河北省农业保险发展问题研究
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摘要
农业保险是现代农业风险管理的有效手段,通过政府诱导充分运用市场机制调动社会主体参与风险管理的积极性,有效应对和解决农业自然灾害问题,在农业和农村经济持续发展中发挥着重要作用。同时,农业保险作为一种对农业适度保护的国际惯例,不仅是农业保障体系中的重要组成部分,而且已成为国际上最重要的符合WTO规则的非价格农业保护工具之一。河北省是我国农业大省,在国家粮食安全和农业产业结构调整中具有举足轻重的地位,河北省又是我国自然灾害最严重的省份之一,亟需农业保险在稳定农业生产、增加农民收入和促进农村经济发展中发挥重要作用。然而,与全国农业保险发展水平相比,河北省农业保险的发展相对缓慢和滞后,这其中既有市场主体供求不足的制约,又受政府支持方式与规模的影响。因此,系统分析河北省农业保险市场供求与政府支持机制,推进农业保险模式和运行机制的改革,对于促进河北省农业保险的可持续发展具有十分重要的理论价值与现实意义。
本文通过深入的理论分析,借鉴国内外农业保险发展的理论与实践,运用实证分析与规范分析相结合的方法,系统分析了河北省农业保险运行的市场供求特征与矛盾,在农业保险市场失衡的表象下挖掘制约农业保险发展的深层次原因,完善政府支持农业保险的政策体系,构建农业保险发展的模式和运行机制,提出促进农业保险的发展策略。研究成果如下:
一是通过对风险管理理论、市场均衡理论和制度经济学理论最新研究成果进行梳理与提炼,形成了河北省农业保险发展研究的理论框架。得出农业保险作为风险管理的重要手段,由于其准公共物品和外部性特征导致农业保险市场失灵,政府必须通过诱导性的制度变迁和创新,实现农业保险市场健康持续发展的结论。
二是梳理河北省农业保险的发展历程,探索农业保险制度发展的脉络、规律和趋势,综合反映河北省农业保险发展的现状,深入分析河北省农业保险发展的险种与区域分布特征,并与我国其他省份农业保险发展水平比较,挖掘河北省农业保险发展存在的差距与问题。
三是以实地调研为基础,区分小农户和规模化经营主体,对河北省农业保险需求特征及影响因素进行系统分析。运用logit二元模型对影响农业保险需求的因素进行分析,发现性别、土地规模、购买其它农村保险的数量、政策宣传力度和农户对农业保险的认知五个变量影响显著。然后通过典型案例调查,剖析土地规模化经营主体的风险效应及农业保险需求特征,认为在现代农业生产方式下,规模化经营主体形成了农业保险新的需求载体,需求水平取决于规模化经营主体与农户利益联结机制的完善程度。
四是在规范分析了农业保险供给特征与影响因素基础上,通过对农业保险经营机构的调查,发现保险机构经营农业保险的意愿、制约因素和政策需求。并从农业保险供给的产品和服务水平、经营机构的数量、组织形式、资本规模、偿付能力和经营效益等角度,对河北省农业保险市场供给能力进行综合评价。认为河北省农业保险经营机构数量少、集中度高、竞争力不够,供给的可持续发展后劲不足,而农业保险供给的高成本、高风险特征,以及制度和技术供给的不足是重要的制约因素。
五是分析河北省农业保险市场供求非均衡的表现形式和原因,通过公共财政和博弈论分析,为政府支持农业保险发展提供了理论依据,并合理定位政府在农业保险市场的作用与行为方式,明确区分中央政府和地方政府的职责。然后通过格兰杰因果检验、回归模型和弹性分析方法,对河北省政府支持农业保险发展的现状和效果进行分析,挖掘河北省政府支持农业保险存在的问题。基于此对河北省农业保险财政补贴方案进行了设计,优化农业保险的财政补贴方式和规模,提高财政资金的使用效益。
六是构建了河北省农业保险发展的理论模式与运行机制,并提出相应的政策措施。对农业保险发展模式的类型及特征进行界定,依据河北省农业生产条件与产业结构、财政支撑能力、农业保险发展阶段、农业合作组织发展情况、农户收入水平和保险意识等基本现实,提出河北省应该选择政府支持下商业化运行的“三阶段”动态发展模式。现阶段以“政府政策支持+商业代办和农民互助保险”模式为主,然后随着经济发展水平等条件的变化逐步过渡到“政策强力扶持+政策性农险机构”模式,最后实现“政府逐步退出+商业化运营”模式。并在此基础上设计了农业保险市场在政府支持下高效运行机制。最后从农业保险发展的制度框架、农业保险的政策支持体系和农业保险市场体系建设三个方面,提出促进河北省农业保险发展的对策。
本文的创新点主要包括:(1)对财政补贴农业保险的效果进行了科学评价,得出财政补贴放大了财政支出的效应,扩大了农业保险发展规模,但整体缺乏弹性的结论,并基于此对河北省农业保险财政补贴方案进行了优化设计;(2)界定了农业保险发展的模式类型,并依据河北省的现实条件,构建了河北省农业保险发展的动态模式,设计了促进政府、保险公司和农户良好互动的高效运行机制;(3)实证分析了河北省农业保险市场供给和需求特征,认为河北省农业保险发展存在供给和需求的双重约束,深入剖析河北省农业保险市场非均衡的原因,通过公共财政和博弈论分析,合理定位政府在农业保险市场中的作用与行为方式。
Agricultural insurance is an effective means of risk management of modern agriculture, the government induced full use of market mechanisms to mobilize the social subject participation in risk management to effectively respond to and solve the problem of agricultural natural disasters, plays important role in the sustainable development of agriculture and rural economy. The same time, the international practice of agricultural insurance as appropriate protection for agriculture, not only is an important part in the agricultural security system, and has become one of the most important tool of non-price of agricultural protection in line with WTO rules.. Hebei Province is a major agricultural province in China, plays a decisive role in national food security and agricultural structure adjustment, also is the most serious natural disasters one of the provinces in our country, so it is urgent need for Hebei Province to make agricultural insurance play an important role in stable agricultural production, increasing farmers' income and promoting rural economic development. However, the development of agricultural insurance is relatively slow and lagged behind, both supply and demand of market players behavior constraints, but also by the impact of government's macro-control measures and financial support. Therefore, systematic analysis of the market supply and demand and government support mechanisms of agricultural insurance, promoting the agricultural insurance mode and operation mechanism, has a very important theoretical value and practical significance for the promotion of the sustainable development of agricultural insurance in Hebei Province.
Based on Mathematical theory, risk management and insurance theory, the theory of market equilibrium and the Institutional Change and mechanism design theory, drawing on the theory and practice of domestic and international development of agricultural insurance, the use of the method of combining the empirical analysis and normative analysis, systems analysis characteristics of the market supply and demand and contradictions,Excavation deep-seated reasons for restricting the development of agricultural insurance on the promotion of the appearance of the agricultural insurance market imbalances, and improve government policy to support agricultural insurance system, build mode and operation mechanism of the development of agricultural insurance, and put forward development policy of agricultural insurance. The research results are as follows:
1. By sorting out and refining for risk management theory, market equilibrium theory and the theory of institutional economics, forming a theoretical framework for the development of agricultural insurance. Agricultural insurance as an important means of risk management, due to its quasi-public goods and external characteristics of the agricultural insurance market failure, so government must induced institutional change and innovation to achieve healthy and sustainable development of agricultural insurance market.
2. Combing the course of development of agricultural insurance, to explore the patterns and trends, of development of agricultural insurance system, comprehensive reflection the status of development of agricultural insurance. in-depth analysis all kinds of nsurance and regional distribution characteristics of of agricultural insurance development, and by comparison with other provinces on the level of development, mining the gaps and problems of agricultural insurance.
3. Based on field research, distinction between small farmers and large-scale business entities, demand characteristics and influencing factors of the agricultural insurance system.is analyzed. Using logit binary model to analyze the factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance and found that the scale of land, the number of people engaged in non-agricultural labor force in the family, buying a number of other rural insurance, policy advocacy and awareness of farmers on agricultural insurance the five variables are significant affect . And then through the typical case studies, analysis of the risk effect of the scale land management business entities and the characteristics of demand for agricultural insurance, think that in the present mode of agricultural production, large-scale business entities formed the new demand carrier of agricultural insurance, and the level of demand depends on the coupling mechanism of the interests of the enterprises or cooperatives and farmers.
4. Based on regulating the supply characteristics of and influencing factors of agricultural insurance, through investigation of the operating agency of agricultural insurance, found the willingness of the insurance institutions engaged in agricultural insurance, constraints and policy requirements. From the perspective of supply levels of products and service , number of operating institutions, organizational forms, the scale of capital, solvency and operating efficiency, agricultural insurance supply capacity is the evaluated, and concludes that sustainable development potential of supply is insufficient of agricultural insurance in Hebei province with the small number of agricultural insurance undertakings, concentration high enough, low competition.
5.Through analysis of the manifestations and causes of non-balanced supply and demand of agricultural insurance market, the paper thinks that government intervention can correct market non-balanced phenomenon, and promote agricultural insurance market to achieve higher levels of equilibrium. Using Granger causality test, the regression model, and flexibility analysis method , the status , effectiveness the problems of government to support the development of agricultural insurance has been analyzed. Then by analysis of Game Relations on government, insurance companies and farmers, it forms correct positioning of the government in the agricultural insurance system to promote agricultural insurance market equilibrium and good interaction.
6. Theoretical model and operation mechanism.of agricultural insurance development has been Build. Defining the type and characteristics of the development mode of agricultural insurance, according to the agricultural production conditions and industrial structure, financial ability to support the basic realities of the agricultural insurance development stage, the development of the agricultural cooperative organizations, farmers' income level and insurance awareness, it has been proposed that Hebei Province should choose the mode of commercial operation in support of the Government, the insurance business organizations form should choose commercial agents and farmers' mutual insurance at this stage, then with the changes of economic development gradual transition to the“policy support”and“commercial operation”three-stage model of development. finally this mechanism is designed for the efficient operation of the agricultural insurance market with government support.From three aspects of the system Environment of development, the market system construction and organization system of agricultural insurance, the policies are put forword to provide a good development environment and platform for the commercial operation of agricultural insurance.
The innovation of this paper include: (1) Scientific evaluation of the effect of financial subsidies for agricultural insurance, draw conclusion that financial subsidies amplified the effects of fiscal spending to expand the scale of development of agricultural insurance, but the overall lack of flexibility, and based on this program on financial subsidy for agricultural insurance is devised; (2) Defines the types of agricultural insurance development model, builds a dynamic model of agricultural insurance development based on the reality of conditions in Hebei Province, and designes efficient operation mechanism to promote the government, insurance companies and farmers good interaction; (3) Make an empirical analysis of supply and demand of agricultural insurance market, thinking that the development of agricultural insurance exists in the supply and demand constraints, in-depth analysis of the non-balanced agricultural insurance market, using public finance and game theory analysis to locate the role and behavior of the government in the agricultural insurance market.
本文通过深入的理论分析,借鉴国内外农业保险发展的理论与实践,运用实证分析与规范分析相结合的方法,系统分析了河北省农业保险运行的市场供求特征与矛盾,在农业保险市场失衡的表象下挖掘制约农业保险发展的深层次原因,完善政府支持农业保险的政策体系,构建农业保险发展的模式和运行机制,提出促进农业保险的发展策略。研究成果如下:
一是通过对风险管理理论、市场均衡理论和制度经济学理论最新研究成果进行梳理与提炼,形成了河北省农业保险发展研究的理论框架。得出农业保险作为风险管理的重要手段,由于其准公共物品和外部性特征导致农业保险市场失灵,政府必须通过诱导性的制度变迁和创新,实现农业保险市场健康持续发展的结论。
二是梳理河北省农业保险的发展历程,探索农业保险制度发展的脉络、规律和趋势,综合反映河北省农业保险发展的现状,深入分析河北省农业保险发展的险种与区域分布特征,并与我国其他省份农业保险发展水平比较,挖掘河北省农业保险发展存在的差距与问题。
三是以实地调研为基础,区分小农户和规模化经营主体,对河北省农业保险需求特征及影响因素进行系统分析。运用logit二元模型对影响农业保险需求的因素进行分析,发现性别、土地规模、购买其它农村保险的数量、政策宣传力度和农户对农业保险的认知五个变量影响显著。然后通过典型案例调查,剖析土地规模化经营主体的风险效应及农业保险需求特征,认为在现代农业生产方式下,规模化经营主体形成了农业保险新的需求载体,需求水平取决于规模化经营主体与农户利益联结机制的完善程度。
四是在规范分析了农业保险供给特征与影响因素基础上,通过对农业保险经营机构的调查,发现保险机构经营农业保险的意愿、制约因素和政策需求。并从农业保险供给的产品和服务水平、经营机构的数量、组织形式、资本规模、偿付能力和经营效益等角度,对河北省农业保险市场供给能力进行综合评价。认为河北省农业保险经营机构数量少、集中度高、竞争力不够,供给的可持续发展后劲不足,而农业保险供给的高成本、高风险特征,以及制度和技术供给的不足是重要的制约因素。
五是分析河北省农业保险市场供求非均衡的表现形式和原因,通过公共财政和博弈论分析,为政府支持农业保险发展提供了理论依据,并合理定位政府在农业保险市场的作用与行为方式,明确区分中央政府和地方政府的职责。然后通过格兰杰因果检验、回归模型和弹性分析方法,对河北省政府支持农业保险发展的现状和效果进行分析,挖掘河北省政府支持农业保险存在的问题。基于此对河北省农业保险财政补贴方案进行了设计,优化农业保险的财政补贴方式和规模,提高财政资金的使用效益。
六是构建了河北省农业保险发展的理论模式与运行机制,并提出相应的政策措施。对农业保险发展模式的类型及特征进行界定,依据河北省农业生产条件与产业结构、财政支撑能力、农业保险发展阶段、农业合作组织发展情况、农户收入水平和保险意识等基本现实,提出河北省应该选择政府支持下商业化运行的“三阶段”动态发展模式。现阶段以“政府政策支持+商业代办和农民互助保险”模式为主,然后随着经济发展水平等条件的变化逐步过渡到“政策强力扶持+政策性农险机构”模式,最后实现“政府逐步退出+商业化运营”模式。并在此基础上设计了农业保险市场在政府支持下高效运行机制。最后从农业保险发展的制度框架、农业保险的政策支持体系和农业保险市场体系建设三个方面,提出促进河北省农业保险发展的对策。
本文的创新点主要包括:(1)对财政补贴农业保险的效果进行了科学评价,得出财政补贴放大了财政支出的效应,扩大了农业保险发展规模,但整体缺乏弹性的结论,并基于此对河北省农业保险财政补贴方案进行了优化设计;(2)界定了农业保险发展的模式类型,并依据河北省的现实条件,构建了河北省农业保险发展的动态模式,设计了促进政府、保险公司和农户良好互动的高效运行机制;(3)实证分析了河北省农业保险市场供给和需求特征,认为河北省农业保险发展存在供给和需求的双重约束,深入剖析河北省农业保险市场非均衡的原因,通过公共财政和博弈论分析,合理定位政府在农业保险市场中的作用与行为方式。
Agricultural insurance is an effective means of risk management of modern agriculture, the government induced full use of market mechanisms to mobilize the social subject participation in risk management to effectively respond to and solve the problem of agricultural natural disasters, plays important role in the sustainable development of agriculture and rural economy. The same time, the international practice of agricultural insurance as appropriate protection for agriculture, not only is an important part in the agricultural security system, and has become one of the most important tool of non-price of agricultural protection in line with WTO rules.. Hebei Province is a major agricultural province in China, plays a decisive role in national food security and agricultural structure adjustment, also is the most serious natural disasters one of the provinces in our country, so it is urgent need for Hebei Province to make agricultural insurance play an important role in stable agricultural production, increasing farmers' income and promoting rural economic development. However, the development of agricultural insurance is relatively slow and lagged behind, both supply and demand of market players behavior constraints, but also by the impact of government's macro-control measures and financial support. Therefore, systematic analysis of the market supply and demand and government support mechanisms of agricultural insurance, promoting the agricultural insurance mode and operation mechanism, has a very important theoretical value and practical significance for the promotion of the sustainable development of agricultural insurance in Hebei Province.
Based on Mathematical theory, risk management and insurance theory, the theory of market equilibrium and the Institutional Change and mechanism design theory, drawing on the theory and practice of domestic and international development of agricultural insurance, the use of the method of combining the empirical analysis and normative analysis, systems analysis characteristics of the market supply and demand and contradictions,Excavation deep-seated reasons for restricting the development of agricultural insurance on the promotion of the appearance of the agricultural insurance market imbalances, and improve government policy to support agricultural insurance system, build mode and operation mechanism of the development of agricultural insurance, and put forward development policy of agricultural insurance. The research results are as follows:
1. By sorting out and refining for risk management theory, market equilibrium theory and the theory of institutional economics, forming a theoretical framework for the development of agricultural insurance. Agricultural insurance as an important means of risk management, due to its quasi-public goods and external characteristics of the agricultural insurance market failure, so government must induced institutional change and innovation to achieve healthy and sustainable development of agricultural insurance market.
2. Combing the course of development of agricultural insurance, to explore the patterns and trends, of development of agricultural insurance system, comprehensive reflection the status of development of agricultural insurance. in-depth analysis all kinds of nsurance and regional distribution characteristics of of agricultural insurance development, and by comparison with other provinces on the level of development, mining the gaps and problems of agricultural insurance.
3. Based on field research, distinction between small farmers and large-scale business entities, demand characteristics and influencing factors of the agricultural insurance system.is analyzed. Using logit binary model to analyze the factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance and found that the scale of land, the number of people engaged in non-agricultural labor force in the family, buying a number of other rural insurance, policy advocacy and awareness of farmers on agricultural insurance the five variables are significant affect . And then through the typical case studies, analysis of the risk effect of the scale land management business entities and the characteristics of demand for agricultural insurance, think that in the present mode of agricultural production, large-scale business entities formed the new demand carrier of agricultural insurance, and the level of demand depends on the coupling mechanism of the interests of the enterprises or cooperatives and farmers.
4. Based on regulating the supply characteristics of and influencing factors of agricultural insurance, through investigation of the operating agency of agricultural insurance, found the willingness of the insurance institutions engaged in agricultural insurance, constraints and policy requirements. From the perspective of supply levels of products and service , number of operating institutions, organizational forms, the scale of capital, solvency and operating efficiency, agricultural insurance supply capacity is the evaluated, and concludes that sustainable development potential of supply is insufficient of agricultural insurance in Hebei province with the small number of agricultural insurance undertakings, concentration high enough, low competition.
5.Through analysis of the manifestations and causes of non-balanced supply and demand of agricultural insurance market, the paper thinks that government intervention can correct market non-balanced phenomenon, and promote agricultural insurance market to achieve higher levels of equilibrium. Using Granger causality test, the regression model, and flexibility analysis method , the status , effectiveness the problems of government to support the development of agricultural insurance has been analyzed. Then by analysis of Game Relations on government, insurance companies and farmers, it forms correct positioning of the government in the agricultural insurance system to promote agricultural insurance market equilibrium and good interaction.
6. Theoretical model and operation mechanism.of agricultural insurance development has been Build. Defining the type and characteristics of the development mode of agricultural insurance, according to the agricultural production conditions and industrial structure, financial ability to support the basic realities of the agricultural insurance development stage, the development of the agricultural cooperative organizations, farmers' income level and insurance awareness, it has been proposed that Hebei Province should choose the mode of commercial operation in support of the Government, the insurance business organizations form should choose commercial agents and farmers' mutual insurance at this stage, then with the changes of economic development gradual transition to the“policy support”and“commercial operation”three-stage model of development. finally this mechanism is designed for the efficient operation of the agricultural insurance market with government support.From three aspects of the system Environment of development, the market system construction and organization system of agricultural insurance, the policies are put forword to provide a good development environment and platform for the commercial operation of agricultural insurance.
The innovation of this paper include: (1) Scientific evaluation of the effect of financial subsidies for agricultural insurance, draw conclusion that financial subsidies amplified the effects of fiscal spending to expand the scale of development of agricultural insurance, but the overall lack of flexibility, and based on this program on financial subsidy for agricultural insurance is devised; (2) Defines the types of agricultural insurance development model, builds a dynamic model of agricultural insurance development based on the reality of conditions in Hebei Province, and designes efficient operation mechanism to promote the government, insurance companies and farmers good interaction; (3) Make an empirical analysis of supply and demand of agricultural insurance market, thinking that the development of agricultural insurance exists in the supply and demand constraints, in-depth analysis of the non-balanced agricultural insurance market, using public finance and game theory analysis to locate the role and behavior of the government in the agricultural insurance market.
引文
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