中国民营上市公司金字塔结构成因及经济后果研究
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摘要
金字塔结构是公司治理研究的热点和前沿问题之一。金字塔结构下终极控制人通常以较少的现金流权获得对公司的控制权，理论研究表明现金流权和控制权的分离会产生严重的代理成本，代理成本导致组织结构无效率，但已有的经验证据显示金字塔结构公司在世界范围内广泛存在。理论和现实产生了严重的背离。是什么原因导致了这种现象?金字塔结构产生严重的代理成本了吗?金字塔结构组织具有何种潜在优势?金字塔结构是否有损公司价值?这些相关的问题都需要细致的理论分析和经验验证。本研究主要在借鉴前人研究成果基础上，重点从理论建模和实证检验两个维度对金字塔结构的成因进行解释，并从资本结构、现金股利和公司价值方面对金字塔结构可能产生的经济后果进行经验验证。
本文将融资约束和破产危机置于统一的研究框架，拓展了Almeida and Wolfenzon(2006a)和Riyanto and Toolsema(2008)的工作，构建了终极控制人对公司控制权结构选择的决策模型，对模型进行了求解并给出了研究推论。进一步利用我国中小民营上市公司的数据对模型的推论进行了经验验证。该研究的贡献主要体现在三个方面：第一，表明公司组织结构的选择是内生的，公司初始成立时受到的融资约束与成立后可能发生的破产危机是影响组织结构的重要因素；第二，发现国家宏观制度环境是重要的，公司承担的税率越高，公司越少可能被金字塔结构控制，股权分置制度下公司更多的被金字塔结构控制；第三，证实金字塔结构是中性的，高的控制权私有收益是金字塔结构伴随的现象，金字塔结构下，终极控制人有激励通过雇佣高质量的会计师事务所向外部投资者发送不掠夺的信号。
本文利用中国民营上市公司2004-2006年的平衡面板数据，实证检验了终极控制人现金流权、现金流权和控制权分离程度与公司负债行为的关系。本研究利用股权分置改革客观导致的所有权结构时变特征信息，用Hausman检验对固定效应模型和随机效应模型进行了选择，避免了目前大部分研究利用横截面数据最小二乘回归或多年度数据混合回归模型可能导致的模型设定错误。本研究的新发现主要有两点：第一是终极控制人现金流权与公司负债正相关，现金流权和控制权分离程度与公司负债不相关，此发现支持外部股权和负债是替代性的融资方式，不支持金字塔结构下控制权和现金流权分离导致终极控制人在资本结构选择上具有代理问题的假说；第二是公司风险在IPO类公司样本回归模型中系数显著为正，而在非IPO类公司样本回归模型中系数不显著异于0，此结果从另一个视角证实了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好。
本文从股权分置改革前后公司现金股利支付差异的新视角，对股权分置改革前现金股利的控制或掠夺效应进行了解读。本研究发现股权分置改革前较改革后公司明显具有高的派发现金股利的概率和高的现金股利发放数额，而且结果只能用股权分置制度下现金股利是终极控制人掠夺手段的假说进行解释。本研究的创新在于没有依赖有效资本市场假设条件下外部投资者对现金股利信号的解读发现了高的现金股利是终极控制人的掠夺手段的更客观证据。
本文引入处置效应模型(Treatment effect model)，研究了金字塔结构与公司价值的关系。研究发现控制了样本的自选择效应后，金字塔结构对公司价值具有正向影响，这以目前大部分未考虑所有权结构内生性的研究发现的金字塔结构有损公司价值的结论正好相反。此结果支持了金字塔结构能够替代缺失的市场或制度的理论预期，进一步证实尽管金字塔结构可能伴随严重的代理成本，但本质上其是一种中性的控股方式。
Pyramid structure now is one of the hot-spots and cutting-edge issues. Under pyramid structure the ultimate controlling shareholders generally gain the corporate control rights with less cash flow rights. The theory research shows separation between the cash flow rights and the control rights would bring to critical agency cost, which lead to low efficiency of organizational structure. But previous empirical evidence shows that corporate pyramid structure is widely used all over the world. There are critical deviation between the theory and realities. What lead to this phenomenon? Can the pyramid structure bring to significant agency cost? What potential advantages belong to pyramid structure? Does pyramid structure destroy corporate value? All these problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test. This paper explores the cause of pyramid structure from theory modeling and empirical test, and verifies empirically economical effect on pyramid structure from capital structure, cash dividends and corporate value.
Putting financial constraint and bankruptcy crisis on a unify research framework, this paper extends the works of Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) , and constructs the decision model. This model describes the corporate controlling structure choice by the ultimate controlling shareholders. Furthermore, we test the model inference using the data of Chinese small and medium-sized private listed companies. The mainly contributions are: first, this research presents that the choice of corporate organization is endogenous. The financial constraint to a new initial company and bankruptcy crisis to an established one is the important elements which affect organization structure. Second, this study finds the national macroeconomic institutional environment is important, and the lower the tax burden, the company may more possibly choose the pyramid structure; after the share segment reform, ultimate controlling shareholders less use Pyramid structure to control the listed company. Last, this paper confirms pyramid structure is neutral. High private benefits of control are the phenomenon accompanied with pyramid structure. Under pyramid structure, ultimate controlling shareholders have an incentive to hire well-qualified accounting firms to transfer the signal of no tunneling to the outside investors.
Based on the balance panel data of private listed companies from 2004 to 2006, this article analyzes the relation between ultimate ownership and the capital structure. Using time-varying specific information of ownership structure caused objectively by the share segment reform, this paper makes a choice between fixed effects model and random effects model with Hausman test, avoiding the model specific errors may arising with cross-section data Least-squares regression and multi-year data Mixed regression model. The main findings include two points: first, there are some positive correlation between cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders and the debt, but separate degree of cash flow rights and control rights is unrelated with the debt. This finding supports that outside equity and liability is alternative financial approach, but does not support the assumption that separation between control rights and cash flow rights under pyramid structure lead to agency problem on capital structure choice by ultimate controlling shareholders. Second, in IPO corporate sample regression model, the coefficient of corporate risk is significantly positive, but in no-IPO corporate sample regression model, the coefficient is indifferent from zero. This result supports the equity financial preference prevailing in China listed companies from another viewpoint.
From the new perspective on corporate cash dividends payment difference before and after share segment reform, this article analyses cash dividend's controlling and tunneling effect before share segment reform. The T-Statistics test shows Companies obviously prefer to pay high cash dividends before reform than after share segment, the Probit and Multiple regression results indicate that it can solely be explained that high cash dividends imply tunneling behavior of ultimate controlling shareholders. Without efficient capital market assumption, this paper finds new evidences about tunneling effect using cash dividends by ultimate controlling shareholders.
Based on treatment effect model, this paper discusses the effect of pyramid structure in corporate value. The result shows pyramid structure has a positive effect on corporate value after controlling sample self-choice effect. This is contrast with most findings without controlling ownership structure as an endogenous varible. This result supports the assumption that pyramid structure can substitute for incomplete market or institute. Even though pyramid structure may accompany with critical agency cost, but pyramid structure in nature is a neutral control manner.
本文将融资约束和破产危机置于统一的研究框架，拓展了Almeida and Wolfenzon(2006a)和Riyanto and Toolsema(2008)的工作，构建了终极控制人对公司控制权结构选择的决策模型，对模型进行了求解并给出了研究推论。进一步利用我国中小民营上市公司的数据对模型的推论进行了经验验证。该研究的贡献主要体现在三个方面：第一，表明公司组织结构的选择是内生的，公司初始成立时受到的融资约束与成立后可能发生的破产危机是影响组织结构的重要因素；第二，发现国家宏观制度环境是重要的，公司承担的税率越高，公司越少可能被金字塔结构控制，股权分置制度下公司更多的被金字塔结构控制；第三，证实金字塔结构是中性的，高的控制权私有收益是金字塔结构伴随的现象，金字塔结构下，终极控制人有激励通过雇佣高质量的会计师事务所向外部投资者发送不掠夺的信号。
本文利用中国民营上市公司2004-2006年的平衡面板数据，实证检验了终极控制人现金流权、现金流权和控制权分离程度与公司负债行为的关系。本研究利用股权分置改革客观导致的所有权结构时变特征信息，用Hausman检验对固定效应模型和随机效应模型进行了选择，避免了目前大部分研究利用横截面数据最小二乘回归或多年度数据混合回归模型可能导致的模型设定错误。本研究的新发现主要有两点：第一是终极控制人现金流权与公司负债正相关，现金流权和控制权分离程度与公司负债不相关，此发现支持外部股权和负债是替代性的融资方式，不支持金字塔结构下控制权和现金流权分离导致终极控制人在资本结构选择上具有代理问题的假说；第二是公司风险在IPO类公司样本回归模型中系数显著为正，而在非IPO类公司样本回归模型中系数不显著异于0，此结果从另一个视角证实了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好。
本文从股权分置改革前后公司现金股利支付差异的新视角，对股权分置改革前现金股利的控制或掠夺效应进行了解读。本研究发现股权分置改革前较改革后公司明显具有高的派发现金股利的概率和高的现金股利发放数额，而且结果只能用股权分置制度下现金股利是终极控制人掠夺手段的假说进行解释。本研究的创新在于没有依赖有效资本市场假设条件下外部投资者对现金股利信号的解读发现了高的现金股利是终极控制人的掠夺手段的更客观证据。
本文引入处置效应模型(Treatment effect model)，研究了金字塔结构与公司价值的关系。研究发现控制了样本的自选择效应后，金字塔结构对公司价值具有正向影响，这以目前大部分未考虑所有权结构内生性的研究发现的金字塔结构有损公司价值的结论正好相反。此结果支持了金字塔结构能够替代缺失的市场或制度的理论预期，进一步证实尽管金字塔结构可能伴随严重的代理成本，但本质上其是一种中性的控股方式。
Pyramid structure now is one of the hot-spots and cutting-edge issues. Under pyramid structure the ultimate controlling shareholders generally gain the corporate control rights with less cash flow rights. The theory research shows separation between the cash flow rights and the control rights would bring to critical agency cost, which lead to low efficiency of organizational structure. But previous empirical evidence shows that corporate pyramid structure is widely used all over the world. There are critical deviation between the theory and realities. What lead to this phenomenon? Can the pyramid structure bring to significant agency cost? What potential advantages belong to pyramid structure? Does pyramid structure destroy corporate value? All these problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test. This paper explores the cause of pyramid structure from theory modeling and empirical test, and verifies empirically economical effect on pyramid structure from capital structure, cash dividends and corporate value.
Putting financial constraint and bankruptcy crisis on a unify research framework, this paper extends the works of Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) , and constructs the decision model. This model describes the corporate controlling structure choice by the ultimate controlling shareholders. Furthermore, we test the model inference using the data of Chinese small and medium-sized private listed companies. The mainly contributions are: first, this research presents that the choice of corporate organization is endogenous. The financial constraint to a new initial company and bankruptcy crisis to an established one is the important elements which affect organization structure. Second, this study finds the national macroeconomic institutional environment is important, and the lower the tax burden, the company may more possibly choose the pyramid structure; after the share segment reform, ultimate controlling shareholders less use Pyramid structure to control the listed company. Last, this paper confirms pyramid structure is neutral. High private benefits of control are the phenomenon accompanied with pyramid structure. Under pyramid structure, ultimate controlling shareholders have an incentive to hire well-qualified accounting firms to transfer the signal of no tunneling to the outside investors.
Based on the balance panel data of private listed companies from 2004 to 2006, this article analyzes the relation between ultimate ownership and the capital structure. Using time-varying specific information of ownership structure caused objectively by the share segment reform, this paper makes a choice between fixed effects model and random effects model with Hausman test, avoiding the model specific errors may arising with cross-section data Least-squares regression and multi-year data Mixed regression model. The main findings include two points: first, there are some positive correlation between cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders and the debt, but separate degree of cash flow rights and control rights is unrelated with the debt. This finding supports that outside equity and liability is alternative financial approach, but does not support the assumption that separation between control rights and cash flow rights under pyramid structure lead to agency problem on capital structure choice by ultimate controlling shareholders. Second, in IPO corporate sample regression model, the coefficient of corporate risk is significantly positive, but in no-IPO corporate sample regression model, the coefficient is indifferent from zero. This result supports the equity financial preference prevailing in China listed companies from another viewpoint.
From the new perspective on corporate cash dividends payment difference before and after share segment reform, this article analyses cash dividend's controlling and tunneling effect before share segment reform. The T-Statistics test shows Companies obviously prefer to pay high cash dividends before reform than after share segment, the Probit and Multiple regression results indicate that it can solely be explained that high cash dividends imply tunneling behavior of ultimate controlling shareholders. Without efficient capital market assumption, this paper finds new evidences about tunneling effect using cash dividends by ultimate controlling shareholders.
Based on treatment effect model, this paper discusses the effect of pyramid structure in corporate value. The result shows pyramid structure has a positive effect on corporate value after controlling sample self-choice effect. This is contrast with most findings without controlling ownership structure as an endogenous varible. This result supports the assumption that pyramid structure can substitute for incomplete market or institute. Even though pyramid structure may accompany with critical agency cost, but pyramid structure in nature is a neutral control manner.
引文
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