水上救援资源优化配置问题研究
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摘要
海洋资源是全人类的共同财富,《联合国海洋法公约》赋予了全世界各国或地区共同享有海洋资源的权利。但是,伴随着海洋经济的快速发展,水上事故对人命、财产及生态环境的危害已越来越受到社会的广泛关注,事故救援需要世界各国及人员的共同合作。但由于现行的水上救援组织和资源保障制度实行各国家或地区、各行业以及部门分别治理的政策,一方面表现为水上救援能力总体不足的问题,另一方面却又存在比较严重的重复建设现象和“搭便车”行为的存在,导致公共地利用的灾难。本文针对水上救援资源优化配置问题的研究,其目的是为提高水上救援组织保障能力,在兼顾公平与效率的原则基础上,合理构建水上救援资源协同配置机制提供理论依据。
本文首先对有关资源配置的理论与方法进行了回顾,接下来是水上救援组织与资源保障制度的概述,其中特别对水上事故及其风险的概念、风险表征方法等比较模糊的概念涵义进行了明确界定,为合理判定事故责任归属、确定区域救援资源总体配置水平及其在责任主体之间的分摊等奠定了基础。第三,基于协同配置的思想,在兼顾公平与效率的基础上,对水上协同配置机制的形成与成本合理分摊进行了分析；第四,采用博弈分析的方法,从社会总体福利最大化的角度对侵权行为法下不同归责原则对责任主体资源配置策略的影响进行了分析,针对“航行疏忽免责”、“赔偿责任限制”以及“责任保险”与“责任基金”等特殊的制度规定对资源配置的影响进行了深入的研究。最后对论文研究成果及其适用性进行了说明。本论文的研究结果表明,(1)社会总体资源配置水平应取决于当地的社会风险最大可接受水平；(2)责任主体的法定配置标准应基于成本的合理分摊,其与外界救援能力和水平是有关系的；(3)协同配置机制的形成与稳定应建立在成本的合理分摊基础上的,即需要兼顾公平与效率；(4)针对水上运输特殊制度规定对社会总体资源优化配置没有影响。
Marine resources are the common wealth to human beings, Convention on the Law of the Sea of United Nations ensures that all the people or nations of the world could share these gifts from God peacefully without any harmful to others or environment. Yet, with the rapid grow of marine economy, public safety and security is challenged by the accidents happened on the high sea. The successful search-and-rescue (SAR) depends mainly on the co-operation of the people and governments around the world. But the present search-and-rescue mechanism is based on individual responsibilities of each Nation or district, and this will definitely lead to the redundant construction and the behavior of'hitch-hike'.This paper focuses on the optimization of SAR resource allocation of marine perils and the so called optimization is determined by the efficient utilization of resources and fairness of cost or benefit allocation within the coalition.
In the first part of this paper, the concerning approaches and investigation about the resource allocation is reviewed previously. In the second part, the author presents the hierarchy of co-operation mechanism on the search and rescue on high sea, especially, the definition of water accidents is defined and the function of risk is amended with the factor of extent of controllable, and this is fundamental and critical to all the researches of the following chapter. In the third part, based on the externality of accident, the drives of coalition formation is discussed and the stability of the mechanism of the co-operation is investigated and analyzed, needless to say, all researches are based on the equity and efficiency of the cost allocation. In the fifth chapter, based on the Tort Responsibility Act, the effect to the optimization of resources allocation under different compensation rules is discussed separately, especial to the special rules and regulations on the compensation of marine accidents are analyzed accordingly. In the last chapter, conclusions and comments are given to the use of the donation of this paper.
According to this paper, author conclude that:(1) the total socail SAR resource allocation level should be determined by the social As-Low-As-Reasonable-Practically risk (ALARP) of the area; (2) the regulated allocation level of the subject of liability of compensation should be based on the reasoble allocation; (3) all the benefits or costs of the whole coalition should be allocated basis on the balance of fairness and efficient within the coalition; (4) the special rules and regulations for maritime accident is not affected the optimization of the emergency resources allocation.
本文首先对有关资源配置的理论与方法进行了回顾,接下来是水上救援组织与资源保障制度的概述,其中特别对水上事故及其风险的概念、风险表征方法等比较模糊的概念涵义进行了明确界定,为合理判定事故责任归属、确定区域救援资源总体配置水平及其在责任主体之间的分摊等奠定了基础。第三,基于协同配置的思想,在兼顾公平与效率的基础上,对水上协同配置机制的形成与成本合理分摊进行了分析；第四,采用博弈分析的方法,从社会总体福利最大化的角度对侵权行为法下不同归责原则对责任主体资源配置策略的影响进行了分析,针对“航行疏忽免责”、“赔偿责任限制”以及“责任保险”与“责任基金”等特殊的制度规定对资源配置的影响进行了深入的研究。最后对论文研究成果及其适用性进行了说明。本论文的研究结果表明,(1)社会总体资源配置水平应取决于当地的社会风险最大可接受水平；(2)责任主体的法定配置标准应基于成本的合理分摊,其与外界救援能力和水平是有关系的；(3)协同配置机制的形成与稳定应建立在成本的合理分摊基础上的,即需要兼顾公平与效率；(4)针对水上运输特殊制度规定对社会总体资源优化配置没有影响。
Marine resources are the common wealth to human beings, Convention on the Law of the Sea of United Nations ensures that all the people or nations of the world could share these gifts from God peacefully without any harmful to others or environment. Yet, with the rapid grow of marine economy, public safety and security is challenged by the accidents happened on the high sea. The successful search-and-rescue (SAR) depends mainly on the co-operation of the people and governments around the world. But the present search-and-rescue mechanism is based on individual responsibilities of each Nation or district, and this will definitely lead to the redundant construction and the behavior of'hitch-hike'.This paper focuses on the optimization of SAR resource allocation of marine perils and the so called optimization is determined by the efficient utilization of resources and fairness of cost or benefit allocation within the coalition.
In the first part of this paper, the concerning approaches and investigation about the resource allocation is reviewed previously. In the second part, the author presents the hierarchy of co-operation mechanism on the search and rescue on high sea, especially, the definition of water accidents is defined and the function of risk is amended with the factor of extent of controllable, and this is fundamental and critical to all the researches of the following chapter. In the third part, based on the externality of accident, the drives of coalition formation is discussed and the stability of the mechanism of the co-operation is investigated and analyzed, needless to say, all researches are based on the equity and efficiency of the cost allocation. In the fifth chapter, based on the Tort Responsibility Act, the effect to the optimization of resources allocation under different compensation rules is discussed separately, especial to the special rules and regulations on the compensation of marine accidents are analyzed accordingly. In the last chapter, conclusions and comments are given to the use of the donation of this paper.
According to this paper, author conclude that:(1) the total socail SAR resource allocation level should be determined by the social As-Low-As-Reasonable-Practically risk (ALARP) of the area; (2) the regulated allocation level of the subject of liability of compensation should be based on the reasoble allocation; (3) all the benefits or costs of the whole coalition should be allocated basis on the balance of fairness and efficient within the coalition; (4) the special rules and regulations for maritime accident is not affected the optimization of the emergency resources allocation.
引文
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