基于风险管理的家具供应商选择及利益分配研究
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摘要
中国已成为世界瞩目的家具制造大国和家具出口第一大国,中国家具业已经形成了以大型企业为龙头、中小型企业为主体的格局,拥有庞大的生产、管理和营销等上下游完整的供应链,家具业已成为国民经济的重要产业。而我国家具供应链管理策略研究刚刚起步,在我国家具行业中的运用还处在初级阶段,严重阻碍了我国家具行业的长远发展。另外,我国每年商品木材一半都需要进口,家具供应商的选择影响家具供应链的整体效益和风险。家具供应链中的各种风险因素导致我国家具企业供应链运作效率降低,家具供应链缺乏应有的弹性,破坏了原有的供应链内逻辑关系,导致供应链利益分配不合理,供应链管理优势难以体现,影响供应链的稳定发展。因此,有必要从风险管理的角度对家具供应链进行深入研究。
本论文从如何减少家具供应链风险的角度研究家具供应链风险、供应商的选择及利益分配。以风险管理理论和供应链管理理论为基础,并结合风险管理学、运筹与控制论、概率与数理统计等学科领域中的方法进行系统性研究。基于系统分析方法对家具企业供应链风险构成进行分析：基于博弈论和决策理论对家具企业与供应商的关系、优化决策进行分析；基于概率分析与统计理论对风险预测、最优供应商数量决策进行研究；基于运筹控制分析方法对家具供应链利益分配及协调进行分析。具体研究内容与创新点如下：
(1)提出了家具供应链风险的扩散机理和变化途径,构建一个较完整的家具供应链风险管理理论框架。
通过引入风险传导思想,建立了一个由风险因素和风险传导途径构成的家具供应链风险传导模型,对家具供应链的风险传导机理进行了分析,然后从家具风险因素、节点企业和整个供应链网络三个层面对风险进行了定量评估,并通过数值实验对传导模型及风险评估方法进行了检验,验证了模型及方法的的有效性性,结论表明通过建立家具风险传导模型,使家具供应链的风险评估更接近于供应链网络现实。
(2)构建了家具供应链风险的评价指标体系,基于粗糙.模糊综合评价法提出家具供应链的风险评估模型。
首先提出风险评价指标体系构建的依据和原则；在此基础上对相关指标的进行选取及解释,对所选指标的进行进一步的筛选及优化,构建完整的家具供应链风险评价指标体系。此外,针对家具供应链的特点建立了基于粗糙集定权的模糊综合评估模型评价家具供应链风险水平,并通过数值实验得出指标体系中采购因素对家具供应链风险影响较大,而系统战略因素风险水平较小,其它各影响因素风险水平中等的结论。
(3)基于层次分析法和模糊综合评价法提出家具供应商的定性选择模型；从风险控制的角度构建家具供应商的最优数量决策模型。
从供应风险控制的角度出发,建立了家具供应商选择的风险评价指标体系；运用模糊综合评价法构建了供应商选择模型。从风险的角度对供应商数量对风险的影响进行了分析,同时考虑家具供应过程中的交易成本、管理成本和风险损失成本,提出了一种考虑供应风险的最优供应商数量决策方法。最后,通过数值实验对上述方法进行了检验,结论表明风险评价指标、评价模型以及最优家具供应商数量的决策方法具有有效性和实用性。
(4)基于Stackelberg博弈提出收益共享和特许经营费协调由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统。
考虑了基于家具制造商决定零售价格的委托销售(寄售)家具供应链,在非合作博弈框架下考虑了双方的决策,得到了Stackelberg均衡解。在需求具有价格敏性下收益共享和特许经营费能使家具供应链达到协调,同时协调后渠道利润和成员利润都比分散化独立决策时相应的利润要大。最后的数值实例检验了模型和方法的有效性。
(5)基于收益共享合约构建了多家具供应商供应链系统的协调模型。
针对n个不同供应商的家具供应商系统,在一体化决策时研究家具供应链系统的最优决策；在分散化决策时,通常的批发价格合约不能使家具供应链系统利润达到最优,提出收益共享合约协调该供应链系统,同时与批发价格合约进行比较,得出了不同合约下的最优决策及相关结论,最后运用数值实验对协调模型进行了检验。
China has become the well-know furniture export and furniture manufacturing country in the world. China's furniture industry has been formed as the leading large enterprises, small and medium enterprises as the main pattern, and the complete upper and lower furniture supply chain with a huge production, management and marketing, furniture has become an important industry in the national economy. In China, furniture supply chain management strategy study has just started, and the use of it is still in the initial stage, which is a serious impediment to long-term development of China's furniture industry. In addition, half of wood depend on to import wood products each year, furniture suppliers'selection effect the overall supply chain benefits and risks. Furniture supply chain of various risk factors lead to reduced efficiency of supply chain operations, furniture supply chain lack of flexibility, destroyed the original logic of supply chain, leading to irrational benefits distribution of supply chain, the superiority of supply chain management difficult to show, which affects the stability and development of the supply chain. Therefore, it is necessary to in-depth study the furniture supply chain from the perspective of risk management.
The furniture supply chain risk was studied, supplier selection and distribution of benefits from the perspective of reducing the risk of furniture supply chain,. Mainly based on the theory of risk management and supply chain management theory, and integrated the risk management, operation research and control theory, probability and mathematical statistics and other disciplines in the field of systematic research methods. Specifically, analyzed the risk of furniture supply chain based on system analysis method, and research the furniture enterprises relationships with suppliers and optimize decision-making analysis based on game theory and decision theory; study the risk prediction and optimal decision of the suppliers number based on probability theory and statistical; research on benefits distribution and furniture supply chain coordination based on operation research and control method. The main research and innovation are as follows:
(1)Proposed the diffusion mechanism and change channels of furniture supply chain, and built a more complete theory of furniture supply chain risk management framework.
The furniture supply chain risk transfer model was proposed that composed of risk factors and risk transfer pathway by considering the risk transfer ideas. The furniture supply chain risk transfer mechanism was analyzed and a risk quantitative assessment was conduct from three levels including the furniture risk factors, the node enterprise and entire supply chain network, and the risk transfer model and risk assessment methods was tested through numerical experiments, and the validity of models and methods were verified. Conclusions show that furniture supply chain risk assessment closer to the supply chain network reality through the proposed risk transfer model; and measure the furniture supply chain network risk factors and the different risk level of companies to give a decision support for effectively managing the furniture supply chain risk. To measure the overall risk of furniture supply chain and give a theoretical basis to improve the furniture supply chain network.
(2)Construction of the furniture supply chain risk evaluation index system, and proposed furniture supply chain risk assessment model based on the Rough-Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.
First, the basis and principles of risk evaluation index system were proposed, then the risks assessment index system was established according to the characteristics of furniture supply chain. The method of weighing indexes was formulated based on rough set theory, and then the supply chain risks assessment models was established with fuzzy comprehensive theory to judge the risks level. By case analysis, the conclusion was drawn that the factors of procurement factors make grater impact on the furniture supply chain, while the factors of system strategic factors make smaller impact, and the risks of other factors are moderate.
(3)Proposed the furniture supplier qualitative selection model based on AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, and built furniture supplier optimal amount decision-making model from the perspective of risk control.
From the perspective of risk control, a furniture supplier selection risk evaluation index system was presented. A supplier selection model using fuzzy comprehensive evaluation was constructed. The optimal suppliers amount risk decision making model was proposed by taking into account the transaction costs, management costs and risks of loss cost in the process of furniture supply of and thus to minimize the total cost for this furniture supply. Finally, the above methods was tested by numerical experiments, and the risk assessment index system, evaluation model and the optimal suppliers amount decision-making method are effective and practical.
(4)Presented revenue sharing and franchise fees to coordinate supply chain system comprising of a supplier and a retailer based on Stackelberg game.
A consignment furniture supply chain was considered that the supplier determines retail price and thus delivery quantity. The Stacklberg equilibrium solution based on non-cooperative game theoretic analytical method was proposed. The mechanism of employing revenue sharing and franchise fees can achieve channel perfect coordination when demand is price-sensitive, meanwhile, the channel profit and individual profits achieved by employing revenue sharing and franchise fees both larger than those achieved when they decentralized decisions. Last, the numerical examples and simulation analysis are provided, which indicate the feasibility of the coordination mechanism.
(5)Constructed more furniture suppliers coordinated model based on revenue sharing contract.
A furniture supply chain with n different furniture suppliers was analyzed. An optimal decision model was proposed under centralized decision setting. In decentralized decision setting, the conventional wholesale price contract can not reach the optimal profit of this furniture supply chain system, then a revenue sharing contract was presented in order to coordinate this furniture supply chain system, specifically, the wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts were compared, and optimal decisions and results were obtained respectively. Finally, the contract models were verified by adopting a numerical analysis.
本论文从如何减少家具供应链风险的角度研究家具供应链风险、供应商的选择及利益分配。以风险管理理论和供应链管理理论为基础,并结合风险管理学、运筹与控制论、概率与数理统计等学科领域中的方法进行系统性研究。基于系统分析方法对家具企业供应链风险构成进行分析：基于博弈论和决策理论对家具企业与供应商的关系、优化决策进行分析；基于概率分析与统计理论对风险预测、最优供应商数量决策进行研究；基于运筹控制分析方法对家具供应链利益分配及协调进行分析。具体研究内容与创新点如下：
(1)提出了家具供应链风险的扩散机理和变化途径,构建一个较完整的家具供应链风险管理理论框架。
通过引入风险传导思想,建立了一个由风险因素和风险传导途径构成的家具供应链风险传导模型,对家具供应链的风险传导机理进行了分析,然后从家具风险因素、节点企业和整个供应链网络三个层面对风险进行了定量评估,并通过数值实验对传导模型及风险评估方法进行了检验,验证了模型及方法的的有效性性,结论表明通过建立家具风险传导模型,使家具供应链的风险评估更接近于供应链网络现实。
(2)构建了家具供应链风险的评价指标体系,基于粗糙.模糊综合评价法提出家具供应链的风险评估模型。
首先提出风险评价指标体系构建的依据和原则；在此基础上对相关指标的进行选取及解释,对所选指标的进行进一步的筛选及优化,构建完整的家具供应链风险评价指标体系。此外,针对家具供应链的特点建立了基于粗糙集定权的模糊综合评估模型评价家具供应链风险水平,并通过数值实验得出指标体系中采购因素对家具供应链风险影响较大,而系统战略因素风险水平较小,其它各影响因素风险水平中等的结论。
(3)基于层次分析法和模糊综合评价法提出家具供应商的定性选择模型；从风险控制的角度构建家具供应商的最优数量决策模型。
从供应风险控制的角度出发,建立了家具供应商选择的风险评价指标体系；运用模糊综合评价法构建了供应商选择模型。从风险的角度对供应商数量对风险的影响进行了分析,同时考虑家具供应过程中的交易成本、管理成本和风险损失成本,提出了一种考虑供应风险的最优供应商数量决策方法。最后,通过数值实验对上述方法进行了检验,结论表明风险评价指标、评价模型以及最优家具供应商数量的决策方法具有有效性和实用性。
(4)基于Stackelberg博弈提出收益共享和特许经营费协调由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统。
考虑了基于家具制造商决定零售价格的委托销售(寄售)家具供应链,在非合作博弈框架下考虑了双方的决策,得到了Stackelberg均衡解。在需求具有价格敏性下收益共享和特许经营费能使家具供应链达到协调,同时协调后渠道利润和成员利润都比分散化独立决策时相应的利润要大。最后的数值实例检验了模型和方法的有效性。
(5)基于收益共享合约构建了多家具供应商供应链系统的协调模型。
针对n个不同供应商的家具供应商系统,在一体化决策时研究家具供应链系统的最优决策；在分散化决策时,通常的批发价格合约不能使家具供应链系统利润达到最优,提出收益共享合约协调该供应链系统,同时与批发价格合约进行比较,得出了不同合约下的最优决策及相关结论,最后运用数值实验对协调模型进行了检验。
China has become the well-know furniture export and furniture manufacturing country in the world. China's furniture industry has been formed as the leading large enterprises, small and medium enterprises as the main pattern, and the complete upper and lower furniture supply chain with a huge production, management and marketing, furniture has become an important industry in the national economy. In China, furniture supply chain management strategy study has just started, and the use of it is still in the initial stage, which is a serious impediment to long-term development of China's furniture industry. In addition, half of wood depend on to import wood products each year, furniture suppliers'selection effect the overall supply chain benefits and risks. Furniture supply chain of various risk factors lead to reduced efficiency of supply chain operations, furniture supply chain lack of flexibility, destroyed the original logic of supply chain, leading to irrational benefits distribution of supply chain, the superiority of supply chain management difficult to show, which affects the stability and development of the supply chain. Therefore, it is necessary to in-depth study the furniture supply chain from the perspective of risk management.
The furniture supply chain risk was studied, supplier selection and distribution of benefits from the perspective of reducing the risk of furniture supply chain,. Mainly based on the theory of risk management and supply chain management theory, and integrated the risk management, operation research and control theory, probability and mathematical statistics and other disciplines in the field of systematic research methods. Specifically, analyzed the risk of furniture supply chain based on system analysis method, and research the furniture enterprises relationships with suppliers and optimize decision-making analysis based on game theory and decision theory; study the risk prediction and optimal decision of the suppliers number based on probability theory and statistical; research on benefits distribution and furniture supply chain coordination based on operation research and control method. The main research and innovation are as follows:
(1)Proposed the diffusion mechanism and change channels of furniture supply chain, and built a more complete theory of furniture supply chain risk management framework.
The furniture supply chain risk transfer model was proposed that composed of risk factors and risk transfer pathway by considering the risk transfer ideas. The furniture supply chain risk transfer mechanism was analyzed and a risk quantitative assessment was conduct from three levels including the furniture risk factors, the node enterprise and entire supply chain network, and the risk transfer model and risk assessment methods was tested through numerical experiments, and the validity of models and methods were verified. Conclusions show that furniture supply chain risk assessment closer to the supply chain network reality through the proposed risk transfer model; and measure the furniture supply chain network risk factors and the different risk level of companies to give a decision support for effectively managing the furniture supply chain risk. To measure the overall risk of furniture supply chain and give a theoretical basis to improve the furniture supply chain network.
(2)Construction of the furniture supply chain risk evaluation index system, and proposed furniture supply chain risk assessment model based on the Rough-Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.
First, the basis and principles of risk evaluation index system were proposed, then the risks assessment index system was established according to the characteristics of furniture supply chain. The method of weighing indexes was formulated based on rough set theory, and then the supply chain risks assessment models was established with fuzzy comprehensive theory to judge the risks level. By case analysis, the conclusion was drawn that the factors of procurement factors make grater impact on the furniture supply chain, while the factors of system strategic factors make smaller impact, and the risks of other factors are moderate.
(3)Proposed the furniture supplier qualitative selection model based on AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, and built furniture supplier optimal amount decision-making model from the perspective of risk control.
From the perspective of risk control, a furniture supplier selection risk evaluation index system was presented. A supplier selection model using fuzzy comprehensive evaluation was constructed. The optimal suppliers amount risk decision making model was proposed by taking into account the transaction costs, management costs and risks of loss cost in the process of furniture supply of and thus to minimize the total cost for this furniture supply. Finally, the above methods was tested by numerical experiments, and the risk assessment index system, evaluation model and the optimal suppliers amount decision-making method are effective and practical.
(4)Presented revenue sharing and franchise fees to coordinate supply chain system comprising of a supplier and a retailer based on Stackelberg game.
A consignment furniture supply chain was considered that the supplier determines retail price and thus delivery quantity. The Stacklberg equilibrium solution based on non-cooperative game theoretic analytical method was proposed. The mechanism of employing revenue sharing and franchise fees can achieve channel perfect coordination when demand is price-sensitive, meanwhile, the channel profit and individual profits achieved by employing revenue sharing and franchise fees both larger than those achieved when they decentralized decisions. Last, the numerical examples and simulation analysis are provided, which indicate the feasibility of the coordination mechanism.
(5)Constructed more furniture suppliers coordinated model based on revenue sharing contract.
A furniture supply chain with n different furniture suppliers was analyzed. An optimal decision model was proposed under centralized decision setting. In decentralized decision setting, the conventional wholesale price contract can not reach the optimal profit of this furniture supply chain system, then a revenue sharing contract was presented in order to coordinate this furniture supply chain system, specifically, the wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts were compared, and optimal decisions and results were obtained respectively. Finally, the contract models were verified by adopting a numerical analysis.
引文
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