美国次贷危机研究—基于信息经济学的思考
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摘要
自2007年4月以来爆发的美国次贷危机无论是在广度还是在深度都已经远远超过了1929-1933年大萧条。但危机没有爆发在新兴市场和发展中国家,而是在金融业高度发达、监管措施最为完备的美国,表明了我们对于金融危机的理解和认知仍存在缺陷,传统金融危机理论仍需要完善。而从信息不对称角度来剖析金融危机,揭示现代金融结构及其对经济行为的影响,构成了20世纪90年代金融危机研究的主要方面。本文就是选取了信息经济学的视角,尝试对美国次贷危机形成机理、传导机制和应对措施进行深入分析,并就中国如何强化金融监管防范金融危机提出某些具体建议。
美国次贷危机的爆发固然有历史沿革下的美元本位、贸易失衡、放松管制等各种矛盾的积累,但美国金融市场上信息不对称问题持续的积淀已经到了必须正确认识的地步。由信息不对称引发的金融市场逆向选择、道德风险和信号发送等扭曲市场机制造成市场失灵,进而导致市场参与主体非理性行为是美国次贷危机爆发的真正原因。而危机传导过程中自我增强效应、非预期传导效应、扩大加速效应和统一市场效应又在以往危机传导理论未给予足够重视的。这些集合到一起,使得美国次贷危机既有较强的破坏性,又有迅速的蔓延性。而解决之道,则应从提高信息透明度,确保信息传导有效性,强化市场纪律和信息披露入手;同时建立良好的薪酬激励和实施有效的外部监管加强内外部约束,在市场不能自我纠正和调整时,以外部力量解决市场失灵,从而使金融市场恢复正常运行状态。
Since the July of 2006, the U.S. subprime mortgage derivatives market reverse quickly, due to the U.S. subprime mortgage deterioration for tightening monetary policy and the sluggish real estate market. As New Century Corporation, the second largest U.S. mortgage lending company went bankrupt in April 2007 as a result of being unable to repurchase the failed mortgage loans, the U.S. subprime crisis erupted entirely. The subprime crisis affected and destroyed the globe real economy rapidly and seriously. It is the first time that the fluctuation of a single type of financial derivatives result in global financial crisis in the history of financial development, which enriched the existing financial crisis theory based on currency stability, international trade and capital flows. The crisis has occurred in the United States, which has highly developed financial sector and perfect regulatory measures, instead of the emerging and developing countries that were considered as inflexible mechanism, inefficiency government and Invalid supervision.. And the crisis was not predicted by any economists. The deep consideration about the formation and contagion mechanism in the subprime crisis have been caused in the Economic Academia, and the explanaion of various theories are all around. The aim of this paper is not to give the judgement to varieties of theories, but to pay more attention to one perspective that has been ignored---the perspective of information economics, analyze the formation and contagion mechanism and the solution of the U.S. subprime crisis, and try to use the microscopic methods to resolve the macro problem. Through the deep study of the U.S. subprime crisis, the paper will strive to drew to a relatively reasonable conclusion of asymmetric information and non-cooperative game phenomenon in the crisis, then contribute to the theoretical study and prevention of the next financial crisis.
This paper argues that the U.S. subprime crisis is essentially irrational behavior of the microinvlover in financial market under asymmetric information. The asymmetric information leads to the distortion of market mechanisms and therefore market failure. Because of the absence of effective internal constraints (such as reasonable salary system) and external constraints (such as the necessary regulatory intervention), the behavior of the microinvlover in this market, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and herding behavior, will accumulate market risk, and ultimately lead to a systemic crisis. One of the most important reasons of the U.S. subprime crisis is that some financial institutions not only have sufficient information on financial derivatives, but also are very aware of the potential risks, but they pursue their own interests by virtue of their information advantage and mislead the consumers through conspiracy with external rating agencies. The financial consumers or investors had to take the following strategy of herd behavior because of not determining the value of the derivatives, which leads the rapid expansion and the non-contact conduction effect in the subprime crisis contagion. These effect may exist in the past crisis contagion, but are not as obvious as in the subprime crisis. It may prove that asymmetric information seriously affected the microscopic behavior and have catastrophic consequences. From a macro perspective, the Finance is actually a confidence industry largely. The behaviors of both sides of the financial transactions are determined by the psychological expectations to some degree. The information has been an important factor in deciding investor confidence and affecting trading decisions. China has not undergone a real financial crisis until now, so if we take the lessons from the U.S. subprime crisis, and promote financial reform and strengthen financial regulation correctly, we can plan ahead as a preventive measure.
Entire thesis is divided into seven parts: Chapter 1 is an introduction part, mainly tells the topics of the paper, explanes clearly the theoretical and practical background and significance, as well as major research methods to solve the problems, and introduces the innovation and deficiency. A brief summary and conclusion of the study of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis at home and abroad shows that the study of the subprim crisis take important role in enriching financial crisis theories and directing practical work. But the research of the subprime crisis is still in a continuous improvement process, and various theories have different emphases, with the useful attempting to explore meaning.
Chapter 2 is a literature review and theoretical comment on part of the theories of the relevant Chinese and foreign theories. By sorting out the classical theory of financial crisis, the modern theory of financial crisis based on currency crisis and system stability, and the past financial crisis theory including research methods based on information economics, the article may nail down the pespective of information economics that contain the following methods: adverse selection, Moral hazard, signaling and signal screening and other methods, so that it can point a clear direction of the study in the financial crisis theory.
Chapter 3 is a key part of this article. From a unique perspective of information economics, it gives a common interpretation of the financial crisis represented by the U.S. subprime crisis. The financial crisis such as U.S. subprime crisis can be understood as the irrational financial behavior under asymmetric information. The prevalence of information accessing paradox, information transmiting distortion and information specialization paradox in the financial market, lead to adverse selection of financial institutions and moral hazard of external rating agencies. Because of the lack of in-house salary distribution system constraints and poor external financial supervision, the asset price bubble bursting in company with investors’herding behavior have spawned an informational financial crisis.
Chapter 4 demonstrates the formation reasons of the U.S. subprime crisis. This chapter is also an important part of the article, following to the explanation of the financial crisis on the basis of the information economics in Chapter 3, the chapter 4 will try to use this approach to specifically interpret and verify the U.S. subprime crisis. Asymmetric information leads to the irrational behavior in the U.S. financial markets, that has made the financial market mechanism of resource allocation failure. The financial crisis would break out.
Chapter 5 focuses on the U.S. subprime crisis transmission and contagion mechanism, combined with evolution to be evidence, and analyzes its impact. From the perspective of information economics, the U.S. subprime crisis transmission and contagion mainly embodied irrational distortions of investor behavior, which results from collective unconscious irrational behavior under asymmetric information, and is an irrational financial activities caused by a psychological fear. The transmission and contagion include self-enhancement effect, non-contact transmission effect, accelerating the scale effect and unified market effect in the financial crisis. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis is actually an evidence of the above point of view. When the U.S. subprime crisis evolved into the global financial crisis, its micro and macro influence had changed the global financial landscape in fact.
Chapter 6 researches the relationship between the subprime crisis and the international financial regulatory reform, highlighted points out the idea of international financial regulatory reform in the post-crisis era. The chapter argues that the interim measures to tackle the crisis of some countries are only a temporary solution and the problem must be resolved by strengthening financial supervision to adjust financial market failures caused by asymmetric information. It considers deeply each country’s financial regulatory reform in dealing with the crisis after the September 2008, analyze and judge these reform from the perspective of information economics, and put forward financial regulatory reform ideas based on information economics.
Chapter 7 concludes the above study and proposes the enlightenment to China. Through the analysis of the previous six chapters, we can see that asymmetric information may lead to significant risk, and we need to re-examine the China's financial security. We should pay more attention to the financial risks of the micro-finance individuals, give full play to the role of government, strengthen financial supervision, make good market guidance, and strive to create a special financial regulatory system in China.
Studied from the perspective of asymmetric information on the formation mechanism, transmission mechanism and response measures of the U.S. subprime crisis, the author reaches the following conclusions:
Firstly, financial crisis theory is accompanied by the continuous development and evolution of the financial crisis. Form the historical perspective, forward-looking and predictive theory of financial crisis does not exist. The financial crisis theory has been constantly improved and enriched. This article does draw specific historical conclusions by examining the U.S. subprime crisis in this particular historical period of the specific historical events. The conclusions are not necessarily overall and universal. But the study of history is also the perspective of the development that will help us judged the various problems. It is a process of constantly enriching and improving the theory, also is a constantly problem-solving process, and the result in the end will be good.
Secondly, the U.S. subprime crisis reflected that the irrational behavior of the micro individuals under asymmetric information has seriously distorted the market mechanism of resource allocation, and the market failure caused a deep financial crises, which are ignored in the past.
Thirdly, the U.S. subprime crisis is rooted in the unfettered irrational behavior of the micro individual. Market failures caused by asymmetric information. There was no internal and external constraints to correct and curb market failures, which lead to the accumulation of risk and crisis outbreak. The internal constraints are positive incentives on the micro individual, and the external constraints are an effective supervision.
Fourthly, the transmission and contagion of the U.S. subprime crisis demonstrated market confidence and psychological expectations play the great role. That role may be disruptive and destructive, but it also suggests the solution is transparent information and reasonable guide that can solve the herding behavior and shepherd effects, thereby reduce the loss of the financial crisis.
Fifthly, the U.S. subprime crisis has proposed for the deep-level requirements of the international financial regulatory reforms. The capital regulation reform and the supervision of liquidity reform are not the only path selection; there may still be a wrong direction. It remains an important direction of financial regulatory reform to resolve asymmetric information and restore self-regulating mechanism in the financial markets.
Sixthly, China should learn from the U.S. subprime crisis and take precautions, strive to resolve opaque information and poor regulation in the current financial market.
美国次贷危机的爆发固然有历史沿革下的美元本位、贸易失衡、放松管制等各种矛盾的积累,但美国金融市场上信息不对称问题持续的积淀已经到了必须正确认识的地步。由信息不对称引发的金融市场逆向选择、道德风险和信号发送等扭曲市场机制造成市场失灵,进而导致市场参与主体非理性行为是美国次贷危机爆发的真正原因。而危机传导过程中自我增强效应、非预期传导效应、扩大加速效应和统一市场效应又在以往危机传导理论未给予足够重视的。这些集合到一起,使得美国次贷危机既有较强的破坏性,又有迅速的蔓延性。而解决之道,则应从提高信息透明度,确保信息传导有效性,强化市场纪律和信息披露入手;同时建立良好的薪酬激励和实施有效的外部监管加强内外部约束,在市场不能自我纠正和调整时,以外部力量解决市场失灵,从而使金融市场恢复正常运行状态。
Since the July of 2006, the U.S. subprime mortgage derivatives market reverse quickly, due to the U.S. subprime mortgage deterioration for tightening monetary policy and the sluggish real estate market. As New Century Corporation, the second largest U.S. mortgage lending company went bankrupt in April 2007 as a result of being unable to repurchase the failed mortgage loans, the U.S. subprime crisis erupted entirely. The subprime crisis affected and destroyed the globe real economy rapidly and seriously. It is the first time that the fluctuation of a single type of financial derivatives result in global financial crisis in the history of financial development, which enriched the existing financial crisis theory based on currency stability, international trade and capital flows. The crisis has occurred in the United States, which has highly developed financial sector and perfect regulatory measures, instead of the emerging and developing countries that were considered as inflexible mechanism, inefficiency government and Invalid supervision.. And the crisis was not predicted by any economists. The deep consideration about the formation and contagion mechanism in the subprime crisis have been caused in the Economic Academia, and the explanaion of various theories are all around. The aim of this paper is not to give the judgement to varieties of theories, but to pay more attention to one perspective that has been ignored---the perspective of information economics, analyze the formation and contagion mechanism and the solution of the U.S. subprime crisis, and try to use the microscopic methods to resolve the macro problem. Through the deep study of the U.S. subprime crisis, the paper will strive to drew to a relatively reasonable conclusion of asymmetric information and non-cooperative game phenomenon in the crisis, then contribute to the theoretical study and prevention of the next financial crisis.
This paper argues that the U.S. subprime crisis is essentially irrational behavior of the microinvlover in financial market under asymmetric information. The asymmetric information leads to the distortion of market mechanisms and therefore market failure. Because of the absence of effective internal constraints (such as reasonable salary system) and external constraints (such as the necessary regulatory intervention), the behavior of the microinvlover in this market, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and herding behavior, will accumulate market risk, and ultimately lead to a systemic crisis. One of the most important reasons of the U.S. subprime crisis is that some financial institutions not only have sufficient information on financial derivatives, but also are very aware of the potential risks, but they pursue their own interests by virtue of their information advantage and mislead the consumers through conspiracy with external rating agencies. The financial consumers or investors had to take the following strategy of herd behavior because of not determining the value of the derivatives, which leads the rapid expansion and the non-contact conduction effect in the subprime crisis contagion. These effect may exist in the past crisis contagion, but are not as obvious as in the subprime crisis. It may prove that asymmetric information seriously affected the microscopic behavior and have catastrophic consequences. From a macro perspective, the Finance is actually a confidence industry largely. The behaviors of both sides of the financial transactions are determined by the psychological expectations to some degree. The information has been an important factor in deciding investor confidence and affecting trading decisions. China has not undergone a real financial crisis until now, so if we take the lessons from the U.S. subprime crisis, and promote financial reform and strengthen financial regulation correctly, we can plan ahead as a preventive measure.
Entire thesis is divided into seven parts: Chapter 1 is an introduction part, mainly tells the topics of the paper, explanes clearly the theoretical and practical background and significance, as well as major research methods to solve the problems, and introduces the innovation and deficiency. A brief summary and conclusion of the study of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis at home and abroad shows that the study of the subprim crisis take important role in enriching financial crisis theories and directing practical work. But the research of the subprime crisis is still in a continuous improvement process, and various theories have different emphases, with the useful attempting to explore meaning.
Chapter 2 is a literature review and theoretical comment on part of the theories of the relevant Chinese and foreign theories. By sorting out the classical theory of financial crisis, the modern theory of financial crisis based on currency crisis and system stability, and the past financial crisis theory including research methods based on information economics, the article may nail down the pespective of information economics that contain the following methods: adverse selection, Moral hazard, signaling and signal screening and other methods, so that it can point a clear direction of the study in the financial crisis theory.
Chapter 3 is a key part of this article. From a unique perspective of information economics, it gives a common interpretation of the financial crisis represented by the U.S. subprime crisis. The financial crisis such as U.S. subprime crisis can be understood as the irrational financial behavior under asymmetric information. The prevalence of information accessing paradox, information transmiting distortion and information specialization paradox in the financial market, lead to adverse selection of financial institutions and moral hazard of external rating agencies. Because of the lack of in-house salary distribution system constraints and poor external financial supervision, the asset price bubble bursting in company with investors’herding behavior have spawned an informational financial crisis.
Chapter 4 demonstrates the formation reasons of the U.S. subprime crisis. This chapter is also an important part of the article, following to the explanation of the financial crisis on the basis of the information economics in Chapter 3, the chapter 4 will try to use this approach to specifically interpret and verify the U.S. subprime crisis. Asymmetric information leads to the irrational behavior in the U.S. financial markets, that has made the financial market mechanism of resource allocation failure. The financial crisis would break out.
Chapter 5 focuses on the U.S. subprime crisis transmission and contagion mechanism, combined with evolution to be evidence, and analyzes its impact. From the perspective of information economics, the U.S. subprime crisis transmission and contagion mainly embodied irrational distortions of investor behavior, which results from collective unconscious irrational behavior under asymmetric information, and is an irrational financial activities caused by a psychological fear. The transmission and contagion include self-enhancement effect, non-contact transmission effect, accelerating the scale effect and unified market effect in the financial crisis. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis is actually an evidence of the above point of view. When the U.S. subprime crisis evolved into the global financial crisis, its micro and macro influence had changed the global financial landscape in fact.
Chapter 6 researches the relationship between the subprime crisis and the international financial regulatory reform, highlighted points out the idea of international financial regulatory reform in the post-crisis era. The chapter argues that the interim measures to tackle the crisis of some countries are only a temporary solution and the problem must be resolved by strengthening financial supervision to adjust financial market failures caused by asymmetric information. It considers deeply each country’s financial regulatory reform in dealing with the crisis after the September 2008, analyze and judge these reform from the perspective of information economics, and put forward financial regulatory reform ideas based on information economics.
Chapter 7 concludes the above study and proposes the enlightenment to China. Through the analysis of the previous six chapters, we can see that asymmetric information may lead to significant risk, and we need to re-examine the China's financial security. We should pay more attention to the financial risks of the micro-finance individuals, give full play to the role of government, strengthen financial supervision, make good market guidance, and strive to create a special financial regulatory system in China.
Studied from the perspective of asymmetric information on the formation mechanism, transmission mechanism and response measures of the U.S. subprime crisis, the author reaches the following conclusions:
Firstly, financial crisis theory is accompanied by the continuous development and evolution of the financial crisis. Form the historical perspective, forward-looking and predictive theory of financial crisis does not exist. The financial crisis theory has been constantly improved and enriched. This article does draw specific historical conclusions by examining the U.S. subprime crisis in this particular historical period of the specific historical events. The conclusions are not necessarily overall and universal. But the study of history is also the perspective of the development that will help us judged the various problems. It is a process of constantly enriching and improving the theory, also is a constantly problem-solving process, and the result in the end will be good.
Secondly, the U.S. subprime crisis reflected that the irrational behavior of the micro individuals under asymmetric information has seriously distorted the market mechanism of resource allocation, and the market failure caused a deep financial crises, which are ignored in the past.
Thirdly, the U.S. subprime crisis is rooted in the unfettered irrational behavior of the micro individual. Market failures caused by asymmetric information. There was no internal and external constraints to correct and curb market failures, which lead to the accumulation of risk and crisis outbreak. The internal constraints are positive incentives on the micro individual, and the external constraints are an effective supervision.
Fourthly, the transmission and contagion of the U.S. subprime crisis demonstrated market confidence and psychological expectations play the great role. That role may be disruptive and destructive, but it also suggests the solution is transparent information and reasonable guide that can solve the herding behavior and shepherd effects, thereby reduce the loss of the financial crisis.
Fifthly, the U.S. subprime crisis has proposed for the deep-level requirements of the international financial regulatory reforms. The capital regulation reform and the supervision of liquidity reform are not the only path selection; there may still be a wrong direction. It remains an important direction of financial regulatory reform to resolve asymmetric information and restore self-regulating mechanism in the financial markets.
Sixthly, China should learn from the U.S. subprime crisis and take precautions, strive to resolve opaque information and poor regulation in the current financial market.
引文
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