地方政府竞争与外资分布的不平衡性研究
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摘要
引进外资有利于扩大投资,创造就业,增加税收,推动产业结构升级。但中国的外资分布具有高度的不平衡特征,一是地区间不平衡,外资主要集中在东部地区,中西部地区吸引外资不足;二是产业间不平衡,外资主要集中在制造业,除房地产外的服务业吸引外资不足。外资分布的不平衡加剧了经济结构失衡。从中国的制度环境出发,应该从地方政府招商引资中的竞争入手来研究这一现象。
地方政府招商引资具有双向选择、分散决策、偏好差异等特征,采用双边匹配模型能很好地研究招商引资的过程。招商引资参与主体的偏好差异是双边匹配的基础。对投资厂商来说,其偏好的形成受到两类因素的影响,一类是环境因素,包括市场、成本、社会环境、产业发展基础与集聚效应,这一类因素地方政府在短期内难以改变。第二类是政策因素,地方政府可以改变,作为参与招商引资竞争的策略,主要包括：税收优惠、地价优惠、财政返还、降低投资门槛等,而不同的政策对投资厂商的影响不同。对政府来说,其偏好的形成同样要考虑投资项目的诸多属性,主要包括经济效益、社会效益、生态效益及企业自身素质。
研究发现,招商引资是一个分散化的匹配过程,但使用的是投资厂商“求婚”的递延接受算法,理论上中央化的匹配算法在分散化的匹配过程中能够得以实现；匹配结果是投资厂商的最优稳定匹配,因此理论上招商引资市场将比较稳定。特别的,当地方政府对投资项目的偏好出现同质时,会导致投资项目集中,即制造业项目集中在少数地区,既表现出地区间外资分布的不平衡,又表现为产业间外资分布的不平衡。
因此,改进地方政府的招商引资、缓解外资分布的不平衡有两条途径,一是改进匹配机制,建立一个类似中央清算所的机构；二是转变政府职能,从而降低偏好一致性。
The introduction of foreign capital is conducive to expand investment, create jobs, increase tax revenue and promote industrial upgrading. But since the reform, the level of using foreign capital to develop among regions is very uneven. At the same time, the extensive merchants and attract investment based on the scale expansion has exposed many issues such as regional disorderly competition, pollution of the environment and regional development. Therefore, study the process and the competition of local governments to attract foreign investment is of great significance to regulate the merchants behavior of local governments, to promote the rational distribution of foreign investment in China, as well as to promote the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure.
Since local government merchants and attract investment has the characteristics of bi-directional choice, decentralized decision-making and preference differences, using bilateral matching model can study the process of merchants and attract investment very well. The preference differences of the merchants and attract investment participants are the basis of bilateral matching. For investment firms, their preferences' formation is influenced by two types of factors. One is the environment-related factors, including the market, the cost, the social environment, the basis for industrial development and the combined effect. The other is the policy-related factors, which means that local governments can change the competition strategy participating in the merchants and attract investment, mainly including preferential tax treatment, land premium concessions, financial return, lowering the investment threshold and so on, while different policies have different influences on investment manufacturers. As for the government, their preferences formation also need to consider the various attributes of investment projects, including economic, social and ecological benefits and their own quality.
The study has found that:the merchants and attract investment is a decentralized matching process, but using a deferred acceptance algorithm in which the investment manufactures make a propose and the centralized matching algorithm can be realized in a decentralized matching process theoretically; the result of matching is the optimal stable matching of investment vendors, so in theory, the investment market will be relatively stable;lacking the differences of local government preferences will leads to investment project concentration, focused around too much competition, in other words, the competition around big projects is too fierce, which will result in great decline of the welfare of the local government and will make the matching results imbalance. Empirical research further shows that the geographical distribution of investment really has a highly uneven characteristic, and the foreign capital regional flow is influenced not only by environmental factors, but also by policy factors.
From this study, there are two ways to improve local government merchants and attract investment. First, improve the matching mechanism, establishing a institution like central clearing institutions; Second, transform government functions, thereby reduce the preference consistency.
地方政府招商引资具有双向选择、分散决策、偏好差异等特征,采用双边匹配模型能很好地研究招商引资的过程。招商引资参与主体的偏好差异是双边匹配的基础。对投资厂商来说,其偏好的形成受到两类因素的影响,一类是环境因素,包括市场、成本、社会环境、产业发展基础与集聚效应,这一类因素地方政府在短期内难以改变。第二类是政策因素,地方政府可以改变,作为参与招商引资竞争的策略,主要包括：税收优惠、地价优惠、财政返还、降低投资门槛等,而不同的政策对投资厂商的影响不同。对政府来说,其偏好的形成同样要考虑投资项目的诸多属性,主要包括经济效益、社会效益、生态效益及企业自身素质。
研究发现,招商引资是一个分散化的匹配过程,但使用的是投资厂商“求婚”的递延接受算法,理论上中央化的匹配算法在分散化的匹配过程中能够得以实现；匹配结果是投资厂商的最优稳定匹配,因此理论上招商引资市场将比较稳定。特别的,当地方政府对投资项目的偏好出现同质时,会导致投资项目集中,即制造业项目集中在少数地区,既表现出地区间外资分布的不平衡,又表现为产业间外资分布的不平衡。
因此,改进地方政府的招商引资、缓解外资分布的不平衡有两条途径,一是改进匹配机制,建立一个类似中央清算所的机构；二是转变政府职能,从而降低偏好一致性。
The introduction of foreign capital is conducive to expand investment, create jobs, increase tax revenue and promote industrial upgrading. But since the reform, the level of using foreign capital to develop among regions is very uneven. At the same time, the extensive merchants and attract investment based on the scale expansion has exposed many issues such as regional disorderly competition, pollution of the environment and regional development. Therefore, study the process and the competition of local governments to attract foreign investment is of great significance to regulate the merchants behavior of local governments, to promote the rational distribution of foreign investment in China, as well as to promote the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure.
Since local government merchants and attract investment has the characteristics of bi-directional choice, decentralized decision-making and preference differences, using bilateral matching model can study the process of merchants and attract investment very well. The preference differences of the merchants and attract investment participants are the basis of bilateral matching. For investment firms, their preferences' formation is influenced by two types of factors. One is the environment-related factors, including the market, the cost, the social environment, the basis for industrial development and the combined effect. The other is the policy-related factors, which means that local governments can change the competition strategy participating in the merchants and attract investment, mainly including preferential tax treatment, land premium concessions, financial return, lowering the investment threshold and so on, while different policies have different influences on investment manufacturers. As for the government, their preferences formation also need to consider the various attributes of investment projects, including economic, social and ecological benefits and their own quality.
The study has found that:the merchants and attract investment is a decentralized matching process, but using a deferred acceptance algorithm in which the investment manufactures make a propose and the centralized matching algorithm can be realized in a decentralized matching process theoretically; the result of matching is the optimal stable matching of investment vendors, so in theory, the investment market will be relatively stable;lacking the differences of local government preferences will leads to investment project concentration, focused around too much competition, in other words, the competition around big projects is too fierce, which will result in great decline of the welfare of the local government and will make the matching results imbalance. Empirical research further shows that the geographical distribution of investment really has a highly uneven characteristic, and the foreign capital regional flow is influenced not only by environmental factors, but also by policy factors.
From this study, there are two ways to improve local government merchants and attract investment. First, improve the matching mechanism, establishing a institution like central clearing institutions; Second, transform government functions, thereby reduce the preference consistency.
引文
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