内部资本市场中的利益冲突与协调研究
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摘要
目前无论是在成熟市场体系下还是在新兴市场经济体中,企业集团都是居于主流地位的企业组织形式,在各个经济体中都占据着举足轻重的地位。与此相伴随的是内部资本市场的广泛应用,在集团总部的主导下通过成员企业之间的资本交易配置可以实现大量的协作剩余:通过资本融通提高有效投资额;降低集团的总融资成本,提高内部的资本配置效率等等。但与此同时,种种迹象表明内部资本市场也会带来成员企业之间大量的摩擦和冲突,如控股大股东对子公司的剥夺,子公司滥用母公司的资产,成员企业之间的资源竞争和内耗等,这些都会导致集团治理成本的增加和合作收益的减少。因此,内部资本市场犹如一把“双刃剑”,人们在利用其制度优势的同时,也要考虑如何协调其内部的利益冲突,减少治理成本,扩大相对收益,因此目前应对内部资本市场中的利益冲突问题从理论上加以研究和总结。
在以往的有关内部资本市场的研究中,往往采用信息经济学的范式来研究其资本配置效率,而从参与内部资本交易的成员企业之间利益冲突的角度来研究内部资本市场组织成本的相关研究较少,所以本文的选题是内部资本市场中的利益冲突与协调研究,在具体的研究中遵循的“提出问题、分析问题、解决问题”的研究路径,核心研究内容包括以下五个部分。
首先,本文揭示了内部资本市场中利益冲突产生的根源。在研究中笔者是从内部资本市场上的具体财务行为入手,利用最优线性规划方法建立了内部资本市场中的各种融投资分配模型。通过对模型的分析,发现由于成员企业的融投资能力的不同以及各种复杂交易动机的存在,使得每个成员企业在内部资本市场中的融资贡献和获得的投资并不匹配,集团总部对于不同成员企业存在着财务歧视的现象,这也就成为内部资本市场中潜在的利益冲突根源。
其次,分析了上述利益冲突所带来的负面后果。本文通过设定内部资本交易中的关键参数和母子公司的博弈对策,建立了母子公司资本转移的博弈支付矩阵,并进一步分析了由此可能导致的多种博弈均衡结果。研究结果发现:以效率为目标的内部资本交易在加入了利益冲突的因素以后可能会异化为其它几种次优结果,并会带来整个社会的效率损失和公平侵害。
第三,尝试性地分析了利益冲突的影响因素,以进一步寻求相关的解决途径。企业集团中的内部资本市场可以看作是一个团队协作行为,协调利益冲突时既要发挥内部的自发协调性,也需要外部力量的介入。本文利用重复博弈中的可自我执行协议理论框架分析了促使有效交易达成的影响因素,试图了解在交易方自发博弈下最优交易状态可能实现的途径,在此基础上又进一步分析了外部法律规制对内部资本运作状态的影响和作用。
第四,对我国上市公司的内部资本交易行为进行了实证分析。在具体研究中通过选取适当的研究方法和计量指标,研究了三方面的内容。首先,通过分析内部资本交易与公司融投资行为之间的关系,从内部资本市场财务歧视的角度对我国上市公司的股权融资偏好行为做出了一个新的解释。其次,研究了内部资本交易的影响因素,发现上市公司的股权结构会显著影响到内部资本交易的发生情况。最后研究了不同类型内部资本交易对公司价值的影响,发现资产置换类型的内部交易会严重损害上市公司的价值。上述结论证明了控股母公司利用内部资本市场进行利益侵害行为的存在性,支持了前述的理论研究假设。
最后,对内部资本市场中的利益冲突及协调情况的现实情况进行了阐述,并提出了相关对策。在研究中笔者首先确定了协调内部资本市场利益冲突的两个目标:提高有效协作交易和减少利益冲突及侵害行为,然后分别从内部资本市场的内部自纠机制和外部制衡机制两方面详细探讨了协调内部利益冲突的多种手段。接着对当前世界各国主要集团类型中内部资本交易的治理情况进行了阐述分析,最后针对我国企业集团中的内部资本交易现状和协调机制提出了相关的政策建议。
通过以上的分析研究,文章总的结论是在内部资本市场中,由于成员企业不同的经营特征和复杂的利益动机,内部资本交易行为会导致成员企业之间的种种利益冲突行为。这种利益冲突会异化内部资本优化配置行为,并会带来效率损失和公平侵害的负面后果。因此应该从内部自纠机制和外部制衡机制两方面入手来协调内部资本市场中的利益冲突行为,减少利益侵害行为和内耗成本,提高企业集团的总合作剩余。
At present, in a mature market system or in the emerging market economy, enterprise groups are living in the mainstream forms of business organization and its production which occupies a pivotal position in all economies. At the same time, the internal capital markets are applicated widerly. Members of enterprises present capital transactions between each other leading by the group headquarters and achieve substantial residual collaboration : enhance effective investment; reduce the group's financing costs and improve the internal efficiency of the allocation of capital, and so on. At the same time, various phenomena indicate internal capital market would bring friction and conflict between members enterprises. As if holding large shareholders deprivate the subsidiaries. abusely investing parent corporation's assets, resources competition and internal friction between the member enterprises, which would lead to an increase in treatment costs and reduce the benefits of cooperation. Therefore, the internal capital market is like a "double-edged sword," people used its advantage of the system. have to consider how to coordinate its internal conflict of interest, reduced management costs and expanding relative returns. Thus the question of conflict of interest in the internal capital market should be studied and summed up theoretically.
In the past the internal capital market research, often using information economics paradigm to study the efficiency of the allocation of capital. The paper research the internal capital transactions from the conflict of interests between groups and the internal capital market organization costs are very fewer. So this paper's topics is the interest confliction and coordination in internal capital market .In the specific research the paper is followed by presenting problem, analyzing and solve problems, the study's core research includes the following four parts.
First of all, the paper reveals the interest conflict root arising from the internal capital market. The study research the internal capital market from the specific financial actions and uses optimal linear programming methods to establish financial and investment allocation models in the internal capital market. As different investment capacity in the members and the various complex transactions motivated exist, each member enterprises's financing and investment from the the internal capital market was not matching. There are financial discrimination against them and it will become a potential source of conflict of interest.
Second, this article has further analyzed the consequence of the interest conflicts.Through establisheing the essential parameter and analyzing the net income situation which the mother and child company as well as their payoff, the paper brings the gambling payment matrix and analyzes the many kinds of possible gambling balanced result.The findings discovered that the internal capitail traszation has been disassimilation for other results because of the interest conflicts and bring the entire social the efficiency loss and the fair violation.
Third, this article analyzes the influence factors to interest conflicts , in order to seeks the situation. In enterprise group's internal capital market may regard as is a team cooperation behavior and the interest conflicts coordination need internal spontaneous and exterior strength the involvement.Therefore this article analyzes the influence factor which the effective transaction achieved using the executive agreement theory frame. Finally, the paper analyzes the influence of the exterior legal rules and regulations to the internal capital market.
Fourth, the paper analyse empirically the internal capital transactions based on the listed companies in China and includes the three areas. Firstly, by analyzing the relation between the internal capital transactions and corporate finance and investment,we put forward an new interpretation to the financing preference behavior in China's listed companies from the perspective of the financial discrimination in the internal capital market. Secondly, we study the impact to the internal capital transactions and find that the shares of listed companies structure will significantly affect the internal capital transactions happened.Finally, we study the different types of internal capital transaction on the value of the company and find that the exchange of assets can seriously damage to the value of listed companies.
Finally, this paper presents the interest conflict coordination mechanisms of the internal capital markets. The study firstly the two objective of the coordination of internal capital markets conflicting interests: to improve and reduce the effective interest transactions conflict and abuse.Then we explore interest conflict coordinate various means from the internal corrections mechanism and external checks and balances mechanism .Then we annalyse capital transactions governance of the major groups in the current world. Finally we present the relevant policy recommendations to progress coordination mechanism of the internal capital transactions in China business groups.
Through the above analysis, the article conclusion are that the internal capital market will lead to member enterprises of various conflicts of interest because different enterprises operating characteristics and the complex interests motives. Therefore we should coordinate the internal capital market interest conflict acts from the internal balances mechanism and external checks mechanism to reduce interest costs and internal friction and enhance effective cooperation remaining.
在以往的有关内部资本市场的研究中,往往采用信息经济学的范式来研究其资本配置效率,而从参与内部资本交易的成员企业之间利益冲突的角度来研究内部资本市场组织成本的相关研究较少,所以本文的选题是内部资本市场中的利益冲突与协调研究,在具体的研究中遵循的“提出问题、分析问题、解决问题”的研究路径,核心研究内容包括以下五个部分。
首先,本文揭示了内部资本市场中利益冲突产生的根源。在研究中笔者是从内部资本市场上的具体财务行为入手,利用最优线性规划方法建立了内部资本市场中的各种融投资分配模型。通过对模型的分析,发现由于成员企业的融投资能力的不同以及各种复杂交易动机的存在,使得每个成员企业在内部资本市场中的融资贡献和获得的投资并不匹配,集团总部对于不同成员企业存在着财务歧视的现象,这也就成为内部资本市场中潜在的利益冲突根源。
其次,分析了上述利益冲突所带来的负面后果。本文通过设定内部资本交易中的关键参数和母子公司的博弈对策,建立了母子公司资本转移的博弈支付矩阵,并进一步分析了由此可能导致的多种博弈均衡结果。研究结果发现:以效率为目标的内部资本交易在加入了利益冲突的因素以后可能会异化为其它几种次优结果,并会带来整个社会的效率损失和公平侵害。
第三,尝试性地分析了利益冲突的影响因素,以进一步寻求相关的解决途径。企业集团中的内部资本市场可以看作是一个团队协作行为,协调利益冲突时既要发挥内部的自发协调性,也需要外部力量的介入。本文利用重复博弈中的可自我执行协议理论框架分析了促使有效交易达成的影响因素,试图了解在交易方自发博弈下最优交易状态可能实现的途径,在此基础上又进一步分析了外部法律规制对内部资本运作状态的影响和作用。
第四,对我国上市公司的内部资本交易行为进行了实证分析。在具体研究中通过选取适当的研究方法和计量指标,研究了三方面的内容。首先,通过分析内部资本交易与公司融投资行为之间的关系,从内部资本市场财务歧视的角度对我国上市公司的股权融资偏好行为做出了一个新的解释。其次,研究了内部资本交易的影响因素,发现上市公司的股权结构会显著影响到内部资本交易的发生情况。最后研究了不同类型内部资本交易对公司价值的影响,发现资产置换类型的内部交易会严重损害上市公司的价值。上述结论证明了控股母公司利用内部资本市场进行利益侵害行为的存在性,支持了前述的理论研究假设。
最后,对内部资本市场中的利益冲突及协调情况的现实情况进行了阐述,并提出了相关对策。在研究中笔者首先确定了协调内部资本市场利益冲突的两个目标:提高有效协作交易和减少利益冲突及侵害行为,然后分别从内部资本市场的内部自纠机制和外部制衡机制两方面详细探讨了协调内部利益冲突的多种手段。接着对当前世界各国主要集团类型中内部资本交易的治理情况进行了阐述分析,最后针对我国企业集团中的内部资本交易现状和协调机制提出了相关的政策建议。
通过以上的分析研究,文章总的结论是在内部资本市场中,由于成员企业不同的经营特征和复杂的利益动机,内部资本交易行为会导致成员企业之间的种种利益冲突行为。这种利益冲突会异化内部资本优化配置行为,并会带来效率损失和公平侵害的负面后果。因此应该从内部自纠机制和外部制衡机制两方面入手来协调内部资本市场中的利益冲突行为,减少利益侵害行为和内耗成本,提高企业集团的总合作剩余。
At present, in a mature market system or in the emerging market economy, enterprise groups are living in the mainstream forms of business organization and its production which occupies a pivotal position in all economies. At the same time, the internal capital markets are applicated widerly. Members of enterprises present capital transactions between each other leading by the group headquarters and achieve substantial residual collaboration : enhance effective investment; reduce the group's financing costs and improve the internal efficiency of the allocation of capital, and so on. At the same time, various phenomena indicate internal capital market would bring friction and conflict between members enterprises. As if holding large shareholders deprivate the subsidiaries. abusely investing parent corporation's assets, resources competition and internal friction between the member enterprises, which would lead to an increase in treatment costs and reduce the benefits of cooperation. Therefore, the internal capital market is like a "double-edged sword," people used its advantage of the system. have to consider how to coordinate its internal conflict of interest, reduced management costs and expanding relative returns. Thus the question of conflict of interest in the internal capital market should be studied and summed up theoretically.
In the past the internal capital market research, often using information economics paradigm to study the efficiency of the allocation of capital. The paper research the internal capital transactions from the conflict of interests between groups and the internal capital market organization costs are very fewer. So this paper's topics is the interest confliction and coordination in internal capital market .In the specific research the paper is followed by presenting problem, analyzing and solve problems, the study's core research includes the following four parts.
First of all, the paper reveals the interest conflict root arising from the internal capital market. The study research the internal capital market from the specific financial actions and uses optimal linear programming methods to establish financial and investment allocation models in the internal capital market. As different investment capacity in the members and the various complex transactions motivated exist, each member enterprises's financing and investment from the the internal capital market was not matching. There are financial discrimination against them and it will become a potential source of conflict of interest.
Second, this article has further analyzed the consequence of the interest conflicts.Through establisheing the essential parameter and analyzing the net income situation which the mother and child company as well as their payoff, the paper brings the gambling payment matrix and analyzes the many kinds of possible gambling balanced result.The findings discovered that the internal capitail traszation has been disassimilation for other results because of the interest conflicts and bring the entire social the efficiency loss and the fair violation.
Third, this article analyzes the influence factors to interest conflicts , in order to seeks the situation. In enterprise group's internal capital market may regard as is a team cooperation behavior and the interest conflicts coordination need internal spontaneous and exterior strength the involvement.Therefore this article analyzes the influence factor which the effective transaction achieved using the executive agreement theory frame. Finally, the paper analyzes the influence of the exterior legal rules and regulations to the internal capital market.
Fourth, the paper analyse empirically the internal capital transactions based on the listed companies in China and includes the three areas. Firstly, by analyzing the relation between the internal capital transactions and corporate finance and investment,we put forward an new interpretation to the financing preference behavior in China's listed companies from the perspective of the financial discrimination in the internal capital market. Secondly, we study the impact to the internal capital transactions and find that the shares of listed companies structure will significantly affect the internal capital transactions happened.Finally, we study the different types of internal capital transaction on the value of the company and find that the exchange of assets can seriously damage to the value of listed companies.
Finally, this paper presents the interest conflict coordination mechanisms of the internal capital markets. The study firstly the two objective of the coordination of internal capital markets conflicting interests: to improve and reduce the effective interest transactions conflict and abuse.Then we explore interest conflict coordinate various means from the internal corrections mechanism and external checks and balances mechanism .Then we annalyse capital transactions governance of the major groups in the current world. Finally we present the relevant policy recommendations to progress coordination mechanism of the internal capital transactions in China business groups.
Through the above analysis, the article conclusion are that the internal capital market will lead to member enterprises of various conflicts of interest because different enterprises operating characteristics and the complex interests motives. Therefore we should coordinate the internal capital market interest conflict acts from the internal balances mechanism and external checks mechanism to reduce interest costs and internal friction and enhance effective cooperation remaining.
引文
[1]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森:《资本主义经济制度》,第401页,北京,商务印书馆,2002。
[1]万良勇,《中国企业内部资本市场的功能、陷阱及其法律规制》,2006,11
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