基于产权约束的农地流转市场定价研究
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摘要
中国的大问题是农民问题,农民的大问题是土地问题,加快农村土地流转被认为是解决中国城乡二元社会经济结构和“三农”问题的途径之一。然而,中国农村土地流转市场发展缓慢,流转规模偏小,流转效率不高。问题的实质在于,受产权制度条件的限制,中国的市场经济一直将农村土地资产排斥在市场资源定价体系之外,定价机制的制度性缺失伤害了流转积极性,降低了流转效率。加快农地流转市场化步伐,建立健全高效、公平、规范的农地流转市场体系,科学配置土地资源,实现农业适度规模经营,这已经成为政府、社会和学界的共识。但是,在现实的产权约束框架下,农地流转怎样市场化,流转市场定价关注的重点是什么?这是农地流转市场化的关键问题,也是现有研究的主要不足。
本文综合运用市场价格理论、现代产权理论、双边市场理论,理论研究和案例分析相结合,规范研究和实证分析互为补充,针对产权约束下的中国农地流转市场定价问题进行了深入研究。论文对国内外现有研究进行了拓展和改进,综合市场和制度两个因素,围绕市场定价这个核心,重点关注产权约束和市场机制的内在联系,将农地保障功能作为重要因子纳入市场定价分析,尝试建立包括价格形成机制、价格发现机制、价格协调机制在内的农地流转市场综合定价机制的理论分析框架,揭示农地流转市场定价的经济学机理。研究结果表明:通过市场竞争、双向拍卖、平台协调、政府保障的多重作用,不仅可以充分发挥市场在资源配置的基础性作用,提高农地流转效率,而且可以为农地产权提供市场化的实现途径,较好地兼顾社会公平。具体内容和结论如下:
首先,通过回顾中国农地制度变迁历史,结合土地产权的相关理论,对中国农地产权制度的形成和特点进行分析归纳,揭示了农地流转的产权属性以及中国农地产权的特殊性。
其次,进行农地流转市场均衡分析,讨论农地价格市场形成机制。引入土地保障功能,建立基于农户和企业最优决策的需求—供给模型,并求解和分析模型的均衡。均衡分析表明,垄断将导致均衡交易量和均衡交易价格下降;给定其他因素,外生因素对均衡交易量和交易价格的影响在竞争性农地市场和垄断市场中的方向是一致的。因此,为了提高农地流转交易的效率,应避免农地市场形成垄断,建立竞争性的农地流转市场,同时重点关注影响市场需求和供给意愿的基本因素,通过适当的政策从源头上引导和管理。
再次,进行农地商品交易定价分析,讨论农地价格市场发现机制。建立基于土地保障功能的双向拍卖模型,将农户看成是土地使用权的卖方,对农地承包经营权有需要的他人或组织看作是买方,将政府视为拍卖商。买卖双方分别向拍卖商报价,拍卖商按照一定规则确定成交价格,然后买卖双方在这一价格下完成交易。模型的均衡分析结果表明:双向拍卖机制将有助于实现土地利用效率的事后帕累托改进,有很高的价格发现效率;政府可以通过在交易价格规则中选择一个最优参数来最大化农地流转交易成功的概率,这为政府设计交易规则提供了一个参数确定的理论基础。
接着,进行农地流转中介定价分析,讨论农地价格协调机制。首先应用双边市场理论,引入平台作为第三方,按照农地流转交易的内涵和特征,建立农地流转交易平台概念模型框架。进一步,建立农户土地流转交易平台利润模型和社会福利模型,形成农地流转交易平台最优价格结构。研究结果表明:农地流转市场具有双边市场的特征,在考虑市场参与者交叉网络外部性的情况下,平台(中介)能够吸引更多的交易者;平台定价结构可以影响平台交易量,政府可以根据需要,通过对农户的倾斜定价(补贴或免费)策略来协调因外部性可能引起的流动性不足和交易量异常,间接实现农地的保障功能。
最后,以全国统筹城乡综合配套改革试验区?成都市为例,结合笔者2004年以来对成都农村的调查数据,就政府在农地流转市场化进程中应发挥的市场保障作用进行案例分析。成都市的经验分析表明,一方面,在农地流转市场建设离不开政府的参与;另一方面,应该处理好市场规律和公权介入的关系,合理界定政府在市场中的行为边界,建设服务型政府。
The big challenge faced in China for a long time is issue concerning farmers and peasants, and the big problem for the farmers and peasants is the land issue. Quicken rural land circulation is considered as one of favorable ways to establish urban-rural dual economic structure and solving issues concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers, namely“Three Rural Issues”in China. However, in China, the market for circulating rural land is developing slowly, circulation scale is comparatively small, and circulation efficiency is not high and yet the essence of the problem is that, due to the restriction of property right system, China’s market economy has been excluding rural land property from pricing system of market resource and deficiencies in the pricing mechanism of circulating of rural land hamper the circulation and reduce the efficiency of circulation as well. To accelerate the pace of market-oriented circulation of rural land, establish and improve the efficient, fair, regulated market system of rural land circulation, scientifically distribute land resources so as to operate the land in appropriate scale, which has become the common goal of the government, society and the academic. Nevertheless, within the constraints of real property right, how to realize market-oriented circulation of rural land? What is the key point to decide the price?, which are the crucial issues for market-oriented circulation of rural land, but also major shortcomings in existing research.
In this dissertation, Market Price Theory, Modern Theory of Property Rights, Bilateral Market Theory are comprehensively exercised, theoretical research and case studies are well combined, normative analysis and empirical analysis are complemented so as to do in-depth study on issues about market pricing of circulation of Chinese rural land under constraints of property rights. Current researches at home and abroad are expanded and improved in this dissertation, combining factors of the market and the mechanism, closely around the market pricing, focusing on inherent relation between property rights constraints and market mechanism, and as an important element, rural land protection will be introduced to analyze market pricing, this dissertation tries to establish theoretical framework of comprehensive pricing mechanism of market-oriented circulation of rural land, including the price formation mechanism, the price discovery mechanism and the price coordination mechanism. Research results in this dissertation show that throght exercising multiple roles of market competition, two-way auction, platform coordination and the Government protection, it not only can give full play to the market in resource allocation as as to enhance the efficiency of rural land circulation, but also provide property rights for rural land with ways to realize market orientation so as to better balance social equity. The specific content and conclusions are as follows:
First of all, by reviewing the historical changes in China's rural land system, combined with land-related property rights theory, the formation and features of Chinese rural land property rights system are analyzed and summarized, which reveals property attributes of rural land circulation, as well as the particularity of China's rural land property rights.
Second, by doing equilibrium analysis on market-oriented circulation of rural land, market pricing mechanism of rural land is discussed; by introducing land protection function, demand-supply model for optimal decisions between farmers and businesses is established, and then equilibrium of model is solved and analyzed. The equilibrium analysis show that monopoly will lead to reduce in equilibrium trading volume and price, when some factors are certain, in a competitive market and monopoly market, the impact of exogenous factors on equilibrium trading volume and price is in the same direction. Therefore, in order to enhance the efficiency of rural land circulation, it is advisable to avoid the monopoly formed in the rural land market, build up competitive rural land circulation market, and meanwhile focus on the fundamental factors which will affect market demand and supply and will at the same time through appropriate policy guidance and management.
Third, by doing pricing analysis on agricultural commodities, the price discovery mechanism of rural land is discussed; two-way auction model functioned with land protection is established. In this model, farmers are considered as a seller who has land use right, and to those who are in need of land contractual management rights are regarded as a buyer, while the government is the auctioneer. Buyers and sellers respectively quote the auctioneer, and according to certain rules, auctioneer determines the transaction price, lastly, buyers and sellers complete transactions in this price. Equilibrium analysis on this model shows that, two-way auction mechanism will help to achieve Pareto improvement after realizing the efficiency of land use; the government can choose an optimal parameter in the rules of trading price to maximize the probability of successful transaction of rural land circulation, which provides the government with theoretical basis to determine parameter when designing trading rules.
Fourth, by doing intermediary pricing analysis on rural land circulation, price coordination mechanism of rural land is discussed. Firstly, framework of conceptual model of transaction system for rural land circulation is established by applying bilateral market theory, introducing platform as a third party and in accordance with the connotation and characteristics of rural land circulation transaction. Further, profit model for trading rural land and social welfare model are built up so as to form the optimal price structure for transaction of rural land circulation. Studies in this dissertation show that, market-oriented rural land circulation is characterized by bilateral market, under the circumstances of cross-network externalities of market participants, platform (trade intermediaries) can attract more traders; platform pricing structure can affect the trading volume, as required, government can coordinate inadequate liquidity and abnormal trading volume that may arise due to externalities by tilting prices (subsidized or free) strategy so as to indirectoly realize the protection function of rural land.
At last, taking, national coordinating urban and rural comprehensive reform pilot area, Chengdu, as a case study to analyze the role of government for market protection in processes of market-oriented rural land circulation, combined with the survey data in rural areas of Chengdu since 2004. Successful experience in Chengdu city shows that, on one hand, market building of rural land circulation is inseparable from the government’s participation; on the other hand, the relationship between market forces and intervention of public power should be properly handled, and rationally define the government's behavior in the market boundary so as to construct service-oriented government.
本文综合运用市场价格理论、现代产权理论、双边市场理论,理论研究和案例分析相结合,规范研究和实证分析互为补充,针对产权约束下的中国农地流转市场定价问题进行了深入研究。论文对国内外现有研究进行了拓展和改进,综合市场和制度两个因素,围绕市场定价这个核心,重点关注产权约束和市场机制的内在联系,将农地保障功能作为重要因子纳入市场定价分析,尝试建立包括价格形成机制、价格发现机制、价格协调机制在内的农地流转市场综合定价机制的理论分析框架,揭示农地流转市场定价的经济学机理。研究结果表明:通过市场竞争、双向拍卖、平台协调、政府保障的多重作用,不仅可以充分发挥市场在资源配置的基础性作用,提高农地流转效率,而且可以为农地产权提供市场化的实现途径,较好地兼顾社会公平。具体内容和结论如下:
首先,通过回顾中国农地制度变迁历史,结合土地产权的相关理论,对中国农地产权制度的形成和特点进行分析归纳,揭示了农地流转的产权属性以及中国农地产权的特殊性。
其次,进行农地流转市场均衡分析,讨论农地价格市场形成机制。引入土地保障功能,建立基于农户和企业最优决策的需求—供给模型,并求解和分析模型的均衡。均衡分析表明,垄断将导致均衡交易量和均衡交易价格下降;给定其他因素,外生因素对均衡交易量和交易价格的影响在竞争性农地市场和垄断市场中的方向是一致的。因此,为了提高农地流转交易的效率,应避免农地市场形成垄断,建立竞争性的农地流转市场,同时重点关注影响市场需求和供给意愿的基本因素,通过适当的政策从源头上引导和管理。
再次,进行农地商品交易定价分析,讨论农地价格市场发现机制。建立基于土地保障功能的双向拍卖模型,将农户看成是土地使用权的卖方,对农地承包经营权有需要的他人或组织看作是买方,将政府视为拍卖商。买卖双方分别向拍卖商报价,拍卖商按照一定规则确定成交价格,然后买卖双方在这一价格下完成交易。模型的均衡分析结果表明:双向拍卖机制将有助于实现土地利用效率的事后帕累托改进,有很高的价格发现效率;政府可以通过在交易价格规则中选择一个最优参数来最大化农地流转交易成功的概率,这为政府设计交易规则提供了一个参数确定的理论基础。
接着,进行农地流转中介定价分析,讨论农地价格协调机制。首先应用双边市场理论,引入平台作为第三方,按照农地流转交易的内涵和特征,建立农地流转交易平台概念模型框架。进一步,建立农户土地流转交易平台利润模型和社会福利模型,形成农地流转交易平台最优价格结构。研究结果表明:农地流转市场具有双边市场的特征,在考虑市场参与者交叉网络外部性的情况下,平台(中介)能够吸引更多的交易者;平台定价结构可以影响平台交易量,政府可以根据需要,通过对农户的倾斜定价(补贴或免费)策略来协调因外部性可能引起的流动性不足和交易量异常,间接实现农地的保障功能。
最后,以全国统筹城乡综合配套改革试验区?成都市为例,结合笔者2004年以来对成都农村的调查数据,就政府在农地流转市场化进程中应发挥的市场保障作用进行案例分析。成都市的经验分析表明,一方面,在农地流转市场建设离不开政府的参与;另一方面,应该处理好市场规律和公权介入的关系,合理界定政府在市场中的行为边界,建设服务型政府。
The big challenge faced in China for a long time is issue concerning farmers and peasants, and the big problem for the farmers and peasants is the land issue. Quicken rural land circulation is considered as one of favorable ways to establish urban-rural dual economic structure and solving issues concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers, namely“Three Rural Issues”in China. However, in China, the market for circulating rural land is developing slowly, circulation scale is comparatively small, and circulation efficiency is not high and yet the essence of the problem is that, due to the restriction of property right system, China’s market economy has been excluding rural land property from pricing system of market resource and deficiencies in the pricing mechanism of circulating of rural land hamper the circulation and reduce the efficiency of circulation as well. To accelerate the pace of market-oriented circulation of rural land, establish and improve the efficient, fair, regulated market system of rural land circulation, scientifically distribute land resources so as to operate the land in appropriate scale, which has become the common goal of the government, society and the academic. Nevertheless, within the constraints of real property right, how to realize market-oriented circulation of rural land? What is the key point to decide the price?, which are the crucial issues for market-oriented circulation of rural land, but also major shortcomings in existing research.
In this dissertation, Market Price Theory, Modern Theory of Property Rights, Bilateral Market Theory are comprehensively exercised, theoretical research and case studies are well combined, normative analysis and empirical analysis are complemented so as to do in-depth study on issues about market pricing of circulation of Chinese rural land under constraints of property rights. Current researches at home and abroad are expanded and improved in this dissertation, combining factors of the market and the mechanism, closely around the market pricing, focusing on inherent relation between property rights constraints and market mechanism, and as an important element, rural land protection will be introduced to analyze market pricing, this dissertation tries to establish theoretical framework of comprehensive pricing mechanism of market-oriented circulation of rural land, including the price formation mechanism, the price discovery mechanism and the price coordination mechanism. Research results in this dissertation show that throght exercising multiple roles of market competition, two-way auction, platform coordination and the Government protection, it not only can give full play to the market in resource allocation as as to enhance the efficiency of rural land circulation, but also provide property rights for rural land with ways to realize market orientation so as to better balance social equity. The specific content and conclusions are as follows:
First of all, by reviewing the historical changes in China's rural land system, combined with land-related property rights theory, the formation and features of Chinese rural land property rights system are analyzed and summarized, which reveals property attributes of rural land circulation, as well as the particularity of China's rural land property rights.
Second, by doing equilibrium analysis on market-oriented circulation of rural land, market pricing mechanism of rural land is discussed; by introducing land protection function, demand-supply model for optimal decisions between farmers and businesses is established, and then equilibrium of model is solved and analyzed. The equilibrium analysis show that monopoly will lead to reduce in equilibrium trading volume and price, when some factors are certain, in a competitive market and monopoly market, the impact of exogenous factors on equilibrium trading volume and price is in the same direction. Therefore, in order to enhance the efficiency of rural land circulation, it is advisable to avoid the monopoly formed in the rural land market, build up competitive rural land circulation market, and meanwhile focus on the fundamental factors which will affect market demand and supply and will at the same time through appropriate policy guidance and management.
Third, by doing pricing analysis on agricultural commodities, the price discovery mechanism of rural land is discussed; two-way auction model functioned with land protection is established. In this model, farmers are considered as a seller who has land use right, and to those who are in need of land contractual management rights are regarded as a buyer, while the government is the auctioneer. Buyers and sellers respectively quote the auctioneer, and according to certain rules, auctioneer determines the transaction price, lastly, buyers and sellers complete transactions in this price. Equilibrium analysis on this model shows that, two-way auction mechanism will help to achieve Pareto improvement after realizing the efficiency of land use; the government can choose an optimal parameter in the rules of trading price to maximize the probability of successful transaction of rural land circulation, which provides the government with theoretical basis to determine parameter when designing trading rules.
Fourth, by doing intermediary pricing analysis on rural land circulation, price coordination mechanism of rural land is discussed. Firstly, framework of conceptual model of transaction system for rural land circulation is established by applying bilateral market theory, introducing platform as a third party and in accordance with the connotation and characteristics of rural land circulation transaction. Further, profit model for trading rural land and social welfare model are built up so as to form the optimal price structure for transaction of rural land circulation. Studies in this dissertation show that, market-oriented rural land circulation is characterized by bilateral market, under the circumstances of cross-network externalities of market participants, platform (trade intermediaries) can attract more traders; platform pricing structure can affect the trading volume, as required, government can coordinate inadequate liquidity and abnormal trading volume that may arise due to externalities by tilting prices (subsidized or free) strategy so as to indirectoly realize the protection function of rural land.
At last, taking, national coordinating urban and rural comprehensive reform pilot area, Chengdu, as a case study to analyze the role of government for market protection in processes of market-oriented rural land circulation, combined with the survey data in rural areas of Chengdu since 2004. Successful experience in Chengdu city shows that, on one hand, market building of rural land circulation is inseparable from the government’s participation; on the other hand, the relationship between market forces and intervention of public power should be properly handled, and rationally define the government's behavior in the market boundary so as to construct service-oriented government.
引文
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