产品市场竞争与企业资本结构选择的互动关系研究
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摘要
自Modigliani和Miller(1958,1963)开创现代资本结构问题研究的先河开始，财务学界就围绕“资本结构与企业价值是否相关”这一关键问题展开了深入的研究，但多数研究都没有将资本结构决策问题与产品市场竞争情况联系起来。20世纪80年代中期，以Brander and Lewis、Maksimovic等为代表的一部分财务学者开始注意到这一问题，并对此展开研究，由此产品市场竞争与资本结构互动关系的研究发展起来，使得资本结构研究逐渐超出单一企业的框架，极大地拓展了资本结构理论的研究视野。
与最近几年国外该领域热烈的讨论相比，我国目前在该领域的研究几乎还是空白。因此，有必要结合我国转型经济体制的背景，探讨产品市场竞争与资本结构的互动关系。本文在借鉴和吸收国外相关研究成果的基础上，结合我国转型时期产品市场竞争和资本结构的特点，对产品市场竞争行为与资本结构决策之间的互动关系作出了较为深入的研究。作者希望通过本文的研究，能够取得部分成果，为我国企业优化资本结构、适应日益激烈的市场竞争环境提供一些参考。
本文的研究工作从层次上分为六个部分，相应的研究内容和结论如下：
本文第一部分对现代资本结构理论最新发展作出较全面的综述。资本结构理论的近期研究主要是从公司治理结构和产业组织两个方向展开。根据本文的研究主题，本文对基于产业组织的资本结构文献作出非常翔实的综述，在形成本文研究文献基础的同时，也为国内其他研究学者提供该领域研究的详细进展。
本文第二部分对企业目标、融资制度与融资行为作出了分析。该部分运用不完全契约理论，从控制权角度将企业目标明确为股东权益最大化，从而为企业的产品市场竞争与资本结构决策行为明确了决策目标。然后，建立理论模型在单一企业框架中分析国家融资制度下的我国企业融资行为，对转型时期企业软预算约束导致贷款扩张冲动的原因给出清晰的解释。研究表明：政府的干预使得银行违背自身效用最大化的决策原则为企业提供更多数量的贷款，最后形成银行的巨额不良债权。这种情况在产业竞争的框架下，是否会得出同样的研究结论呢？本文第三、四、五部分的研究工作则回答了这一问题。
本文第三部分对转型时期我国产品市场竞争与资本结构的特征进行描述。转型时期，多数产品市场的竞争行为表现出一定程度的无序和混乱，一部分产业内还存在恶性竞争情况。而我国企业资本结构最主要的特征是高负债率、内源融资小。在此基础上，本文针对内部人控制和产品市场竞争压力下产生的非理性投资行为进行了分析，探讨非理性投资行为对企业资本结构的影响。第四、五部分将结合转型时期产品市场竞争与资本结构的特征对两者的互动关系进行研究。
本文第四部分主要分析资本结构决策对产品市场竞争行为的影响。由于不同债务契约下进行的债务融资对产品市场竞争行为具有不同的影响，因此，本文首先在标准债务契约下，通过对经典理论模型的介绍来阐述债务融资对产量竞争、价格竞争以及竞争中合谋行为的影响。继而，本文设计了一个包含债务重组和转型时期软预算约束特征的最优债务融资契约，并分析了使用这种债务契约进行融资对产品市场竞争行为的影响。该部分研究表明：①在现代公司有限责任制度下，标准债务契约融资在企业产品市场竞争中可以发挥特定的承诺作用，可以使企业竞争策略对竞争对手产生攻击性，也可能招致竞争对手的掠夺性竞争行为。并且，不同融资工具的采用，会影响企业竞争中的合谋行为。②在本文设计的非标准债务融资契约中，企业对债权人的支付为企业实现利润与债务数量的最小值，债务重整失败的概率与企业债务数量、债务重整产生的支付义务正相关，与企业持续经营价值、政府预算补贴负相关。③企业的预算约束越硬，竞争达到均衡时的产量越高，并且均高于无负债时的产量。④当竞争对手的融资受到约束时，企业的产量竞争策略取决于特定的信息结构。如果企业知道竞争对手融资约束和生产成本的充分信息，企业可能会采取掠夺性的竞争策略，并且，竞争对手的预算约束越软化，企业掠夺性竞争行为成功的可能性越小。
本文第五部分则分析了产品市场竞争程度对企业资本结构决策行为的影响。由于产品市场竞争程度相当复杂，难以建立理论模型加以讨论，故本文采用实证分析方法，以我国上市公司为研究对象，根据行业进入是否存在特定行政许可为标志，将样本企业划分为完全竞争和垄断竞争两组，通过两种竞争形态下企业资本结构选择过程的对比分析，揭示产品市场竞争行为对资本结构选择的不同影响。实证结果表明：①处于垄断竞争行业的公司资本结构决策表现出不大顾及自身盈利能力的倾向；与此相反，完全竞争行业的公司由于面临强大的竞争压力，比较注重自身的盈利能力，量力举债。②我国上市公司在融资方式的选择过程之中也体现出与竞争形态相适应的特点，企业资本结构的选择过程首先是建立在调整历史年度累积的杠杆差异（负债不足或负债过度）基础上，再满足公司总资产规模变动引致的融资需求。③公司最终采用何种增资方式，不同竞争形态下的企业表现出不同的特点，垄断竞争行业内的企业，是在综合累积杠杆差异、总资产规模变动
After Modigliani and Miller (1958,1963) blazed the trail in the study of modern capital structure theory, scholars in financial circles had been carrying out further studies on whether the capital structure is relevant to the value of the firm. However, most of the studies didn't relate the capital structure decision to the product-market competition. In the middle of 1980s,some financial economists, such as Brander and Lewis, Maksimovic, identified this problem, and pushed forward the study of the interactive effects between product-market competition and capital structure. Till now, the study of capital structure has been greatly expanded instead of only confining to one single firm.
Compared to the more and more studies in western countries, the study in this field in China is few. Therefore, it's quite necessary to explore the interactive effects between product-competition and capital structure, based on the relevant achievements abroad and combined with the special background in China. This dissertation studies deeply the interactive effects between the product-market competition and capital structure. Hopefully, this dissertation aims to gain some achievements and put forward some valuable suggestions so that the firms in China can optimize their capital structure to meet the more and more competitive market.
Altogether, there are six parts in this dissertation.
The first part gives an overall review of the latest researches on capital structure theory, which focuses on corporate governance and industrial organization. Since the interactive effects is the major topic, this dissertation also gives a very detailed review on the capital structure literature, which is based on industrial organization theory, to form the foundation of this research, and meanwhile, provide the detailed progresses in this field for other researchers.
The second part analyzes the aims of the firms, financial system and financial behaviors. With the application of incomplete contract theory, this dissertation clarifies the aim of maximizing shareholder's value from the perspective of firm's control right. Then, considering our country's financial system, theoretical study is employed to analyze the financial behavior within one single firm. Finally, the causes that lead to bank's loan expansion are stated clearly. The analysis shows that the intervening of government makes the bank violate the principle of maximizing its own utility and provides more credit loan. As a result, a large amount of low quality credit assets come into being. So can we get the same conclusion under the framework of industrial competition? The following three parts
give the answer to this question.
The third part gives a description of product-market competition and the characteristics of capital structure. In transitional economy system, the competition in most product-market are out of order, some over-competition even exists in some industries. The main characteristics of capital structure in China are high debt-equity ratio and small proportion of internal financing. Furthermore, this dissertation discus the effects of irrational investment on capital structure due to the insider control and product-market competition.
The fourth part of this dissertation focuses on the influence of capital structure decisions on the product-market competition behavior. Because different debt covenant has different influence on the product-market competition, this dissertation illustrates how the debt financing influences the competitor in product, price competition and the behavior of collusion by introducing the classical theoretical models. Then, this dissertation designs a non-standard debt contract, which includes the soft budget constraint and the possibility of debt renegotiations, and analyze the influence of debt financing on the product-market competition under this debt contract. The study of this part illustrates: firstly, due to the limited liability, the standard debt contract plays an important role of strategy commitment in the produ
与最近几年国外该领域热烈的讨论相比，我国目前在该领域的研究几乎还是空白。因此，有必要结合我国转型经济体制的背景，探讨产品市场竞争与资本结构的互动关系。本文在借鉴和吸收国外相关研究成果的基础上，结合我国转型时期产品市场竞争和资本结构的特点，对产品市场竞争行为与资本结构决策之间的互动关系作出了较为深入的研究。作者希望通过本文的研究，能够取得部分成果，为我国企业优化资本结构、适应日益激烈的市场竞争环境提供一些参考。
本文的研究工作从层次上分为六个部分，相应的研究内容和结论如下：
本文第一部分对现代资本结构理论最新发展作出较全面的综述。资本结构理论的近期研究主要是从公司治理结构和产业组织两个方向展开。根据本文的研究主题，本文对基于产业组织的资本结构文献作出非常翔实的综述，在形成本文研究文献基础的同时，也为国内其他研究学者提供该领域研究的详细进展。
本文第二部分对企业目标、融资制度与融资行为作出了分析。该部分运用不完全契约理论，从控制权角度将企业目标明确为股东权益最大化，从而为企业的产品市场竞争与资本结构决策行为明确了决策目标。然后，建立理论模型在单一企业框架中分析国家融资制度下的我国企业融资行为，对转型时期企业软预算约束导致贷款扩张冲动的原因给出清晰的解释。研究表明：政府的干预使得银行违背自身效用最大化的决策原则为企业提供更多数量的贷款，最后形成银行的巨额不良债权。这种情况在产业竞争的框架下，是否会得出同样的研究结论呢？本文第三、四、五部分的研究工作则回答了这一问题。
本文第三部分对转型时期我国产品市场竞争与资本结构的特征进行描述。转型时期，多数产品市场的竞争行为表现出一定程度的无序和混乱，一部分产业内还存在恶性竞争情况。而我国企业资本结构最主要的特征是高负债率、内源融资小。在此基础上，本文针对内部人控制和产品市场竞争压力下产生的非理性投资行为进行了分析，探讨非理性投资行为对企业资本结构的影响。第四、五部分将结合转型时期产品市场竞争与资本结构的特征对两者的互动关系进行研究。
本文第四部分主要分析资本结构决策对产品市场竞争行为的影响。由于不同债务契约下进行的债务融资对产品市场竞争行为具有不同的影响，因此，本文首先在标准债务契约下，通过对经典理论模型的介绍来阐述债务融资对产量竞争、价格竞争以及竞争中合谋行为的影响。继而，本文设计了一个包含债务重组和转型时期软预算约束特征的最优债务融资契约，并分析了使用这种债务契约进行融资对产品市场竞争行为的影响。该部分研究表明：①在现代公司有限责任制度下，标准债务契约融资在企业产品市场竞争中可以发挥特定的承诺作用，可以使企业竞争策略对竞争对手产生攻击性，也可能招致竞争对手的掠夺性竞争行为。并且，不同融资工具的采用，会影响企业竞争中的合谋行为。②在本文设计的非标准债务融资契约中，企业对债权人的支付为企业实现利润与债务数量的最小值，债务重整失败的概率与企业债务数量、债务重整产生的支付义务正相关，与企业持续经营价值、政府预算补贴负相关。③企业的预算约束越硬，竞争达到均衡时的产量越高，并且均高于无负债时的产量。④当竞争对手的融资受到约束时，企业的产量竞争策略取决于特定的信息结构。如果企业知道竞争对手融资约束和生产成本的充分信息，企业可能会采取掠夺性的竞争策略，并且，竞争对手的预算约束越软化，企业掠夺性竞争行为成功的可能性越小。
本文第五部分则分析了产品市场竞争程度对企业资本结构决策行为的影响。由于产品市场竞争程度相当复杂，难以建立理论模型加以讨论，故本文采用实证分析方法，以我国上市公司为研究对象，根据行业进入是否存在特定行政许可为标志，将样本企业划分为完全竞争和垄断竞争两组，通过两种竞争形态下企业资本结构选择过程的对比分析，揭示产品市场竞争行为对资本结构选择的不同影响。实证结果表明：①处于垄断竞争行业的公司资本结构决策表现出不大顾及自身盈利能力的倾向；与此相反，完全竞争行业的公司由于面临强大的竞争压力，比较注重自身的盈利能力，量力举债。②我国上市公司在融资方式的选择过程之中也体现出与竞争形态相适应的特点，企业资本结构的选择过程首先是建立在调整历史年度累积的杠杆差异（负债不足或负债过度）基础上，再满足公司总资产规模变动引致的融资需求。③公司最终采用何种增资方式，不同竞争形态下的企业表现出不同的特点，垄断竞争行业内的企业，是在综合累积杠杆差异、总资产规模变动
After Modigliani and Miller (1958,1963) blazed the trail in the study of modern capital structure theory, scholars in financial circles had been carrying out further studies on whether the capital structure is relevant to the value of the firm. However, most of the studies didn't relate the capital structure decision to the product-market competition. In the middle of 1980s,some financial economists, such as Brander and Lewis, Maksimovic, identified this problem, and pushed forward the study of the interactive effects between product-market competition and capital structure. Till now, the study of capital structure has been greatly expanded instead of only confining to one single firm.
Compared to the more and more studies in western countries, the study in this field in China is few. Therefore, it's quite necessary to explore the interactive effects between product-competition and capital structure, based on the relevant achievements abroad and combined with the special background in China. This dissertation studies deeply the interactive effects between the product-market competition and capital structure. Hopefully, this dissertation aims to gain some achievements and put forward some valuable suggestions so that the firms in China can optimize their capital structure to meet the more and more competitive market.
Altogether, there are six parts in this dissertation.
The first part gives an overall review of the latest researches on capital structure theory, which focuses on corporate governance and industrial organization. Since the interactive effects is the major topic, this dissertation also gives a very detailed review on the capital structure literature, which is based on industrial organization theory, to form the foundation of this research, and meanwhile, provide the detailed progresses in this field for other researchers.
The second part analyzes the aims of the firms, financial system and financial behaviors. With the application of incomplete contract theory, this dissertation clarifies the aim of maximizing shareholder's value from the perspective of firm's control right. Then, considering our country's financial system, theoretical study is employed to analyze the financial behavior within one single firm. Finally, the causes that lead to bank's loan expansion are stated clearly. The analysis shows that the intervening of government makes the bank violate the principle of maximizing its own utility and provides more credit loan. As a result, a large amount of low quality credit assets come into being. So can we get the same conclusion under the framework of industrial competition? The following three parts
give the answer to this question.
The third part gives a description of product-market competition and the characteristics of capital structure. In transitional economy system, the competition in most product-market are out of order, some over-competition even exists in some industries. The main characteristics of capital structure in China are high debt-equity ratio and small proportion of internal financing. Furthermore, this dissertation discus the effects of irrational investment on capital structure due to the insider control and product-market competition.
The fourth part of this dissertation focuses on the influence of capital structure decisions on the product-market competition behavior. Because different debt covenant has different influence on the product-market competition, this dissertation illustrates how the debt financing influences the competitor in product, price competition and the behavior of collusion by introducing the classical theoretical models. Then, this dissertation designs a non-standard debt contract, which includes the soft budget constraint and the possibility of debt renegotiations, and analyze the influence of debt financing on the product-market competition under this debt contract. The study of this part illustrates: firstly, due to the limited liability, the standard debt contract plays an important role of strategy commitment in the produ
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