禀赋差异、配置效应与机制创新
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摘要
农户禀赋不足、农业高风险低收益以及农村分散居住的特点,决定了农村金融市场存在信贷约束与金融缺口。按照“禀赋差异-配置效应-机制激励”这一线索,借助于空间计量、MNL、OLM等计量模型,利用中国人民银行全国调查数据、中国银行业监督管理委员会统计数据以及有关统计年鉴的数据,本文对供需双重约束、农村金融绩效、农村金融缺口以及缓解市场失灵的机制激励问题进行了认真分析与实证研究。研究内容和分析结论如下：
在导论、理论回顾和文献综述两章之后,具体分析的行文安排如下：第3章主要利用多项Logit选择模型,对农户禀赋、金融认知等相关因素对农户融资意愿的影响进行实证分析；第4章通过空间计量模型分析农村金融网点省域分布差异的影响因素；第5章在对供给型信贷约束、需求型信贷约束理论分析基础上,利用有序多分类Logit选择模型(OLM)、Logit模型分别对供给型信贷约束、需求型信贷约束的影响因素进行实证分析；第6章估算农村金融市场低水平均衡下1985-2012年间农村金融供需缺口；第7章利用Heckman模型、内生转换模型分别对信贷约束下的农户获贷效应、农户福利效应进行回归分析；第8章利用统计数据,运用VAR模型分析农民增收与农村金融变量的关系,运用DEA-Tobit模型分析农村金融的配置效率及其影响因素；第9章利用激励模型对扶持机制的重要性进行理论探讨,并对我国财政金融政策扶持措施与存在问题进行分析；第10章利用信号模型与博弈模型论证征信机制的重要性,并对对我国农村信用体系建设与存在问题进行分析；第11章先通过Heckprob模型计量分析非正规借款对缓解农户信贷约束的作用,然后论证金融联结的重要性。
基于上述分析,本文得到如下七点主要结论：
第一,农户禀赋与金融认知对融资意愿有重要影响。农户家庭储蓄水平有助于增强从国有商业银行与邮政储蓄银行、从信用社以及从资金互助社、村镇银行、贷款公司等借款的意愿；提高金融认知有助于农户从正规金融获贷。
第二,我国省域农村金融网点分布具有明显的空间集聚现象。省域创新水平、金融市场化水平、农村人力资本水平和农村技术水平对农村金融机构网点分布具有明显的正向作用。
第三,农户融资受到供给型信贷约束与需求型信贷约束。家庭规模、年龄、教育、对获贷因素的认识、存在正规金融网点、进行信用评级以及存在民间借贷等因素有助于减少供给型信贷约束；外出劳动时间、对获贷因素的认识、存在正规金融网点等因素有助于减少需求型信贷约束；相比于西部地区,中部地区明显受到供给型信贷约束；东部、中部地区明显受到需求型信贷约束。
第四,农村金融市场处于低位均衡状态,存在较大的金融缺口。2003年农信社改革试点全面启动以来,金融支持“三农”发展的力度不断加大,但是农村金融市场尚处于有效供需不足、贷款利率水平偏高的低水平均衡状态。1985-2012年间农村金融供需缺口仍在快速扩大,金融缺口率平均为34.2%。金融缺口的存在说明农村金融市场存在局部失灵。
第五,农户的财产水平与认知水平对申贷农户贷款可得性有重要影响,增加借贷金额可以显著地增加受信贷约束农户的收入。家庭规模、受教育程度、对微型金融的认知以及对获贷因素的认知等因素对农户发生贷款申请有正向影响,稳定收入来源、家庭金融资产、受教育程度等因素对农户贷款金额有正向影响。对于申贷农户样本中的受信贷约束农户,增加一单位借贷金额可以显著地增加其收入。
第六,农村资金外流现象与农村贷款“非农化”现象,配置效率存在地区差异。1978-2010年间农村贷存比、农民受教育程度等能促进农民增收,但不能缩小城乡收入差距；农村贷款率、财政支农水平对农民增收作用有待提高。从配置效率看,2006-201O年间东部地区农村金融的技术效率明显高于全国水平,西部地区农村金融的技术效率一直在全国平均值以下；金融规模、金融效率、受教育水平与农村金融配置效率明显负相关。
第七,政策扶持机制、征信机制以及金融联结机制可以缓解农村金融市场局部失灵与信贷约束。我国出台了一系列财政金融政策扶持措施,提高了涉农金融机构支农的内生动力；我国初步形成了鼓励守信、惩戒失信双向激励的农村征信机制,有助于提高农户贷款的可得性；金融联结能增加农贷信贷量,提高农村金融的普惠程度。
在上述研究结论基础上,本文得出五点政策建议,以期为缓解农村金融市场局部失灵与信贷约束、提高农村金融普惠程度提供参考。
Market failure of rural finance is found because of the deficiency of farmers endowment and high risk of agriculture. In this paper, performance and gap of rural financial in China are studied systematically, adopting survey data and statistical data, creating and applying some econometric models, according to the research route of endowment difference,financial performance, mechanism incentive.
The dissertation goes as follows:following two chapters in introduction to the research, literature review on its theoretical bases, respectively, the third paper examines the relationships of household endowments、financial knowledge and financing will by MNL model.The reasons for difference of rural financial resource distribution are focused on in the fourth chapter,by applying spatial econometric model. In the fifth chapter, the paper discusses dual credit constraints which are due to credit supply rationing and demand depression. In the sixth chapter, the gap between supply and demand of rural financial is discussed. In the sevevnth chapter, the paper discusses how the factors affect loan for farmer by Heckman model;and the household welfare in the case of dual credit constraints is evaluated by ERSM model. In the eighth chapter, the main variables which lead to enhance the farmers' income are discussed, the regional difference of the efficiency of rural finance is evaluated as well. The theoretical research on incentive model、signal model and the financial linkage is carried out, respectively, in the ninth、tenth and eleventh chapter.
In the twelfth chapter, the dissertation offers several policy recommendations based on the above research,which would contribute to alleviate the market failure and promote inclusion of rural financial in China.
在导论、理论回顾和文献综述两章之后,具体分析的行文安排如下：第3章主要利用多项Logit选择模型,对农户禀赋、金融认知等相关因素对农户融资意愿的影响进行实证分析；第4章通过空间计量模型分析农村金融网点省域分布差异的影响因素；第5章在对供给型信贷约束、需求型信贷约束理论分析基础上,利用有序多分类Logit选择模型(OLM)、Logit模型分别对供给型信贷约束、需求型信贷约束的影响因素进行实证分析；第6章估算农村金融市场低水平均衡下1985-2012年间农村金融供需缺口；第7章利用Heckman模型、内生转换模型分别对信贷约束下的农户获贷效应、农户福利效应进行回归分析；第8章利用统计数据,运用VAR模型分析农民增收与农村金融变量的关系,运用DEA-Tobit模型分析农村金融的配置效率及其影响因素；第9章利用激励模型对扶持机制的重要性进行理论探讨,并对我国财政金融政策扶持措施与存在问题进行分析；第10章利用信号模型与博弈模型论证征信机制的重要性,并对对我国农村信用体系建设与存在问题进行分析；第11章先通过Heckprob模型计量分析非正规借款对缓解农户信贷约束的作用,然后论证金融联结的重要性。
基于上述分析,本文得到如下七点主要结论：
第一,农户禀赋与金融认知对融资意愿有重要影响。农户家庭储蓄水平有助于增强从国有商业银行与邮政储蓄银行、从信用社以及从资金互助社、村镇银行、贷款公司等借款的意愿；提高金融认知有助于农户从正规金融获贷。
第二,我国省域农村金融网点分布具有明显的空间集聚现象。省域创新水平、金融市场化水平、农村人力资本水平和农村技术水平对农村金融机构网点分布具有明显的正向作用。
第三,农户融资受到供给型信贷约束与需求型信贷约束。家庭规模、年龄、教育、对获贷因素的认识、存在正规金融网点、进行信用评级以及存在民间借贷等因素有助于减少供给型信贷约束；外出劳动时间、对获贷因素的认识、存在正规金融网点等因素有助于减少需求型信贷约束；相比于西部地区,中部地区明显受到供给型信贷约束；东部、中部地区明显受到需求型信贷约束。
第四,农村金融市场处于低位均衡状态,存在较大的金融缺口。2003年农信社改革试点全面启动以来,金融支持“三农”发展的力度不断加大,但是农村金融市场尚处于有效供需不足、贷款利率水平偏高的低水平均衡状态。1985-2012年间农村金融供需缺口仍在快速扩大,金融缺口率平均为34.2%。金融缺口的存在说明农村金融市场存在局部失灵。
第五,农户的财产水平与认知水平对申贷农户贷款可得性有重要影响,增加借贷金额可以显著地增加受信贷约束农户的收入。家庭规模、受教育程度、对微型金融的认知以及对获贷因素的认知等因素对农户发生贷款申请有正向影响,稳定收入来源、家庭金融资产、受教育程度等因素对农户贷款金额有正向影响。对于申贷农户样本中的受信贷约束农户,增加一单位借贷金额可以显著地增加其收入。
第六,农村资金外流现象与农村贷款“非农化”现象,配置效率存在地区差异。1978-2010年间农村贷存比、农民受教育程度等能促进农民增收,但不能缩小城乡收入差距；农村贷款率、财政支农水平对农民增收作用有待提高。从配置效率看,2006-201O年间东部地区农村金融的技术效率明显高于全国水平,西部地区农村金融的技术效率一直在全国平均值以下；金融规模、金融效率、受教育水平与农村金融配置效率明显负相关。
第七,政策扶持机制、征信机制以及金融联结机制可以缓解农村金融市场局部失灵与信贷约束。我国出台了一系列财政金融政策扶持措施,提高了涉农金融机构支农的内生动力；我国初步形成了鼓励守信、惩戒失信双向激励的农村征信机制,有助于提高农户贷款的可得性；金融联结能增加农贷信贷量,提高农村金融的普惠程度。
在上述研究结论基础上,本文得出五点政策建议,以期为缓解农村金融市场局部失灵与信贷约束、提高农村金融普惠程度提供参考。
Market failure of rural finance is found because of the deficiency of farmers endowment and high risk of agriculture. In this paper, performance and gap of rural financial in China are studied systematically, adopting survey data and statistical data, creating and applying some econometric models, according to the research route of endowment difference,financial performance, mechanism incentive.
The dissertation goes as follows:following two chapters in introduction to the research, literature review on its theoretical bases, respectively, the third paper examines the relationships of household endowments、financial knowledge and financing will by MNL model.The reasons for difference of rural financial resource distribution are focused on in the fourth chapter,by applying spatial econometric model. In the fifth chapter, the paper discusses dual credit constraints which are due to credit supply rationing and demand depression. In the sixth chapter, the gap between supply and demand of rural financial is discussed. In the sevevnth chapter, the paper discusses how the factors affect loan for farmer by Heckman model;and the household welfare in the case of dual credit constraints is evaluated by ERSM model. In the eighth chapter, the main variables which lead to enhance the farmers' income are discussed, the regional difference of the efficiency of rural finance is evaluated as well. The theoretical research on incentive model、signal model and the financial linkage is carried out, respectively, in the ninth、tenth and eleventh chapter.
In the twelfth chapter, the dissertation offers several policy recommendations based on the above research,which would contribute to alleviate the market failure and promote inclusion of rural financial in China.
引文
① 拉丰、马赫蒂摩：《激励理论(第一卷)：委托代理模型》导言pⅢ(中国人民大学出版社,2002年)
① 本节部分内容以《信誉机制、信号显示与集群信用增级》发表于《征信》,2011年第4期。
① 中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组.中国农村金融服务报告(2010),P32-22.北京：中国金融出版社,2011.
① 本节部分内容以《金融多样化、民间融资生态位与发展规管》,发表于《浙江金融》,2011年第12期。
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① 本节部分内容以《信誉机制、信号显示与集群信用增级》发表于《征信》,2011年第4期。
① 中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组.中国农村金融服务报告(2010),P32-22.北京：中国金融出版社,2011.
① 本节部分内容以《金融多样化、民间融资生态位与发展规管》,发表于《浙江金融》,2011年第12期。
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