管理层股权激励对股东利益影响研究
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摘要
随着中国上市公司股权分置改革的顺利进行,《公司法》、《证券法》等相关法律法规的修订及证券市场环境的逐步成熟,上市公司针对管理层的股权激励真正开始并得到迅速的发展。从2005年至2008年6月底,中国沪、深两市已有109家上市公司公告了管理层股权激励预案,更有大量公司在积极做相关的准备工作。国际上学术界的研究和实务界的实践对管理层股权激励的效用并没有得出一致的结论,无从直接指导中国股权激励的实践。另外,中国在经济的整体发展、资本市场的有效性甚至企业文化等方面也与国外企业有巨大差异。在中国上市公司大规模股权激励之前,有必要充分、深入研究目前中国上市公司如何设计管理层股权激励的方案才能更好地保护股东利益?市场上的投资者如何看待管理层股权激励问题,以及什么类型的公司适合采用股权激励的模式等等。基于此,本文选择对中国上市公司管理层股权激励对股东利益的影响为题进行研究。
本文的研究将立足于公司股东的视角,研究管理层股权激励对股东利益的影响,即对股东权利和股东收益的影响。研究中分别采用已经先行公告管理层股权激励预案的上市公司和实际上已经实施(授予)的上市公司为样本,在股权激励方案设计阶段侧重于研究方案本身以及公司的选择性偏好是否有损于股东利益,在预案公告阶段通过市场反应和公告前的股价波动研究对股东短期利益的影响,在实施阶段通过对公司行为的变化预期对股东长期利益的影响,并且对实施前后真实的股东收益以及中小股东利益进行了实证检验。本文拟通过对其全方位、全过程的研究,发现在股权激励的不同环节可能存在的问题及其对股东利益的影响,从而在上市公司大规模地展开股权激励时规避风险,更好地发挥激励作用。从行文的逻辑主线来看,全文共分为八个部分:
第一部分,绪论,主要阐述论文的研究背景、研究意义、相关概念界定、研究思路与逻辑框架以及本研究的主要创新之处。重点是对本文研究范围的界定:一是整理了中国管理层股权激励的发展历程,根据其发展历程、股权来源、法律法规和资本市场特征等,将整个历程划分为4个阶段,并确定本文研究的是从2005年开始的第四阶段;二是根据前人的研究,确定本文所研究的股东利益概念,即包括两个层次四项内容:第一个层次是股东权利,研究内容是管理层股权激励方案设计阶段对股东权利的保障;第二个层次是股东收益,包括预案公告时股价波动产生的累积超常收益,股权激励方案实施后公司行为变化的考察,股权激励实施后股东收益变化的考察等,分别代表股东短期、长期和中期收益的情况。
第二部分,文献综述,按照对股东利益的界定,研究文献集中在管理层股权激励对股东收益的影响研究和管理层股权激励的影响因素研究两部分。通过文献综述,发现国外研究中相互矛盾的结论无从解释,而不同国家之间基于法律、经济发展、资本市场乃至文化的差异更使得无从直接从中吸取经验。再分析目前国内的相关研究,一方面得出了矛盾的结论;二来其对管理层股权激励的研究阶段也各不相同,而管理层股权激励的不同发展阶段的激励效果必然存在差异;三来学者们的研究基本上都是以管理层持股作为管理层股权激励的替代,以此确定了基于2005年相关法律、法规实施后的管理层股权激励研究独特的意义。同时,目前管理层股权激励对股东利益的研究基本上是独立进行的,而实际上董事会的结构、股权结构以及控股股权性质等也会对股权激励效果产生影响,因此,将管理层股权激励与公司的其它治理特征融合起来研究对股东利益的影响也将是本文的特色所在。
第三部分,理论基础,本文主要以委托代理理论、产权(企业控制权)理论和权变激励理论为研究的基础。委托代理理论是股权激励产生的根本原因,但也提出了可能存在管理层寻租的问题。基于此,本文进一步分析了公司控制权,尤其是公司实际控制权的归属,将可能影响到高管股权激励的科学性和公平性。最后,论文进一步分析了权变激励理论,即研究公司高管股权激励必须着眼于系统,高管股权激励系统的设计必须充分考虑与企业其他相关系统的协调一致,包括公司治理、公司财务业绩、企业经营特征等权变因素。
第四部分,中国上市公司管理层股权激励的选择性偏好研究,主要研究内容包括管理层股权激励的现状、股权激励方案的特征以及股权激励的选择性偏好。通过对激励方案具体特征的统计和分析,发现存在等待期(锁定期)过短、主要采用会计指标作为行权(解锁)条件、实际行权条件满足率高等问题。通过股权激励的选择性偏好研究,发现进行管理层股权激励的上市公司选择具有行业内经营较为保守、盈利能力较好、筹资活动相对保守导致股东收益能力相对较低、目前股价也相对较低等偏好,同时结合实施公司实际行权条件满足率的结果,可以得出方案设计阶段整体上有利于管理层,而不利于股东权利保护的结论。
第五部分,中国上市公司管理层股权激励的市场反应研究,本部分分别以独立公告股权激励预案的全部公司、国有控股公司和其它公司、不同年份公告的公司为样本进行事件研究,通过市场投资者的反应从侧面体现投资者对未来收益的预期。研究发现:上市公司在公告管理层股权激励后,得到了积极的市场反应,但国有企业在[0,30]的累积超常收益为负,证明投资者对国有企业实施管理层股权激励持怀疑态度。考察不同年份股权激励公告的市场反应显示,尽管少数公司发生了由于股权激励对股东不利的情况,但并没有影响投资者的热情,某种程度上可以认为投资者并没有因此认识到股权激励本身可能存在的风险。同时,本部分还对企业预案公告前1天和前30天是否存在打压股价的行为进行了分析,结果显示,公告的全部上市公司均不存在打压股价的行为,只是比较起其他企业,国有企业在该期间的CAR更低一些。另外,从管理层股权激励公告前后短期的CAR可以看出存在一定的信息泄露问题,我国的资本市场还有待进一步完善。
第六部分,管理层股权激励对公司行为影响的实证研究,本部分通过对管理层股权激励实施后,对公司业绩影响最大、且具有可观测性的投资行为、融资行为和收益分配行为的变化及其驱动因素的研究,尝试发现其中的规律,从而预期股东长期利益的实现。通过对实施股权激励前后公司行为变化的显著性检验发现,对管理层进行股权激励之后,公司的股利支付率显著下降,投资规模较为显著扩大,进一步分析其驱动因素,发现执行董事比例与投资规模变化之间呈负相关关系,即随着执行董事在董事会中所占席位的增加,将使企业减少过度投资行为,某种程度上可以降低代理成本。
第七部分,管理层股权激励对实施当期股东收益影响的实证检验,本部分的研究内容包括股东收益指标设计、剔除行业影响的管理层股权激励效果检验、剔除盈余管理影响的管理层股权激励效果检验和股权激励实施后控股股东对中小股东利益侵害程度变化检验。论文首先从不同角度较为科学地选取了三个指标替代股东收益:资产报酬率、每股收益和市净率;其次,比较样本公司管理层股权激励前后经当年行业均值调整后的股东收益,发现每股收益和市净率发生了非常显著的提升,资产报酬率也较为显著地提高;再次,由于会计指标容易受到盈余管理的影响,本文进一步对剔除盈余管理的股东收益指标变化进行检验,发现股权激励的激励效果并不明显,进一步对激励效果差异进行驱动因素检验,发现公司执行董事比例对其具有较为显著的正向作用,说明被授予股权激励后,执行董事发挥了较为显著的正向作用,代理成本较低,高管的努力程度增加;最后,本文针对管理层股权激励之后,控股股东对中小股东利益侵害的情况及其驱动因素进行了初步探讨,发现从整体上看,进行管理层股权激励之后,控股股东对中小股东的利益侵害减轻了,而通过驱动因素的分析,发现侵害减轻也是执行董事驱动下的结果。
第八部分,结论和建议。根据本文的研究结果,主要提出进一步对上市公司的管理层股权激励措施进行引导,进一步加强信息披露和管理层股权激励的监督和管理,以及进一步加强公司治理机制的研究和建设等政策建议。本文的研究局限性主要体现在由于时间短、样本少,影响了对长期激励效果和驱动因素的检验,并且可能影响研究结果的准确性,这也是后面的任务和方向。
综上,论文主要在以下方面具有一定的创新性:
(1)本文在研究管理层股权激励对我国股东利益的影响时,同时研究了股东的权利和股东的收益,采取了从股权激励的不同阶段来界定的全过程研究方法:在股权激励方案的设计阶段重点关注股东权利的保障;而在方案实施的过程中则转为关注股东收益的实现,其中,包括预案公告时CAR代表股东短期收益的实现、实施后中期收益的实现,以及通过实施后公司行为的研究预期股东长期收益的实现等。
(2)前人对股东收益的衡量采取的指标各不相同,本文立足于我国新兴资本市场的特点,提出综合采用市场指标和会计指标进行股东收益衡量的思路,并从股东收益实现的不同角度选取了资产报酬率、每股收益和市净率三个指标。
(3)本文通过对我国目前已经公告过进行管理层股权激励的上市公司的特征分析和比较,研究我国上市公司管理层股权激励的选择性偏好。经研究得出,目前进行管理层股权激励的属于行业内经营较为保守、盈利能力较好,但筹资活动相对保守,导致股东收益能力相对较低,而且目前股价相对较低,从而整体上较有利于管理者的结论。
(4)目前研究管理层股权激励对公司行为影响的较少,并且基本上仅研究某一个方面,本文提出公司行为是决定股东长期利益实现的根本,并据此选取公司投资行为、筹资行为、收益分配行为作为研究对象,通过研究管理层股权激励前后公司行为的变化预期长期激励效果。
(5)本文在对管理层股权激励前后公司行为和股东收益指标变化的研究过程中,进一步尝试着研究了驱动其变化的公司层面因素,并发现,执行董事比例与投资规模变化、控股股东侵害中小股东的程度变化呈负相关关系。
With China's reform of non-tradable shares of listed companies and the revision of Company Law of the People's Republic of China, Securities law of the People's Republic of China, other relevant laws and regulations and the maturity of the securities market environment, the managerial equity incentives by the listed company get really began and rapid development. From 2005 to the end of June 2008, in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, there are 109 companies have announced the managerial equity incentives plan and even a lot of companies are getting ready for it. Because the international academic research and practical field have not unanimous conclusion on the practice of the utility of the equity incentives, there is no direct guidance for our practice in China. In addition, there are great differences about the whole economic development and the efficiency of capital market and even enterprise culture etc between China's companies and foreign companies. Before the managerial equity incentives plans start in a large scale of our listed companies, fully and deeply research is necessary to know how China's listed companies design the managerial equity incentives scheme to protect the interests of the shareholders better and what investors' attitude is on the managerial equity incentives problems and what kind of companies suit for using the managerial equity incentive mode, etc. Based on this, this paper chooses the effect of the managerial equity incentives of listed companies in China on the interests of shareholders as its topic.
This research will be based upon the perspective of the shareholder and study the effect of the managerial equity incentives to the interests of shareholders, namely its influence on shareholders' rights and shareholder returns. I respectively adopt the listed companies which have announced the managerial equity incentive plans and those have actually implemented (awarded equity) plans as samples. In design stage of managerial equity incentive scheme I focus on researching plan itself and if the selectivity of the company is detrimental to the interests of shareholders. In plan announcement stage, I study the influence of events on the short-term earnings of shareholders through market reaction and the stock price fluctuation before announcement. In the implementation stage, I expect the effect of events to the long-term earnings of shareholders through observing the company's behavior change and make empirical test for the real shareholder interests and the interests of small shareholders before and after implementation. This paper try to find the possible problems of the managerial equity incentives in different stages and their influences on the interests of shareholders through comprehensive research in order to hedge risk and play a better incentive role when the listed companies launch a large-scale managerial equity incentives actions. With the logic chain, this paper was divided into eight parts:
The first part is the introduction with the research background, significance, the related concepts and ideas, logical framework of this research and innovation. The keystone is to define the scope of this research. Firstly, I sort out the development process of the managerial equity incentives in China. I divided the whole course into four stages according to its development history, the source of stock right, laws and regulations and the features of capital market, then I determined this paper to study the fourth stage which was from 2005. Secondly, I determined the concept of the interests of shareholders according to the previous studies. The concept includes two levels without involving the content of laws and regulations. The first level is the shareholder's rights, by rearching the investor protection at the design stage, I studied the guarantee of the interests of shareholders of the managerial equity incentive scheme. The second level is shareholder returns, which include cumulative abnormal returns from the stock price fluctuation when plans are announced, the observation of company behavior change after the implementation of the managerial equity incentiveson and shareholder returns at the implementation period change behalf of short-term, long-term and middle returns of shareholders.
The second part is the literature review. According to the definition of the interests of the shareholders, the literature review focused on the influencial of management equity incentives to shareholder returns and the influencial factors of managerial equity incentives. Through literature review, there is no explanation for the contradictory conclusion in overseas research and no direct draw experience from them because of the differences among the legal, economic development, the capital market and the culture in different countries. Then think about the present domestic studies. On the one hand, the conclusions are contradictory. Secondly, because of the different research stages applied, the equity incentives result in different incentive effects. Third, scholars basically make management shareholding as the replacement of the managerial equity incentives. So this paper can have its special significance which based on the implementation of the relevant laws and regulations in 2005. At the same time, the previous literatures studied the influencial of managerial equity incentives on the interests of the shareholders independently, but in fact, the structure of the board of directors, the ownership structure and controlling shareholder's properties can all influence the managerial equity incentive effects, which gathered together to study is another feature of this paper.
The third part is the theoretical foundation. This paper takes the principal-agent theory, property rights (Corporation Control) theory and adaptability incentive theory as the study foundation. The principal-agent theory is the fundamental cause of the managerial equity incentives, but also put forward the problem of management rent-seeking. Based on this, the paper analyzed the corporate control, especially the ownership of company's actual control which may affect the scientificity and fairness of the managerial equity incentives. Finally, the paper analyzed further adaptability incentive theory, namely the research of the managerial equity incentives should focus on its system, and the design of the system must consider the harmony with other relevant systems, including corporate governance, corporate financial performance, enterprise management features and other adaptability factors.
The fourth part is the selective preference research for managerial equity incentives of China's listed companies, of which mainly contents include the status of the managerial equity incentives, the characteristics of its plans and its selective preference. Through statistics and analysis on the specific characteristics of incentive plans, I found that vesting period (locking period) is too short, accounting indexes mainly are adopted as exercise (unlock) terms, the ratio meeting actual exercise terms is high and other problems. Through the selective preference research of the managerial equity incentives, I found that the listed companies carring on the managerial equity incentives have selective bias of the more conservative management in industry, better profitability, relatively more conservative financing activities which resulting in lower shareholder returns ability and lower stock price etc. Moreover, combining with the ratio meeting the actual exercise conditions, I can make the conclusion that it make for management instead of shareholders' right protection at the design plan stage.
The fifth part is a study of the market reaction of the managerial equity incentives of China's listed companies.In this part, I have event study with all companies, which announced independent equity incentive plans, state-owned holding companies and other companies, companies announced plans in different years as samples, then through the investors' response find investors' expect of the future earnings. The results are as follows. The listed company get a positive market response after having announced the stock ownership incentive, but the cumulative abnormal returns of state-owned enterprises are negative in the [0,30] period which proved investors doubt on state-owned enterprises implementing the managerial equity incentives. The market reactions of incentive announcement in the different years show that although there are some unfavorable conditions of the managerial equity incentives to shareholders in some companies, the enthusiasm of investors weren't affected by them, which means investors don't realize the impossible risks with incentives to a certain extent. At the same time, this part also analyzed if there are price suppress actions at the plans notice 1 day and 30 days ago, and the results show that there are no price suppress in the listed company announced plans, just the CAR of state-owned enterprises are much lower in these periods compared to other companies. In addition, there may be some information leakage from studying the short-term CAR before and after the announcement which prove that China's capital market remains to be improved.
The sixth part is the empirical study on the affecting of managerial equity incentives to company behavior. This part study the influence and driving factors of the investment behavior, financing behavior and income distribution behavior which impact on company performance the most and can be observed, then try to find some rules and expect whether shareholders' long-term interests realized. Through significant test on company behavior change before and after the implementation of equity incentive, I found that the dividend rate decreased significantly and the investment scale expanded significantly after the implementation of the managerial equity incentives. Then I further analyzed the driving factors and found that the relationship between the proportion of executive director and investment scale change is a negative correlation, namely when the seats of executive director in board increase, companies will reduce the excessive investment behavior effectively and further reduce agency cost.
The seventh part is the empirical test on the incentive affecting shareholders' earnings in implement period. This part includes the design of shareholder earnings index, incentive effect test excluding the impact of industry and earnings management, test on changes of the controlling shareholders infringed the interests of small shareholders after incentive implementation. Firstly, I choose three indexes alternative shareholder earnings from different angles: rate of asset returns, earnings per share and PB. Secondly, through comparing the shareholder earnings after adjusting of industry of samples before and after the managerial equity incentives, I found that earnings per share and PB improved significantly and so did rate of asset returns. Moreover, because the accounting index can be affected by earnings management, this paper further test on the shareholder earnings change after eliminating earnings management and found incentive effect is not obvious. And I further have driving factors test on the difference of incentive effect and found that company executive directors proportion affects it as a more significant positive role, which means executive director exerts a significant positive effect after being awarded the incentive and then agency cost is reduced with degree increase of executive efforts. Finally, the paper discussed the situation and driving factors of controlling shareholder infringing the interests of small shareholders after the incentive and found that on the whole this kind of infringement after incentive was reduced which was driven by the executive director proportion through analyzing the driving factors.
The eighth part is the conclusions and suggestions. According to the study result, this paper mainly gives three suggestions, the first is to give more guidance to the managerial equity incentives measures, the second is to reinforce mornitoring and management of information announcement and managerial equity incentives, and the third is to reinforce the research and establish of corporate governance machnism. The limitations is mainly at the short research period and fewer samples which affect the test of long-term incentive effect and driving factors, which may even affect the accuracy of the results which is also my further research task.
Altogether, the innovations of this paper are mainly in the following aspects.
(1) when study the interests of the shareholders, I study not only the shareholder's rights but also shareholder earnings by full process research defined from the different stages of incentive: in the incentive design phase I focused on shareholders' rights protection; in the process of implementing scheme I focused on the realization of shareholders' earnings which include the realizations of CAR represented shareholder short-term returns when plans announcement, medium-term returns after the implementation, and shareholders' long-term earning expectations after researching the company behavior change after the implementation.
(2) Because the measure indexes of the shareholder returns in previous studies were different, this paper measures shareholder returns with both market indexes and accounting indexes based on the characteristics of the new capital market in China, and selects rate of asset returns, earnings per share and PB as indexes from the different angle of the realization of shareholder returns.
(3) Through analyzing and comparing the characteristics of listed companies which have announced the managerial equity incentive plans, I studied the incentive selective preference of listed companies. The study concluded that companies had incentive with conservative management in industry, good profitability, but relatively conservative financing activities which resulting in the lower shareholder earnings ability, and I also found these companies have relatively lower stock price which benefit the management.
(4) There are fewer researches on effect of company behavior by the managerial equity incentives currently, and they are basically just in one aspect. This paper holds that company behavior is the fundamentality which decided the realization of shareholders long-term interests, and then selects corporate investment behavior, the financing behavior and income distribution behavior as the research object, then expects the long-term incentive effect by studying company behavior changes before and after the managerial equity incentives.
(5) During studying the changes of company behavior and shareholder return indexes before and after the managerial equity incentives, this paper further study driving factors of the changes on company level, and find that the relationships between executive directors proportion and investment scale change, the degree change of the controlling shareholder infringed small shareholders are negative correlation.
本文的研究将立足于公司股东的视角,研究管理层股权激励对股东利益的影响,即对股东权利和股东收益的影响。研究中分别采用已经先行公告管理层股权激励预案的上市公司和实际上已经实施(授予)的上市公司为样本,在股权激励方案设计阶段侧重于研究方案本身以及公司的选择性偏好是否有损于股东利益,在预案公告阶段通过市场反应和公告前的股价波动研究对股东短期利益的影响,在实施阶段通过对公司行为的变化预期对股东长期利益的影响,并且对实施前后真实的股东收益以及中小股东利益进行了实证检验。本文拟通过对其全方位、全过程的研究,发现在股权激励的不同环节可能存在的问题及其对股东利益的影响,从而在上市公司大规模地展开股权激励时规避风险,更好地发挥激励作用。从行文的逻辑主线来看,全文共分为八个部分:
第一部分,绪论,主要阐述论文的研究背景、研究意义、相关概念界定、研究思路与逻辑框架以及本研究的主要创新之处。重点是对本文研究范围的界定:一是整理了中国管理层股权激励的发展历程,根据其发展历程、股权来源、法律法规和资本市场特征等,将整个历程划分为4个阶段,并确定本文研究的是从2005年开始的第四阶段;二是根据前人的研究,确定本文所研究的股东利益概念,即包括两个层次四项内容:第一个层次是股东权利,研究内容是管理层股权激励方案设计阶段对股东权利的保障;第二个层次是股东收益,包括预案公告时股价波动产生的累积超常收益,股权激励方案实施后公司行为变化的考察,股权激励实施后股东收益变化的考察等,分别代表股东短期、长期和中期收益的情况。
第二部分,文献综述,按照对股东利益的界定,研究文献集中在管理层股权激励对股东收益的影响研究和管理层股权激励的影响因素研究两部分。通过文献综述,发现国外研究中相互矛盾的结论无从解释,而不同国家之间基于法律、经济发展、资本市场乃至文化的差异更使得无从直接从中吸取经验。再分析目前国内的相关研究,一方面得出了矛盾的结论;二来其对管理层股权激励的研究阶段也各不相同,而管理层股权激励的不同发展阶段的激励效果必然存在差异;三来学者们的研究基本上都是以管理层持股作为管理层股权激励的替代,以此确定了基于2005年相关法律、法规实施后的管理层股权激励研究独特的意义。同时,目前管理层股权激励对股东利益的研究基本上是独立进行的,而实际上董事会的结构、股权结构以及控股股权性质等也会对股权激励效果产生影响,因此,将管理层股权激励与公司的其它治理特征融合起来研究对股东利益的影响也将是本文的特色所在。
第三部分,理论基础,本文主要以委托代理理论、产权(企业控制权)理论和权变激励理论为研究的基础。委托代理理论是股权激励产生的根本原因,但也提出了可能存在管理层寻租的问题。基于此,本文进一步分析了公司控制权,尤其是公司实际控制权的归属,将可能影响到高管股权激励的科学性和公平性。最后,论文进一步分析了权变激励理论,即研究公司高管股权激励必须着眼于系统,高管股权激励系统的设计必须充分考虑与企业其他相关系统的协调一致,包括公司治理、公司财务业绩、企业经营特征等权变因素。
第四部分,中国上市公司管理层股权激励的选择性偏好研究,主要研究内容包括管理层股权激励的现状、股权激励方案的特征以及股权激励的选择性偏好。通过对激励方案具体特征的统计和分析,发现存在等待期(锁定期)过短、主要采用会计指标作为行权(解锁)条件、实际行权条件满足率高等问题。通过股权激励的选择性偏好研究,发现进行管理层股权激励的上市公司选择具有行业内经营较为保守、盈利能力较好、筹资活动相对保守导致股东收益能力相对较低、目前股价也相对较低等偏好,同时结合实施公司实际行权条件满足率的结果,可以得出方案设计阶段整体上有利于管理层,而不利于股东权利保护的结论。
第五部分,中国上市公司管理层股权激励的市场反应研究,本部分分别以独立公告股权激励预案的全部公司、国有控股公司和其它公司、不同年份公告的公司为样本进行事件研究,通过市场投资者的反应从侧面体现投资者对未来收益的预期。研究发现:上市公司在公告管理层股权激励后,得到了积极的市场反应,但国有企业在[0,30]的累积超常收益为负,证明投资者对国有企业实施管理层股权激励持怀疑态度。考察不同年份股权激励公告的市场反应显示,尽管少数公司发生了由于股权激励对股东不利的情况,但并没有影响投资者的热情,某种程度上可以认为投资者并没有因此认识到股权激励本身可能存在的风险。同时,本部分还对企业预案公告前1天和前30天是否存在打压股价的行为进行了分析,结果显示,公告的全部上市公司均不存在打压股价的行为,只是比较起其他企业,国有企业在该期间的CAR更低一些。另外,从管理层股权激励公告前后短期的CAR可以看出存在一定的信息泄露问题,我国的资本市场还有待进一步完善。
第六部分,管理层股权激励对公司行为影响的实证研究,本部分通过对管理层股权激励实施后,对公司业绩影响最大、且具有可观测性的投资行为、融资行为和收益分配行为的变化及其驱动因素的研究,尝试发现其中的规律,从而预期股东长期利益的实现。通过对实施股权激励前后公司行为变化的显著性检验发现,对管理层进行股权激励之后,公司的股利支付率显著下降,投资规模较为显著扩大,进一步分析其驱动因素,发现执行董事比例与投资规模变化之间呈负相关关系,即随着执行董事在董事会中所占席位的增加,将使企业减少过度投资行为,某种程度上可以降低代理成本。
第七部分,管理层股权激励对实施当期股东收益影响的实证检验,本部分的研究内容包括股东收益指标设计、剔除行业影响的管理层股权激励效果检验、剔除盈余管理影响的管理层股权激励效果检验和股权激励实施后控股股东对中小股东利益侵害程度变化检验。论文首先从不同角度较为科学地选取了三个指标替代股东收益:资产报酬率、每股收益和市净率;其次,比较样本公司管理层股权激励前后经当年行业均值调整后的股东收益,发现每股收益和市净率发生了非常显著的提升,资产报酬率也较为显著地提高;再次,由于会计指标容易受到盈余管理的影响,本文进一步对剔除盈余管理的股东收益指标变化进行检验,发现股权激励的激励效果并不明显,进一步对激励效果差异进行驱动因素检验,发现公司执行董事比例对其具有较为显著的正向作用,说明被授予股权激励后,执行董事发挥了较为显著的正向作用,代理成本较低,高管的努力程度增加;最后,本文针对管理层股权激励之后,控股股东对中小股东利益侵害的情况及其驱动因素进行了初步探讨,发现从整体上看,进行管理层股权激励之后,控股股东对中小股东的利益侵害减轻了,而通过驱动因素的分析,发现侵害减轻也是执行董事驱动下的结果。
第八部分,结论和建议。根据本文的研究结果,主要提出进一步对上市公司的管理层股权激励措施进行引导,进一步加强信息披露和管理层股权激励的监督和管理,以及进一步加强公司治理机制的研究和建设等政策建议。本文的研究局限性主要体现在由于时间短、样本少,影响了对长期激励效果和驱动因素的检验,并且可能影响研究结果的准确性,这也是后面的任务和方向。
综上,论文主要在以下方面具有一定的创新性:
(1)本文在研究管理层股权激励对我国股东利益的影响时,同时研究了股东的权利和股东的收益,采取了从股权激励的不同阶段来界定的全过程研究方法:在股权激励方案的设计阶段重点关注股东权利的保障;而在方案实施的过程中则转为关注股东收益的实现,其中,包括预案公告时CAR代表股东短期收益的实现、实施后中期收益的实现,以及通过实施后公司行为的研究预期股东长期收益的实现等。
(2)前人对股东收益的衡量采取的指标各不相同,本文立足于我国新兴资本市场的特点,提出综合采用市场指标和会计指标进行股东收益衡量的思路,并从股东收益实现的不同角度选取了资产报酬率、每股收益和市净率三个指标。
(3)本文通过对我国目前已经公告过进行管理层股权激励的上市公司的特征分析和比较,研究我国上市公司管理层股权激励的选择性偏好。经研究得出,目前进行管理层股权激励的属于行业内经营较为保守、盈利能力较好,但筹资活动相对保守,导致股东收益能力相对较低,而且目前股价相对较低,从而整体上较有利于管理者的结论。
(4)目前研究管理层股权激励对公司行为影响的较少,并且基本上仅研究某一个方面,本文提出公司行为是决定股东长期利益实现的根本,并据此选取公司投资行为、筹资行为、收益分配行为作为研究对象,通过研究管理层股权激励前后公司行为的变化预期长期激励效果。
(5)本文在对管理层股权激励前后公司行为和股东收益指标变化的研究过程中,进一步尝试着研究了驱动其变化的公司层面因素,并发现,执行董事比例与投资规模变化、控股股东侵害中小股东的程度变化呈负相关关系。
With China's reform of non-tradable shares of listed companies and the revision of Company Law of the People's Republic of China, Securities law of the People's Republic of China, other relevant laws and regulations and the maturity of the securities market environment, the managerial equity incentives by the listed company get really began and rapid development. From 2005 to the end of June 2008, in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, there are 109 companies have announced the managerial equity incentives plan and even a lot of companies are getting ready for it. Because the international academic research and practical field have not unanimous conclusion on the practice of the utility of the equity incentives, there is no direct guidance for our practice in China. In addition, there are great differences about the whole economic development and the efficiency of capital market and even enterprise culture etc between China's companies and foreign companies. Before the managerial equity incentives plans start in a large scale of our listed companies, fully and deeply research is necessary to know how China's listed companies design the managerial equity incentives scheme to protect the interests of the shareholders better and what investors' attitude is on the managerial equity incentives problems and what kind of companies suit for using the managerial equity incentive mode, etc. Based on this, this paper chooses the effect of the managerial equity incentives of listed companies in China on the interests of shareholders as its topic.
This research will be based upon the perspective of the shareholder and study the effect of the managerial equity incentives to the interests of shareholders, namely its influence on shareholders' rights and shareholder returns. I respectively adopt the listed companies which have announced the managerial equity incentive plans and those have actually implemented (awarded equity) plans as samples. In design stage of managerial equity incentive scheme I focus on researching plan itself and if the selectivity of the company is detrimental to the interests of shareholders. In plan announcement stage, I study the influence of events on the short-term earnings of shareholders through market reaction and the stock price fluctuation before announcement. In the implementation stage, I expect the effect of events to the long-term earnings of shareholders through observing the company's behavior change and make empirical test for the real shareholder interests and the interests of small shareholders before and after implementation. This paper try to find the possible problems of the managerial equity incentives in different stages and their influences on the interests of shareholders through comprehensive research in order to hedge risk and play a better incentive role when the listed companies launch a large-scale managerial equity incentives actions. With the logic chain, this paper was divided into eight parts:
The first part is the introduction with the research background, significance, the related concepts and ideas, logical framework of this research and innovation. The keystone is to define the scope of this research. Firstly, I sort out the development process of the managerial equity incentives in China. I divided the whole course into four stages according to its development history, the source of stock right, laws and regulations and the features of capital market, then I determined this paper to study the fourth stage which was from 2005. Secondly, I determined the concept of the interests of shareholders according to the previous studies. The concept includes two levels without involving the content of laws and regulations. The first level is the shareholder's rights, by rearching the investor protection at the design stage, I studied the guarantee of the interests of shareholders of the managerial equity incentive scheme. The second level is shareholder returns, which include cumulative abnormal returns from the stock price fluctuation when plans are announced, the observation of company behavior change after the implementation of the managerial equity incentiveson and shareholder returns at the implementation period change behalf of short-term, long-term and middle returns of shareholders.
The second part is the literature review. According to the definition of the interests of the shareholders, the literature review focused on the influencial of management equity incentives to shareholder returns and the influencial factors of managerial equity incentives. Through literature review, there is no explanation for the contradictory conclusion in overseas research and no direct draw experience from them because of the differences among the legal, economic development, the capital market and the culture in different countries. Then think about the present domestic studies. On the one hand, the conclusions are contradictory. Secondly, because of the different research stages applied, the equity incentives result in different incentive effects. Third, scholars basically make management shareholding as the replacement of the managerial equity incentives. So this paper can have its special significance which based on the implementation of the relevant laws and regulations in 2005. At the same time, the previous literatures studied the influencial of managerial equity incentives on the interests of the shareholders independently, but in fact, the structure of the board of directors, the ownership structure and controlling shareholder's properties can all influence the managerial equity incentive effects, which gathered together to study is another feature of this paper.
The third part is the theoretical foundation. This paper takes the principal-agent theory, property rights (Corporation Control) theory and adaptability incentive theory as the study foundation. The principal-agent theory is the fundamental cause of the managerial equity incentives, but also put forward the problem of management rent-seeking. Based on this, the paper analyzed the corporate control, especially the ownership of company's actual control which may affect the scientificity and fairness of the managerial equity incentives. Finally, the paper analyzed further adaptability incentive theory, namely the research of the managerial equity incentives should focus on its system, and the design of the system must consider the harmony with other relevant systems, including corporate governance, corporate financial performance, enterprise management features and other adaptability factors.
The fourth part is the selective preference research for managerial equity incentives of China's listed companies, of which mainly contents include the status of the managerial equity incentives, the characteristics of its plans and its selective preference. Through statistics and analysis on the specific characteristics of incentive plans, I found that vesting period (locking period) is too short, accounting indexes mainly are adopted as exercise (unlock) terms, the ratio meeting actual exercise terms is high and other problems. Through the selective preference research of the managerial equity incentives, I found that the listed companies carring on the managerial equity incentives have selective bias of the more conservative management in industry, better profitability, relatively more conservative financing activities which resulting in lower shareholder returns ability and lower stock price etc. Moreover, combining with the ratio meeting the actual exercise conditions, I can make the conclusion that it make for management instead of shareholders' right protection at the design plan stage.
The fifth part is a study of the market reaction of the managerial equity incentives of China's listed companies.In this part, I have event study with all companies, which announced independent equity incentive plans, state-owned holding companies and other companies, companies announced plans in different years as samples, then through the investors' response find investors' expect of the future earnings. The results are as follows. The listed company get a positive market response after having announced the stock ownership incentive, but the cumulative abnormal returns of state-owned enterprises are negative in the [0,30] period which proved investors doubt on state-owned enterprises implementing the managerial equity incentives. The market reactions of incentive announcement in the different years show that although there are some unfavorable conditions of the managerial equity incentives to shareholders in some companies, the enthusiasm of investors weren't affected by them, which means investors don't realize the impossible risks with incentives to a certain extent. At the same time, this part also analyzed if there are price suppress actions at the plans notice 1 day and 30 days ago, and the results show that there are no price suppress in the listed company announced plans, just the CAR of state-owned enterprises are much lower in these periods compared to other companies. In addition, there may be some information leakage from studying the short-term CAR before and after the announcement which prove that China's capital market remains to be improved.
The sixth part is the empirical study on the affecting of managerial equity incentives to company behavior. This part study the influence and driving factors of the investment behavior, financing behavior and income distribution behavior which impact on company performance the most and can be observed, then try to find some rules and expect whether shareholders' long-term interests realized. Through significant test on company behavior change before and after the implementation of equity incentive, I found that the dividend rate decreased significantly and the investment scale expanded significantly after the implementation of the managerial equity incentives. Then I further analyzed the driving factors and found that the relationship between the proportion of executive director and investment scale change is a negative correlation, namely when the seats of executive director in board increase, companies will reduce the excessive investment behavior effectively and further reduce agency cost.
The seventh part is the empirical test on the incentive affecting shareholders' earnings in implement period. This part includes the design of shareholder earnings index, incentive effect test excluding the impact of industry and earnings management, test on changes of the controlling shareholders infringed the interests of small shareholders after incentive implementation. Firstly, I choose three indexes alternative shareholder earnings from different angles: rate of asset returns, earnings per share and PB. Secondly, through comparing the shareholder earnings after adjusting of industry of samples before and after the managerial equity incentives, I found that earnings per share and PB improved significantly and so did rate of asset returns. Moreover, because the accounting index can be affected by earnings management, this paper further test on the shareholder earnings change after eliminating earnings management and found incentive effect is not obvious. And I further have driving factors test on the difference of incentive effect and found that company executive directors proportion affects it as a more significant positive role, which means executive director exerts a significant positive effect after being awarded the incentive and then agency cost is reduced with degree increase of executive efforts. Finally, the paper discussed the situation and driving factors of controlling shareholder infringing the interests of small shareholders after the incentive and found that on the whole this kind of infringement after incentive was reduced which was driven by the executive director proportion through analyzing the driving factors.
The eighth part is the conclusions and suggestions. According to the study result, this paper mainly gives three suggestions, the first is to give more guidance to the managerial equity incentives measures, the second is to reinforce mornitoring and management of information announcement and managerial equity incentives, and the third is to reinforce the research and establish of corporate governance machnism. The limitations is mainly at the short research period and fewer samples which affect the test of long-term incentive effect and driving factors, which may even affect the accuracy of the results which is also my further research task.
Altogether, the innovations of this paper are mainly in the following aspects.
(1) when study the interests of the shareholders, I study not only the shareholder's rights but also shareholder earnings by full process research defined from the different stages of incentive: in the incentive design phase I focused on shareholders' rights protection; in the process of implementing scheme I focused on the realization of shareholders' earnings which include the realizations of CAR represented shareholder short-term returns when plans announcement, medium-term returns after the implementation, and shareholders' long-term earning expectations after researching the company behavior change after the implementation.
(2) Because the measure indexes of the shareholder returns in previous studies were different, this paper measures shareholder returns with both market indexes and accounting indexes based on the characteristics of the new capital market in China, and selects rate of asset returns, earnings per share and PB as indexes from the different angle of the realization of shareholder returns.
(3) Through analyzing and comparing the characteristics of listed companies which have announced the managerial equity incentive plans, I studied the incentive selective preference of listed companies. The study concluded that companies had incentive with conservative management in industry, good profitability, but relatively conservative financing activities which resulting in the lower shareholder earnings ability, and I also found these companies have relatively lower stock price which benefit the management.
(4) There are fewer researches on effect of company behavior by the managerial equity incentives currently, and they are basically just in one aspect. This paper holds that company behavior is the fundamentality which decided the realization of shareholders long-term interests, and then selects corporate investment behavior, the financing behavior and income distribution behavior as the research object, then expects the long-term incentive effect by studying company behavior changes before and after the managerial equity incentives.
(5) During studying the changes of company behavior and shareholder return indexes before and after the managerial equity incentives, this paper further study driving factors of the changes on company level, and find that the relationships between executive directors proportion and investment scale change, the degree change of the controlling shareholder infringed small shareholders are negative correlation.
引文
[1] Alfred Haid and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation in Germany, Working paper by ssrn.com, 2006.
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