多视角的银行关闭策略研究
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摘要
对问题银行的关闭作为监管者防范金融危机而采取的市场退出监管的重要组成部分,有助于银行形成一种审慎经营的动力。通过制定和实施恰当的银行关闭策略可以减少安全网的负效应和社会福利的损失,提高整个银行和金融体系的稳定和效率。法律法规、社会文化、经济效率和市场纪律都会直接或间接地影响监管者的银行关闭策略。
本文从特许权价值、银行信息披露行为、委托-代理问题和系统性风险四个视角研究了监管者的银行关闭策略:(1)特许权价值的存在可以在一定程度上促使银行减少风险承担和增加资本水平。在社会福利最大化的目标下,对于具有较大特许权价值的问题银行,监管者应采取较为宽容的关闭策略。(2)在银行不披露有关其经营状况真实信息的情况下,监管者可以通过设计审计策略来监督银行。虽然监管者事后最优的关闭策略取决于银行的经营成果,但是从事前的角度看,监管者必须权衡银行操纵信息对社会福利造成的损失和其对银行进行审计的成本,并根据总的福利影响选择相应的关闭策略。(3)银行内部股东-经理间委托-代理关系会影响银行最终表现出来的行为,通过恰当的银行关闭策略和对银行经理管理租金的干预,监管者可以限制股东对经理承担过度风险的激励,从而减少社会福利的损失。另一方面,监管者是由具体的理性经济人构成的,可能会出于自身声誉等考虑拖延对问题银行的关闭,故还应加强对具体监管人员的激励和约束,使其做出较为公正的关闭决策。(4)系统风险下的银行关闭策略不同于仅考虑单个代表银行下的关闭策略。从传染性系统风险看,监管者的银行关闭策略应在关闭与宽容、救助间进行权衡。合理的审计放松,可以在一定程度上起到事前威慑和事后稳定的作用。在银行体系遭受宏观经济打击的情况下,监管者应采取一种弹性的关闭策略。
我国现有银行关闭中存在着政府干预过多等问题,在银行关闭策略的设计和实施上存在着由产权制度缺陷等带来的难点问题。因此,现阶段我国监管者可以对国有商业银行采取一种有透明度的监管宽容策略。对中小商业银行则可以采取事前承诺较严格的关闭标准,而在事后根据具体情况适当放宽标准的策略。此外,还应从深化金融体制改革等方面建立提高我国银行关闭效率的保障措施。
The closure of problem bank as the important constituent of the regulator's positive market withdrawal supervising which adopts for the guard of finance crisis, is incentive for the bank under the information asymmetrical environment to form the prudential operation. The appropriate closure strategy may reduce the negative effect that the safety net brings, reduce the social welfare losses, and enhance the stable and efficiency of the entire bank industry and the financial system. The legal laws and regulations, the social culture, the economic efficiency and the market discipline may directly or indirectly affects the strategy of the bank closure.From the view of the franchise value, the bank information disclosure behavior, the principal-agent problem, and the systematic risk, this article systematically and thoroughly study the closure strategy of the problem bank: (1) The franchise value may cause the bank to reduce the risk which it undertakes and increase its capital level. Therefore under the social welfare maximization goal, the franchise value is bigger; the bank closure strategy should be looser. (2) Under the situation of the bank's manipulation of the real information, the regulator could design the audit strategy. The ex-ante closure strategy may not consistency with ex-post closure strategy. Because the ex-ante optimal strategy is depending on the social welfare, the ex-post optimal strategy is decided by the bank's operation achievement. (3) The regulator should consider the principal-agent problem in and out of the bank. The bank closure strategy should consider the intervention of the bank manager's managerial rents to limit the incentive, which the shareholder drives to the manager to undertake excessively the risk. On the other hand, the regulator is constituted by the concrete rational economic men, who may delay the problem bank closure from their own prestige, therefore it should give them some incentive and restrain in order to cause them make fair closure decision. (4) The bank closure strategy under the banking system risk is different from the condition under the consideration of an individually representative bank. Looking from the infectious system risk, the bank closure strategy should trade-off between closure and forbearance or rescue. Under the situation, which the bank system was suffered by a macro-economical attack, the regulator should adopt an elastic closure strategy.There are many problem in our country's existing bank closure, such as government intervenes too much etc, and also many difficult question in our bank closure strategy such as the property right system flaw etc. At present, it should carry on transparency forbearance to the state-owned commercial bank. To the middle and small commercial bank, it may adopt a strict closure policy from an ex-ante standpoint and may relax it ex-post. It should deepen finance organizational reform etc. in order to enhance the efficiency of our country's bank closure strategy.
本文从特许权价值、银行信息披露行为、委托-代理问题和系统性风险四个视角研究了监管者的银行关闭策略:(1)特许权价值的存在可以在一定程度上促使银行减少风险承担和增加资本水平。在社会福利最大化的目标下,对于具有较大特许权价值的问题银行,监管者应采取较为宽容的关闭策略。(2)在银行不披露有关其经营状况真实信息的情况下,监管者可以通过设计审计策略来监督银行。虽然监管者事后最优的关闭策略取决于银行的经营成果,但是从事前的角度看,监管者必须权衡银行操纵信息对社会福利造成的损失和其对银行进行审计的成本,并根据总的福利影响选择相应的关闭策略。(3)银行内部股东-经理间委托-代理关系会影响银行最终表现出来的行为,通过恰当的银行关闭策略和对银行经理管理租金的干预,监管者可以限制股东对经理承担过度风险的激励,从而减少社会福利的损失。另一方面,监管者是由具体的理性经济人构成的,可能会出于自身声誉等考虑拖延对问题银行的关闭,故还应加强对具体监管人员的激励和约束,使其做出较为公正的关闭决策。(4)系统风险下的银行关闭策略不同于仅考虑单个代表银行下的关闭策略。从传染性系统风险看,监管者的银行关闭策略应在关闭与宽容、救助间进行权衡。合理的审计放松,可以在一定程度上起到事前威慑和事后稳定的作用。在银行体系遭受宏观经济打击的情况下,监管者应采取一种弹性的关闭策略。
我国现有银行关闭中存在着政府干预过多等问题,在银行关闭策略的设计和实施上存在着由产权制度缺陷等带来的难点问题。因此,现阶段我国监管者可以对国有商业银行采取一种有透明度的监管宽容策略。对中小商业银行则可以采取事前承诺较严格的关闭标准,而在事后根据具体情况适当放宽标准的策略。此外,还应从深化金融体制改革等方面建立提高我国银行关闭效率的保障措施。
The closure of problem bank as the important constituent of the regulator's positive market withdrawal supervising which adopts for the guard of finance crisis, is incentive for the bank under the information asymmetrical environment to form the prudential operation. The appropriate closure strategy may reduce the negative effect that the safety net brings, reduce the social welfare losses, and enhance the stable and efficiency of the entire bank industry and the financial system. The legal laws and regulations, the social culture, the economic efficiency and the market discipline may directly or indirectly affects the strategy of the bank closure.From the view of the franchise value, the bank information disclosure behavior, the principal-agent problem, and the systematic risk, this article systematically and thoroughly study the closure strategy of the problem bank: (1) The franchise value may cause the bank to reduce the risk which it undertakes and increase its capital level. Therefore under the social welfare maximization goal, the franchise value is bigger; the bank closure strategy should be looser. (2) Under the situation of the bank's manipulation of the real information, the regulator could design the audit strategy. The ex-ante closure strategy may not consistency with ex-post closure strategy. Because the ex-ante optimal strategy is depending on the social welfare, the ex-post optimal strategy is decided by the bank's operation achievement. (3) The regulator should consider the principal-agent problem in and out of the bank. The bank closure strategy should consider the intervention of the bank manager's managerial rents to limit the incentive, which the shareholder drives to the manager to undertake excessively the risk. On the other hand, the regulator is constituted by the concrete rational economic men, who may delay the problem bank closure from their own prestige, therefore it should give them some incentive and restrain in order to cause them make fair closure decision. (4) The bank closure strategy under the banking system risk is different from the condition under the consideration of an individually representative bank. Looking from the infectious system risk, the bank closure strategy should trade-off between closure and forbearance or rescue. Under the situation, which the bank system was suffered by a macro-economical attack, the regulator should adopt an elastic closure strategy.There are many problem in our country's existing bank closure, such as government intervenes too much etc, and also many difficult question in our bank closure strategy such as the property right system flaw etc. At present, it should carry on transparency forbearance to the state-owned commercial bank. To the middle and small commercial bank, it may adopt a strict closure policy from an ex-ante standpoint and may relax it ex-post. It should deepen finance organizational reform etc. in order to enhance the efficiency of our country's bank closure strategy.
引文
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