我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题研究
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摘要
农业是一国经济的基础产业,在建设社会主义新农村和发展现代农业的背景下,政府高度重视农村土地承包经营权的流转。农村土地流转是优化我国农村土地资源配置、实现农业规模经营和提高农民收入的重要途径,也是进一步巩固和完善土地家庭承包经营制度、推动农业效益提升的必然要求。但是,我国当前农村土地流转还存在着流转程序不规范、农户利益受到侵害和市场化水平低等突出问题。
本文将委托代理理论引入农地流转分析,以此研究我国当前农村土地流转中存在的主要问题。在对我国农村土地流转现状进行研究的过程中,运用委托代理理论,对农户、农村集体经济组织和业主之间的关系进行认真分析,揭示我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题及其原因,提出了包括构建激励约束机制在内的相应的对策建议,以便促进我国农村土地的规范流转,从而推动农村经济的发展。
本文对我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题分析主要分为以下四个部分:
第一部分,提出本文的选题背景和研究意义,阐述相关理论基础。认为农村土地流转是完善和发展家庭承包经营责任制、推动现代农业发展的客观要求,将委托代理理论和农村土地流转结合起来,对研究制约我国农村土地流转发展的因素具有重要意义。本文以产权理论和委托代理理论为基础,以信息经济学理论中的委托人——代理人理论为框架,着重分析我国农村土地流转主体之间的委托代理关系以及激励约束机制的构建。
第二部分,分析我国农村土地流转中的委托代理关系。在对我国农村土地流转主体进行分析的基础上,指出农户、农村集体经济组织和非农业主之间存在着契约关系、信息不对称和利益结构不一致,三者之间确实存在着委托代理关系。在此基础上,着重对以农村集体经济组织为中介的委托代理关系这一类型进行分析研究。
第三部分,研究我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题。主要从委托代理问题的表现、原因和实证三个方面进行分析。指出集体经济组织与基层自治组织的重合性,导致集体经济组织常常会损害农户利益,而利益目标不一致,使得非农业主改变农地用途、侵害农民权益的情况也是屡见不鲜。同时,从激励约束机制不完善、专业性的中介组织缺失、政府角色定位不恰当和相关法律法规不完备等几个方面,分析委托代理问题产生的原因。最后运用主成分分析的方法,对我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题进行实证分析,为研究委托代理问题提供数据支持。
第四部分,提出解决我国农村土地流转委托代理问题的对策建议。针对以上部分的研究分析,分别从构建激励约束机制、培育市场化的中介组织、优化政府职能和完善法律法规等方面加以讨论,提出相应对策。并且根据信息经济学中的激励相容约束和参与约束思路,构建一个激励约束机制的简单模型。
Agriculture is a nation’s a fundamental industry. The circulation of the right of contracted management of rural land is highly valued by Chinese government under the new socialist countryside construction and modern agriculture development for the reason that cultivated land circulation plays an essential part in the optimized configuration of rural land resources, in the realization of scale managed agriculture and in the improvement of farmers’income. However problems still exists which include non-standard circulation progress, infringement of farmers’interests and rights, and low leveled marketization.
Into the analysis of land circulation this paper introduces principal-agent theory, based on which main issues on land circulation are studied in order to blaze new trails to promote circulation efficiency. In the investigation of current land circulating principal-agent theory is adopted to analyze the relationship among farmers, rural collective economic organizations and non-agricultural owners, reveal principal-agent issues on land circulation in China, and offer suggestions which involve establishing the incentive and restraining mechanism for the purpose of propelling standardized land circulating and promoting economic development.
This paper can be divided into four sectors.
The first part deals with theme background and significance, aiming at basic theories. Cultivated land circulation is an objective requirement of improving Household Contract Responsibility System and propelling modern agriculture. Adopting principal-agent theories into land circulation is of great significance in studying the constraints on Chinese rural land circulation. Taken the theoretic basis of property right theory and principal-agent theory and the framework of principal-agent theory which is specially used in information economics arguments, this paper makes analysis on the principal-agent relationship of entities in Chinese rural land circulation and establishes the incentive and restraining mechanism.
The second part works over the principal-agent relationship analysis, based on which an argument is put forward that principal-agent relationship really exists among farmers, rural collective economic organizations and non-agricultural owners due to the existence of the asymmetry of contract relations and information and inconformity of interest structure. Then different types of principal-agent relationship are listed, among which one that takes rural collective economic organizations as the intermediate agent was further studied.
The third part highlights principal-agent problem in land circulation from cases’phenomenon, causes and demonstrations. The coincidence of collective economic organizations and basic-level autonomous organizations often leads to the infringement of farmers rights while the inconformity of interests targets results in cultivated land conversion by the non-agricultural owner and rights infringement. Meanwhile the paper argues why principal-agent problem come into reality from several aspects which include imperfection of the incentive and restraining mechanism, lack of professional intermediate agents, inappropriateness of government role orientation and inadequacy of relevant laws and regulations. Then the paper presents a demonstration of a principal-agent problem in the land circulation by means of principal component analysis to provide data support for principal-agent issues studying.
The final part specifies the suggestions and solutions towards principal-agent problem on rural land circulation in China. Followed the analysis presented above, the suggestions may involved establishing principal-agent mechanism, encouraging marketing intermediate organizations, optimizing government capabilities and improving laws and regulations. Also in the paper an elementary model of incentive and restraining mechanism is conceived based on the information economics thinking of incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint.
本文将委托代理理论引入农地流转分析,以此研究我国当前农村土地流转中存在的主要问题。在对我国农村土地流转现状进行研究的过程中,运用委托代理理论,对农户、农村集体经济组织和业主之间的关系进行认真分析,揭示我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题及其原因,提出了包括构建激励约束机制在内的相应的对策建议,以便促进我国农村土地的规范流转,从而推动农村经济的发展。
本文对我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题分析主要分为以下四个部分:
第一部分,提出本文的选题背景和研究意义,阐述相关理论基础。认为农村土地流转是完善和发展家庭承包经营责任制、推动现代农业发展的客观要求,将委托代理理论和农村土地流转结合起来,对研究制约我国农村土地流转发展的因素具有重要意义。本文以产权理论和委托代理理论为基础,以信息经济学理论中的委托人——代理人理论为框架,着重分析我国农村土地流转主体之间的委托代理关系以及激励约束机制的构建。
第二部分,分析我国农村土地流转中的委托代理关系。在对我国农村土地流转主体进行分析的基础上,指出农户、农村集体经济组织和非农业主之间存在着契约关系、信息不对称和利益结构不一致,三者之间确实存在着委托代理关系。在此基础上,着重对以农村集体经济组织为中介的委托代理关系这一类型进行分析研究。
第三部分,研究我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题。主要从委托代理问题的表现、原因和实证三个方面进行分析。指出集体经济组织与基层自治组织的重合性,导致集体经济组织常常会损害农户利益,而利益目标不一致,使得非农业主改变农地用途、侵害农民权益的情况也是屡见不鲜。同时,从激励约束机制不完善、专业性的中介组织缺失、政府角色定位不恰当和相关法律法规不完备等几个方面,分析委托代理问题产生的原因。最后运用主成分分析的方法,对我国农村土地流转中的委托代理问题进行实证分析,为研究委托代理问题提供数据支持。
第四部分,提出解决我国农村土地流转委托代理问题的对策建议。针对以上部分的研究分析,分别从构建激励约束机制、培育市场化的中介组织、优化政府职能和完善法律法规等方面加以讨论,提出相应对策。并且根据信息经济学中的激励相容约束和参与约束思路,构建一个激励约束机制的简单模型。
Agriculture is a nation’s a fundamental industry. The circulation of the right of contracted management of rural land is highly valued by Chinese government under the new socialist countryside construction and modern agriculture development for the reason that cultivated land circulation plays an essential part in the optimized configuration of rural land resources, in the realization of scale managed agriculture and in the improvement of farmers’income. However problems still exists which include non-standard circulation progress, infringement of farmers’interests and rights, and low leveled marketization.
Into the analysis of land circulation this paper introduces principal-agent theory, based on which main issues on land circulation are studied in order to blaze new trails to promote circulation efficiency. In the investigation of current land circulating principal-agent theory is adopted to analyze the relationship among farmers, rural collective economic organizations and non-agricultural owners, reveal principal-agent issues on land circulation in China, and offer suggestions which involve establishing the incentive and restraining mechanism for the purpose of propelling standardized land circulating and promoting economic development.
This paper can be divided into four sectors.
The first part deals with theme background and significance, aiming at basic theories. Cultivated land circulation is an objective requirement of improving Household Contract Responsibility System and propelling modern agriculture. Adopting principal-agent theories into land circulation is of great significance in studying the constraints on Chinese rural land circulation. Taken the theoretic basis of property right theory and principal-agent theory and the framework of principal-agent theory which is specially used in information economics arguments, this paper makes analysis on the principal-agent relationship of entities in Chinese rural land circulation and establishes the incentive and restraining mechanism.
The second part works over the principal-agent relationship analysis, based on which an argument is put forward that principal-agent relationship really exists among farmers, rural collective economic organizations and non-agricultural owners due to the existence of the asymmetry of contract relations and information and inconformity of interest structure. Then different types of principal-agent relationship are listed, among which one that takes rural collective economic organizations as the intermediate agent was further studied.
The third part highlights principal-agent problem in land circulation from cases’phenomenon, causes and demonstrations. The coincidence of collective economic organizations and basic-level autonomous organizations often leads to the infringement of farmers rights while the inconformity of interests targets results in cultivated land conversion by the non-agricultural owner and rights infringement. Meanwhile the paper argues why principal-agent problem come into reality from several aspects which include imperfection of the incentive and restraining mechanism, lack of professional intermediate agents, inappropriateness of government role orientation and inadequacy of relevant laws and regulations. Then the paper presents a demonstration of a principal-agent problem in the land circulation by means of principal component analysis to provide data support for principal-agent issues studying.
The final part specifies the suggestions and solutions towards principal-agent problem on rural land circulation in China. Followed the analysis presented above, the suggestions may involved establishing principal-agent mechanism, encouraging marketing intermediate organizations, optimizing government capabilities and improving laws and regulations. Also in the paper an elementary model of incentive and restraining mechanism is conceived based on the information economics thinking of incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint.
引文
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[18]张新辉.准确把握农地流转中集体组织与农户间的委托代理关系[J].中共山西省委党校学报,2006,(29):91-93.
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[1]骆东奇,周于翔,姜文.基于农户调查的重庆市农村土地流转研究[J].中国土地科学,2009,(5):51
[1]约翰·穆勒.政治经济学原理[M].北京:商务印书馆,1991.
[2]巴泽尔.产权的经济分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1997.
[3]卢现祥.新制度经济学[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2004.
[4]孙佑海.土地流转制度研究[M].北京:中国大地出版社,2001.
[5]刘国臻.论我国土地利用管理制度改革[M].北京:人民法院出版社,2006.
[6]徐汉明.中国农民土地持有产权制度研究[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.
[7]汤敏,茅于轼.现代经济学前沿专题[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002.
[8]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2007.
[9]郝朝辉.农村土地流转问题的深层思考[J].农村经济,2005,(2):24-26.
[10]高杰.我国农村土地流转制度研究[D].吉林:吉林大学,2007.
[11]戴中亮.委托代理理论述评[J].商业研究,2004,(19):98-100.
[12]金晶,王颖.委托代理理论综述[J].中国商界,2008,(6):241.
[13]蔡玉胜.现阶段我国农地流转的六种典型模式及其适用性[J].调研世界,2009,(2):35-37.
[14]郭亮.土地流转的三个考察维度[J].调研世界,2009,(4):32-33.
[15]裴金波.上市公司治理中信息不对称问题探析[J].科技创业月刊,2005,(2):72-73.
[16]李霄.关于农村土地流转市场主体关系的经济学分析[J].商业经济,2004,(1):25-27
[17]董红,王有强.关于村民委员会职能的思考[J].调研世界,2009,(10):32-34.
[18]张新辉.准确把握农地流转中集体组织与农户间的委托代理关系[J].中共山西省委党校学报,2006,(29):91-93.
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