小额贷款公司贷款风险防控研究
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摘要
根据农村金融体制改革和小额信贷发展状况,我国政府逐步探索组建符合国情的小额贷款公司,以期望其作为金融的“毛细血管”,向面临融资难的各类微型经济主体输送资金血液,同时在扩大就业、规范和引导民间资金流向、缩小城乡贫富差距和促进社会经济发展等方面发挥作用。2005年10月,中国人民银行在五省(区)开展小额贷款公司试点以来,其在各地均取得蓬勃发展,越来越多的小额贷款公司成为金融服务领域的重要补充力量。截至2012年底,全国小额贷款公司已达6080家,同比增长42.78%,贷款余额5921.38亿元,同比增长51.24%。但在小额贷款机构和业务数量双增长,小额贷款公司发展形势一片大好的今天,我们不能忽视其与生俱来的贷款风险,小额贷款公司想要做到基业长青,实现自身的可持续发展,就一定要对小额贷款风险做好防控工作。
本文正是从小额贷款公司贷款风险防范的角度,分析小额贷款公司贷款风险防控现状及存在的问题,重点剖析典型的贷款联保风险防控机制在我国小额贷款公司风险防控中的适用性问题。在基础分析部分,通过对小额贷款公司贷款风险特点和成因的分析,发现贷款风险较高且成因复杂,使得小额贷款公司贷款风险防控十分必要。经走访小额贷款公司并总结实践经验,发现目前小额贷款公司贷款风险防控方法虽有其存在的合理性,但也存在事前调查不到位埋下后续风险隐患、事中风险评审主观意识较强、事后监督检查机制不健全及贷款管理滞后、财务数据不健全或不真实、人员风险突出等问题。针对这些问题,最核心的整改方案应该是鼓励小额贷款公司创新贷款风险防控技术,而贷款联保机制可以说是当前小额贷款领域最为经典的风险防控技术,在我国小额贷款公司实践中也被作为贷款风险防控流程的重要补充手段,研究其在我国小额贷款公司的适用性具有一定的实际价值。文章将对贷款联保机制风控技术从具体概念、国内外研究现状、理论基础和博弈分析几点进行阐述,为后文适用性分析铺垫。然后,分析了贷款联保机制在我国小额贷款公司的适用性,分析表明：联保贷款技术在小额贷款公司实务中,从形成客户自动筛选机制、降低小额贷款风险、缓解小额贷款客户担保难问题、拓展小额贷款公司业务量、降低贷款管理成本、促进社会信用环境建设等方面均取得了良好的效果。但实践调研发现,由于面临联保小组难以形成、社会惩罚效应不高、小组成员合谋骗贷、小组内部“监督成本”使联保机制失效、司法纠纷程序复杂、贷款资金扶强弃弱等问题,使得贷款联保风险防控技术在我国小额贷款公司的适用性还是有限的,需要从不同方面对这些问题进行改进,以便于拓展贷款联保机制在小额贷款公司中的适用性,增强小额贷款公司贷款风险防控能力。
目前国内对贷款机构联保机制研究主要集中在农村信用社农户联保贷款,由于小额贷款公司目前基本研究数据较难获得,且主要依靠软信息作为放贷决策的依据,所以对联保风控技术在我国小额贷款公司中的适用性研究还较少。本文研究特色主要是将贷款联保风险防控技术,放在我国小额贷款公司实践中去分析其适用性问题。
Based on the reform of the rural financial system and micro-credit development, the Chinese government has been exploring ways to establish small loan companies that are in line with our current national conditions. In doing so, the Chinese government hopes to enable them to become the veins of the finance and transfer funds to micro economic entities which are facing financial difficulties. At the same time, small loan companies are expected to play a major role in expanding employment, standardizing and guiding flowing direction of private funds, narrowing the income inequality between the rural and urban regions, and contributing to social and economic development. In October2005, People's Bank of China launched small loan companies in five provinces, including regions. After that, small loan companies have prospered in different parts of China and many of them have become an important additional force of the financial services. By the end of2012, the number of small loan companies has reached6080, up by42.78%while the balance of loans has reached RMB592.138billion, an increase of51.24%. However, though the small loan companies and their businesses have grown substantially, risks are inherent in issuing loans. Therefore, in order to achieve sustainable development, the small loan companies must do a good work of guarding against risks.
The present paper centers on the risk prevention of small loan companies by analyzing the status quo of the risk prevention as well as the present problems. The priority is given to elaborate on the applicability of risk prevention technics practiced by typical group lending to the small loan companies in China.Based on this analysis as well as the analysis of the characteristics and reasons of the loan risks facing these companies, the paper comes to find that there is a high risk of issuing loans and reasons behind are very complex. Therefore, it is imperative for small loan companies to prevent such risks. After on-site investigation and the summarization of experience, the paper finds that though there are reasonableness in the risk prevention procedures of small loan companies, there are some prominent problems such as the latent risks due to insufficient prior investigation, the strong subjectivity of risk assessment in the loans processing stage, the incomplete monitoring and examination mechanism after the loans are issued, the incomplete or falsified financial data as well as the personnel risks.The most important restructuring method for these small loan companies is to encourage them to innovate technics to guard against risks. At present, the joint guarantee mechanism is the most typical way to prevent such risks and can be considered as one of the most important methods in the field of micro-credit. Therefore, it is of practical significance to study its applicability to the small loan companies in China.The paper will elaborate on the joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics from aspect of concrete concept, the foreign and domestic researches in the field, the theoretical analysis as well as the game analysis. Such work can pave the way for the latter analysis of its applicability. After that, the paper concentrates on analyzing the joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics in helping small loan companies in China. The analysis shows that these technics can make positive achievement in forming the customer automatic selecting mechanism, lowering the small loan risks, alleviating the small loan clients difficult security issues, expanding the business quality, slashing the management costs and improving social credit environment.However, on-site investigation finds that the problems such as the difficulty in establishing lending group, the light social credit punishment, the collaborative loan issuing traps between the group members, the ineffectiveness of joint guarantee mechanism because of "monitoring cost", the complex legal procedures as well as the preference of the issued funds have limited the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China. Therefore, it is necessary to modify these problems in various aspects so that the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China can be enlarged and the risk prevention ability of these companies can be improved.
Currently, the domestic academic studies on joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention have focused on the joint guarantee loan in rural credit cooperatives. Because the basic information about the small loan companies are hard to collect and the loan issuance decisions are mainly determined by soft information, the studies on the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies is rather sporadic. Therefore, the major feature of the paper is to analyze the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China.
本文正是从小额贷款公司贷款风险防范的角度,分析小额贷款公司贷款风险防控现状及存在的问题,重点剖析典型的贷款联保风险防控机制在我国小额贷款公司风险防控中的适用性问题。在基础分析部分,通过对小额贷款公司贷款风险特点和成因的分析,发现贷款风险较高且成因复杂,使得小额贷款公司贷款风险防控十分必要。经走访小额贷款公司并总结实践经验,发现目前小额贷款公司贷款风险防控方法虽有其存在的合理性,但也存在事前调查不到位埋下后续风险隐患、事中风险评审主观意识较强、事后监督检查机制不健全及贷款管理滞后、财务数据不健全或不真实、人员风险突出等问题。针对这些问题,最核心的整改方案应该是鼓励小额贷款公司创新贷款风险防控技术,而贷款联保机制可以说是当前小额贷款领域最为经典的风险防控技术,在我国小额贷款公司实践中也被作为贷款风险防控流程的重要补充手段,研究其在我国小额贷款公司的适用性具有一定的实际价值。文章将对贷款联保机制风控技术从具体概念、国内外研究现状、理论基础和博弈分析几点进行阐述,为后文适用性分析铺垫。然后,分析了贷款联保机制在我国小额贷款公司的适用性,分析表明：联保贷款技术在小额贷款公司实务中,从形成客户自动筛选机制、降低小额贷款风险、缓解小额贷款客户担保难问题、拓展小额贷款公司业务量、降低贷款管理成本、促进社会信用环境建设等方面均取得了良好的效果。但实践调研发现,由于面临联保小组难以形成、社会惩罚效应不高、小组成员合谋骗贷、小组内部“监督成本”使联保机制失效、司法纠纷程序复杂、贷款资金扶强弃弱等问题,使得贷款联保风险防控技术在我国小额贷款公司的适用性还是有限的,需要从不同方面对这些问题进行改进,以便于拓展贷款联保机制在小额贷款公司中的适用性,增强小额贷款公司贷款风险防控能力。
目前国内对贷款机构联保机制研究主要集中在农村信用社农户联保贷款,由于小额贷款公司目前基本研究数据较难获得,且主要依靠软信息作为放贷决策的依据,所以对联保风控技术在我国小额贷款公司中的适用性研究还较少。本文研究特色主要是将贷款联保风险防控技术,放在我国小额贷款公司实践中去分析其适用性问题。
Based on the reform of the rural financial system and micro-credit development, the Chinese government has been exploring ways to establish small loan companies that are in line with our current national conditions. In doing so, the Chinese government hopes to enable them to become the veins of the finance and transfer funds to micro economic entities which are facing financial difficulties. At the same time, small loan companies are expected to play a major role in expanding employment, standardizing and guiding flowing direction of private funds, narrowing the income inequality between the rural and urban regions, and contributing to social and economic development. In October2005, People's Bank of China launched small loan companies in five provinces, including regions. After that, small loan companies have prospered in different parts of China and many of them have become an important additional force of the financial services. By the end of2012, the number of small loan companies has reached6080, up by42.78%while the balance of loans has reached RMB592.138billion, an increase of51.24%. However, though the small loan companies and their businesses have grown substantially, risks are inherent in issuing loans. Therefore, in order to achieve sustainable development, the small loan companies must do a good work of guarding against risks.
The present paper centers on the risk prevention of small loan companies by analyzing the status quo of the risk prevention as well as the present problems. The priority is given to elaborate on the applicability of risk prevention technics practiced by typical group lending to the small loan companies in China.Based on this analysis as well as the analysis of the characteristics and reasons of the loan risks facing these companies, the paper comes to find that there is a high risk of issuing loans and reasons behind are very complex. Therefore, it is imperative for small loan companies to prevent such risks. After on-site investigation and the summarization of experience, the paper finds that though there are reasonableness in the risk prevention procedures of small loan companies, there are some prominent problems such as the latent risks due to insufficient prior investigation, the strong subjectivity of risk assessment in the loans processing stage, the incomplete monitoring and examination mechanism after the loans are issued, the incomplete or falsified financial data as well as the personnel risks.The most important restructuring method for these small loan companies is to encourage them to innovate technics to guard against risks. At present, the joint guarantee mechanism is the most typical way to prevent such risks and can be considered as one of the most important methods in the field of micro-credit. Therefore, it is of practical significance to study its applicability to the small loan companies in China.The paper will elaborate on the joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics from aspect of concrete concept, the foreign and domestic researches in the field, the theoretical analysis as well as the game analysis. Such work can pave the way for the latter analysis of its applicability. After that, the paper concentrates on analyzing the joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics in helping small loan companies in China. The analysis shows that these technics can make positive achievement in forming the customer automatic selecting mechanism, lowering the small loan risks, alleviating the small loan clients difficult security issues, expanding the business quality, slashing the management costs and improving social credit environment.However, on-site investigation finds that the problems such as the difficulty in establishing lending group, the light social credit punishment, the collaborative loan issuing traps between the group members, the ineffectiveness of joint guarantee mechanism because of "monitoring cost", the complex legal procedures as well as the preference of the issued funds have limited the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China. Therefore, it is necessary to modify these problems in various aspects so that the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China can be enlarged and the risk prevention ability of these companies can be improved.
Currently, the domestic academic studies on joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention have focused on the joint guarantee loan in rural credit cooperatives. Because the basic information about the small loan companies are hard to collect and the loan issuance decisions are mainly determined by soft information, the studies on the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies is rather sporadic. Therefore, the major feature of the paper is to analyze the applicability of joint guarantee mechanism risk prevention technics to the small loan companies in China.
引文
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[2]N.Jeyaseelan.Risk Management in Micro finance:Emerging Challenges in the Indian Context.Rome,Italy:FAO Headquarters,2007.
[3]Mark wenner,Sergio Navajas,Carolina Trivelli & Alvaro Tarazona.Managing Credit Risk in Rural Financial Institutions in Latin America,International Conference on Rural Finance Research:Moving Results into Policies and Practice,FAO Headquarters,Rome,Italy,2007.
[4]Fitzgerald,Thomas and Robert Vogel. Moving towards Risk based supervision in Developing Economics. Harvard Institute for international Developing,Cambridge.2000.
[5]Guillamon,Bemardo,etal.Risk Mitigation as a cost effective MF strategy:Case study-IDB-Peru Global Micro enterprise credit program,Inter American Development Bank,Washington.D.2000.
[6]Frank Lenisa.The Importance of Credit Information & Credit Scoring for Micro Lending & Micro Finance Institutions[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2007.
[7]Mark Schreiner.Can Credit Scoring Help Attract Profit-Minded Investors to Micro-credit[J].New Partnerships for Innovation in Micro finance,2009:198-222.
[8]Schmit,Mathias,Marrez,Helena.Credit risk analysis in micro-credit:How does gender matter[J].Savings and development:quarterly review,2010:369-388.
[9]杜晓山.我国小额信贷发展报告[J].农村金融研究,2009(02)：37-44.
[10]张哲,陈玉.浅谈小额惠农贷款的风险防范及对策[J].今日财富,2006(02)：55～56.
[11]李修平.“只贷不存”小额贷款公司的风险及对策[J].当代经济,2009(02)：26-27.
[12]孔为民,刘海英.小额贷款公司风险表现及应对策略研究[J].当代经济管理,2012(10)：83～88.
[13]王颖.中国农户小额信贷信用风险评估研究——基于模糊综合评价模型[J].西南金融,2010(08)：60～62.
[14]张峭,李峻.基于协变理论的小额信贷风险管理研究[J].安徽农业科学,2010(35)：63～72.
[15]闫雪,卢继梁.提高小额贷款公司风险控制力的创新型途径一建立小额贷款公司信用评估体系[J].中国经贸导刊,2010(16).65-66.
[16]陈红兵.对小额贷款发展与风险管理的思考[J].湖北农村金融究,2009(09)：43-44.
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