股权再融资中大股东产权侵占问题研究
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摘要
股权分置制度背景下股权再融资一度成为中国上市公司大股东侵占小股东利益的重要工具。2005年启动的股权分置改革从制度上解决了非流通大股东与流通小股东的利益分裂问题,然而纵然是股票全流通的西方国家仍然存在股权再融资中的大股东侵占。本文研究的目的,一是检验股改后股权再融资中是否依然存在大股东侵占,二是研究股权再融资过程中大股东侵占的治理措施。
理论分析中本文运用产权理论研究大股东侵占的本质。大股东侵占的验证研究中,本文通过对公开增发和向大股东定向增发两类公司融资前后盈余管理的考察以验证大股东侵占的存在。其基本逻辑是,如果上市公司对外公开增发时调高盈余而向大股东定向增发时调减盈余,前者会导致众多参与认购的小股东以高于真实价值的价格购买股份,而后者则会使得大股东以低于真实价值的价格获得股权,小股东利益受损而大股东从中获益便可证实利益侵占的存在。在大股东侵占的治理分析中,本文从利益摄取、产权限制和法律惩戒三方面分析影响大股东侵占的可能因素,然后以操纵性应计利润为大股东侵占的替代变量,运用多元回归分析检验我国上市公司股权再融资过程中大股东侵占的实际影响因素,并依此获取有价值的政策启示。
理论分析表明,大股东摄取私有收益实质是对小股东收益产权的侵占,大股东产权侵占不是源于共有产权而是来自产权分割,防治大股东产权侵占的重点是对大股东分割来的产权——重大决策权——予以合理限制。实证检验发现,公开增发前会计业绩显著增加而增发后显著减小,向大股东定向增发前会计业绩显著减小而增发后显著增加；公开增发前操纵性应计利润显著增加而增发后显著减小,向大股东发行定向增发前操纵性应计利润显著减小而增发后显著增加；公开增发后长期股票业绩显著为负,而向大股定向增发长期股票业绩显著为正；公开增发有负的宣告效应,且宣告效应与增发前操纵性应计利润负相关；定向增发有正的宣告效应,且宣告效应与增发前操纵性应计利润负相关。治理研究的结果表明,股权制衡和高管持股等产权限制替代变量以及利益摄取的替代变量控制权现金流权分离度与操纵性应计利润显著负相关。
本文研究证实,股改后我国上市公司股权再融资过程中依然存在大股东侵占。本文认为对大股东分割的产权——重大决策权——予以合理限制是治理当前我国上市公司大股东产权侵占问题的关键。
In the context of Chinese special split share structure seasoned equity offerings were once important tools for majority shareholders expropriation. The reform of split share structure began in 2005 have resolved the problem of split interest between majority shareholders with non-tradable shares and minority shareholders with tradable shares. In other countries with full tradable shares, however, the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists. The thesis aims to test if the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists in the process of seasoned equity offerings after the reform of split share structure and to investigate solutions to majority shareholders expropriation.
The property rights theory is applied to analyze the nature of majority shareholders expropriation in the theoretical part of this thesis. Earnings managements between public equity offerings and private equity placements are investigated to test if majority shareholders expropriation still exists after the reform of split share structure. The expropriation by majority shareholders can be testified if firms with public equity offerings adjust earnings upwards while firms with private equity placements to their majority shareholders adjust earnings downwards before issuing. The reason is that the former would cause lots of minority shareholders to purchase shares with higher price and the latter would cause majority shareholders to purchase shares with lower price. Minority shareholders lose and majority shareholders benefit, which can confirm majority shareholders expropriation. Three aspects including interest expropriation, property rights restrictions and legal punishments are theoretically analyzed to investigate potential factors of majority shareholders expropriation, and then the multiple regression analysis, discretionary accruals as substitution variable of majority shareholders expropriation, is applied to test the actual impact factors.
Theoretical analyses indicate that the expropriation by majority shareholders is actually an encroachment to the property rights of minority shareholders. Furthermore, it is the split property rights but not common property rights that cause to majority shareholders expropriation. The empirical results show that earnings in public equity offerings increase prior to financing but decrease after that abnormally while earnings in private equity placements to majority shareholders decrease prior to financing but increase after that abnormally. The results also show that public equity offerings firms experience abnormal increase of discretionary accruals before financing, negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day, and negative long stock performance. In contrast, private equity placements firms experience abnormal decreases of discretionary accruals before financing, positive cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day, and positive long stock performance. The results in the governance analysis of majority shareholders expropriation show that variables proxy to property rights restrictions, such as the ownership balancing degree and the CEO share-holding, and variables proxy to interest expropriation, such as divergence between control and cash flow rights, are negatively related to discretionary accruals.
It is confirmed that the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists in the process of seasoned equity offerings after the reform of split share structure. It is argued that the appropriate restriction to the property rights of majority shareholders is the key to solving the problem of majority shareholders expropriation.
理论分析中本文运用产权理论研究大股东侵占的本质。大股东侵占的验证研究中,本文通过对公开增发和向大股东定向增发两类公司融资前后盈余管理的考察以验证大股东侵占的存在。其基本逻辑是,如果上市公司对外公开增发时调高盈余而向大股东定向增发时调减盈余,前者会导致众多参与认购的小股东以高于真实价值的价格购买股份,而后者则会使得大股东以低于真实价值的价格获得股权,小股东利益受损而大股东从中获益便可证实利益侵占的存在。在大股东侵占的治理分析中,本文从利益摄取、产权限制和法律惩戒三方面分析影响大股东侵占的可能因素,然后以操纵性应计利润为大股东侵占的替代变量,运用多元回归分析检验我国上市公司股权再融资过程中大股东侵占的实际影响因素,并依此获取有价值的政策启示。
理论分析表明,大股东摄取私有收益实质是对小股东收益产权的侵占,大股东产权侵占不是源于共有产权而是来自产权分割,防治大股东产权侵占的重点是对大股东分割来的产权——重大决策权——予以合理限制。实证检验发现,公开增发前会计业绩显著增加而增发后显著减小,向大股东定向增发前会计业绩显著减小而增发后显著增加；公开增发前操纵性应计利润显著增加而增发后显著减小,向大股东发行定向增发前操纵性应计利润显著减小而增发后显著增加；公开增发后长期股票业绩显著为负,而向大股定向增发长期股票业绩显著为正；公开增发有负的宣告效应,且宣告效应与增发前操纵性应计利润负相关；定向增发有正的宣告效应,且宣告效应与增发前操纵性应计利润负相关。治理研究的结果表明,股权制衡和高管持股等产权限制替代变量以及利益摄取的替代变量控制权现金流权分离度与操纵性应计利润显著负相关。
本文研究证实,股改后我国上市公司股权再融资过程中依然存在大股东侵占。本文认为对大股东分割的产权——重大决策权——予以合理限制是治理当前我国上市公司大股东产权侵占问题的关键。
In the context of Chinese special split share structure seasoned equity offerings were once important tools for majority shareholders expropriation. The reform of split share structure began in 2005 have resolved the problem of split interest between majority shareholders with non-tradable shares and minority shareholders with tradable shares. In other countries with full tradable shares, however, the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists. The thesis aims to test if the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists in the process of seasoned equity offerings after the reform of split share structure and to investigate solutions to majority shareholders expropriation.
The property rights theory is applied to analyze the nature of majority shareholders expropriation in the theoretical part of this thesis. Earnings managements between public equity offerings and private equity placements are investigated to test if majority shareholders expropriation still exists after the reform of split share structure. The expropriation by majority shareholders can be testified if firms with public equity offerings adjust earnings upwards while firms with private equity placements to their majority shareholders adjust earnings downwards before issuing. The reason is that the former would cause lots of minority shareholders to purchase shares with higher price and the latter would cause majority shareholders to purchase shares with lower price. Minority shareholders lose and majority shareholders benefit, which can confirm majority shareholders expropriation. Three aspects including interest expropriation, property rights restrictions and legal punishments are theoretically analyzed to investigate potential factors of majority shareholders expropriation, and then the multiple regression analysis, discretionary accruals as substitution variable of majority shareholders expropriation, is applied to test the actual impact factors.
Theoretical analyses indicate that the expropriation by majority shareholders is actually an encroachment to the property rights of minority shareholders. Furthermore, it is the split property rights but not common property rights that cause to majority shareholders expropriation. The empirical results show that earnings in public equity offerings increase prior to financing but decrease after that abnormally while earnings in private equity placements to majority shareholders decrease prior to financing but increase after that abnormally. The results also show that public equity offerings firms experience abnormal increase of discretionary accruals before financing, negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day, and negative long stock performance. In contrast, private equity placements firms experience abnormal decreases of discretionary accruals before financing, positive cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day, and positive long stock performance. The results in the governance analysis of majority shareholders expropriation show that variables proxy to property rights restrictions, such as the ownership balancing degree and the CEO share-holding, and variables proxy to interest expropriation, such as divergence between control and cash flow rights, are negatively related to discretionary accruals.
It is confirmed that the expropriation by majority shareholders still exists in the process of seasoned equity offerings after the reform of split share structure. It is argued that the appropriate restriction to the property rights of majority shareholders is the key to solving the problem of majority shareholders expropriation.
引文
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