机构股东与公司治理绩效相关性的实证研究
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摘要
20世纪80年代之后,英美发达国家的机构投资者迅速崛起,公司股权结构从高度分散转变为相对集中,机构投资者的投资策略也由“保持距离”向“控制导向”转变,从而导致不受监督制约的“伯利-米恩斯”式的“管理人导向型”向越来越受到机构投资者控制与监督的“投资人导向型”转变。德鲁克称之为看不见的革命,也被称为机构股东积极主义的兴起。我国上市公司股权结构不合理,流通股比重低且过度分散。市场法律法规不完善且监管不力,导致上市公司治理问题严重。而我国机构投资者正处于蓬勃发展中,借鉴国外机构投资者参与公司治理的经验,引进我国机构投资者介入公司治理可以弥补国有股退出的空间,优化上市公司股权结构和治理结构,从而实现向公司剩余索取权与控制权合一的投资人导向治理模式转变。
本文首先探讨了中国机构投资者作为公司治理监督主体的有效性及必然性,跟着分析了中国机构投资者参与公司治理的内在动因、参与方式。然后使用股数效应模型、公司数效应模型和行为博弈模型进一步从经济学的角度对机构投资者参与公司治理的行为进行分析。接着本文以2001、2002和2003三年2017个沪深机构持股上市公司为研究样本,对机构投资者持股与公司治理绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究,并结合中国机构投资者参与上市公司治理近五年的案例对机构股东参与公司治理绩效进行案例分析。实证研究表明,机构投资持股比例与公司绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系,机构投资者持股比例高的公司具有更好的经营绩效。而机构投资者通过“用手投票”和“关系投资”介入公司治理的个案也充分说明机构股东积极主义在监督控股股东和管理层侵害中小股东利益的行为的有效性。本文最后提出了中国机构投资者提升上市公司治理绩效的相关对策。
After 1980’s, the institutional investors of developed countries developed faster and faster. The ownership structure of listed companies has changed from dispersal into relative concentration. The investment strategy of institutional shareholder also changed from‘arms length’into‘control-oriented’. Consequently, this change induced the uncontrolled‘Berle-Means’administrator leading type convert into investors leading type controlled by institutional shareholders. It was called by Drunker as an‘unseen revolution’, also called as institutional shareholder activism rising. The ownership structure of Chinese listed company is irrational: lower proportion of circulating shares and lonely state-owned shares. The market law and code is fault. Both of this bring serious problem on the corporate governance. Institutional investors of our country are in a flourish development lately. Using the experience of foreign institutional shareholders involving in corporate governance for reference, we suggest that the market introduces the institutional investor to make up the space of reduction of state-owned shares. And thus it can optimize equity structure and improve operating performance of the listed company. Sequentially, it will make the conversion into the investors leading governance pattern which residual income power and control power are syncretic come true.
This paper first discussed the supervision effectiveness of institutional investor in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, then analyzed the inherent reason, exertion manner of Chinese institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Then from the economical point, we use shares effect model, company numbers effect model and behavior game model to make further study on institutional shareholders activism behavior. After that, this paper examines the relativity of institutional shareholdings and the corporate performance through an empirical study on data of 2017 institutional holding listed companies from 2001～2003. The empirical study indicates that there is a positive and significant correlation between the proportion of institutional investor shareholdings and corporate governance performance. Moreover, combing with cases of institutional investor exerting shareholder activism in later five years, we carry out a further exemplification on the effectiveness of Chinese institutional shareholder participating in corporate governance. The cases of institutional investor exerting activism by‘vote with hand’and‘relationship investment’explain fully the effective of institutional shareholder activism in monitoring control shareholder and administrators infracting the interest of middle-small shareholders. The final section brings out corresponding countermeasures of institutional investor improving corporate governance performance.
本文首先探讨了中国机构投资者作为公司治理监督主体的有效性及必然性,跟着分析了中国机构投资者参与公司治理的内在动因、参与方式。然后使用股数效应模型、公司数效应模型和行为博弈模型进一步从经济学的角度对机构投资者参与公司治理的行为进行分析。接着本文以2001、2002和2003三年2017个沪深机构持股上市公司为研究样本,对机构投资者持股与公司治理绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究,并结合中国机构投资者参与上市公司治理近五年的案例对机构股东参与公司治理绩效进行案例分析。实证研究表明,机构投资持股比例与公司绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系,机构投资者持股比例高的公司具有更好的经营绩效。而机构投资者通过“用手投票”和“关系投资”介入公司治理的个案也充分说明机构股东积极主义在监督控股股东和管理层侵害中小股东利益的行为的有效性。本文最后提出了中国机构投资者提升上市公司治理绩效的相关对策。
After 1980’s, the institutional investors of developed countries developed faster and faster. The ownership structure of listed companies has changed from dispersal into relative concentration. The investment strategy of institutional shareholder also changed from‘arms length’into‘control-oriented’. Consequently, this change induced the uncontrolled‘Berle-Means’administrator leading type convert into investors leading type controlled by institutional shareholders. It was called by Drunker as an‘unseen revolution’, also called as institutional shareholder activism rising. The ownership structure of Chinese listed company is irrational: lower proportion of circulating shares and lonely state-owned shares. The market law and code is fault. Both of this bring serious problem on the corporate governance. Institutional investors of our country are in a flourish development lately. Using the experience of foreign institutional shareholders involving in corporate governance for reference, we suggest that the market introduces the institutional investor to make up the space of reduction of state-owned shares. And thus it can optimize equity structure and improve operating performance of the listed company. Sequentially, it will make the conversion into the investors leading governance pattern which residual income power and control power are syncretic come true.
This paper first discussed the supervision effectiveness of institutional investor in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, then analyzed the inherent reason, exertion manner of Chinese institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Then from the economical point, we use shares effect model, company numbers effect model and behavior game model to make further study on institutional shareholders activism behavior. After that, this paper examines the relativity of institutional shareholdings and the corporate performance through an empirical study on data of 2017 institutional holding listed companies from 2001～2003. The empirical study indicates that there is a positive and significant correlation between the proportion of institutional investor shareholdings and corporate governance performance. Moreover, combing with cases of institutional investor exerting shareholder activism in later five years, we carry out a further exemplification on the effectiveness of Chinese institutional shareholder participating in corporate governance. The cases of institutional investor exerting activism by‘vote with hand’and‘relationship investment’explain fully the effective of institutional shareholder activism in monitoring control shareholder and administrators infracting the interest of middle-small shareholders. The final section brings out corresponding countermeasures of institutional investor improving corporate governance performance.
引文
[1] 马歇尔·E·布鲁姆. 华尔街的革命.北京:经济科学出版社,1999
[2] Peter Drunker.The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, New York, Harper & Row, 1974
[3] 耿志民.中国机构投资者研究.北京:中国人民出版社,1999
[4] 黄菊波,杨小舟.上市公司治理结构与财务治理相关问题的研究.财政研究,2003,(2):14-19
[5] Pound, John.Proxy contest and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.Journal of Financial Economics 1988, (20): 237-265
[6] Brickley J. A. , R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith. J r,.Ownership structure and the monitoring of managers.Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, (20): 267-291
[7] Michael P.Smith.Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CALPERS.The Journal of Finance, 1996
[8] Tarun Khanna, Krishna Palepu.Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance.NBER Working Papers 6955, www.nber.org/ papers/w6955
[9] McConnell, J.; H. Servaes,.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (27): 595-612
[10] McConnell, J.; H. Servaes.Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt.Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, (39): 131-157
[11] Philip C., Thomas I. Smythe, Chris R. Maneil . The “CalPERS effect” Revisited.Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, (10): 157-174
[12] Murali Patibandla.Equity pattern, corporate governance and performance: A study of India’s corporate sector.Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, 2006, (59): 29-44
[13] Mara Faccio, M.Ameziane Lasfer . Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes.Journal of Corporate Finance 2000, (6): 71-110
[14] Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang.Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies.Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Economic Development Institute, 1997
[15] 娄伟.基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究.上海经济研究,2002,(6):58-62
[16] 向朝进,谢明.我国上市公司绩效与公司治理机构关系的实证分析.管理世界,2003,(5):117-123
[17] 汤劲松,黄少军.机构投资者与上市公司治理结构.世界经济与政治论坛,2003,(3):36-39
[18] 江向东.公司治理与机构投资人持股之研究.南开管理评论,2004,(7):33-40
[19] Berle, A., and G. Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York,Macmillan Publishing Company, 1932
[20] Fama, Eugene F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy, 1980, (88)
[21] 郭鹏飞、孙培源.资本结构的行业特征:基于中国上市公司的实证研究.经济研究,2003,(5):66-73
[22] 叶康涛.公司控制权的隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究.经济科学,2003,(5):61-69.
[23] 秦海.皇帝的夜鹰——孟可斯的公司治理心说.上市公司,2000,(120)
[24] 卢现祥.西方新制度经济学.北京:中国发展出版社,1996
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[26] 万解秋,陈洁.投资机构介入公司治理的新视野.上海经济研究,2000,(8):28-32
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[32] 何自力.论机构投资者在美国公司治理中的作用.南开经济研究,1998 (3):31-35
[33] 买亿媛.机构投资者的战略选择与公司治理.商业经济与管理,1999,(4):51-53
[34] 杨德群,杨朝军.论机构投资者的持股特征.上海管理科学,2004,(4):12-14
[35] 高永辉,李小毛.股权结构、公司治理与机构投资者保护的一个分析框架.北方经贸,2003,(10):35-36
[36] E. Philip Davis.Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector.Economic Systems, 2002, (26): 203–229
[37] Gillan, Stuart L. and Starks, Laura T.Relationship investing and shareholder activism by institutional investors.Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (57)
[38] 张俊生,杨熠.美国机构投资者在公司治理中的作用.证券市场导报,2001,(8):68-72
[39] Carleton, W., Nelson, J,.Weisbach, M. The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: evidence from TIAA-CREF.Journal of Finance LIII, 1998: 1335-1362
[40] John K. and A Klein.Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Governance.New York University Working Paper, 1995
[41] Guercio,D., Hawkins, J, . The motivation and impact of pension fund activism.Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, (52): 293-340
[42] Gillan, S., Starks, L,.Corporate governance proposal and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors.Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, (57): 275-305
[43] 崔讯,刘磊磊.机构投资者参与公司治理分析.经济与管理,2004, (5):78-80
[44] 贾小松,封文丽.机构投资者与上市公司治理.财贸研究,2002(3):62-66
[45] 陈仲民.机构投资者与公司治理结构——论发达国家机构股东积极主义的兴起及其对公司治理的影响.吉林大学博士学位论文,2005.5
[46] Holderness, G. G. and Sheehan, D. P,.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporation: An Exploratory Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
[47] 仲继银.积极投资者的崛起——美国机构投资者为何和如何参与公司治理及其对中国的启示.国际经济评论,2000,(9):41-45
[48] 李青原.论机构投资者在公司治理中的角色定位及政策建议.南开管理评论,2003,(2):28-33
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[2] Peter Drunker.The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, New York, Harper & Row, 1974
[3] 耿志民.中国机构投资者研究.北京:中国人民出版社,1999
[4] 黄菊波,杨小舟.上市公司治理结构与财务治理相关问题的研究.财政研究,2003,(2):14-19
[5] Pound, John.Proxy contest and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.Journal of Financial Economics 1988, (20): 237-265
[6] Brickley J. A. , R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith. J r,.Ownership structure and the monitoring of managers.Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, (20): 267-291
[7] Michael P.Smith.Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CALPERS.The Journal of Finance, 1996
[8] Tarun Khanna, Krishna Palepu.Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance.NBER Working Papers 6955, www.nber.org/ papers/w6955
[9] McConnell, J.; H. Servaes,.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (27): 595-612
[10] McConnell, J.; H. Servaes.Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt.Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, (39): 131-157
[11] Philip C., Thomas I. Smythe, Chris R. Maneil . The “CalPERS effect” Revisited.Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, (10): 157-174
[12] Murali Patibandla.Equity pattern, corporate governance and performance: A study of India’s corporate sector.Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, 2006, (59): 29-44
[13] Mara Faccio, M.Ameziane Lasfer . Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes.Journal of Corporate Finance 2000, (6): 71-110
[14] Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang.Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies.Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Economic Development Institute, 1997
[15] 娄伟.基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究.上海经济研究,2002,(6):58-62
[16] 向朝进,谢明.我国上市公司绩效与公司治理机构关系的实证分析.管理世界,2003,(5):117-123
[17] 汤劲松,黄少军.机构投资者与上市公司治理结构.世界经济与政治论坛,2003,(3):36-39
[18] 江向东.公司治理与机构投资人持股之研究.南开管理评论,2004,(7):33-40
[19] Berle, A., and G. Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York,Macmillan Publishing Company, 1932
[20] Fama, Eugene F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy, 1980, (88)
[21] 郭鹏飞、孙培源.资本结构的行业特征:基于中国上市公司的实证研究.经济研究,2003,(5):66-73
[22] 叶康涛.公司控制权的隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究.经济科学,2003,(5):61-69.
[23] 秦海.皇帝的夜鹰——孟可斯的公司治理心说.上市公司,2000,(120)
[24] 卢现祥.西方新制度经济学.北京:中国发展出版社,1996
[25] 姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述.经济研究,2003,(5):83-91
[26] 万解秋,陈洁.投资机构介入公司治理的新视野.上海经济研究,2000,(8):28-32
[27] Black, B. S,.Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States.The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, P. Newman, 1998
[28] Talner, L.The Origins of Shareholder Activism.Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc. Washington D.C, 1983
[29] 张小蒂,李风华.机构投资者的策略变动与上市公司治理.财贸经济,2001,(11):19-24
[30] 唐正清,王子文.机构投资者参与公司治理的效应分析.中州学刊,2005,(3):55-57
[31] 唐正清,顾慈阳. 机构投资者参与公司治理:理论分析、经验总结和对策建议.江淮论坛,2005,(3):36-43
[32] 何自力.论机构投资者在美国公司治理中的作用.南开经济研究,1998 (3):31-35
[33] 买亿媛.机构投资者的战略选择与公司治理.商业经济与管理,1999,(4):51-53
[34] 杨德群,杨朝军.论机构投资者的持股特征.上海管理科学,2004,(4):12-14
[35] 高永辉,李小毛.股权结构、公司治理与机构投资者保护的一个分析框架.北方经贸,2003,(10):35-36
[36] E. Philip Davis.Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector.Economic Systems, 2002, (26): 203–229
[37] Gillan, Stuart L. and Starks, Laura T.Relationship investing and shareholder activism by institutional investors.Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (57)
[38] 张俊生,杨熠.美国机构投资者在公司治理中的作用.证券市场导报,2001,(8):68-72
[39] Carleton, W., Nelson, J,.Weisbach, M. The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: evidence from TIAA-CREF.Journal of Finance LIII, 1998: 1335-1362
[40] John K. and A Klein.Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Governance.New York University Working Paper, 1995
[41] Guercio,D., Hawkins, J, . The motivation and impact of pension fund activism.Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, (52): 293-340
[42] Gillan, S., Starks, L,.Corporate governance proposal and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors.Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, (57): 275-305
[43] 崔讯,刘磊磊.机构投资者参与公司治理分析.经济与管理,2004, (5):78-80
[44] 贾小松,封文丽.机构投资者与上市公司治理.财贸研究,2002(3):62-66
[45] 陈仲民.机构投资者与公司治理结构——论发达国家机构股东积极主义的兴起及其对公司治理的影响.吉林大学博士学位论文,2005.5
[46] Holderness, G. G. and Sheehan, D. P,.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporation: An Exploratory Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
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