信贷配给微观机理研究
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摘要
信贷配给是信贷市场上的一种常见经济现象,表现为借款者的借款要求被拒绝或者不能全部得到满足。就大致类别,信贷配给可以划分为非均衡信贷配给与均衡信贷配给。前者源自于货币当局的金融管制或者外在冲击,类似于商品市场上的配给现象,而后者则属于商业银行出于利润最大化动机考虑而做出的理性选择。以新古典经济学为代表的传统经济理论认为,只有当市场上存在着价格管制等外部因素干扰时,才会出现信贷配给现象,它是一种暂时的非均衡状态,利率的调节作用能够使信贷市场出清。然而,在现实经济生活中,信贷市场上经常地、大量地存在着信贷配给,以至于不能把它简单地看成是一种暂时现象。在后续的研究过程中,经济学家们逐渐认识到:市场上持久的信贷配给实际上是一种均衡现象。
新凯恩斯主义信贷配给论认为,在信贷市场中,利率机制和配给机制同时起作用,利率具有激励效应和选择效应。在信息不对称情形下,利率的双重效应所导致的逆向选择和道德风险,是产生信贷配给的根本原因。信贷配给的微观经济意义在于,它是商业银行在信息不对称情况下对信贷供给的一种保护性措施;信贷配给对宏观经济的影响在于,它提供了利率之外又一条连接金融市场与总需求的货币政策传导渠道,可能会加剧经济衰退或扩张的程度并延长其持续时间,部分地抵消宏观经济政策的有效性。
现有的关于信贷配给的经济模型分别从信息不对称、抵押品作用、监督成本等不同角度表明了信贷配给的形成和作用机理。对这些模型的拓展和完善,使信贷配给理论日益丰富。
银企关系对于信贷配给也具有重要影响。银企之间长期合作所形成的隐性合约和关系型融资方式,不仅能够增强厂商的贷款可得性,也有利于降低交易成本。厂商的声誉对于改善融资环境也是一个重要的条件。贷款银行规避风险的信贷决策机制有助于减少信息不对称所带来的信贷风险。在信息不完备的信贷市场上,借贷双方互为博弈的对象。在银企博弈的过程中,存在着借款厂商违约欠贷的可能性,贷款银行便会使用信贷配给的手段来约束厂商。在重复博弈情形下,银企双方的行为选择会趋于达成较优的均衡解。
抵押担保在一定程度上可以防止信贷市场上的逆向选择和道德风险,有助于缓解信贷配给,但条件是借款者必须能够提供足够的抵押品和具有有效的担保体系。同时过高的抵押担保要求也可能会产生新的逆向选择。抵押品也像利率一样具有正向选择和反向选择效应,贷款银行可以根据两者的作用程度确定最适度的抵押品水平。
将期权的思想加入到对信贷配给理论的研究当中,将使得对信贷配给的解释,产生不同于原有信贷配给理论的观点。由期权理论的角度考虑,投资厂商可以推迟投资行为,等待所从事投资项目的信息更加明朗以后再决定是否进行投资。这样对于风险较高的投资项目来说,既能够降低投资风险、降低抵押品要求,也可以从等待过程中获得更大的收益,从而使信贷配给现象在一定程度上得以消除。
从总体上看,信贷配给均衡只是从银行收益最大化角度出发达成的局部均衡。信贷配给对银行来说可能是属于一种理性行为,但对全社会而言,却意味着局部均衡与帕累托最优的背离,政府对信贷配给行为应当适当的干预,以增进社会总体福利。
除了传统的抵押担保手段外,建立借款联盟、实行贷款承诺制、发展关系型融资、规范发展民间金融、发展中小金融机构、实现银行间信息共享、建立贷款保险制度以及提出净值要求等一些制度安排,对于减少信贷配给、改善融资环境都具有一定的作用。
本篇论文共分八章,外加一个全文结语部分。第一章是绪论,说明论文的研究意义、研究思路和内容结构,并对信贷配给的有关问题做了一个概述;第二章是文献述评,大致按时间顺序对于信贷配给理论的发展历程进行了一个回顾;第三章分析信贷配给的生成机理及其经济效应;第四章对信贷配给重点基本模型进行了扩展;第五章具体分析信贷配给过程中银行与企业的各自行为;第六章探析信贷市场上的银企融资博弈过程;第七章研究信息不对称信贷市场上的担保抵押机制;第八章从期权角度探讨信贷配给与投资时机选择的关系;最后是全文结语部分,简要地从微观层面评价了信贷配给现象和信贷配给理论,概括了信贷配给理论的启示,提出了若干项缓解信贷配给的制度安排,指出了本篇论文的不足之处,并提出了下一步深化研究的方向。
Credit rationing is a common phenomenon in credit market,which refers to the scenario that the request of borrowers is refused or is fulfilled only partially. There are generally two types of credit rationing, the non-equilibrium rationing and equilibrium rationing. The former originates from financial regulation of the monetary authority or external influence, which is similar to the rationing in the commodity market. The latter arises from the rational choices by commercial banks to maximize their profit. By the traditional economic theory with new classical economics as representation, credit rationing appears only if there is external interference such as price control in credit market. It is a temporary non-equilibrium state, the market can be cleared by the adjustment of interest rate. Nevertheless, in reality there is often credit rationing everywhere. So it cannot be regarded as a temporary phenomenon. Subsequently, economists gradually realized that the long lasting credit rationing in the market is actually an equilibrium phenomenon.
In the credit rationing theory of the new Keynes doctrine, the mechanism of both interest rate and rationing are considered to have impact in the credit market. Interest rates have both the incentive and selective effect. In the presence of information asymmetry , adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the dual effect of interest rates is the fundamental reason of credit rationing. At the microscopic level, commercial banks use credit rationing as a protective measure for their credit supply in case of information asymmetry. At the macroscopic level, credit rationing provides an alternative transmission channel of monetary policy to interest rate that connects financial markets with total demand. This may accelerate the degree of economy recession or extend and prolong their duration, and partially offset the effectiveness of macroscopical economic policies.
Existing economic models for credit rationing have shown the mechanism on the formation and impact of credit rationing from different aspects such as information asymmetry, collateral effects, and supervision cost. The expansion and improvement for these models can further enrich the credit rationing theory.
The relationship between banks and enterprises has significant influence on credit rationing. The implicit contract and relational financing, both of them based on long-term cooperation between banks and enterprises, not only enhances the chance for enterprises to get a loan, but also helps reduce transaction cost. Enterprise’s reputation is also an important condition for improving the financing environment. The banks’credit decision mechanism to risk aversion helps reduce credit risk due to information asymmetry. In the credit markets of incomplete information, borrowers and lenders are game objects each other. In the gambling process, between the banks and the enterprises, there always exists the possibility that enterprises are in default on a loan, so the banks use credit rationing as means to restrain the enterprises. In the repeated game, the banks and enterprises’choices tend to reach an equilibrium solution due to their interaction.
Collateral mortgage could prevent adverse selection and moral hazard in the credit market to some extent, and could help ease credit rationing, under the condition that the borrowers must be able to provide sufficient mortgage security and that there exists an effective guarantee system. Meanwhile, excessive collateral mortgage requirement may lead to new adverse selection. Like interest rate, mortgage security has both positive and reverse selection effect. Banks can determine the appropriate collateral level by balancing the impact of the two.
Incorporating the idea of option into research on credit rationing can lead to new results that will be different from classical credit rationing theory. From the perspective of option theory, enterprises may postpone their decision on their investment until more information is available. In this way enterprises can reduce their investment risk and collateral mortgage requirement on highly risky projects. In addition, they many get more profit from this process. Finally, credit rationing can be eliminated to certain degree.
Overall, credit rationing equilibrium is merely a local equilibrium achieved from banks’maximization of profits. To the banks, credit rationing is their rational behavior. But to the society, credit rationing implies the deviation of a local equilibrium from Pareto optimality. So the government should take appropriate intervention measures to improve the welfare of the society.
Besides the traditional collateral mortgage, other institutional arrangements also have certain impact on reducing credit rationing and improving the financing environment. These include the establishment of borrowers alliance, implementation of loan commitment, development of financing based on long-term collaboration, regulation and development of private finance, development of small and medium-sized financial institutions, information sharing among banks, establishment of loan insurance system, and net requirements,etc.
This dissertation consists of eight chapters and epilogue. Chapter one is introduction, which summarizes significance, means, and structure of the dissertation. In addition, it presents a brief review on credit ration. Chapter two reviews the development credit rationing theory in a chronological order. Chapter three analyzes the formation mechanism of credit rationing and its economic effect. Chapter four focuses on the extension of basic model for credit rationing. Chapter five analyzes the individual behavior of banks and enterprises in credit rationing process. Chapter six studies financing game process between banks and enterprises in credit markets. Chapter seven investigates collateral mortgage mechanism in credit marks with information asymmetry. Chapter eight discusses the relationship between credit rationing and investment timing from the perspective of options. Finally, there is a conclusion part of the dissertation, which briefly evaluates the phenomenon and theory of credit rationing from the micro level, summarizes the observations from credit rationing theory, and proposes several system arrangements to ease credit rationing. It also points out the imitations of the dissertation and puts forward the directions of further research.
新凯恩斯主义信贷配给论认为,在信贷市场中,利率机制和配给机制同时起作用,利率具有激励效应和选择效应。在信息不对称情形下,利率的双重效应所导致的逆向选择和道德风险,是产生信贷配给的根本原因。信贷配给的微观经济意义在于,它是商业银行在信息不对称情况下对信贷供给的一种保护性措施;信贷配给对宏观经济的影响在于,它提供了利率之外又一条连接金融市场与总需求的货币政策传导渠道,可能会加剧经济衰退或扩张的程度并延长其持续时间,部分地抵消宏观经济政策的有效性。
现有的关于信贷配给的经济模型分别从信息不对称、抵押品作用、监督成本等不同角度表明了信贷配给的形成和作用机理。对这些模型的拓展和完善,使信贷配给理论日益丰富。
银企关系对于信贷配给也具有重要影响。银企之间长期合作所形成的隐性合约和关系型融资方式,不仅能够增强厂商的贷款可得性,也有利于降低交易成本。厂商的声誉对于改善融资环境也是一个重要的条件。贷款银行规避风险的信贷决策机制有助于减少信息不对称所带来的信贷风险。在信息不完备的信贷市场上,借贷双方互为博弈的对象。在银企博弈的过程中,存在着借款厂商违约欠贷的可能性,贷款银行便会使用信贷配给的手段来约束厂商。在重复博弈情形下,银企双方的行为选择会趋于达成较优的均衡解。
抵押担保在一定程度上可以防止信贷市场上的逆向选择和道德风险,有助于缓解信贷配给,但条件是借款者必须能够提供足够的抵押品和具有有效的担保体系。同时过高的抵押担保要求也可能会产生新的逆向选择。抵押品也像利率一样具有正向选择和反向选择效应,贷款银行可以根据两者的作用程度确定最适度的抵押品水平。
将期权的思想加入到对信贷配给理论的研究当中,将使得对信贷配给的解释,产生不同于原有信贷配给理论的观点。由期权理论的角度考虑,投资厂商可以推迟投资行为,等待所从事投资项目的信息更加明朗以后再决定是否进行投资。这样对于风险较高的投资项目来说,既能够降低投资风险、降低抵押品要求,也可以从等待过程中获得更大的收益,从而使信贷配给现象在一定程度上得以消除。
从总体上看,信贷配给均衡只是从银行收益最大化角度出发达成的局部均衡。信贷配给对银行来说可能是属于一种理性行为,但对全社会而言,却意味着局部均衡与帕累托最优的背离,政府对信贷配给行为应当适当的干预,以增进社会总体福利。
除了传统的抵押担保手段外,建立借款联盟、实行贷款承诺制、发展关系型融资、规范发展民间金融、发展中小金融机构、实现银行间信息共享、建立贷款保险制度以及提出净值要求等一些制度安排,对于减少信贷配给、改善融资环境都具有一定的作用。
本篇论文共分八章,外加一个全文结语部分。第一章是绪论,说明论文的研究意义、研究思路和内容结构,并对信贷配给的有关问题做了一个概述;第二章是文献述评,大致按时间顺序对于信贷配给理论的发展历程进行了一个回顾;第三章分析信贷配给的生成机理及其经济效应;第四章对信贷配给重点基本模型进行了扩展;第五章具体分析信贷配给过程中银行与企业的各自行为;第六章探析信贷市场上的银企融资博弈过程;第七章研究信息不对称信贷市场上的担保抵押机制;第八章从期权角度探讨信贷配给与投资时机选择的关系;最后是全文结语部分,简要地从微观层面评价了信贷配给现象和信贷配给理论,概括了信贷配给理论的启示,提出了若干项缓解信贷配给的制度安排,指出了本篇论文的不足之处,并提出了下一步深化研究的方向。
Credit rationing is a common phenomenon in credit market,which refers to the scenario that the request of borrowers is refused or is fulfilled only partially. There are generally two types of credit rationing, the non-equilibrium rationing and equilibrium rationing. The former originates from financial regulation of the monetary authority or external influence, which is similar to the rationing in the commodity market. The latter arises from the rational choices by commercial banks to maximize their profit. By the traditional economic theory with new classical economics as representation, credit rationing appears only if there is external interference such as price control in credit market. It is a temporary non-equilibrium state, the market can be cleared by the adjustment of interest rate. Nevertheless, in reality there is often credit rationing everywhere. So it cannot be regarded as a temporary phenomenon. Subsequently, economists gradually realized that the long lasting credit rationing in the market is actually an equilibrium phenomenon.
In the credit rationing theory of the new Keynes doctrine, the mechanism of both interest rate and rationing are considered to have impact in the credit market. Interest rates have both the incentive and selective effect. In the presence of information asymmetry , adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the dual effect of interest rates is the fundamental reason of credit rationing. At the microscopic level, commercial banks use credit rationing as a protective measure for their credit supply in case of information asymmetry. At the macroscopic level, credit rationing provides an alternative transmission channel of monetary policy to interest rate that connects financial markets with total demand. This may accelerate the degree of economy recession or extend and prolong their duration, and partially offset the effectiveness of macroscopical economic policies.
Existing economic models for credit rationing have shown the mechanism on the formation and impact of credit rationing from different aspects such as information asymmetry, collateral effects, and supervision cost. The expansion and improvement for these models can further enrich the credit rationing theory.
The relationship between banks and enterprises has significant influence on credit rationing. The implicit contract and relational financing, both of them based on long-term cooperation between banks and enterprises, not only enhances the chance for enterprises to get a loan, but also helps reduce transaction cost. Enterprise’s reputation is also an important condition for improving the financing environment. The banks’credit decision mechanism to risk aversion helps reduce credit risk due to information asymmetry. In the credit markets of incomplete information, borrowers and lenders are game objects each other. In the gambling process, between the banks and the enterprises, there always exists the possibility that enterprises are in default on a loan, so the banks use credit rationing as means to restrain the enterprises. In the repeated game, the banks and enterprises’choices tend to reach an equilibrium solution due to their interaction.
Collateral mortgage could prevent adverse selection and moral hazard in the credit market to some extent, and could help ease credit rationing, under the condition that the borrowers must be able to provide sufficient mortgage security and that there exists an effective guarantee system. Meanwhile, excessive collateral mortgage requirement may lead to new adverse selection. Like interest rate, mortgage security has both positive and reverse selection effect. Banks can determine the appropriate collateral level by balancing the impact of the two.
Incorporating the idea of option into research on credit rationing can lead to new results that will be different from classical credit rationing theory. From the perspective of option theory, enterprises may postpone their decision on their investment until more information is available. In this way enterprises can reduce their investment risk and collateral mortgage requirement on highly risky projects. In addition, they many get more profit from this process. Finally, credit rationing can be eliminated to certain degree.
Overall, credit rationing equilibrium is merely a local equilibrium achieved from banks’maximization of profits. To the banks, credit rationing is their rational behavior. But to the society, credit rationing implies the deviation of a local equilibrium from Pareto optimality. So the government should take appropriate intervention measures to improve the welfare of the society.
Besides the traditional collateral mortgage, other institutional arrangements also have certain impact on reducing credit rationing and improving the financing environment. These include the establishment of borrowers alliance, implementation of loan commitment, development of financing based on long-term collaboration, regulation and development of private finance, development of small and medium-sized financial institutions, information sharing among banks, establishment of loan insurance system, and net requirements,etc.
This dissertation consists of eight chapters and epilogue. Chapter one is introduction, which summarizes significance, means, and structure of the dissertation. In addition, it presents a brief review on credit ration. Chapter two reviews the development credit rationing theory in a chronological order. Chapter three analyzes the formation mechanism of credit rationing and its economic effect. Chapter four focuses on the extension of basic model for credit rationing. Chapter five analyzes the individual behavior of banks and enterprises in credit rationing process. Chapter six studies financing game process between banks and enterprises in credit markets. Chapter seven investigates collateral mortgage mechanism in credit marks with information asymmetry. Chapter eight discusses the relationship between credit rationing and investment timing from the perspective of options. Finally, there is a conclusion part of the dissertation, which briefly evaluates the phenomenon and theory of credit rationing from the micro level, summarizes the observations from credit rationing theory, and proposes several system arrangements to ease credit rationing. It also points out the imitations of the dissertation and puts forward the directions of further research.
引文
①约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特和彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典(第3卷)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1996:925
②王霄,张捷.银行信贷配给与中小企业贷款[J].经济研究,2005(7):68
①林毅夫,孙希芳.信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2005(7)
②王宣喻,储小平.资本市场层级结构与信息不对称下的私营企业融资[J].财经科学,》2002(3)
③Adams J,H P Brunner&Raymond F(2003),“Interactions of Informal and Formal Agents in South Asian Rural Credit Markets”,Review of Development Economics,7(3):431-444.
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