煤矿企业逆向物流的演化博弈分析及激励机制研究
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摘要
煤矿企业高投入、高消耗和高排放的发展模式,对环境造成了严重的污染,对资源造成了极大的浪费,煤矿的清洁生产势在必行。物流是煤矿企业生产中的一个重要环节,在很大程度上决定着煤矿清洁生产是否能够实现。然而,传统的煤矿物流由于其固有的缺陷已不能满足现实的发展需要,逆向物流却能够有效降低对环境的污染和对资源的浪费,能够为煤矿企业、甚至整个社会带来重大的经济利益和环境效益。于是,素有“绿色物流”之称的逆向物流就成为煤矿物流的现实性选择。近年来,有关煤矿逆向物流的文献不少,主要集中于逆向物流的构建方面,且大都停留于理论层面,有关煤矿逆向物流参与主体的研究很少见。事实上,煤矿逆向物流参与主体在很大程度上决定着煤矿逆向物流实施的效果。因此,对煤矿逆向物流各参与主体进行深入分析,并在此基础上构建煤矿逆向物流的激励机制以促使煤矿企业积极实施逆向物流的研究具有重要意义,这亦是本文的选题依据所在。
为解决煤矿企业逆向物流的顺利实施问题,本文运用演化博弈论和委托——代理模型的相关理论和方法,结合我国煤矿逆向物流的实施现状,研究了煤矿逆向物流各参与主体及其相互关系,建立了煤矿实施逆向物流的激励机制。主要研究内容如下：
首先,对逆向物流理论、演化博弈理论和激励机制理论等与煤矿逆向物流相关的理论进行了简要阐述,在对国内外相关研究进行了分类分析的基础上发现对煤矿逆向物流各参与主体的研究是不可缺少的；
其次,利用演化博弈理论分别对政府与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与社会监督力量(本文指新闻媒体)、社会监督力量与政府的博弈关系进行演化博弈模型的构建和分析。重点研究了三者之间的演化博弈行为对煤矿逆向物流实施的影响,深入探索了各参与主体对煤矿逆向物流产生影响的内在作用机理；
然后,在分析三者演化博弈情况的基础上,以政府为主体、社会监督力量和煤矿企业自身为两翼,构建煤矿企业实施逆向物流的激励机制,主要包括政府对煤矿企业的激励机制、社会监督力量对煤矿企业的激励机制、煤矿企业内部的激励机制；
最后,将演化博弈模型和委托——代理模型应用于某典型煤矿企业,并就政府与煤矿企业的演化博弈和政府对煤矿企业的经济激励为例,求解演化博弈的稳定策略和激励的最优水平,观察不同情况下的演化状态,检验本文所提出相关结论的正确性。
以上研究表明：政府、煤矿企业和社会监督力量在煤矿企业逆向物流的实施过程中起着举足轻重的作用,仅凭借某一方的力量无法保证逆向物流的顺利进行；煤矿企业逆向物流激励机制对煤矿企业实施逆向物流的积极性具有一定的促进作用；煤矿企业逆向物流不仅仅是煤矿企业应尽的责任,也是整个社会的责任。
The development model of high input, high consumption and high emission of coal mine enterprises causes serious pollution to the environment and great waste of resources. Cleaner production is imperative in the coal mine. Coal mine enterprises logistics is an important link in production of coal mine enterprises, which greatly determines whether coal cleaner production can be achieved. However, due to its inherent defects, traditional coal mine logistics already cannot satisfy the development of modern society. Reverse logistics can effectively reduce the pollution to the environment and waste of resource, and could bring economic benefits and environmental benefits to coal mine enterprises, and even the society as a whole. So, reverse logistics called "green logistics" become the realistic choice of coal mine enterprises. In recent years, there are many documents of the reverse logistics of coal mine, which mainly focus on the construction of reverse logistics, and mostly stay in the theoretical level. However, there are few documents of participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine. In fact, the participants affect the result of coal mine implementing reverse logistics. Therefore, there is great significance to analyze participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine and establish incentive mechanism, which could encourage coal mine to actively implement reverse logistics.
To solve the problem of coal mine enterprises reverse logistics' smooth implementation, with combination of the present situation of the reverse logistics of coal mine, evolutionary game theory and principal-agent model are used to study participants of the reverse logistics, and incentive mechanism of coal mine enterprises reverse logistics is established in this paper. The main contents are as follows:
Firstly, theories related to reverse logistics of coal mine are described, such as the reverse logistics theory, evolutionary game theory and the theory of incentive mechanism. The study to participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine is indispensable based on related research at home and abroad;
Secondly, three evolutionary game models are established to analyze the process of dynamic evolution and interaction mechanism among the government, coal enterprises and the media. The impact of the behavior among the three to reverse logistics of coal mine enterprises is analyzed;
Then, the incentive mechanism of reverse logistics of coal mine enterprises is established on the basis of the above research. The government is the main body, the media and the coal enterprise for the two wings. The incentive mechanism includes: the government' encouragements for coal mining enterprises, the public' encouragements for coal mining enterprises and encouragements from the coal enterprise for itself.
Finally, evolutionary game model and principal-agent model are applied to a certain coal mining enterprise. Related data is selected to solve the evolutionary stable strategy and the optimal level of motivation in order to check the validity of the conclusions in this paper.
The above studies have shown that:the government, coal enterprises and the media play an important role when coal enterprises implement reverse logistics. If only rely on a particular, it's unable to ensure the smooth progress of coal enterprises reverse logistics. The incentive mechanism of coal enterprise reverse logistics is effective; reverse logistics is not only coal mining enterprises' responsibility, but also the responsibility of the society as a whole.
为解决煤矿企业逆向物流的顺利实施问题,本文运用演化博弈论和委托——代理模型的相关理论和方法,结合我国煤矿逆向物流的实施现状,研究了煤矿逆向物流各参与主体及其相互关系,建立了煤矿实施逆向物流的激励机制。主要研究内容如下：
首先,对逆向物流理论、演化博弈理论和激励机制理论等与煤矿逆向物流相关的理论进行了简要阐述,在对国内外相关研究进行了分类分析的基础上发现对煤矿逆向物流各参与主体的研究是不可缺少的；
其次,利用演化博弈理论分别对政府与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与社会监督力量(本文指新闻媒体)、社会监督力量与政府的博弈关系进行演化博弈模型的构建和分析。重点研究了三者之间的演化博弈行为对煤矿逆向物流实施的影响,深入探索了各参与主体对煤矿逆向物流产生影响的内在作用机理；
然后,在分析三者演化博弈情况的基础上,以政府为主体、社会监督力量和煤矿企业自身为两翼,构建煤矿企业实施逆向物流的激励机制,主要包括政府对煤矿企业的激励机制、社会监督力量对煤矿企业的激励机制、煤矿企业内部的激励机制；
最后,将演化博弈模型和委托——代理模型应用于某典型煤矿企业,并就政府与煤矿企业的演化博弈和政府对煤矿企业的经济激励为例,求解演化博弈的稳定策略和激励的最优水平,观察不同情况下的演化状态,检验本文所提出相关结论的正确性。
以上研究表明：政府、煤矿企业和社会监督力量在煤矿企业逆向物流的实施过程中起着举足轻重的作用,仅凭借某一方的力量无法保证逆向物流的顺利进行；煤矿企业逆向物流激励机制对煤矿企业实施逆向物流的积极性具有一定的促进作用；煤矿企业逆向物流不仅仅是煤矿企业应尽的责任,也是整个社会的责任。
The development model of high input, high consumption and high emission of coal mine enterprises causes serious pollution to the environment and great waste of resources. Cleaner production is imperative in the coal mine. Coal mine enterprises logistics is an important link in production of coal mine enterprises, which greatly determines whether coal cleaner production can be achieved. However, due to its inherent defects, traditional coal mine logistics already cannot satisfy the development of modern society. Reverse logistics can effectively reduce the pollution to the environment and waste of resource, and could bring economic benefits and environmental benefits to coal mine enterprises, and even the society as a whole. So, reverse logistics called "green logistics" become the realistic choice of coal mine enterprises. In recent years, there are many documents of the reverse logistics of coal mine, which mainly focus on the construction of reverse logistics, and mostly stay in the theoretical level. However, there are few documents of participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine. In fact, the participants affect the result of coal mine implementing reverse logistics. Therefore, there is great significance to analyze participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine and establish incentive mechanism, which could encourage coal mine to actively implement reverse logistics.
To solve the problem of coal mine enterprises reverse logistics' smooth implementation, with combination of the present situation of the reverse logistics of coal mine, evolutionary game theory and principal-agent model are used to study participants of the reverse logistics, and incentive mechanism of coal mine enterprises reverse logistics is established in this paper. The main contents are as follows:
Firstly, theories related to reverse logistics of coal mine are described, such as the reverse logistics theory, evolutionary game theory and the theory of incentive mechanism. The study to participants of the reverse logistics of coal mine is indispensable based on related research at home and abroad;
Secondly, three evolutionary game models are established to analyze the process of dynamic evolution and interaction mechanism among the government, coal enterprises and the media. The impact of the behavior among the three to reverse logistics of coal mine enterprises is analyzed;
Then, the incentive mechanism of reverse logistics of coal mine enterprises is established on the basis of the above research. The government is the main body, the media and the coal enterprise for the two wings. The incentive mechanism includes: the government' encouragements for coal mining enterprises, the public' encouragements for coal mining enterprises and encouragements from the coal enterprise for itself.
Finally, evolutionary game model and principal-agent model are applied to a certain coal mining enterprise. Related data is selected to solve the evolutionary stable strategy and the optimal level of motivation in order to check the validity of the conclusions in this paper.
The above studies have shown that:the government, coal enterprises and the media play an important role when coal enterprises implement reverse logistics. If only rely on a particular, it's unable to ensure the smooth progress of coal enterprises reverse logistics. The incentive mechanism of coal enterprise reverse logistics is effective; reverse logistics is not only coal mining enterprises' responsibility, but also the responsibility of the society as a whole.
引文
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