终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的实证研究
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摘要
传统大小股东代理问题的研究多是停留在公司直接股东层面,研究直接控股股东对上市公司的利益侵害。本文选用2005-2006年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据为研究样本,通过对控制链层层追溯,找出上市公司真正的控股股东——终极控制人,运用T检验、多元线性回归等统计方法,较为全面研究了终极控制人特征与公司价值关系并根据检验结果提出相应的政策建议,揭开控股股东“掏空”上市公司更为深层的原因,为防止终极控制人侵害、加强中小投资者保护提供更多依据。
本文对终极控制人特征的研究主要着眼于与终极控制人有关的四大特征——现金流权、控制权、两权分离度及控制人性质。研究结果发现我国目前终极股东的现金流权和控制权都比较集中,但现金流权和控制权还是呈现出较大的分离程度。在对终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的研究中,本文首先检验了现金流权对公司价值的影响,研究结果表明现金流权与公司价值呈正相关关系,终极控制人拥有的现金流权越大,公司价值越高。然后本文又检验了终极控制人的控制权对公司价值的影响,检验结果表明终极控制人的控制权与公司价值呈非线性关系,公司价值随控制权的增大先下降后上升然后再下降,拐点为26.32%和67.60%。当公司终极控制人的控制权低于26.32%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越低;当公司终极控制人的控制权在26.32%至67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越大;当公司终极控制人的控制权大于67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权与公司价值又重新呈现负相关关系。上市公司的现金流权和控制权对公司价值的影响呈现出不同的特征,为了找出差异的原因进一步研究真正影响公司价值的终极控制人特征,本文进一步研究两权分离程度对公司价值的影响。研究结果表明上市公司的两权分离度与公司价值负相关,两权分离程度越大,公司价值越小。两权分离程度对公司价值的影响也解释了终极控制人的控制权与公司价值的非线性关系。为了更完整的解释研究影响公司价值的终极控制人的特征,本文又研究了终极控制人的性质、两权分离程度及公司价值的关系,结果发现,国有终极控制公司价值并不显著低于非国有控制公司,不能简单的判断国有产权和非国有产权控制的公司哪个会有更高效率。进一步研究发现非国有终极控制公司的两权分离度大于国有终极控制公司,非国有终极控制人更倾向于构建复杂金字塔结构或交叉持股等方式对上市公司进行控制,在这种效应作用下导致两种公司价值差异比较模糊。本文的最终研究结果表明,最深层次影响公司价值的终极控制人特征是两权分离程度,两权分离程度决定了终极控制人侵害中小股东等外部人利益的动机和能力。
Traditional research on agency problem of controlling shareholders concentrates on the direct controlling shareholders. They study the harming of the direct controlling shareholders to the listed company. This paper selects the data of listed company of Hu-Shen stock market in 2005-2006 as sample, finds the real controller-the ultimate controller by tracing the control chain, adopts T-test and multiple linear regression, studies the relationship between the characteristics of ultimate controller and the firm value in various aspects and provides the corresponding measures according to the test result in order to provide more basis for preventing the tunneling of the ultimate controllers and protecting the minority shareholders.
This paper studies four characteristics of ultimate controller-cash flow rights, control rights, the separation of two rights and the nature of the ultimate controller. First we test the effect of the cash flow rights on the firm value. The result shows that the cash flow rights are positive to the firm value. The more the cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controller, the more the firm value and vice versa. Second this paper test the effect of the control rights on the firm value. The result shows that the relationship between the control rights and the firm value is none-linear: a converse N shape. The inflexions are 26.32% and 67.60%. When the control rights below 26.32%, the control rights is negative to the firm value; when the control right between 26.32% and 67.60%, the control rights is positive to the firm value; when the control rights excess 67.60%, the control rights is negative to the firm value again. The cash flow rights and the control rights show different effect characteristics. In order to find the further reason, we go on to study the separation of two rights. The result shows that the separation of two rights is negatively related to the firm value. This explains the non-linear relationship between control rights and firm value. In order to completely research on the ultimate controller's characteristics, this paper studies the nature of the ultimate controller and the firm value. It shows that firm of state-ultimate owned company is not lower than the non-state owned company significantly. We can't say which one is more efficient between the state-ultimate controlled and non-state ultimate controlled company. The non-state ultimate controllers prefer to establish the complex pyramid structure to control the listed company. The non-state ultimate controllers are more active and more efficient. Two effects lead the difference of the firm value of the stated owned and the non-state owned ambiguous. The separation of two rights decides the motivation and ability to invading the minority shareholders.
本文对终极控制人特征的研究主要着眼于与终极控制人有关的四大特征——现金流权、控制权、两权分离度及控制人性质。研究结果发现我国目前终极股东的现金流权和控制权都比较集中,但现金流权和控制权还是呈现出较大的分离程度。在对终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的研究中,本文首先检验了现金流权对公司价值的影响,研究结果表明现金流权与公司价值呈正相关关系,终极控制人拥有的现金流权越大,公司价值越高。然后本文又检验了终极控制人的控制权对公司价值的影响,检验结果表明终极控制人的控制权与公司价值呈非线性关系,公司价值随控制权的增大先下降后上升然后再下降,拐点为26.32%和67.60%。当公司终极控制人的控制权低于26.32%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越低;当公司终极控制人的控制权在26.32%至67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越大;当公司终极控制人的控制权大于67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权与公司价值又重新呈现负相关关系。上市公司的现金流权和控制权对公司价值的影响呈现出不同的特征,为了找出差异的原因进一步研究真正影响公司价值的终极控制人特征,本文进一步研究两权分离程度对公司价值的影响。研究结果表明上市公司的两权分离度与公司价值负相关,两权分离程度越大,公司价值越小。两权分离程度对公司价值的影响也解释了终极控制人的控制权与公司价值的非线性关系。为了更完整的解释研究影响公司价值的终极控制人的特征,本文又研究了终极控制人的性质、两权分离程度及公司价值的关系,结果发现,国有终极控制公司价值并不显著低于非国有控制公司,不能简单的判断国有产权和非国有产权控制的公司哪个会有更高效率。进一步研究发现非国有终极控制公司的两权分离度大于国有终极控制公司,非国有终极控制人更倾向于构建复杂金字塔结构或交叉持股等方式对上市公司进行控制,在这种效应作用下导致两种公司价值差异比较模糊。本文的最终研究结果表明,最深层次影响公司价值的终极控制人特征是两权分离程度,两权分离程度决定了终极控制人侵害中小股东等外部人利益的动机和能力。
Traditional research on agency problem of controlling shareholders concentrates on the direct controlling shareholders. They study the harming of the direct controlling shareholders to the listed company. This paper selects the data of listed company of Hu-Shen stock market in 2005-2006 as sample, finds the real controller-the ultimate controller by tracing the control chain, adopts T-test and multiple linear regression, studies the relationship between the characteristics of ultimate controller and the firm value in various aspects and provides the corresponding measures according to the test result in order to provide more basis for preventing the tunneling of the ultimate controllers and protecting the minority shareholders.
This paper studies four characteristics of ultimate controller-cash flow rights, control rights, the separation of two rights and the nature of the ultimate controller. First we test the effect of the cash flow rights on the firm value. The result shows that the cash flow rights are positive to the firm value. The more the cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controller, the more the firm value and vice versa. Second this paper test the effect of the control rights on the firm value. The result shows that the relationship between the control rights and the firm value is none-linear: a converse N shape. The inflexions are 26.32% and 67.60%. When the control rights below 26.32%, the control rights is negative to the firm value; when the control right between 26.32% and 67.60%, the control rights is positive to the firm value; when the control rights excess 67.60%, the control rights is negative to the firm value again. The cash flow rights and the control rights show different effect characteristics. In order to find the further reason, we go on to study the separation of two rights. The result shows that the separation of two rights is negatively related to the firm value. This explains the non-linear relationship between control rights and firm value. In order to completely research on the ultimate controller's characteristics, this paper studies the nature of the ultimate controller and the firm value. It shows that firm of state-ultimate owned company is not lower than the non-state owned company significantly. We can't say which one is more efficient between the state-ultimate controlled and non-state ultimate controlled company. The non-state ultimate controllers prefer to establish the complex pyramid structure to control the listed company. The non-state ultimate controllers are more active and more efficient. Two effects lead the difference of the firm value of the stated owned and the non-state owned ambiguous. The separation of two rights decides the motivation and ability to invading the minority shareholders.
引文
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[1]以懈怠的方式出现,包括偷懒和在职消费等损害公司价值的一切行为。
[2]这里假定市场是完全有效的,外部投资者能够无成本地获得有关企业家行为的全部信息。但是,当市场并非完全有效时,外部投资者仍有可能会承担企业家懈怠行为的部分成本。
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[4]棘轮效应是指人的消费习惯形成之后有不可逆性,即易于向上调整,而难于向下调整。尤其是在短期内消费是不可逆的,其习惯效应较大。这一词最初来自对苏联式计划经济制度的研究。在计划体制下,企业的年度生产指标根据上年的实际生产不断调整,好的表现反而由此受到惩罚(因此,聪明的经理用隐瞒生产能力来对付当局)。
[5]预算软约束是指企业一旦发生亏损,政府对其追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收、并提供财政补贴。这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)成为“预算软约束”。
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[1]Volpin,P.Governance with Poor Investor Protection:Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(64):61-90.
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[5]Lins,K.Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Market[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003(38):159-184.
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[1]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,and L H P Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[2]Faccio,M.and L H P Lang.The ultimate ownership of western european corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[3]Denis,D.,and McConnell,J.J.International corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003(38):1-36.
[4]Grundmann,S.,and Moslein,F.Golden Shares-State Control in Privatized Companies:Comparative Law and European Law and Policy Aspects[J].Eurpean Banking & Financial Law Journal,2004(1):53-94.
[5]Attig,N.,and Gadhoum,Y.The Governance of the Canadian Traded Firms:An Analysis of the Ultimate Ownership Structure[R].SSRN Working Paper.2005.
[6]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999(54):471-517.
[1]Faccio,M.and L H P Lang.The ultimate ownership of western european corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[2]Morck,R.,A.Shleifer,and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):293-315.
[3]Stulz,R.M.Managerial Control of Voting Rights,Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):25-54.
[4]Hermalin,B.,and Weisbach,M.The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance[J].Financial Management Association,1991(20):91-102.
[5]Holderness,C.,Kroszner,R.,and Sheehan,D.Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression[J].The Journal of Finance,1999(54):435-469.
[6]Pound,J.Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[j].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):237-265.
[7]McConnell,and Servaes,H.Additional Evidence on Equity[J].Ownership and Corporate Valuation,1990(27):612-696.Corporate Valuation,1990(27):612-696.
[8]Short,H.Ownership,Control,Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,1994(8):203-249.
[9]Holderness.2003.A survey of blockholders and corporate control[J].Economic Policy Review,2003(9):51-63
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[2]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[3]Demsetz,H.,and Villalonga,B.Ownership structure and Corporate Performance.Journal of Corporate Finance,2001(7):209-233.
[4]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155.
[5]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.and L H P Lang.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[6]Lemmon,M.and Lins,K.Ownership structure,corporate governance,and firm value:Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis[J].Journal of Finance,2003(58):1445-1468.
[7]Lins,K.and Servaes,H.Is corporate diversification beneficial in emerging market[R].SSRN Working Paper.2005.
[8]Lins,K.Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Market[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003(38):159-184.
[1]Voipin,P.Governance with Poor Investor Protection:Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(64):61-90.
[2]Attig,N.and Gadhoum,Y.The governance of the Canadian traded firms:An analysis of the ultimate ownership structure[R].SSRN Working Paper.2003.
[3]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[4]Boubakri,N.,and Cosset,J.The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms:Evidence from Developing Countries[J].The Journal of Finance.1998(15):36-78.
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[1]施东晖.股权结构、公司治理与绩效表现[J].世界经济,2000(12):37-44.
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[1]刘芍佳,孙霖,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4):51-61.
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[1]我国《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号(年度报告的内容与格式)》(2004年修订)才正式要求披露详细信息
[1]La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes和Shleifer(1999)对金子塔型持股结构定义第三条为处于控制链条中的公司必须是上市公司。根据中国的特殊国情,我国上市公司大多数是非上市公司直接或间接控制,因此本文放松了La Porta(1999)等人对金子塔型持股结构第三条严格定义。
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[1]以懈怠的方式出现,包括偷懒和在职消费等损害公司价值的一切行为。
[2]这里假定市场是完全有效的,外部投资者能够无成本地获得有关企业家行为的全部信息。但是,当市场并非完全有效时,外部投资者仍有可能会承担企业家懈怠行为的部分成本。
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[1]许永斌,郑金芳.中国民营上市公司家族控制与公司绩效实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(11):50-57.
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[1]陈小悦,徐晓东.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J]经济研究,2003(2):64-93.
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[4]棘轮效应是指人的消费习惯形成之后有不可逆性,即易于向上调整,而难于向下调整。尤其是在短期内消费是不可逆的,其习惯效应较大。这一词最初来自对苏联式计划经济制度的研究。在计划体制下,企业的年度生产指标根据上年的实际生产不断调整,好的表现反而由此受到惩罚(因此,聪明的经理用隐瞒生产能力来对付当局)。
[5]预算软约束是指企业一旦发生亏损,政府对其追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收、并提供财政补贴。这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)成为“预算软约束”。
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