is not evidently. It is worth pointing out that CAAR increase negatively in short-term (t=from -1 to 30). It indicates that the short-term risk speculation is unreasonable and is special in China capital market. Meanwhile the unreasonable speculation in the market results to the phenomenon that the bad eliminate the good. In the long term, market accumulated average rate of revenue decreases obviously. So, in the long term, the investment value of listed companies punished decreases obviously and the fortune of the share holders is damaged.
In this paper I used positive research way to prove the government audit has higher audit sample quality and settlement quality and as to the research way, I gave a new try. Meanwhile I analyzed why the function of the audit supervision did not bring into play fully. Finally, I gave some related suggestions. Subject to data, there are not enough samples to carry out positive research on the settlement of China securities regulatory commission and the quality of listed companies’information disclosure. Along with the strengthening of government audit supervision, I expect that I can have the chance to give a deeper research in the future. Besides, the design of the positive research means and variable has the possibility to make it perfect.
本文收集了2002-2005年审计署检查的60家左右具有证券业务从业资格的会计师事务所和延伸审计的121家上市公司作为审计样本,并按照同年度、同行业、同规模的标准选取了相应的对照样本,采用描述性统计、回归分析和累计异常回报模型,做了以下研究:(1)将上市公司的审计样本与对照样本相比较,研究了国家审计抽样的效率;(2)将审计移交样本与未移交样本相比较,研究了国家审计监管的效率;(3)将证监会处罚样本与未处罚样本相比较,研究了证监会监管的偏好;(4)将被处罚的事务所处罚前后年度市场占有率、审计收费和审计独立性变化情况进行比较,研究了政府对事务所的监管效果;(5)将被处罚的上市公司处罚前后年度信息披露质量变化情况进行比较,研究了政府延伸上市公司的监管效果;(6)将处罚日前后短期和长期的平均异常回报和累计异常回报进行比较,研究了处罚事件的市场反应。
本文通过对国家审计监管质量和国家审计监管效果的研究,证明了国家审计具有较高的审计抽样质量和审计结果质量,国家审计监管取得了较好的效果,但受体制、机制等因素的制约,审计监督作用的发挥受到了一定程度的影响。因此本文提出了改革监管体制、完善监管机制等的政策建议。
In the effective capital markets, the social auditing and information disclosure quality of listed companies are extremely concerned by the public. After experiencing 1970s-1980s“lawsuit explosion”, American accounting professional sector began the research on audit quality and information disclosure. In 2001 the Enron case caused the "century-old store" Arthur Andersen to withdraw from listed company auditing market. Furthermore, the Shitong company issue, which happened immediately after the Enron case, made Bimawei blamed. Then the listed companies and accounting offices’auditing quality, information disclosure and management once again absorbed attentions of countries all over the world. In recent years in China, along with breach of Accounting firms and listed companies being disclosed and strengthening of democracy, law and risk awareness, not only information disclosure of listed companies and quality of social auditing absorbed public attentions, but also the quality of government supervision was put forward.“Who will supervise the surveillant”, the public has sent out such question.
In recent years,“the audit storm”of the economic field blew more and more fiercely. The state audit has bring his function into full play, then how about the qulity and how much can people use the result in capital market? Reseach will be done on the qulity and efficenicy of government audit .
Because some capital market developed country's state audit has no supervision function on capital and related market, as to the research of state audit on capital and related markets, there are only a few related researches in our country. Furthermore, subject to materials and data, positive researches are fewer. As to the existing researches, they are only indirect normative analysts, which are carried out from some aspects of supervision and quality.
This paper uses data which were obtained from Auditing Administration when it carried out inspection on quality of audit of securities qualified accounting firms which simultaneously extended to more than 120 listed companies from 2002 to 2005 to inspect quality of government audit supervision. Also, it uses these data to carry out deep researches on our country’s capital market and auditing market supervision and quality. Based on these, we can test the effect of government audit. Then I give some suggestions on how to strength and advance goverment audit supervision and advance quality of social audit and listed companies’information disclosure.
The content of this paper
Social audit and listed company supervision carried out by state audit deals with government supervision economics, enterprise theory, audit, financial management, etc. Until now, there is no one agreed theoretical and positive research framework. The research design of this paper use all subjects’merit for reference and use ways of normative analyst cooperated with positive analyst. The aim is to try to construct an analytical framework that goverment audit can supervise on social audit and listed corporations. This paper surrounds the national inspection on social audit, then, it extends audit to listed corporations, carrying out six important positive researches. These researches include: first, using the comparison between listed corporations’audit sample and comparison sample, study the quality of goverment audit sample; second, using the comparison between handover sample and non handover sample, study the quality of goverment audit consequence; third, using the comparison between China securities regulatory commission’s penalty sample and non penalty sample and from the state that China securities regulatory commission use the production of goverment audit, study the effect of goverment audit supervision and the preference of China securities regulatory commission’s supervision; forth, using the comparison between the audit quality changes of punished audit firm before punishment and after punishment and the comparison between the audit quality changes of punished audit firm and comparison audit firm, study the effect of government supervision on audit firm; fifth, using the comparison of the punished audit firm’s quality changes of information disclosure before and after punishment, study the effect of government supervision extended to listed companies; sixth, using the comparison between long-term and short-term average abnormal return and accumulative abnormal return, study the market feedback of punishment issue. During the process of research, some econometrics ways such as description statistic analysis, multiple regression analysis and event analysis etc were used.
Characteristic and innovation
Firstly, as to the aspect of data, I collect the whole sample of audit quality inspection, which was obtained through goverment audit extending to securities qualified audit firm. Then I classified and analyzed the whole sample and classified the whole sample into audit supervision problem-group and non-problem-group. Finally, in order to check the supervision quality, I carried out induction, analysis and positive research on two group data of listed companies.
Secondly, as to the ways of research, I carried out the research on goverment audit supervision quality. Because the function of government audit is different from country to country, there is little research about the supervision that goverment audit put on capital and related markets in foreign countries. In recent two years, along with the goverment audit absorbed more and more public attention, the researches of goverment audit quality emerged in and out of China. But, most of the existing researches are normative analysis. This paper, for the first time, used positive analysis to study the goverment audit supervision on capital and audit markets.
Thirdly, as to the research content, most of the foreign researches on the effect of goverment audit pay great attention to performance audit and the corn of the study is the state that government carry out its fiduciary duty to use public fund. As to our country, most of researches pay great attention to audit consequence settlement and audit public report and carry out positive study. This paper, for the first time, used the state that China securities regulatory commission take advantage of the consequence of goverment audit to study the effect of goverment audit supervision and from the angle of goverment audit supervision, used the related changes before and after the penalty of audit firm to carry out positive study on the effect of government audit supervision and from the angle of government audit supervision, used the related changes before and after the penalty of listed companies to carry out positive study on the effect of government audit supervision.
Finally, as to the suggestions, based on positive study, this paper used accurate and informative data and got the believable conclusion. Also, the above gave strong support to the advancement of social audit quality and listed corporations’information disclosure quality and the suggestions on reform on supervision mechanism and the perfection of the supervision system.
Main production and conclusion of this paper
Through the positive research on the quality and the effect of the government audit supervision, this paper proved that government audit has high quality of audit sample and audit consequence. But the audit supervision function was affected somehow subject to system and mechanism and other factors.
1. The main conclusion of the positive research on government audit extending to listed corporations
First, comparing the audit extending to listed corporations with the degree of the listed companies’financial quality; we find that government audit has higher audit sample quality. That is to say, when the government audit selected listed companies, it intentionally selected listed corporations that have lower financial quality and have higher social audit risk as the objects. Furthermore, as to the listed companies’financial quality, government audit pay more attention to their short term repaying and payoff ability and getting profit ability.
Second, comparing listed companies handed over to China securities regulatory commission with those not hand over to China securities regulatory commission , we find that government audit has higher audit consequence quality. That is to say, through extended audit, audit organ handed listed companies that have lower financial quality and higher financial risk to China securities regulatory commission. Furthermore, as to the listed companies’financial quality, government audit pay more attention to listed companies’short term repaying ability and getting profit ability.
Third, the consequence that administering indicator in all samples including audit extending to listed companies and the whole listed corporations and listed companies handed to China securities regulatory commission and those not handed’test is not obvious reflected such a question that neither as to the audit sample nor as to the audit settlement, government audit never regards companies’governance as the main indicator. So, from the angle of share governance, government audit treats listed companies all the same and government audit supervision is self-governed.
2. The main conclusion of the positive research that government audit affected the settlement of China securities regulatory commission
First, comparing samples’financial quality that got China securities regulatory commission’s penalty with those not get penalty, we find that when China securities regulatory commission deals with punishment, it pays no more attention to listed companies’financial quality.
Second, comparing samples’administration structure that got China securities regulatory commission’s penalty with those not get penalty, we accidentally find that the settlement is different to listed companies that have different share character. That is to say, the settlements of China securities regulatory commission are not absolutely fair and they need advanced amendment.
Third, from the settlements of China securities regulatory commission, we find that government audit consequences are not used fully. On one side, the standard of China securities regulatory commission’s settlement is different from that of the government audits. As the self-governed outside supervision department, government audit hands listed companies that got out of line, have lower financial quality and have more long term repaying risk to China securities regulatory commission. But when China securities regulatory commission deals with them, it pays no more attention to their financial quality. That is to say, if the listed companies have no big problem on sustaining operation, they seldom get China securities regulatory commission’s penalty. On the other side, as one government department, China securities regulatory commission has the burden to carry out macroeconomic regulation, so as to the nation absolutely and relatively controlled listed corporations, he is more and more careful.
3. The positive research of the government audit’s influence on accounting firm
First, comparing related indicators before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that their self audit quality is not obvious different. But from the angle of the whole market, comparing related indicators before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that the handover firms are obvious different to those comparison accounting firms and the audit quality increased evidently.
Second, better effect resulted from government audit’s quality inspection on social audit and self governing and audit quality enhanced obviously. Meanwhile, we find that punishments have little effect on accounting firms’market share and fees that reflected that there are some problems on our audit market. That is to say, there is less need for high quality audit service. The phenomenon of bad eliminating good is existing.
4. The positive research of the government audit’s influence on listed companies’information disclosure quality and market reaction.
First, through related and regression analysis on information disclosure management level before and after the accounting firms were handed over to China securities regulatory commission to get settlement, we find that it is very important to audit supervision effect whether punishment information is public or not. When the punished samples in the related analysis include the samples that have non public information, surplus management level of information disclosure is not obviously related to penalty year. But, if the samples that have non public information are picked out, surplus management level of listed companies is evidently different. From the angle of surplus management, the quality of information disclosure enhanced obviously after punishment. The government audit handover is positive for higher information disclosure quality of listed corporations and the effect is better.
Second, through the research on short-term (five, ten, thirty days) and long-term (about six months) market reaction before and after the day when the punishment report is public, we find that the phenomenon of information disclosure beforehand is existing. The punishment information has been digested two months before the punishment report is public. So the short-term market reaction is not evidently. It is worth pointing out that CAAR increase negatively in short-term (t=from -1 to 30). It indicates that the short-term risk speculation is unreasonable and is special in China capital market. Meanwhile the unreasonable speculation in the market results to the phenomenon that the bad eliminate the good. In the long term, market accumulated average rate of revenue decreases obviously. So, in the long term, the investment value of listed companies punished decreases obviously and the fortune of the share holders is damaged.
In this paper I used positive research way to prove the government audit has higher audit sample quality and settlement quality and as to the research way, I gave a new try. Meanwhile I analyzed why the function of the audit supervision did not bring into play fully. Finally, I gave some related suggestions. Subject to data, there are not enough samples to carry out positive research on the settlement of China securities regulatory commission and the quality of listed companies’information disclosure. Along with the strengthening of government audit supervision, I expect that I can have the chance to give a deeper research in the future. Besides, the design of the positive research means and variable has the possibility to make it perfect.
引文
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[2] NAO of UK, www.nao.org.uk