基于最大化的平台功能研究
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摘要
信息革命特别是网络的出现,使原先的大规模标准化生产向多元化、柔性化(定制)生产转变。在这个过程中,随着技术和工艺的不断创新,以及消费者收入的提高带来的需求变化,使得新的行业和大量的新产品不断出现。与以往的情况相比,这就给企业带来了新的问题。首先,消费者需求的增长和变化要求行业内新的产品市场从初始到成熟的速度比以往要迅速得多。企业如何才能加速自身的产品市场从初始的、不完全的市场快速向成熟的市场转变。其次,由于产品技术的深入、扩散和衍生导致分工的细化和重构,企业生产的产品可能与其他企业生产的组件和相关产品息息相关。同时,消费者群体的需求也不断细分,这就使消费者从购买产品到购买产品集合(包括服务)转变。因此,企业在自身产品的使用、销售、定价、收费和升级等等各个方面都受到其他相关企业的影响。那么,企业如何处理与这些相关企业的关系,在很多情况下则是企业通过平台功能来尝试解决的。
以平台为中心的多边市场在经济体中逐渐显露并不断增加其比重。许多学者及时关注了这一新的课题。基于网络外部性的研究是最初的研究视角,继而多边市场的收费也成为重要的切入点。但是,这些研究大多比较零散,往往是对于某些案例的较为孤立的分析。
本文认为,从行业的中观层次考察以平台为中心的多边市场较为恰当。多边平台的主要参与者大多在行业的产品市场之内,对于其中的企业而言,它必然与其产品的相关组件、产品、服务等的生产企业和消费者发生关系。同时,由于平台内消费者所购买或者消费往往是一个产品集合,还需要对消费者所需要的产品集合内的产品结构进行分析。
在这个前提背景下,本文从以平台为中心的多边市场出发,讨论平台结构中平台的功能及企业相应的行为策略。行业内的企业和企业群体采用平台策略,可以实现如下功能。
在对外方面,是新出现的产品市场从不成熟向成熟市场转变的要求。市场的成熟程度和相应交易费用的高低,很大程度上取决于市场的基础设施。由于新兴行业和高科技行业的特点,其层出不穷的创新和专业性,对于行业或者新的产品市场的行业基础设施提出很高的要求,相应的基础设施如果不到位,就会出现瓶颈问题。企业采取以平台为中心的多边结构,可以较好的解决这个问题。
在对内方面,由于消费者购买产品的多样化和更深层次的需求,往往需要多个产品组合在一起才能较好的实现消费者需求。这就将相关的产品生产企业相对紧密的联系在一起。那么,采用平台结构,不但可以便于组合和生产出令消费者满意的产品或者产品集合,还可以通过以平台为核心变革原有的价格体系和收费方式,以便更好的处理平台内各企业的利润分配。同时,针对产品消费的长期性和多层次性,采用平台结构收费才能更好的区分不同消费者的效用,从而更好的为不同消费者提供适当的服务,同时也有利于相关的服务企业的收费分成。
在宏观层次,技术进步和市场的飞速发展使企业环境与消费者的需求不断快速变化,平台结构也会在这个背景下相应变迁。不断出现的技术进步和创新,持续推动原有的产品市场产生复杂的变化。一方面,随着行业基础设施的逐步完善和积累,生产者和消费者对原有的产品不断加深认识。对于生产者而言,产品可以在不断提高质量的同时降低产品成本；对于消费者,随着产品性能的提高,可以不断发现产品的新的用途,并对产品提出新的要求。由此,产品的平台体系和其问产品结构更加成熟,交易成本不断降低,因而产品价格不断下降,性能不断提升。另一方面,技术和创新也可能创造出新的需求,在原有的平台体系上新的产品,新的平台随之出现。新的平台可能开拓新的市场,也可能挤占原有的平台市场份额。原来的平台结构中的领导企业如果不能及时调整,将不断丢失原有市场份额,被新的平台领导者代替。
The information revolution, especially the rapid development of the Internet has converted the previous large-scale standardized production to diversified, flexible (customized) one. In this process, with the technology and process innovation, as well as changes in demand brought by consumers'incomes rise, the new industries and new products have emerged continuously, which result in new problems. First, the growth and changes in consumer demand require the new product market of the industry to accelerate maturity. Second, Due to the refinement and reconstruction of production caused by penetration, diffusion and derivation of the technology, the products of the enterprise are likely to be closely related to the components or products of other enterprises. Besides, the continuous refinement of consumer demands leads to the purchase of a collection of products (including services). Therefore, the relations with other enterprises should be taken into consideration as the use of the product, sales, pricing, fees and upgrade of one enterprise would be affected by others.
Multilateral-platform market has gradually emerged and been increasing its share in the economy. Many scholars have paid attention to this new issue. It was first approached from the perspective of network externality and then the charges of multilateral market have become an important entry point. Nevertheless, such studies usually are fragmented, and often are isolated case analysis.
This paper is going to examine the multilateral platform market in meso level. The major players of the multilateral platform are in the same industry, so they are bound to be affected by the components, products, services of other related enterprises as well as consumers. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the product structure since the platform consumers often purchase a collection of products.
On this premise, this paper is going to discuss the function of the platform as well as the corresponding strategies of the enterprises.
Externally, the emerging markets need to mature from infancy. The degree of maturity of the market and the level of transaction costs, to a large extent, depend on the existing infrastructure. The infrastructure should keep up with the constant innovation and professionalization of the emerging high-tech industries. Otherwise, there would be bottlenecks because of the absence of corresponding infrastructure.
Internally, usually only the multiple product portfolio could satisfy the consumers because of diversification and refinement of their demands, which would closely link the related manufacturers. The adoption of the platform would not only facilitate the combination and production but also reform the previous price and charge system so as to optimize the profit distribution among the enterprise in the platform. What's more, due to the long-term multi-level consumption of the product the price system based on the platform would distinguish the utilities of consumers in order to provide appropriate services and help the enterprises to share fees.
At the macro level, technological advance and the rapid development of the market spurs the enterprise environment and consumer demand. Accordingly, the platform would undergo changes. Continuous innovation would promote complex changes in the previous product market. On one hand, with the gradual improvement of the industry infrastructure the producers and consumers would deepen their understanding of the original products. For consumers, with the improvement of product performance, they would keep on looking for the new uses of the product and put forward new demands. For producers, they would keep on improve the functions of the products but reduce their costs. Therefore, the platform system and the product structure would become mature; the transaction costs would decline; the product price would fall but its performance will improve. On the other hand, technology and innovation may also create new demands, new products, and a new platform, which might open up new markets, or divert the market share of the previous one. the original platform market share. The leading enterprise would lose its share or even be replaced if it failed to make timely adjustment.
以平台为中心的多边市场在经济体中逐渐显露并不断增加其比重。许多学者及时关注了这一新的课题。基于网络外部性的研究是最初的研究视角,继而多边市场的收费也成为重要的切入点。但是,这些研究大多比较零散,往往是对于某些案例的较为孤立的分析。
本文认为,从行业的中观层次考察以平台为中心的多边市场较为恰当。多边平台的主要参与者大多在行业的产品市场之内,对于其中的企业而言,它必然与其产品的相关组件、产品、服务等的生产企业和消费者发生关系。同时,由于平台内消费者所购买或者消费往往是一个产品集合,还需要对消费者所需要的产品集合内的产品结构进行分析。
在这个前提背景下,本文从以平台为中心的多边市场出发,讨论平台结构中平台的功能及企业相应的行为策略。行业内的企业和企业群体采用平台策略,可以实现如下功能。
在对外方面,是新出现的产品市场从不成熟向成熟市场转变的要求。市场的成熟程度和相应交易费用的高低,很大程度上取决于市场的基础设施。由于新兴行业和高科技行业的特点,其层出不穷的创新和专业性,对于行业或者新的产品市场的行业基础设施提出很高的要求,相应的基础设施如果不到位,就会出现瓶颈问题。企业采取以平台为中心的多边结构,可以较好的解决这个问题。
在对内方面,由于消费者购买产品的多样化和更深层次的需求,往往需要多个产品组合在一起才能较好的实现消费者需求。这就将相关的产品生产企业相对紧密的联系在一起。那么,采用平台结构,不但可以便于组合和生产出令消费者满意的产品或者产品集合,还可以通过以平台为核心变革原有的价格体系和收费方式,以便更好的处理平台内各企业的利润分配。同时,针对产品消费的长期性和多层次性,采用平台结构收费才能更好的区分不同消费者的效用,从而更好的为不同消费者提供适当的服务,同时也有利于相关的服务企业的收费分成。
在宏观层次,技术进步和市场的飞速发展使企业环境与消费者的需求不断快速变化,平台结构也会在这个背景下相应变迁。不断出现的技术进步和创新,持续推动原有的产品市场产生复杂的变化。一方面,随着行业基础设施的逐步完善和积累,生产者和消费者对原有的产品不断加深认识。对于生产者而言,产品可以在不断提高质量的同时降低产品成本；对于消费者,随着产品性能的提高,可以不断发现产品的新的用途,并对产品提出新的要求。由此,产品的平台体系和其问产品结构更加成熟,交易成本不断降低,因而产品价格不断下降,性能不断提升。另一方面,技术和创新也可能创造出新的需求,在原有的平台体系上新的产品,新的平台随之出现。新的平台可能开拓新的市场,也可能挤占原有的平台市场份额。原来的平台结构中的领导企业如果不能及时调整,将不断丢失原有市场份额,被新的平台领导者代替。
The information revolution, especially the rapid development of the Internet has converted the previous large-scale standardized production to diversified, flexible (customized) one. In this process, with the technology and process innovation, as well as changes in demand brought by consumers'incomes rise, the new industries and new products have emerged continuously, which result in new problems. First, the growth and changes in consumer demand require the new product market of the industry to accelerate maturity. Second, Due to the refinement and reconstruction of production caused by penetration, diffusion and derivation of the technology, the products of the enterprise are likely to be closely related to the components or products of other enterprises. Besides, the continuous refinement of consumer demands leads to the purchase of a collection of products (including services). Therefore, the relations with other enterprises should be taken into consideration as the use of the product, sales, pricing, fees and upgrade of one enterprise would be affected by others.
Multilateral-platform market has gradually emerged and been increasing its share in the economy. Many scholars have paid attention to this new issue. It was first approached from the perspective of network externality and then the charges of multilateral market have become an important entry point. Nevertheless, such studies usually are fragmented, and often are isolated case analysis.
This paper is going to examine the multilateral platform market in meso level. The major players of the multilateral platform are in the same industry, so they are bound to be affected by the components, products, services of other related enterprises as well as consumers. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the product structure since the platform consumers often purchase a collection of products.
On this premise, this paper is going to discuss the function of the platform as well as the corresponding strategies of the enterprises.
Externally, the emerging markets need to mature from infancy. The degree of maturity of the market and the level of transaction costs, to a large extent, depend on the existing infrastructure. The infrastructure should keep up with the constant innovation and professionalization of the emerging high-tech industries. Otherwise, there would be bottlenecks because of the absence of corresponding infrastructure.
Internally, usually only the multiple product portfolio could satisfy the consumers because of diversification and refinement of their demands, which would closely link the related manufacturers. The adoption of the platform would not only facilitate the combination and production but also reform the previous price and charge system so as to optimize the profit distribution among the enterprise in the platform. What's more, due to the long-term multi-level consumption of the product the price system based on the platform would distinguish the utilities of consumers in order to provide appropriate services and help the enterprises to share fees.
At the macro level, technological advance and the rapid development of the market spurs the enterprise environment and consumer demand. Accordingly, the platform would undergo changes. Continuous innovation would promote complex changes in the previous product market. On one hand, with the gradual improvement of the industry infrastructure the producers and consumers would deepen their understanding of the original products. For consumers, with the improvement of product performance, they would keep on looking for the new uses of the product and put forward new demands. For producers, they would keep on improve the functions of the products but reduce their costs. Therefore, the platform system and the product structure would become mature; the transaction costs would decline; the product price would fall but its performance will improve. On the other hand, technology and innovation may also create new demands, new products, and a new platform, which might open up new markets, or divert the market share of the previous one. the original platform market share. The leading enterprise would lose its share or even be replaced if it failed to make timely adjustment.
引文
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