基于专业化的企业理论研究
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摘要
过去20多年中,企业组织已发生了巨大变化。其中,人力资本相对于非人力资本的重要性上升尤为显著。虽然人力资本是否适用新古典的规模与范围经济概念尚不清楚,但是这种资源似乎更直接地受制于基于新兴古典的专业化与分工经济的法则。因此,作为技术与组织经济的一个综合,专业化与分工经济应该正是理解这些变化更为恰当的视角。本文从Holmstrom-Kaplan(HK)问题(即为什么新经济企业选择独立公司形式的问题)开始,尝试在现有的专业化理论基础上发展一种企业的自生成理论。
首先必须面对的重要问题是在有专业化递增报酬情况下,是否存在竞争性均衡。通过构造一个m人专业化分工对称超模博弈,运用代数格论和Tarski不动点定理,本文对专业化分工均衡的存在性提供了一个示例性证明,并在给定专业化经济不变条件下用基于产品交易效率参量( 的乘数效应重新诠释了分工演进内在的效率含义。然后,本文转入正式的企业分析。
企业组织内在的基本关系是发生于雇主与雇员之间的雇佣关系。尽管也有经济学家更愿意将之看作资本与劳动之间的契约关系,但是,无论如何,它实际上是一种人与人之间的相互关系。常可看到,一个曾经效力于某家公司的雇员后来离开这家公司,创建了自己的企业,其中的关键变化是他或者她从雇员变成了雇主。这触及到一个主流经济学少有涉足的领域,此即雇主与雇员之间的专业化分工问题。新兴古典经济学的Yang-Ng企业模型是在这方面的第一个数理模型,它的优点是内生专业化和一般均衡性,缺点是其中的企业完全失去了自我发展的能力。本文的动态企业模型弥补了这一不足,证明雇员的企业专用性人力资本投资在雇主受到专业化限制的那些部门对企业增长至关重要。正是由于专业化对雇主投资存在限制,故而雇员投资才变得重要起来。随雇员投资增加,雇员生产的专业化经济本身将会上升,而随专业化经济上升,雇员人力资本的企业专用性程度则会下降。后一变化减小了雇员离职或者他的人力资本转移的机会成本。当需要雇员作出更大的投资时,企业改变控制配置或者雇员新建企业就难以避免。雇主与雇员之间的分工产生了他们彼此缔结合作契约的必要,而分工契约的不完全性则又促使他们合作破裂或者新建企业出现。企业在获得发展的同时往往也衍生了自己的竞争对手,这被称作企业的自生成过程。对不相关多元化企业而言,由于这类企业无法在自己的每个分部都作出这样的控制调整,故而至少在要求多种重大的企业专用性人力资本投资的时候,它们是毁灭价值的。延伸的讨论显示,成功的企业战略将受制于企业核心要素的专用性类型。
另外,本文也证明了,专业化经济的增长对企业资本结构具有限制作用,它意味着权益替代债务现象的发生。这预言增长型企业具有较低的负债水平,且与Holmstrom与Kaplan(2001)的观察一致。
专业化与分工经济的发展与相关合作契约的不完全性正是企业组织发生演进的一个重要原因。本文在此结论基础上,进一步考察了过去20多年中公司治理的变迁和中国国有企业改革。人力资本相对于非人力资本的重要性上升已经导致对经典的Berle-Means治理范式的超越,现在的公司治理要求股东赋予企业权利以便能为重要的人力资本投资提供足够的激励。而国有体制本身则类似于一个庞大的不相关多元化企业,无法作出能够激励重大专用性人力资本投资的制度安排。中国国有企业改革当前面临的急迫问题应是合理化国有产权的进入分布,而不应是推行所谓的现代企业制度。
Business organizations have changed substantially in the past more than 20 years. The altered nature of the firm makes it turn out to be necessary reconsidering much of what a majority of economists take for granted in the theory of the firm. Perhaps the most important difference is the increased importance of human capital relative to inanimate assets. Human capital seems to be more directly enslaved to new classical principles on the basis of economies of specialization and division of labor although it still is not bright whether the resource is suited to neoclassical economies of scale and scope, a sort of conceptions of purely technological economies. As a synthesis of economies of technology and organization, economies of specialization and division of labor are therefore a more appropriately visual angle of comprehending these changes. This paper begins from the Holmstrom-Kaplan (HK) problem (that is why new economy enterprises choose an independently administrative form), and attempts to develop a self-generation theory of the firm.
First question that must be faced is if there is a competitive equilibrium when increasing returns to specialization exist. This paper has provided an exemplified attestation for the existence of equilibrium division of labor based on specialization by constructing a m-person symmetry supermodular game and using lattice theory and Tarski’s fixpoint theorem, and utilized multiplier effect grounded on product transaction efficiency parameter, (, with unchanging economies of specilization to renewedly enlighten intrinsic implication of evolution of division of labor. And then, this paper switches to formal analyses of the firm.
The fundamental connection of the firm is the employment relationship between employers and employees. However, it is in reality an interpersonal correlation although some economists would like to look upon it as the contract between capital and labor. It usually can be seen that an employee serving a company departs from afterward the firm and establishes her own enterprise, in which the pivotal change is that she turns into an employer from an employee. Notice, this is the area that mainstream economics rarely intervenes. That is the subject of division of labor based on specialization among employers and employees. The Yang-Ng firm model in new classical economics is the first mathematical representation in this realm. Its virtues are endogenous specialization and general equilibrium and shortcoming is that the Yang-Ng firms have entirely not
self-improving ability. The dynamic firm model in this paper has supplied the gap and proved that employees’ investments of their firm-specific human capital are significant for the growth of the firm in those sectors of employers’ investments limited by specialization. Employees’ investments become crucial just for the reason of the restriction of specialization on employers’ investments. With an employee’s investment going up, eonomies of specialization of her production will itself increase and with the increase, the firm-specific degree of her human capital will drop. The latter variation reduces opportunity costs of her resignation or the transfer of her human capital. When an employee is asked to make a greater investment, it will be essential that she newly builds her own enterprise or that the firm modifies its initial control allocation. The division of labor amid employers and employees brings their collaborative contract to be indispensable, and the incompleteness of the contract about the division of labor further impels their teamwork to break down or newly-built enterprises to emerge. The firm derives its rivals from its development, which is called as the self-generation process of the firm. For irrelatively diversified firms, they will destroy values at least at the moment requiring a variety of large investments of firm-specific human capital in view of the fact that they can not adjust control over their each production subsection. Outstretched discussion shows that successful corporat
首先必须面对的重要问题是在有专业化递增报酬情况下,是否存在竞争性均衡。通过构造一个m人专业化分工对称超模博弈,运用代数格论和Tarski不动点定理,本文对专业化分工均衡的存在性提供了一个示例性证明,并在给定专业化经济不变条件下用基于产品交易效率参量( 的乘数效应重新诠释了分工演进内在的效率含义。然后,本文转入正式的企业分析。
企业组织内在的基本关系是发生于雇主与雇员之间的雇佣关系。尽管也有经济学家更愿意将之看作资本与劳动之间的契约关系,但是,无论如何,它实际上是一种人与人之间的相互关系。常可看到,一个曾经效力于某家公司的雇员后来离开这家公司,创建了自己的企业,其中的关键变化是他或者她从雇员变成了雇主。这触及到一个主流经济学少有涉足的领域,此即雇主与雇员之间的专业化分工问题。新兴古典经济学的Yang-Ng企业模型是在这方面的第一个数理模型,它的优点是内生专业化和一般均衡性,缺点是其中的企业完全失去了自我发展的能力。本文的动态企业模型弥补了这一不足,证明雇员的企业专用性人力资本投资在雇主受到专业化限制的那些部门对企业增长至关重要。正是由于专业化对雇主投资存在限制,故而雇员投资才变得重要起来。随雇员投资增加,雇员生产的专业化经济本身将会上升,而随专业化经济上升,雇员人力资本的企业专用性程度则会下降。后一变化减小了雇员离职或者他的人力资本转移的机会成本。当需要雇员作出更大的投资时,企业改变控制配置或者雇员新建企业就难以避免。雇主与雇员之间的分工产生了他们彼此缔结合作契约的必要,而分工契约的不完全性则又促使他们合作破裂或者新建企业出现。企业在获得发展的同时往往也衍生了自己的竞争对手,这被称作企业的自生成过程。对不相关多元化企业而言,由于这类企业无法在自己的每个分部都作出这样的控制调整,故而至少在要求多种重大的企业专用性人力资本投资的时候,它们是毁灭价值的。延伸的讨论显示,成功的企业战略将受制于企业核心要素的专用性类型。
另外,本文也证明了,专业化经济的增长对企业资本结构具有限制作用,它意味着权益替代债务现象的发生。这预言增长型企业具有较低的负债水平,且与Holmstrom与Kaplan(2001)的观察一致。
专业化与分工经济的发展与相关合作契约的不完全性正是企业组织发生演进的一个重要原因。本文在此结论基础上,进一步考察了过去20多年中公司治理的变迁和中国国有企业改革。人力资本相对于非人力资本的重要性上升已经导致对经典的Berle-Means治理范式的超越,现在的公司治理要求股东赋予企业权利以便能为重要的人力资本投资提供足够的激励。而国有体制本身则类似于一个庞大的不相关多元化企业,无法作出能够激励重大专用性人力资本投资的制度安排。中国国有企业改革当前面临的急迫问题应是合理化国有产权的进入分布,而不应是推行所谓的现代企业制度。
Business organizations have changed substantially in the past more than 20 years. The altered nature of the firm makes it turn out to be necessary reconsidering much of what a majority of economists take for granted in the theory of the firm. Perhaps the most important difference is the increased importance of human capital relative to inanimate assets. Human capital seems to be more directly enslaved to new classical principles on the basis of economies of specialization and division of labor although it still is not bright whether the resource is suited to neoclassical economies of scale and scope, a sort of conceptions of purely technological economies. As a synthesis of economies of technology and organization, economies of specialization and division of labor are therefore a more appropriately visual angle of comprehending these changes. This paper begins from the Holmstrom-Kaplan (HK) problem (that is why new economy enterprises choose an independently administrative form), and attempts to develop a self-generation theory of the firm.
First question that must be faced is if there is a competitive equilibrium when increasing returns to specialization exist. This paper has provided an exemplified attestation for the existence of equilibrium division of labor based on specialization by constructing a m-person symmetry supermodular game and using lattice theory and Tarski’s fixpoint theorem, and utilized multiplier effect grounded on product transaction efficiency parameter, (, with unchanging economies of specilization to renewedly enlighten intrinsic implication of evolution of division of labor. And then, this paper switches to formal analyses of the firm.
The fundamental connection of the firm is the employment relationship between employers and employees. However, it is in reality an interpersonal correlation although some economists would like to look upon it as the contract between capital and labor. It usually can be seen that an employee serving a company departs from afterward the firm and establishes her own enterprise, in which the pivotal change is that she turns into an employer from an employee. Notice, this is the area that mainstream economics rarely intervenes. That is the subject of division of labor based on specialization among employers and employees. The Yang-Ng firm model in new classical economics is the first mathematical representation in this realm. Its virtues are endogenous specialization and general equilibrium and shortcoming is that the Yang-Ng firms have entirely not
self-improving ability. The dynamic firm model in this paper has supplied the gap and proved that employees’ investments of their firm-specific human capital are significant for the growth of the firm in those sectors of employers’ investments limited by specialization. Employees’ investments become crucial just for the reason of the restriction of specialization on employers’ investments. With an employee’s investment going up, eonomies of specialization of her production will itself increase and with the increase, the firm-specific degree of her human capital will drop. The latter variation reduces opportunity costs of her resignation or the transfer of her human capital. When an employee is asked to make a greater investment, it will be essential that she newly builds her own enterprise or that the firm modifies its initial control allocation. The division of labor amid employers and employees brings their collaborative contract to be indispensable, and the incompleteness of the contract about the division of labor further impels their teamwork to break down or newly-built enterprises to emerge. The firm derives its rivals from its development, which is called as the self-generation process of the firm. For irrelatively diversified firms, they will destroy values at least at the moment requiring a variety of large investments of firm-specific human capital in view of the fact that they can not adjust control over their each production subsection. Outstretched discussion shows that successful corporat
引文
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