终极控制人特征与公司价值关系的实证研究
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摘要
目前国内外对股权结构的研究主要集中在公司直接控股股东层面上,但是仅拥有上市公司直接控股股东的资料并不足以了解这些企业真正实际的所有权与控制权。自从La Porta等(1999)首次提出了终极控制人的概念,在分析股权结构问题时,越来越多的学者通过股权控制链找到企业的终极控制人,而不是简单地以第一大股东作为控股股东来研究大股东的侵害度。有关终极控制人与公司绩效关系的研究不断涌现,并逐渐成为公司治理研究的主流方向之一。
由于终极控制人对公司的控制具有隐秘性和复杂性,终极控制人从而也就成为我国证券市场许多不规范行为的重要症结之所在。此外,通过终极控股方式还可以使控制权和现金流权产生偏离,使其可以用较小的股份来达到实际控制公司的目的,从而获得同股不同权,小股有大权的效应。国内许多影响巨大的事件都与终极控制人有着直接联系。
本文的样本来自于深圳国泰安公司的CSMAR中国股票市场研究数据库和巨潮资讯网。本文的研究主要是通过层层分析,寻找到拥有各上市公司最大控制权的终极控制人,并将终极控制人按性质的层级分为五类(即中央政府控制、省级政府控制、市级政府控制、县级政府控制以及非政府控制),最终确定本文的研究目标:相对于非政府控制的公司来说,政府控制的上市公司其价值更低,而且随着政府控制层级降低,公司价值越小;终极控制人控股比例与公司价值呈正相关关系。经过检验得到与非政府控制相比较而言,政府控制下的公司其公司价值较低,并且大的趋势是政府层级越低、公司价值越低,以及终极控制人持股比例与公司价值无明显相关关系的结论。这对完善政府作为终极控制人时对公司的管理体制和理念、促使上市公司注重长远发展和正常运作,具有重要的学术价值与现实意义;对防止终极控制人侵害其他股东利益,加强对中小投资者的保护,促进我国证券市场的发展也有着重要的现实意义。
The current shareholding structure at home and abroad focused on the direct controlling shareholder of the company level, but only has a direct controlling shareholder of listed companies of information and not enough to truly understand the actual business ownership and control. Since La. Porta et al (1999) first proposed the concept of ultimate control, the analysis of the issue of ownership structure, more and more options to control through the chain of scholars to find the ultimate controller of enterprises, rather than simply the first major shareholders as a controlling shareholder to study the degree of violation of a major shareholder. Related to the ultimate control and performance study on the relationship between the company will continue to emerge and gradually become the mainstream of corporate governance one of the study.
Due to the ultimate control of the company's control with a secretive and complex nature of the ultimate control of China's securities market has become so many irregularities in the important problem lies. In addition, the ultimate holding means can also control and cash flow have the right to deviate from its smaller shares can be used to achieve de facto control of the company's purpose, which was different with the right stocks, small stocks have the effect of power. Many events have a tremendous impact and the ultimate controller has a direct connection.
In this article, the samples were taken from the country in Shenzhen Taian CSMAR China's stock market research database and information network giant wave. This study mainly through the layers of analysis, to find all listed companies have the greatest control over the ultimate control and ultimate control by the nature of the level is divided into five categories ( ie, central government control, the provincial government, municipal Government control, county-level government-controlled and non-government-controlled), the ultimate goal of this study to determine: Compared to non-government-controlled companies, the government-controlled lower the value of listed companies, and along with lower levels of government control, the company value smaller; the ultimate control of the proportion of people with the company holding a positive correlation between the value of. Been tested and compared to non-governmental control, the Government under the control of the company lower the value of their companies, and major trend is the lower levels of government, the lower the value of the company, as well as the ultimate controller of the value of shares held with the company had no significant correlation between the conclusion. This is perfect as the ultimate control of the Government when the company's management system and the concept of listed companies to pay attention to the normal operation of long-term development and has important practical significance and academic value; to prevent the ultimate control against the interests of other shareholders to strengthen small and medium-sized investment protection, and promote the development of China's stock market also has important practical significance.
由于终极控制人对公司的控制具有隐秘性和复杂性,终极控制人从而也就成为我国证券市场许多不规范行为的重要症结之所在。此外,通过终极控股方式还可以使控制权和现金流权产生偏离,使其可以用较小的股份来达到实际控制公司的目的,从而获得同股不同权,小股有大权的效应。国内许多影响巨大的事件都与终极控制人有着直接联系。
本文的样本来自于深圳国泰安公司的CSMAR中国股票市场研究数据库和巨潮资讯网。本文的研究主要是通过层层分析,寻找到拥有各上市公司最大控制权的终极控制人,并将终极控制人按性质的层级分为五类(即中央政府控制、省级政府控制、市级政府控制、县级政府控制以及非政府控制),最终确定本文的研究目标:相对于非政府控制的公司来说,政府控制的上市公司其价值更低,而且随着政府控制层级降低,公司价值越小;终极控制人控股比例与公司价值呈正相关关系。经过检验得到与非政府控制相比较而言,政府控制下的公司其公司价值较低,并且大的趋势是政府层级越低、公司价值越低,以及终极控制人持股比例与公司价值无明显相关关系的结论。这对完善政府作为终极控制人时对公司的管理体制和理念、促使上市公司注重长远发展和正常运作,具有重要的学术价值与现实意义;对防止终极控制人侵害其他股东利益,加强对中小投资者的保护,促进我国证券市场的发展也有着重要的现实意义。
The current shareholding structure at home and abroad focused on the direct controlling shareholder of the company level, but only has a direct controlling shareholder of listed companies of information and not enough to truly understand the actual business ownership and control. Since La. Porta et al (1999) first proposed the concept of ultimate control, the analysis of the issue of ownership structure, more and more options to control through the chain of scholars to find the ultimate controller of enterprises, rather than simply the first major shareholders as a controlling shareholder to study the degree of violation of a major shareholder. Related to the ultimate control and performance study on the relationship between the company will continue to emerge and gradually become the mainstream of corporate governance one of the study.
Due to the ultimate control of the company's control with a secretive and complex nature of the ultimate control of China's securities market has become so many irregularities in the important problem lies. In addition, the ultimate holding means can also control and cash flow have the right to deviate from its smaller shares can be used to achieve de facto control of the company's purpose, which was different with the right stocks, small stocks have the effect of power. Many events have a tremendous impact and the ultimate controller has a direct connection.
In this article, the samples were taken from the country in Shenzhen Taian CSMAR China's stock market research database and information network giant wave. This study mainly through the layers of analysis, to find all listed companies have the greatest control over the ultimate control and ultimate control by the nature of the level is divided into five categories ( ie, central government control, the provincial government, municipal Government control, county-level government-controlled and non-government-controlled), the ultimate goal of this study to determine: Compared to non-government-controlled companies, the government-controlled lower the value of listed companies, and along with lower levels of government control, the company value smaller; the ultimate control of the proportion of people with the company holding a positive correlation between the value of. Been tested and compared to non-governmental control, the Government under the control of the company lower the value of their companies, and major trend is the lower levels of government, the lower the value of the company, as well as the ultimate controller of the value of shares held with the company had no significant correlation between the conclusion. This is perfect as the ultimate control of the Government when the company's management system and the concept of listed companies to pay attention to the normal operation of long-term development and has important practical significance and academic value; to prevent the ultimate control against the interests of other shareholders to strengthen small and medium-sized investment protection, and promote the development of China's stock market also has important practical significance.
引文
[1] La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Corporate Ownership Around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,(54): 471-517.
[2] Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, 461-488.
[3] Claessens, S, Djankov, S. and Lang, L.H.P,“The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations”[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58).
[4] Faccio, M., and LHP Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002(65): 365-395.
[5] Julan Du and Yi Dai. Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure and Capital Structures: Evidence From East Asian Economies[J]. Corporate Governance, 2005, 13(1).
[6] Berle A., and Means G., 1932. The modern corporation and private property [M]. Macmillan, New York.
[7] Faccio et al, Lang, Larry. H.P and Young, Leslie, Deslie, Debt and corporate governance[J].SSRN Working paper,2005.
[8] McConnell, and Servaes, H. Additional Evidence on Equity[J]. Ownership and Corporate Valuation, 1990(27): 612-696.
[9] Denis, D., and McConnell, J. J. International Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003(38): 1-36.
[10] Attig,N.,and Gadhoum, Y. The Governance of the Canadian Traded Firms: An Analysis of the Ultimate Ownership Structure[R].SSRN Working Paper.2005.
[11]孙健.终极控制人与资本结构的选择——基于中国上市公司的研究[D].南京:东南大学, 2006.
[12]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 2001(11): 3-11.
[13]施东辉.上市公司控制权价值的实证研究[J].经济科学, 2003(6), 83-89.
[14]张华,张俊喜,宋敏.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学, 2004a(3): 1-13.
[15]夏立军,方秩强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005(5): 40-51.
[16]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全,终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4), 51-62.
[17]赖建清,吴世农.我国上市公司最终控制人的现状研究[R].第三届实证会计会议论文. 2004.
[18]叶勇,胡培,贺伟.上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效[J].管理科学, 2005(18): 58-64.
[19]郭红玲.国外企业社会责任与企业财务绩效关联性研究综述[J].绿色经济, 2006(4): 83-86.
[20] Jensen M., Meckling W.. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3): 305-360.
[21]肖腾文.上市公司治理中大股东与中小股东的代理问题[J].财经科学, 2001(5), 32-35.
[22] Gugler, K. Corporate ownership structure in Austria[J]. Empirical.1998(25): 285-307.
[23]邹平,付莹.我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离——理论研究与实证检验[J].财经研究, 2007(9): 135-143.
[24]王俊秋,张奇峰.法律环境、金字塔结构与家族企业的“掏空”行为[J].财贸研究,2007,(5).
[25] Grosfeld, I., and Tressel, T. Competition and Ownership Structure: Substitutes or Complements [J]. Economics of Transition, 2002(10): 525-551.
[26]许永斌,彭白颖.控制权、现金流权与公司业绩[J].商业经济与管理, 2007(4): 74-79.
[27] Richard A, Brealey Stewart, C Myers, Alan Marcus. Fundamental of Corporate Finance. McGraw-Hill, Inc.1998.
[28]张详建等.大股东终极控制与掠夺行为研究.当代经济科学[J],2004(9), 61-82.
[29]李宝仁.计量经济学:第一版[M].北京:机械工业出版社, 2008: 8-120.
[30] Laurence Booth, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic. Capital Structures in Developing Countries. The Journal of Finance[J], 2001,(56):87-130.
[31]陈建华.资本结构对公司价值的影响——基于我国高科技板块上市公司数据的实证分析[D].南京:暨南大学, 2006.
[32]刘孟晖,沈中华,余怒涛.终极产权与公司价值——对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验[J].华东经济管理, 2009,(1): 62-68.
[33] Pound, J. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 1998(20): 237-265.
[34]刘磊等.企业核心控制权与一般控制权[J].中国工业经济, 2004(2), 68-76.
[35]董秀良等.上市公司控制权结构:问题与对策[J].当代经济研究, 2002(3), 26-30.
[36] Smith, C., and Jerold B. Warner. On Financial Contracting: an Analysis of Bond Covenants[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1979(7), 117-161.
[37]叶康涛.公司控制权的隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究[J].经济科学, 2003 (5).
[38]苏坤,杨淑娥,杨蓓.终极控制股东超额控制与资本结构决策[J].统计与决策, 2008(22), 88-90.
[39]郑晓旭.终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的实证研究[D].济南:山东大学, 2008.
[40]戴传刚.股权分置、资本结构和公司价值:基于中国上市公司的分析[D].南昌:南昌大学, 2008.
[41]叶勇.上市公司终极控制权效应研究及实证分析[D].成都:西南交通大学, 2005.
[42]方芳,周道传,李由.资本市场中企业价值评估方法[J].经济理论与经济管理, 2003(6): 39-44.
[2] Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, 461-488.
[3] Claessens, S, Djankov, S. and Lang, L.H.P,“The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations”[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58).
[4] Faccio, M., and LHP Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002(65): 365-395.
[5] Julan Du and Yi Dai. Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure and Capital Structures: Evidence From East Asian Economies[J]. Corporate Governance, 2005, 13(1).
[6] Berle A., and Means G., 1932. The modern corporation and private property [M]. Macmillan, New York.
[7] Faccio et al, Lang, Larry. H.P and Young, Leslie, Deslie, Debt and corporate governance[J].SSRN Working paper,2005.
[8] McConnell, and Servaes, H. Additional Evidence on Equity[J]. Ownership and Corporate Valuation, 1990(27): 612-696.
[9] Denis, D., and McConnell, J. J. International Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003(38): 1-36.
[10] Attig,N.,and Gadhoum, Y. The Governance of the Canadian Traded Firms: An Analysis of the Ultimate Ownership Structure[R].SSRN Working Paper.2005.
[11]孙健.终极控制人与资本结构的选择——基于中国上市公司的研究[D].南京:东南大学, 2006.
[12]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 2001(11): 3-11.
[13]施东辉.上市公司控制权价值的实证研究[J].经济科学, 2003(6), 83-89.
[14]张华,张俊喜,宋敏.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学, 2004a(3): 1-13.
[15]夏立军,方秩强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005(5): 40-51.
[16]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全,终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4), 51-62.
[17]赖建清,吴世农.我国上市公司最终控制人的现状研究[R].第三届实证会计会议论文. 2004.
[18]叶勇,胡培,贺伟.上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效[J].管理科学, 2005(18): 58-64.
[19]郭红玲.国外企业社会责任与企业财务绩效关联性研究综述[J].绿色经济, 2006(4): 83-86.
[20] Jensen M., Meckling W.. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3): 305-360.
[21]肖腾文.上市公司治理中大股东与中小股东的代理问题[J].财经科学, 2001(5), 32-35.
[22] Gugler, K. Corporate ownership structure in Austria[J]. Empirical.1998(25): 285-307.
[23]邹平,付莹.我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离——理论研究与实证检验[J].财经研究, 2007(9): 135-143.
[24]王俊秋,张奇峰.法律环境、金字塔结构与家族企业的“掏空”行为[J].财贸研究,2007,(5).
[25] Grosfeld, I., and Tressel, T. Competition and Ownership Structure: Substitutes or Complements [J]. Economics of Transition, 2002(10): 525-551.
[26]许永斌,彭白颖.控制权、现金流权与公司业绩[J].商业经济与管理, 2007(4): 74-79.
[27] Richard A, Brealey Stewart, C Myers, Alan Marcus. Fundamental of Corporate Finance. McGraw-Hill, Inc.1998.
[28]张详建等.大股东终极控制与掠夺行为研究.当代经济科学[J],2004(9), 61-82.
[29]李宝仁.计量经济学:第一版[M].北京:机械工业出版社, 2008: 8-120.
[30] Laurence Booth, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic. Capital Structures in Developing Countries. The Journal of Finance[J], 2001,(56):87-130.
[31]陈建华.资本结构对公司价值的影响——基于我国高科技板块上市公司数据的实证分析[D].南京:暨南大学, 2006.
[32]刘孟晖,沈中华,余怒涛.终极产权与公司价值——对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验[J].华东经济管理, 2009,(1): 62-68.
[33] Pound, J. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 1998(20): 237-265.
[34]刘磊等.企业核心控制权与一般控制权[J].中国工业经济, 2004(2), 68-76.
[35]董秀良等.上市公司控制权结构:问题与对策[J].当代经济研究, 2002(3), 26-30.
[36] Smith, C., and Jerold B. Warner. On Financial Contracting: an Analysis of Bond Covenants[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1979(7), 117-161.
[37]叶康涛.公司控制权的隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究[J].经济科学, 2003 (5).
[38]苏坤,杨淑娥,杨蓓.终极控制股东超额控制与资本结构决策[J].统计与决策, 2008(22), 88-90.
[39]郑晓旭.终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的实证研究[D].济南:山东大学, 2008.
[40]戴传刚.股权分置、资本结构和公司价值:基于中国上市公司的分析[D].南昌:南昌大学, 2008.
[41]叶勇.上市公司终极控制权效应研究及实证分析[D].成都:西南交通大学, 2005.
[42]方芳,周道传,李由.资本市场中企业价值评估方法[J].经济理论与经济管理, 2003(6): 39-44.