国家分级控股、资本结构与代理问题研究
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摘要
国有经济是我国国民经济的主导力量,国有控股公司作为国有经济的主要组织便在我国经济发展中有着十分着重要的作用。如何完善国有控股公司治理结构、降低国有控股公司代理成本是关系到国有控股公司乃至整个国民经济发展的重大问题。资本结构是公司治理结构的重要方面,它不仅规定着公司剩余索取权的分配,而且规定着公司控制权的分配。如何通过完善资本结构来解决国有控股公司中的经营者代理问题和控股股东代理问题,是我国公司治理研究领域中颇受人们关注的一个前沿问题。
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究文献的基础上,在不完全合同的分析框架下,综合运用利益相关者理论、产权理论和委托代理理论等现代经济学理论,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,沿着“制度背景——理论分析——实证分析——对策研究”的研究路线,对选题“国家分级控股、资本结构与代理问题研究”进行了全面而深入地研究,得出了具有一定理论价值和实践价值的观点和结论。
首先,基于不完全合同理论建立了国有控股公司资本结构影响代理问题的分析框架。以往研究公司资本结构影响代理问题的理论基础是完全合同理论。该理论认为未来所有问题都可以在合同中加以描述,都可以通过事前谈判来解决。这显然不符合现实,无法对资本结构影响代理问题做出合理解释。而由Grossman和Har(t1986)、Hart和Moore(1990)等建立和发展起来的不完全合同理论则认为当合同不完全时,资产归谁所有,谁拥有资产的支配权等问题就非常重要,研究重点是公司剩余索取权和控制权的最优安排问题。把剩余索取权和控制权在股东、债权人和经营者等利益相关者之间加以合理的配置是公司治理结构所要解释的核心问题,是公司提高经营效率、降低代理成本的关键。因此,不完全合同理论从企业所有权的角度研究代理问题便直接触及到问题的本质,是我们研究公司代理问题,特别是国有控股公司治理问题的有力工具。本文以不完全合同理论为基础,研究发现资本结构是否完善是决定公司剩余索取权和控制权配置是否合理的关键因素,是国有控股公司代理问题产生的根源。
其次,在理论分析的基础上,对我国国有控股上市公司在国家分级控股下的代理问题进行了实证分析。基于国有控股上市公司分级控股的现状,将国有控股上市公司分为中央政府控股的上市公司和地方政府控股的上市公司两类,本文依据两类国有控股上市公司形成路径的差异,系统地论述了两类公司在治理特征、代理问题存在的差异,实证研究也支持了这一结论:中央政府控股的上市公司主要面临的是控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题;地方政府控股的上市公司主要面临的是控股股东与经营者之间的代理问题。
最后,建立了新的代理成本计量指标,并用以分析国有控股上市公司资本结构对代理问题的影响。针对以往代理成本计量指标的局限性,本文通过回归模型估算出企业正常的费用开支水平,然后用模型的回归残差作为代理成本的替代变量。以国有控股上市公司为研究对象,通过实证研究发现,资本结构是影响国有控股上市公司代理问题的重要因素,而且在不同级别政府控股的上市公司中资本结构对代理成本的影响存在差异。
State-owned economy is a dominant part in our national economy. And as the primary organizational entities in state-owned economy, state holding enterprises play a vital role in the economic development in our country. How to perfect the governance structure of state holding enterprises, and how to reduce their agency costs are momentous matters that not only pertain to state holding enterprises themselves, but also pertain to the development of national economy as a whole. Corporate capital structure is the vital part of corporate governance structure, which regulates the allocation of corporate control, as well as the arrangement of residue claims for enterprises. How to solve the agent problem of managers and controlling shareholders in state holding enterprises through perfecting capital structure is a forefront research subject in the field of corporate governance that gains great attentions.
On the basis of literature review of related research fruits home and board, and under the analysis framework of incomplete contract theory, this paper makes comprehensive use of the latest research fruits in modern economics, such as stakeholder theory, the property right theory, the principal-agent theory, and combines the methods of normative research and empirical research. Meanwhile, following the research clue of“institutional background—theoretical analysis—empirical analysis—countermeasure research”, this paper makes a all-rounded and deepened research on the subject of“state grade control, capital structure and agent problem”and gets several view points and conclusions of theoretical and practical value.
Firstly, this paper establishes the analysis framework of capital structure’s impact on agent problems in state holding companies based on the incomplete contract theory. The theoretical foundation of previous analysis of capital structure’s influence on agent problem is complete contract theory. However, under restrict assumptions, complete contract theory suggests that every related question in future can be described in contracts, every related matter can be solved by negotiation in advance. This is unrealistic and unable to give reasonable explanation to capital structure’s influence on agent problem. The incomplete theory developed by Grossman and Hart (1998), Hart and Moore (1990) suggests that when contracts are incomplete, the questions of who owns the assets and who has the right to control the assets, etc., are of vital importance. It is focused on the optimal arrangement of residue claims and corporate control. The proper allocation of residue claims and corporate control between stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors and managers is the key to improve operation efficiency and decrease agent costs. Therefore, the incomplete contract theory makes direct analysis on agent problem and reaches the essence of the question from the angel of corporate control, and thus, it is a useful tool in analyzing the issue of corporate governance of state holding enterprises. This paper is based on incomplete contract theory and finds that unreasonable capital structure will lead to asymmetric arrangement of residue claims and corporate control in stakeholders, which is the origin of the agent problems in state holding companies.
Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper adopts data from our state holding listed companies and carries out empirical analysis on agent problem under the situation of state grade control. Due to the status que of grade control of state holding listed companies, state holding companies can be categorized as central government holding listed companies and local government holding listed companies. The series of significant differences in governance characteristics and agent problem of these two kinds of companies were been systematically discussed. Based on the difference in establishment path of these two kinds of state holding listed companies, the empirical research in this paper finds that there are differences in agent problem for state holding listed companies in different grade of control: central government holding listed companies mainly face the agent problem between controlling shareholders and small-and-medium shareholders, whereas local government holding listed companies mainly face the agent problem between controlling shareholders and managers.
Lastly, this paper constructs new measuring index for agent costs, and makes analyses on capital structure’s influence on agent problem in state holding enterprises. Contra posing the limitation of previous measures for agent costs, this paper estimates corporate normal expenditure by regression model, and then takes regression residual as the replacing variable for agent costs. It takes state holding listed companies as research objects, does empirical researches and finds that capital structure is significant factor in capital structure’s influence on agent problem in state holding enterprises, meanwhile, there are differences in agent costs for state holding listed companies in different grade of control.
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究文献的基础上,在不完全合同的分析框架下,综合运用利益相关者理论、产权理论和委托代理理论等现代经济学理论,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,沿着“制度背景——理论分析——实证分析——对策研究”的研究路线,对选题“国家分级控股、资本结构与代理问题研究”进行了全面而深入地研究,得出了具有一定理论价值和实践价值的观点和结论。
首先,基于不完全合同理论建立了国有控股公司资本结构影响代理问题的分析框架。以往研究公司资本结构影响代理问题的理论基础是完全合同理论。该理论认为未来所有问题都可以在合同中加以描述,都可以通过事前谈判来解决。这显然不符合现实,无法对资本结构影响代理问题做出合理解释。而由Grossman和Har(t1986)、Hart和Moore(1990)等建立和发展起来的不完全合同理论则认为当合同不完全时,资产归谁所有,谁拥有资产的支配权等问题就非常重要,研究重点是公司剩余索取权和控制权的最优安排问题。把剩余索取权和控制权在股东、债权人和经营者等利益相关者之间加以合理的配置是公司治理结构所要解释的核心问题,是公司提高经营效率、降低代理成本的关键。因此,不完全合同理论从企业所有权的角度研究代理问题便直接触及到问题的本质,是我们研究公司代理问题,特别是国有控股公司治理问题的有力工具。本文以不完全合同理论为基础,研究发现资本结构是否完善是决定公司剩余索取权和控制权配置是否合理的关键因素,是国有控股公司代理问题产生的根源。
其次,在理论分析的基础上,对我国国有控股上市公司在国家分级控股下的代理问题进行了实证分析。基于国有控股上市公司分级控股的现状,将国有控股上市公司分为中央政府控股的上市公司和地方政府控股的上市公司两类,本文依据两类国有控股上市公司形成路径的差异,系统地论述了两类公司在治理特征、代理问题存在的差异,实证研究也支持了这一结论:中央政府控股的上市公司主要面临的是控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题;地方政府控股的上市公司主要面临的是控股股东与经营者之间的代理问题。
最后,建立了新的代理成本计量指标,并用以分析国有控股上市公司资本结构对代理问题的影响。针对以往代理成本计量指标的局限性,本文通过回归模型估算出企业正常的费用开支水平,然后用模型的回归残差作为代理成本的替代变量。以国有控股上市公司为研究对象,通过实证研究发现,资本结构是影响国有控股上市公司代理问题的重要因素,而且在不同级别政府控股的上市公司中资本结构对代理成本的影响存在差异。
State-owned economy is a dominant part in our national economy. And as the primary organizational entities in state-owned economy, state holding enterprises play a vital role in the economic development in our country. How to perfect the governance structure of state holding enterprises, and how to reduce their agency costs are momentous matters that not only pertain to state holding enterprises themselves, but also pertain to the development of national economy as a whole. Corporate capital structure is the vital part of corporate governance structure, which regulates the allocation of corporate control, as well as the arrangement of residue claims for enterprises. How to solve the agent problem of managers and controlling shareholders in state holding enterprises through perfecting capital structure is a forefront research subject in the field of corporate governance that gains great attentions.
On the basis of literature review of related research fruits home and board, and under the analysis framework of incomplete contract theory, this paper makes comprehensive use of the latest research fruits in modern economics, such as stakeholder theory, the property right theory, the principal-agent theory, and combines the methods of normative research and empirical research. Meanwhile, following the research clue of“institutional background—theoretical analysis—empirical analysis—countermeasure research”, this paper makes a all-rounded and deepened research on the subject of“state grade control, capital structure and agent problem”and gets several view points and conclusions of theoretical and practical value.
Firstly, this paper establishes the analysis framework of capital structure’s impact on agent problems in state holding companies based on the incomplete contract theory. The theoretical foundation of previous analysis of capital structure’s influence on agent problem is complete contract theory. However, under restrict assumptions, complete contract theory suggests that every related question in future can be described in contracts, every related matter can be solved by negotiation in advance. This is unrealistic and unable to give reasonable explanation to capital structure’s influence on agent problem. The incomplete theory developed by Grossman and Hart (1998), Hart and Moore (1990) suggests that when contracts are incomplete, the questions of who owns the assets and who has the right to control the assets, etc., are of vital importance. It is focused on the optimal arrangement of residue claims and corporate control. The proper allocation of residue claims and corporate control between stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors and managers is the key to improve operation efficiency and decrease agent costs. Therefore, the incomplete contract theory makes direct analysis on agent problem and reaches the essence of the question from the angel of corporate control, and thus, it is a useful tool in analyzing the issue of corporate governance of state holding enterprises. This paper is based on incomplete contract theory and finds that unreasonable capital structure will lead to asymmetric arrangement of residue claims and corporate control in stakeholders, which is the origin of the agent problems in state holding companies.
Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper adopts data from our state holding listed companies and carries out empirical analysis on agent problem under the situation of state grade control. Due to the status que of grade control of state holding listed companies, state holding companies can be categorized as central government holding listed companies and local government holding listed companies. The series of significant differences in governance characteristics and agent problem of these two kinds of companies were been systematically discussed. Based on the difference in establishment path of these two kinds of state holding listed companies, the empirical research in this paper finds that there are differences in agent problem for state holding listed companies in different grade of control: central government holding listed companies mainly face the agent problem between controlling shareholders and small-and-medium shareholders, whereas local government holding listed companies mainly face the agent problem between controlling shareholders and managers.
Lastly, this paper constructs new measuring index for agent costs, and makes analyses on capital structure’s influence on agent problem in state holding enterprises. Contra posing the limitation of previous measures for agent costs, this paper estimates corporate normal expenditure by regression model, and then takes regression residual as the replacing variable for agent costs. It takes state holding listed companies as research objects, does empirical researches and finds that capital structure is significant factor in capital structure’s influence on agent problem in state holding enterprises, meanwhile, there are differences in agent costs for state holding listed companies in different grade of control.
引文
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